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The right to education is entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. The Constitution, together with various policy 
documents, provides guiding principles for the transformation of higher 
education in South Africa. Several universities were placed under 
administration, before and after the attainment of democracy in South 
Africa. The independent assessors reports on these institutions have one 
thing in common, namely that they point out poor administration and 
ineffective corporate governance practices.  Despite many commendable 
initiatives by Government since 1994 to improve an apparently flawed 
higher education system, some aspects could be enhanced further, 
especially concerning corporate governance and governance 
accountability. 
 
Council members and the executive management of higher education 
institutions are subject to common law fiduciary duties and duties of care 
and skill.  However, their accountability for breaches of these duties is not 
always clear and is seldom enforced.  There is a need to balance effective 
accountability and the exercise of discretionary powers that are integral to 
effective governance and management. This thesis considers how 
corporate governance and compliance in higher education can be improved 
further, taking into account various legislative changes to the Higher 
Education Act 101 of 1997, direction provided by the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 and the Banks Act 94 of 1990 in respect of the regulation of directors’ 
duties. An in-depth investigation into the relevant provisions of these Acts 
was not intended nor undertaken. Rather, the thesis draws from these Acts 
so that the problems concerning corporate governance in the higher 
education sector may be dealt with. 
 
The regulation of higher education in the foreign jurisdiction of the State of 
Georgia in the United States of America and in the Canadian province of 
Ontario was also considered. Based on the research undertaken, specific 
amendments are proposed to the Higher Education Act of 1997 and the 
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Regulations for Reporting by Public Higher Education Institutions 2014, 
which are aimed at improving governance accountability and compliance in 
higher education. 
 
Keywords: institutional autonomy; corporate governance; co-operative 
governance; government interventions; higher education institutions; public 































Die reg op onderwys word in die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-
Afrika 1996 verskans. Riglyne vir die transformasie van hoër onderwys in 
Suid-Afrika word in die Grondwet en verskeie ander beleidsdokumente 
vervat. Voordat en nadat ‘Suid-Afrika demokraties geword het, is verskeie 
universiteite onder administrasie geplaas. Luidens die onafhanklike 
assessore se verslae, het hierdie instellings een ding gemeen gehad: swak 
administrasie en ondoeltreffende korporatiewe regering. Ondanks talle 
prysenswaardige stappe van die regering sedert 1994 om die probleme in 
die hoëronderwysstelsel te ondervang, kan bepaalde aspekte steeds 
verbeter, in die besonder korporatiewe regering en regeeraanspreeklikheid. 
 
Raadslede en lede van die uitvoerende besture van 
hoëronderwysinstellings is verplig om hulle gemeenregtelike fidusiêre pligte 
en hulle sorgvuldigheids- en kundigheidsplig na te kom. Hulle 
verantwoordingspligtigheid in geval van pligsversuim is egter dikwels vaag 
en word selde afgedwing. Die juiste ewewig moet gevind word tussen 
doeltreffende verantwoordingspligtigheid en die uitoefening van 
diskresionêre magte wat onlosmaaklik deel is van doeltreffende 
korporatiewe regering en bestuur.  
 
In hierdie tesis word gekyk hoe korporatiewe regering en nakoming in hoër 
onderwys verbeter kan word met inagneming van verskeie wysigings van 
die Wet op Hoër Onderwys 101 van 1997, riglyne in die Maatskappywet 71 
van 2008 en in die Bankwet 94 van 1990 aangaande die pligte van 
direkteure. Geen grondige ondersoek na die toepaslike bepalings in hierdie 
wette is beoog of gedoen nie. Hulle word eerder gebruik om oplossings vir 
die probleme met korporatiewe regering in hoër onderwys te vind. 
 
Hoe hoër onderwys in die Amerikaanse deelstaat Georgia en die Kanadese 
provinsie Ontario gereël word, is eweneens in ag geneem. Wysigings van 
die Wet op Hoër Onderwys van 1997 en die Regulations for Reporting by 
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Public Higher Education Institutions 2014, wat poog om 
verantwoordingspligtigheid en voldoening in hoër onderwys te verbeter, 
word voorgestel. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: instellingsoutonomie; korporatiewe regering; 
samewerkende bestuur, regeringsingryping; hoëronderwysinstellings; 
publieke aanspreeklikheid; fidusiêre pligte, persoonlike aanspreeklikheid, 





























Ilungelo lokufunda liqukethwe uMthethosisekelo woMbuso waseNingizimu 
Afrika, wangonyaka ka 1996. UMthethosisekelo, kanye neminye imibhalo 
eyahlukahlukene yemigomo, inikeza umhlahlandlela wemigomo 
yokuguqulwa kwamaziko emfundo ephakeme eNingizimu Afrika. 
Amanyuvesi ahlukahlukene amiswa futhi, ngaphambili nangemuva 
kokuthola idemokhrasi eNingizimu Afrika. Imibiko yabaphenyi  
bamanyuvesi abazimele inophawu olufanayo, lokuthi iveza ukungahanjiswa 
kahle kohlelo lokuphatha kanye nokungalandelwa kwezingqubo zokuphatha 
amabhizinisi. Yize kunemizamo eminingi encomekayo evela uHulumeni 
kusukela ngonyaka ka 1994, imizamo yokuthuthukisa uhlelo lwemfundo 
ephakeme olwehlulekayo, ezinye zezimpawu zaqhubeka nokuqiniswa, 
ikakhulu lezo ezimayelana nokuphathwa kwamaziko kanye 
nokuziphendulela kwamaziko.  
 
Amalungu omkhandlu kanye nesigungu sabaphathi bamaziko emfundo 
ephakeme bayaphoqeleka ukulandela umthetho ngokuthi benze imisebenzi 
ngokuthembeka okuyimisebenzi emayelana nokunakekela kanye 
namakhono okusebenza. Yize-kunjalo, ukuziphendulela kwabo uma 
bephula imithetho kaningi akucaci kahle kanti le mithetho ayivamisile 
ukuqiniswa. Kunesidingo sokulinganisa uhlelo olusebenzayo 
lokuziphendulela kanye nokusebenzisa amandla okuphatha onikezwe 
wona, okungamandla ayinsika ekuqiniseni uhlelo lokuhanjiswa kahle 
kwamaziko kanye nokuphathwa. Le thesis iqonde ekutheni ngabe uhlelo 
lokuphathwa kwamaziko kanye nokulandelwa kwemithetho emazikweni 
emfundo aphakeme kungathuthukiswa kanjani, uma kubhekwa izinguquko 
zomthetho ezahlukahlukene, kuMthetho 101 weMfundo Ephakeme ka 1997, 
uma kubhekwa indlela enikezwa uMthetho 71 weziNkampani ka 2008 
kanye noMthetho 94 wamaBhange ka 1990 mayelana nomthetho 
wemisebenzi yabaqondisi. Akukaze kube nenhloso futhi kwenziwe uphenyo 
olujulile mayelana nemithetho efanele yale Mithetho. Kunalokho, ithesisi 
yencike phezu kwaleMithetho ukuze  izinkinga ezimayelana nokuphathwa 




Umthetho wemfundo ephakeme esiyingini somthetho sangaphandle se-
State of Georgia ngase-United States of America kanye nasesifundazweni 
saseCanada ngase-Ontario nawo uye wabhekwa. Ngenxa yocwaningo 
olwenziwe, sekuye kwaphakanyiswa ukuthi kube nezinguquke ezithile 
eMthethweni weMfundo ePhakeme ka 1997 kanye naseMithethweni  
yokuBika yamaZiko eMfundo ePhakeme oMphakathi ka 2014, 
okuyimithetho ehlose ukuthuthukisa izinga lokuphatha 
okunokuziphendulela kanye nokulandela umthetho wemfundo ephakeme.  
 
Amagama asemqoka: Igunya lokuziphatha; uhlelo lokuphathwa 
kwamaziko; uhlelo lokuphatha ngokuhlanganyela; imizamo kahulumeni 
yokutakula isimo; amaziko emfundo ephakeme; ukuziphendulela 
emphakathini; ukwenzaq imisebenzi ngokuthembeka; ukuphoqeleleka 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
RELATING TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1.1 Introduction  
 
This study focuses on inadequate corporate governance practices and the 
absence of adequate accountability measures for breaches of their duties 
by Council members and executive management. Inadequate governance 
practices were pointed out in the independent assessors’ reports, of 
several public higher education institutions that had been placed under 
administration after the attainment of democracy in South Africa. 1 Some of 
these institutions have been placed under administration more than once. 
The independent assessors’ reports revealed some common perceptions: 
Councils were having difficulties in providing oversight and direction as well 
as taking responsibility for the overall governance of their institutions as 
required by the Higher Education Act of 1997;2 the inability of both the 
Councils and the Vice-Chancellors of individual institutions to discharge 
their fiduciary duties towards their institutions; ineffective senior 
management, including the Vice-Chancellor of certain institutions; fraud 
and tender corruption; conflicts of interest between  Council members and 
the procurement of services for the university; financial mismanagement; 
and unfair remuneration practices. It was also clear that there is insufficient 
accountability for members of executive management who allowed 
fraudulent behaviour or made decisions to the detriment of the institution.     
 
The objective of the research is to review the South African higher 
education environment before and after the attainment of democracy, to 
compare corporate governance practices and accountability in South Africa 
 
1 These fa i lures in  governance ar e d iscussed  more ful ly  in  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  be low.  
 
2 Section  27 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997 .  
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and selected foreign jurisdictions, and to consider guidelines provided by 
some South African statutes aimed at enhancing governance practices in  
other sectors. Based on this research, amendments to the Higher 
Education Act 101 of 19973 as well as the Regulations for Reporting by 
Public Higher Education Institutions4 are proposed to improve regulatory 
governance practices and to strengthen accountability for their breaches in 
the higher education sector. 
 
As stated above, the focus of this research will be to investigate corporate 
governance practices in public higher education institutions. It is, therefore, 
essential to understanding what constitutes corporate governance. There is 
no single or specific definition of corporate governance.5 The Fourth King 
Code of Corporate Governance (King IV) defines it as “the exercise of 
ethical and effective leadership by the governing body towards the 
achievement of the following governance outcomes – ethical culture; good 
performance; effective control and legitimacy.”6  
 
1.1.2 Governance framework for public higher education institutions 
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997, together with the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations, and the institutional statute of each institution are the primary 
 
3 Here inaf ter  refer red to  as the Higher  Educat ion  Act of  1997.  
 
4 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  37726 (GN. 588)  9  Jun ie 2014.   Hereinaf te r  referred to  as the  
2014 Report ing  Regulat ions.  See  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  be low for  a  discussion  on these  
regula t ions.  
 
5 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 . 4 .1  below for  a  discussion on corpora te governance in  general .  
The HIH Royal Commission  (Owen Repor t) ,  af ter  the col lapse  of  HIH In surance l imi ted 
def ine corpora te governance as fol lows: "Corpora te governance  descr ibes the 
framework of  rules,  re la t ionships ,  sys tems and processes wi thin and by which au thori ty  
is  exercised  and contro l led in  corporat ions.   In  l ight  of  this  def in i t ion,  th e express ion  
"corpora te governance" embraces no t  only the models or  systems themselves but  a lso  
the prac tices by which that  exercise,  and con tro l  of  authori ty  are af fec ted.  See also Du 
Pless is  J  e t  al .  Princip les o f  Contemporary  Corporate  Governance  3 r d  ed (Cambridge  
Univers i ty  Press 2015)  4  -  5 .  
 




documents that govern higher education institutions, including universities. 7 
A higher education institution is a juristic person established in terms of 
section 20(4) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 and is governed by a 
Council established in terms of section 27, as well  as the institution's 
institutional statute in terms of section 33 of the Act. 8  The Council is the 
highest decision-making body of a public higher education institution. The 
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) is the custodian of 
public higher education institutions9 while the institution’s executive 
management is tasked with its daily operations, administration and 
management.10    
 
Chapter 4 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for governance of 
public higher education institutions. However, it does not provide for a 
standard of conduct for Council members and members of executive 
management.11  It also does not provide for the removal of Council 
members or declaring a Council member delinquent in certain 
circumstances.  In the author's view, the Higher Education Act of 1997 
lacks accountability measures and should be addressed. 







7 The Higher  Education  Act  of  1997 i s  d iscussed  in  de tai l  in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .3 .  
 
8 Any reference to  h igher  education ins t i tut ion wi thin th is thesis refers specif ica l ly  to  a  
public  univers i ty .  Higher  Educat ion also inc ludes  Fur ther  Educat ion  and Train ing 
(FET)  co lleges.  This,  however ,  might  change  with  the  in troduction  of  the Whi te  Paper  
for  Post-School Education Systems (hereinaf ter  referred  to  as the 2014  Whi te  Paper ) .   
This research wi l l  be l imited  to  un iversi t ies only.  
 
9There  are  a lso  o ther  externa l  s takeholders l ike the example,  the  Council  of  Higher  
Educat ion (CHE) is  discussed in  Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .3 .1  be low.  
 
10 The legis lat ive framewor k of  a  publ ic  higher  educat ion inst i tu t ion i s  d iscussed more  
ful ly  in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .1  below.  
11 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .3  for  a  d iscuss ion on the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997.  
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1.1.3 Relevant company law and corporate governance 
 
In terms of section 66 of the Companies Act of 2008, the board of directors 
of a company is responsible for its management. 12 The Companies Act of 
2008 provides for stringent accountability measures for directors in the 
form of a standard of conduct, which for the first time, includes partially 
codified fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill. 13 Apart from the 
latter duties, the Companies Act of 2008 also provides for the removal of 
directors, liability for breaches by directors as well as declaring a director 
delinquent.14  The Higher Education Act of 1997 does not prescribe similar 
provisions, although the common law fiduciary duties apply to Council 
members. The provisions contained in the Companies Act of 2008 enhance 
accountability at board level.  There is significant case law where directors 
were held personally liable for their breaches of fiduciary duties and where 
it was confirmed that fraudulent and reckless trading by executives would 
not be tolerated.15 However, there is no known case law where a Council 
member of a higher education institution was found to have contravened 
his/her breach of fiduciary duty and was accordingly held personally liable.  
 
Further to the Companies Act of 2008, the fourth iteration of the King Code 
of Corporate Governance (King IV)16 is considered as well as the Banks Act 
94 of 1990.17 This study reviews relevant legislative changes to the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 and investigates how this Act can be amended 
further to improve governance practices at public higher education 
 
12 Here inaf ter  referred to  as the Companies Act of  2008.  
13 The f iduc iary dut ies and the  duty of  care and  ski l l  are  discussed in  more deta i l  in  
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2 .5  and 4.2 .6  be low.  
14 These prov is ions  are discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .8 ,  4 .2 .9  and 4.2 .10 below.  
15 See for  ins tance Fourie  v  Firs t  Rand Bank Ltd  (2013)  (1)  SA 204 ( SC) ;  Volvo v Ysse l  
(247/08)[2009]  ZASCA.  See in  genera l ,  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  be low.  
 
16 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  below for  a  discussion on King IV.  
 
17 Here inaf ter  referred to  as the Banks Act of  1990; see Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .3  for  a  
discuss ion on the Banks  A ct of  1990.  
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institutions.  The study considers explicitly whether specific duties and 
liabilities of Council members and executive management should be 
included in the Higher Education Act of 1997 to ensure effective 
accountability. Furthermore, the study investigates whether specific 
provisions relating to corporate governance and enhanced accountability 
contained in the Companies Act of 2008  as well as the Banks Act of 1990 
can inform the Higher Education Act of 1997.18  
 
1.1.4 Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1997 
 
Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1997 brought about by the 
Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act 23 of 2012 raised 
several concerns.19 Various higher education stakeholders20 believed that 
these amendments would have a negative impact on the continued 
institutional autonomy21 as well as academic freedom22 of higher education 
institutions. The Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 
2012 introduced new sections23 and amended existing sections24 that 
 
18 These recommendat ions  are made in  Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3  and 6.4  be low.  
19 Hereinaf ter  referred to  as  the Higher  E ducation Amendment  and Training  Laws 
Amendment Act  of  2012 .  
 
20 These s takeholders i nclude  the  Vice -Chancel lors  of  public  h igher  educ at ion 
ins t i tut ion;  Universi t ies  South Afr ica and  the  Council  for  Higher  Educat ion (CHE);  
var ious submiss ions  to  th is  fact  were  made to  Par l iament.  See 
https: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /14944/  (Date of  use :  3  December 2019) .   Also,  
see  Rensburg I  "Regula tory Overki l l  Threatens  Academic Autonomy in  South Afr ica"  
Business Day  (date  published :  31 January 2013);  Gray BL “Despi te  These Many 
Challenges:  The Textua l  Construct ion of  Autonomy of  a  Corpora t ised  South  Afr ican 
Univers i ty”  2017(21)  Education as Change  1  –  21.  
 
21 Refers  to  a  degree  of  self - regulat ion and  independen ce of  a  higher  educat ion  
ins t i tut ion in  fu lf i l l ing  i t s  day - to-day educat ional  and academic ob ligations (Green  
Paper  of  1996,  Chapter  1  -  para 4 .6) .   See the d iscuss ion in  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .2  below 
regarding inst i tu t ional  autonomy, public  accountabil i ty  and  coopera tive  governance .  
 
22.  This impl ies the absence of  ou tside  in terference and obstac les in  the prac tice of  
academic work (Green Paper ,  of  1996 ,  chap ter  1  -  paragraph  4.6) .  
 
23 Sect ions 45A and  B and 49A -  E  of  the  Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997.  These sec t ions  
were fur ther  amended by the Higher  Educ at ion  Amendment Act 9  of  2016.  The la t ter  




changed the independent assessor process 25 into a legal process, instead 
of allowing the assessor to do a general investigation of the circumstances 
of the institution in question.26  Prior to these amendments, the independent 
assessor's mandate was relatively straightforward: he or she had to 
investigate the public university concerned, report the findings in writing to 
the Minister and suggest appropriate measures. 27 The Higher Education 
and Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012 extended the Minister’s powers 
and simplified the process through which the Government can place a 
university under administration, thereby threatening institutional 
autonomy.28 In terms of the new sections,29 the Minister may issue directives 
and dissolve a university’s Council.30    
 
In the author's view, one of the reasons for enacting the Higher Education 
and Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012 was due to all the governance-
related problems facing public higher education institutions. These 
problems were highlighted in the various independent assessors' reports 
for the institutions that were placed under administration in a relatively 
 
24Sections 27  and  47 of  the  Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997.   Subsequently ,  th is  was  
amended by the Hig her  Education Amendment Act 9  of  2016.  The la t ter  Act is  
descr ibed in  more de ta i l  in  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4 .2  below.  
 
25Independent asse ssors are appoin ted  by the  Minis ter  to  invest igate  and  repor t  on  
al legat ions of  misconduct  a t  a  un iversi ty  in  terms of  s  45A  of  the Higher  Education Act 
of  1997.  
 
26 The Counci l  of  Higher  Educat ion "Submission on the Higher  Educat ion  and Train ing 
Laws Amendment Bil l  t o  the Por tfol io  Commit tee on Higher  Educat ion  and Train ing" 
October  2012 at  3 .   These amendments are discussed in  more detai l  in  Chapter  3 ,  para  
3 .4  below.  
 
27 Section  47 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997  
 
28 Sect ions 49A-E of  the  Higher  Educat ion Amendment  and Tra ining  Laws Amendment  
Act  of  2012.  
 
29 Sect ions 49A-E of  the  Higher  Educat ion Amendment  and Tra ining  Laws Amendment  
Act  of  2012.  
 




short period.31 The DHET attempted to address these inadequacies by 
proposing legislative changes to the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. As 
mentioned above, the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act  
of 2012 has caused a considerable reaction within the higher education 
environment.32  According to the Council of Higher Education (CHE), 33 
Universities South Africa (USAf), as well as other individual higher 
education institutions,34 they were not adequately consulted and provided 
with the opportunity to make recommendations before the promulgation of 
the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012.  Since 
the enactment of the said Act, the DHET met with various stakeholders to 
discuss their fears and to discuss possible amendments to address these 
concerns.35 These consultations resulted in the promulgation of the Higher 
Education Amendment Act 9 of 2016.36  The Higher Education Amendment 
Act of 2016 clarified certain of the issues raised by the Higher Education 
and Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012. However, not all issues were 




31 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  below for  a  discuss ion on the universi t ies tha t  were  p laced 
under  administrat ion.  
 
32 The Univers i ty  of  Pre tor ia ,  Central  Univers i ty  of  Technology (Free State) ,  Council  
for  Higher  Educat ion (CHE);  Higher  Educat ion South Afr ica (HESA) made submiss ions 
before  the enac tment of  the  Bil l ,  and o ther  univers i t ies l ike  the  Universi ty  of  
Johannesburg reac ted only af te rwards as  they were no t  aware tha t  the Bi l l  had been  
published for  commentary.  
 
33 Confirmed in  the ir  submiss ion to  the  Portfo l io  Committee  on  Higher  Educat ion and  
Train ing in  October  2012.  
 
34 For  ins tance,  the  Central  Univers i ty  of  Technology and Durban  Univers i ty  of  
Technology; see Nkosi  B “Univers i t ies round on Nzimande and his Higher  Education  
Amendment Bi l l”  2012-11-19 Mail  & Guardian .  Adv.  Jeremy Gauntlet t  a lso conf irmed  
i t  in  an op inion he prepared for  UCT on 13 February 2013.   
 
35 See Higher  Educat ion  Amendmen t  Bi l l  (B36 -2015)  br ie f ing by  the Depar tment o f  
Higher  Educat ion  and Train ing  h ttps: / /pmg.org.za/committee -meet ing/21947/  (Date o f  
use :  22 November  2018) .  
 




However, it is the author's opinion that further changes to the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 are necessary to ensure optimal governance and 
compliance by public higher education institutions. This study aims to 
provide relevant recommendations to ensure the improvement of 
governance and compliance practices in South African public higher 
education institutions. Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1997 as 
well as the 2014 Reporting Regulations are therefore recommended to 
assist universities in addressing accountability and governance 
shortcomings in public higher education institut ions. 
 
1.1.5 International comparison 
 
The research also includes an international comparison with higher 
education regulation in the jurisdictions of the State of Georgia, United 
States of America (USA) and the province of Ontario, Canada.  There are 
several reasons for the inclusion of these jurisdictions: the autonomous 
relationship between the government and these institutions; the legislation 
applicable to these institutions; and the type of policies, procedures and 
programmes they have in place to enhance corporate governance and 
accountability. Various legislative instruments in both jurisdictions are 
considered with the view of recommending the inclusion of similar 
provisions in the South African Higher Education Act of 1997. The public 
higher education institutions in these jurisdictions are incorporated as 
corporations, and there are some similarities between the corporate laws of 
these jurisdictions and provisions contained in the South African 
Companies Act of 2008. This also points out the extent to which they may 
assist corporate governance practices in South African public higher 




37 These inte rnat ional  jur i sdict ions and thei r  leg is lat ion are d iscussed in  more deta i l  i n  




1.1.6 Rationale and problem statement 
 
The general introduction in par 1.1.1 above provides the background and 
rationale for the study and puts the problem statement and guiding 
research question into proper context. The problem statement underpinning 
this research is that corporate governance practices and their consequence 
management in South African higher education could be improved. 38 It 
seems that management decisions are not always in the best interests of 
the university nor aligned with acceptable corporate governance practices. 
Inadequate corporate governance practices at various higher education 
institutions have led to several institutions being placed under 
administration in recent years.39 The independent assessors’ reports of 
these institutions indicate that there is an urgent need to improve 
governance practices in public higher education institutions.40 Although the 
DHET has implemented various changes to the Higher Education Act of 
1997 to improve governance practices at public higher education 
institutions,41 these legislative changes have been perceived as a threat to 
institutional autonomy by various higher education stakeholders. 42 This 
research considers the concept of institutional autonomy and assesses, 
 
38 Severa l  un iversi t ies  were placed  under  adminis trat ion before  and  af ter  the advent  of  
democracy,  one of  them more  than once.   Currently ,  one  publ ic  univers i ty  i s  involved 
in  l i t iga t ion  aga inst  a  senior  member  of  management  as well  as i t s  former chairperson.   
This i s  d iscussed in  deta i l  in  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  below.  
 
39 These  inc lude  the Univers i ty  of  Zulul and;  Walter  Sisulu  Universi ty;  Vaal  Universi ty  
of  Technology; and the Tshwane Univers i ty  of  Technology.   The independent 
assessors’  repor ts for  these  inst i tu t ions a l l  indica te ins tances of  governance fai l ings  
and mismanagement.   See in  genera l ,  Stumpf ,  R “ Analysis of  recent  assessor  repor ts of  
universi t ies in  SA” HESA Ju ly 2012 (unpublished report) .  
 
40 The  var ious  univers i t ies p laced u nder  admin is t rat ion  are d iscussed in  Chapter  3 ,  para  
3 .3 .2  below.  
 
41 These amendments a re discussed  in  chap ter  3 ,  para 3 .4  b elow.  The  Higher  Educat ion 
Act  of  1997 i s  d iscussed  more ful ly  in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .3  be low.  
 
42 The  Vice-Chancel lors  of  the var io us  publ ic  h igher  education  inst i tu t ions;  CHE and  
USAf,  see  Rensburg I  “Regula tory Overki l l  Threatens Academic Autonomy in  So uth 
Africa”  2013-01-31  Business  Day  Du Toit  A “Revisi t ing  ‘Co -opera tive Governance’  in  
Higher  Educat ion” 2014  Higher  Education  South  Africa 1 –  2 ;  Gaunt le t t  J  Opinion to  
UCT on the Higher  Educat ion Tra ining and Amendment Act 23 of  2012 (18 February  




whether recent legislative interventions indeed threaten it. The Higher 
Education Act of 1997 promises autonomy to institutions in its preamble by 
stating that "… for higher education institutions to enjoy freedom and 
autonomy in their relationship with the State within the context of public 
accountability and the national need for advanced skills and scientific 
knowledge.”43 It was during 2012 with the promulgation of the Higher 
Education and Training Laws Amendment Act 23 of 2012 that the various 
higher education stakeholders indicated that these amendments might 
constitute a threat to institutional autonomy.44 These amendments provide 
the Minister with more powers to dissolve a public higher education 
institution's Council and place it under administration. This research 
investigates whether these amendments genuinely threaten institutional 
autonomy or whether there is a justifiable reason for the amendment.    
 
This thesis interrogates the corporate governance practices in South 
African higher education institutions relating to governance accountability 
and determines whether they can be regarded as adequate. These issues 
are investigated concerning relevant company and banking law guidelines 
as well as governance practices in selected international higher education 
jurisdictions.45   
 
1.1.7 Points of departure, assumptions and hypothesis 
 
As a point of departure, the pre-1994 South African higher education 
landscape is briefly reviewed to indicate the fragmentation of higher 
education during that period.46 This is followed by a description of the 
 
43 Ins t i tu t ional  autonomy is d iscussed in  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .2 .1  be low.  
 
44 See  these  submiss ions  at  h t tps : / /pmg.org.za/commit tee -meeting /14944/  (Date  of  use:  
3 December 2018) ;  Rensburg I  “Regula tor y overkil l  threa tens academic au tonomy in  
South Afr ica”2013-01-31 Business Day .) ;  Jenvey N “New Legislat ion  is  a  blow to  
universi ty  au tonomy” 2012-12-9 Universi ty  World News .  
 
45 Chapter  5  below conta ins the in ternat ional  comparison.  
 




situation post-1994, and the improvements in higher education regulation, 
including the promulgation of the Higher Education Act of 1997 after the 
advent of democracy.47  
 
There are several assumptions discussed in this research. The first relates 
to the assumption that public higher education institutions have institutional 
autonomy as provided for in the preamble of the Higher Education Act of 
1997, although the DHET has never promised complete autonomy. 
Institutional autonomy must be balanced against public accountability.48 It is 
also assumed that public higher education institutions are subject to  public 
accountability since the government funds them, and they need to report on 
how state funds were spent.49 Another assumption is that both the Council 
and the executive management of a public higher education institution are 
subject to common law fiduciary duties, as well as the duties of care and 
skill.  As such, they could be held accountable for breaches of these 
obligations.50 However, thus far, such accountability has not arisen in 
practice. Since these duties and principles of corporate governance are 
well developed in company law, a comparison between the governance 
practices of a company and those of higher education institutions would be 
useful.51 
 
The hypothesis posed in this research is that public higher education 
institutions will benefit from several amendments to the Higher Education 
Act of 1997. These amendments would include a standard of conduct, 
holding Council members personally liable for the breach of their fiduciary 
 
47 Higher  educat ion in  the  post -1994 era  i s  d iscussed in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2  below.  
 
48 See the preamble to  the Higher  Education Act  of  1997,  which promises ins t i tut iona l  
autonomy,  but  also  sta tes that  i t  must  be ba lanced  against  publ ic  accountabi l i ty .  
Inst i tu t ional  autonomy is discussed  more fu lly  in  Chapter  2 ,  para 3 .2 .1  below.  
 
49 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .2 .1  for  a  d iscuss ion on public  accountab il i ty .  
 
50 The Council  of  a  un iversi ty  i s  d iscussed in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b .1)  below.  
 
51 Corporate  governance in  the  South Afr ican context  i s  discussed  in  Chapter  4 ,  para  




duties, removal of errant Council members, declaring a Council member 
delinquent and corporate governance provisions. 52 These suggested 
amendments would assist in holding Council members as well as executive 
management accountable for not acting in the best interests of the 
institution and breaching their fiduciary duties. 53 It is suggested that if these 
changes were to be included in the Higher Education Act of 1997, 
governance and compliance in public institutions would improve. Once 
governance has improved, the DHET would need to rely less on the 
ministerial interventions contained in the Higher Education Amendment Act 
of 2016, and therefore institutional autonomy will not be threatened. 54  
 
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.2.1 Research methodology 
 
This section provides an overview of the research methodology used in this 
thesis.55 The study employs mixed disciplines, a common approach in legal 
research.56 These disciplines include a hermeneutic discipline, 57 an 
argumentative discipline,58 an empirical discipline,59 an explanatory 
 
52 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 . 3  below for  the recommended amendments.  
53 All  recommendations,  includ ing the  formulat ion of  such  a  s tandard,  are ou tl ined  in  
Chapter  6  below.  
 
54 The minister ial  in te rventions are discussed in  Chapter  3 ,  para  3 .3  be low.  
 
55 Accord ing to  Hesse -Biber ,  research  methodology enta i l s  “ the methods,  techniques  
and procedures that  are  used in  the process of  implement ing the research desig n or  
research plan,  as well  as the under lying pr incip les and assumptions tha t  underl ie  the ir  
use” .  For  methodology  in  general ,  see Hesse-Biber  SN The Practice  of  Quali ta t ive  
Research  3 r d  ed (SAGE 2017)  7  –  10 ;  Babbie ER and Mouton J The Practice o f  Soc ial  
Research  (South Afr ican  Edit ion Cape Town: Oxford Universi ty  Press 2005)  269 –  311.  
 
56 For  more on mul t i -method research,  see Cane  P  and Kr itzer  HM (eds)  The Oxford  
Handbook o f  Empirical  Legal Research  (Oxford  Uni ted Kingdom 2010)  953 –  956.  
 
57 Accord ing to  Van Hoecke,  a  hermeneutic  d isc ipline in terpre ts tex ts and arguments  
about a  cho ice  among d ifferen t  interpretat ions.  Van Hoecke M ( ed)  Methodolog ies o f  
Legal Research:   Which  Kind of  Method for What Kind o f  Discip line? (Hart  Publishing  
Uni ted Kingdom 2011 )  4 .  
 
58 With in this d iscip line,  i t  i s  the argumentat ion to  suppor t  some legal  in terpretat ion or  
solu tion  that  i s  emphasised,  rather  than  the  in terpre ta t ion  as such .  Van Hoecke  (ed)  
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discipline60 and relevant discipline.61 Further to the latter disciplines, this 
study also uses a qualitative approach. 62 According to Creswell, qualitative 
research “…is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning of 
individuals or groups ascribed to a social or human problem.”63 Qualitative 
research follows a research strategy that is relatively open and 
unstructured, and the data are usually collected through three main 
methods, used either on their own or in combination, of direct observation, 
in-depth interviews and the analysis of documents.64 Even when interview 
schedules are used as a research technique, the researcher provides 
minimal guidance to interviewees, allowing them considerable latitude 
when responding to questions. In this study, interviews were conducted 
either through electronic communication via email or in person. The 
interviews were either structured, with specific questions forwarded to the 
 
Methodolog ies of  Legal Research:   Which Kind of  Method for What Kind of  Dis cipl ine? 
4 –  5 .  
 
59 According  to  Ross,  "empir ical  ver if ica t ion  takes  place  by check ing statements  in  
lega l  doctr ine against  the judi c ia l  prac tice”,  see  in  genera l  Ross A On Law and Just ice  
(Stevens & Sons London 1958)  40.  The empir ical  discip line is  used qu ite  of ten in  the  
lega l  f ield ;  accord ingly,  whether  a  par t icular  law ex is ts  may  be checked  empir ica l ly  but  
what the lega l  doctr in e  is  mainly  about,  i s  the actual  in terpretat ion of  that  law and 
balanc ing i t  with  o ther  laws and pr incip les .  See also  Van Hoecke  (ed)  Methodolog ies of  
Legal Research:   Which  Kind  of  Method for What Kind o f  Discip line? 5 –  7 .  
 
60 Accord ing to  this discipl ine ,  i t  is  exp la ined  why a rule  i s  a  va lid  lega l  rule  in  
soc iety .   Accord ing to  Van Hoecke,  " in  this  approach,  the  ex istence  of  a  r ule  wi l l  be  
"expla ined" by the existence of  a  h igher  norm, f rom which tha t  rule  i s  der ived,  or  the  
existence  of  underlying  value s or  pr incip les,  or  a  more  ex tensive ne twork of  lega l  ru les  
and pr incip les,"  See Van Hoecke (ed)  Methodologies of  Legal  Research :   Which  Kind o f  
Method for What  Kind o f  Discip line? 8.  
 
61 I t  i s  necessary to  emphasise the impor tance  of  log ic  in  legal  reasoni ng and  the 
sc ient if ic  st ructur ing of  legal  data.  However ,  legal  data a re too indefini te  to  be  
perce ived as a  pure ly logica l  disc ipl ine.  Too much depends on the interpre ta t ion of  
lega l  pr incip les,  ru les and concepts.  See  Van  Hoecke (ed)  Methodologies of  Legal  
Research:   Which Kind  of  Method for What Kind of  Discip line? 9.  
 
62 For  more  on  qual i tat ive research  in  general ,  see in  genera l  Cane  and  Kr itzer  (eds)  
The Oxford Handbook o f  Empir ical  Legal Research  927 –  948.  
 
63 Creswel l  JW Research Design:  Qual i ta t iv e,  Quant i ta t ive and Mixed Methods 
Approaches  3 r d  ed (SAGE Uni ted Sta tes 2009)  4;  see in  general  Creswel l  JW 
Qual i tat ive Inquiry & Research Design:   Choosing  Among Five  Approaches  3 r d  ed 
(SAGE 2013)  42  –  128 ;  Hesse-Biber  The Practice o f  Quali tat ive Research  2  –  63;  
Si lverman D Interpre ting Qual i ta t ive Data  5 t h  ed (SAGE Uni ted Kingdom 2014)  3  –  
160.  
 
64 Cane and Kr itzer  (eds)  The Oxford  Handbook o f  Empir ical  Legal Research  928.   
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individuals, or unstructured, mainly with questions asked and answered by 
the interviewees in person. The structured interviews took place with 
specifically targeted individuals within the Department of Higher Education 
and Training. There were also structured interviews via email with 
individuals like Prof Chris de Beer, former administrator for the University 
of Zululand, Prof Johann de Jager from the South African Reserve Bank 
and Prof Theresa Shanahan, Ms Maureen Armstrong and Mr Bob Everett 
from York University in Ontario, Canada.  Unstructured interviews took 
place either in person or via email with individuals from the University 
System of Georgia (USG) which included Mr John Fuchko, Mr Michael 
Foxman, Mr Wesley Horne, Ms Kenyatta Morrison and Ms Shelley Nickel; 
Mr Barry McCarton from the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities; 
Prof Glen Jones and Prof Ian Lee from the University of Toronto and Mr 
Brent Davis Davis from McMaster University. These interviewees were 
each chosen for their specific knowledge and expertise in either corporate 
governance, company law or higher education. Since the positions of 
interviewees, standard questionnaires were not used. These questions 
were used to gather information.65  
 
According to Schumacher and McMillan,  
……research design is the plan and structure of the 
investigation; it is used to obtain evidence in order to 
answer specific research questions. The design 
describes the procedures for conducting the study. 66  
 
Mouton suggests that the research design enables researchers to 
anticipate the appropriate research decisions in order to maximise the 
 
65 Typical  quest ions asked during inte rviews and email  exchanges  included the 
fol lowing: What legis lat ion governs public  h igher  educat ion in  your  jur i sdict ions? 
What ex ternal  and  in ternal  governance struc tures are  in  p lace a t  public  higher  
educat ion inst i tu t ions?  What governance documents and  pol ic ies are in  place  a t  these  
public  inst i tu t ions?  What  is  the  level  of  state  involvement  in  public  h igher  education 
ins t i tut ions ,  and how do  they invest iga te any  mismanageme nt?  
 
66 Schumacher  SJ and McMil lan  JH Research  in  Educat ion -  a  Conceptual  In troduct ion  




validity of the eventual results. 67 In this thesis, the research involves a 
literature study of various books, accredited and unaccredited academic 
articles, electronic and internet resources, media reports and newspaper 
articles, published and unpublished reports and policy documents, 
dissertations and theses, White Papers, relevant case law, Government 
Gazettes and applicable legislation.  Further to this, ethical clearance was 
obtained to conduct interviews with key role-players in management at 
higher education institutions as well as the ministr ies responsible for higher 
education in both Georgia, USA and Ontario, Canada.  Interviews were also 
conducted by way of emails, as mentioned above, where questionnaires 
were forwarded to high-ranking professors at higher education institutions 
in Ontario, Canada. Valuable information was obtained through these 
interviews.    
 
Within the scope of empirical research, empirical observations or data are 
collected in order to answer the research questions.68 This methodology 
was combined with a comparative analysis of selected international 
jurisdictions.69 This is a commonly used methodology in legal research.  
Comparative legal studies can be done with different objectives in mind.  
One of the principal aims of a comparative legal study is to gain a better 
understanding of a legal system and establish whether it offers possible 
solutions to situations, which are unclear in a given system. 70 There are 
three phases in a comparative legal study: investigating the relative legal 
systems to obtain information on the content of each of the applicable legal 
rules; analysing the relevant elements of each of these legal systems, 
taking into account the background and social framework of  each of these 
 
67 Mouton J Understandin g Social  Research  (Van Schaik Publ ishers Pretor ia  1996)  107.  
 
68 Mouton J How to succeed in  your Master’s and Doctoral  S tud ies  1 s t  ed (Van Schaik 
Publ ishers Pretor ia  2001) .  
  
69 The cho ice  of  jur i sdic t ion is  mot ived below in  the summary of  Chapter  5 .  
 
70 Van  Zyl DH Beginsels  van Regsvergelyk ing  (Butterworth’s  1991)  17  –  21;  Eber le  EJ 
“The Method  and Role of  Compara tive  Law” 2 009 (8)  Washington Universi ty  Global  




systems; and considering the similarities and differences between the 
elements in both the South African and the international legal systems to 
arrive at a synthesis.71 It was with this object in mind that the comparative 
analysis was undertaken in this study. There is a difference between 
"descriptive" and "applied" comparative legal research.  The first is merely 
a description of the content of the relevant legal systems without drawing 
any conclusions; the latter points out the differences and similarities among 
the various legal systems to conclude.72 The last technique was used in this 
research where comparisons were drawn between the higher education 
system, corporate law and corporate governance system of South Africa 
and those of Georgia, USA and Ontario, Canada. The differences and 
similarities are discussed in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 contains the 
recommendations based on the positive conclusions drawn from this 
comparison. It was essential to select the most appropriate methods, 
techniques and methodological paradigm to achieve the objectives of the 
study, in particular, because it interrogates aspects of company law and 
corporate governance in another context, that of higher education.  
 
1.2.2 Research questions 
 
Researchers ask specific questions to help them answer and provide 
solutions to the research problem under investigation. The following 
research questions are addressed in this thesis:  
• Has governance improved in the South African higher education 
sector since the attainment of democracy? 
• Do the recent legislative changes in higher education threaten 
institutional autonomy? 
• Is there enough public accountability in respect of public higher 
education institutions? 
 
71 Venter  F e t  al .  Regsnavorsing:   Metode en Publikasie  ( Juta  en Kie  Cape Town 1990)  
219; Eberle  2009  Washington Univers i ty  Global  Stud ies Law Review  455 –  470 ;  Kroeze 
IJ  “Legal  Research Me thodology and the d ream of  Interdisc ipl inar i ty” 2013 (16)  PER  
49.  
 
72 Van Zyl Beginse ls van Regsvergelyk ing  35.  
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• Why have there been so many failures in the governance of public 
higher education institutions? 
• Will the higher education environment benefit from further legislative 
changes through the inclusion of a standard of conduct for Council 
members? 
• Will the higher education environment benefit from amending its 2014 
Reporting Regulations to include a code of good governance?   
 
1.2.3 Research objectives and aim of the study 
 
This study aims to recommend possible improvements to corporate 
governance practices at South African higher education institutions in order 
to increase the accountability of Council members and executive 
management in appropriate instances. 
 
In order to provide answers to the research questions and to achieve the 
aim of the study, the research objectives are formulated as follows:  
• Consider the post-democracy higher education landscape in South 
Africa;  
• Investigate whether the inclusion of some or similar, provisions to 
those contained in the Companies Act of 2008 and the Banks Act of 
1990 will improve the Higher Education Act of 1997. These provisions 
include those confirming fiduciary duties, the removal of certain 
officers and ones relating to delinquency; 
• Review the accountability of Council members and executive 
management of higher education institutions. Although there are 
common law provisions for this, the inclusion of statutory provisions in 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 could assist public universities in 
holding Council members and members of the executive management 
accountable for not acting in the best interests of the institution; and 
• Compare the regulation of relevant aspects of South African higher 
education, corporate law and corporate governance with the positions 
in selected jurisdictions in the USA and Canada to ascertain whether 
36 
 
any guidance may be obtained from the latter jurisdictions to improve 
corporate governance in higher education institutions in South Africa.  
 
1.2.4 Terminological clarification 
 
In the interests of clarity, terms frequently used in this thesis are briefly 
defined at the beginning of Chapter 1. Comprehensive conceptual 
clarifications of research-specific terms are provided in the appropriate 
chapters. Authorities are cited in full when first referred to; after that, they 
are referred to in abbreviated form in the footnotes. The full titles and 
references are provided in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.73 All 
newspaper articles are cited with the date included on which the article was 
published, while all internet resources are cited with the date on which the 
article was accessed. 
 
Court cases are cited in full when referred to for the first time.  In the 
footnotes, the abbreviation "para" is used to refer to a paragraph, while "s" 
is used to indicate a particular section of the legislation.  
 
The law is stated as it is up to and including 31 December 2018
 
73 The methods of  c i ta t ion comply  with  Unisa’s modes  of  c i tat ion prov ided to  doctoral  
candida tes.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE SOUTH AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION LANDSCAPE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter commences with a brief historical overview of higher 
education in South Africa before Apartheid was entrenched in South Africa.  
It then examines how Apartheid influenced higher education. The focus 
thereafter moves to the progression of higher education regulation since 
the attainment of democracy in 1994. It is essential to discuss the influence 
of Apartheid on higher education, as it is indicative that the structure of the 
higher education system was in need of an overhaul. This may be a 
potential reason why corporate governance practices have not yet been 
reviewed extensively.  
 
The chapter also discusses the legislative and governance framework of 
higher education institutions, including policy development and ultimately, 
the promulgation of the Higher Education Act of 1997.   
 
Higher education in South Africa started with the establishment of the 
South African College in Cape Town in 1829.  From 1829 until 1874, a 
series of similar colleges were established under the auspices of the Dutch 
Reformed Church and the Church of England in the Western Cape, Eastern 
Cape, Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg. Eventually, these colleges 
migrated to universities. For instance, the University of Cape Town evolved 
from the South African College.1  
 
2.1.1 History of Apartheid 
 
Apartheid has a long history. The English translation of the word 
means “separateness.” Apartheid developed in the 1930s and 1940s, 
 
1 Coetzee CJS and Geggus C Universi ty  Education in  the Republ ic  of  South Afr ica  
(South Afr ican Human Research Council  Pretor ia  1980)  3 .  
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following from the policy of segregation which it replaced.2 The 
term “Apartheid” was used commonly in discussions about race and pol itics 
by Afrikaner Nationalists who wanted white domination in South Africa .3  
The Population Registration Act 30 of 19504 laid down the procedures for 
classifying and reclassifying the South African population into three racial 
groups namely “White,”5 “Native”6 and “Coloured”7 by using three 
classificatory criteria: appearance, acceptance and descent. 8 Apartheid 
made segregation part of the law and cruelly and forcibly  separated people 
and races. The apartheid regime wielded a fearsome state apparatus which 
punished those who opposed it.9 Apartheid was regarded by many as being 
worse than segregation insofar as it was introduced at a period when other 
countries were moving away from racist policies, whereas South Africa 
opted instead to promote racial separation. It was after the African National 
 
2 This paragraph provides a  shor t  backg round to  Aparthe id and i ts  inf luence on higher  
educat ion.   However ,  the focus of  the thesis is  on the post -Apar the id era .    For  m ore on  
Apartheid in  genera l ,  see Fiske EB and Ladd HF Elusive Equity :  Education Reform in  
Post-Aparthe id South Africa  (Brookings Ins t i tut ional  Press Washing ton 2004)  20 –  39.  
 
3 Verwey C and Quayle M “Whiteness,  Racism and Afr ikaner  iden ti ty  in  Post -Apartheid  
South Afr ica” 2012(111)  African Af fairs  551 –  575.  
 
4 Hereaf ter  referred to  as  the Populat ion Regis tra t ion Act  of  1930.  
 
5 In  te rms o f  the Populat ion Registrat ion Act  of  1930,  a  White  person was  def ined  as “a 
person who in  appearance obviously i s ,  or  w ho is  genera l ly  accep ted as a  White person,  
but  does no t  include a person who,  al though in  appearance obviously a  Whi te person ,  i s  
genera l ly  accepted  as a  Coloured person”.  
 
6 Renamed “Bantu” then  “Black”.   Black  people in  this con tex t  refers  specif ica l ly  to  
African Amer ican people.  “Native” is  def ined  in  the Popula t ion  Regis tra t ion Act of  
1930 as  “a  person who in  fact  i s  or  i s  ge nera lly  accep ted as  a  member  of  any abor iginal  
race or  tr ibe of  Afr ica” .  
 
7 In  terms of  the  Popula t ion Registrat ion Act of  1930,  a Coloured person is  “a person  
who is  no t  a  White person or  a  Nat ive” .  
 
8 Erasmus Y Racia l  ( re)classi f icat ion during  aparthe id South  Afr ica:  Regulat ions ,  
Experiences and  the Meaning(s)  of  “Race”  (Published  PhD thesis  Univers i ty  of  
London) .  
 
9  This regime forc ibly  separa ted people accord ing to  the ir  race and perceived the whi te  




Party came into power in 1948 that South Africa introduced the more rigid 
racial policy of Apartheid.10  
 
The first Constitution of South Africa was the South Africa Act of 1909 
created by an Act of British Parliament. This Act provided a framework for 
government but was not a complete constitutional code.11 The Republic of 
South Africa was established by the promulgation of the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961. One of the significant changes that the 
Constitution Act of 1961 brought about is that South Africa changed from a 
Union within the British Commonwealth to a Republic outside of the 
Commonwealth.12 This Constitution was later replaced by the Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983.13 Black people had no 
representation in Parliament.14  The government at the time did everything 
in its power to separate the races and to promote the white race as being 
superior. Various Acts were implemented to achieve racial segregation to 
ensure that only White people benefited from Apartheid.15 Today South 
Africa still faces many challenges due to its deep-rooted history of political 
exclusion, racial and class discrimination and inequality. 
 
 
10See  in  general ,  South Afr ican Hi sto ry “Apar the id and  React ions  to  I t” .  
http: / /www.sah istory.org.za/ar t ic le/apar theid -and-reac tions- i t  (Date of  use:  17 May 
2018) .  
 
11 Marais R Const i tu t ional Development of  Sou th  Africa  (Southern Book Publ isher s  
Pre tor ia  1981)  31 -55  
 
12 Marais D South Afr ica:  Consti tut ional Development:  A Mul t i -Discip linary Approach  
(Southern Book Publ ishers Pre tor ia  1989)  161.   
 
13 Hereinaf ter  referred to  as  the  Consti tut ion of  1983.  This referendum was he ld on 12  
Sep tember  1983 :   Marais South Afr ica:  Const i tu t ional Development:  A Mult i -
Disc ipl inary Approach  253.   
 
14 Mara is  South Afr ica:  Const i tu t ional Development:  A Mult i -Discip linary Approach  
253.  
 
15 Some of  these acts were the Populat ion Regis t r at ion Act 30 of  1950; the Promot ion  
of  Bantu Sel f -Government Act 46 of  1959; the Bantu Education Act  47 of  1953; the 
Suppression of  Communism Act 44 of  1950 ;  Prohibit ion of  Mixed Marr iages Act 55 of  
1949; the Immoral i ty  Amendment Act 21 of  1950; the Separa te  Representat ion of  




The Apartheid-era also had a detrimental effect on education and the post-
1994 government inherited a deeply troubled higher education system. 
During Apartheid, various policies had been put in place to ensure that 
higher education institutions benefited Whites. These institutions were 
divided into either universities or technikons and were controlled by various 
government departments, causing them to be ineffective and difficult to 
manage. The National Party viewed the essence of a university as science, 
while the essence of a technikon was technology. 16 Different Ministries were 
responsible for the education of different races.  Under the Constitution of 
1983, the Minister of Education and Culture: Administration, House of 
Representatives was responsible for the education of Coloured and Indian 
people whereas the Department of National Education was responsible for 
the higher education of White people.  According to the Constitution of 
1983, the provincial education departments became sub-departments of the 
Department of Education and Culture, Administration: House of Assembly. 
Thus, higher education became the responsibility of this ministry. 
Furthermore, the Constitution of 1983 divided the national parliament into 
three chambers with a separate representation of White voters (House of 
Assembly), Coloured voters (House of Representatives) and Indian voters 
(House of Delegates).17 There was no representation for Africans. 18 A clear 
distinction was drawn between “own affairs” 19 and “general affairs”.20 “Own 
affairs” pertained to matters specific to the “cultural and value frameworks” 
of the Coloured, Indian or White communities. “General affairs”, on the 
 
16 Cloe te  N et  al .  Transformation  in  Higher Education:  Global  Pressures and  Local  
Real i t ies in  South Africa  (Ju ta  Pre tor ia  2002)  62 -  63 
 
17 Sect ion 7  of  the  Const i tu t ion  of  1983 ;  Vos AJ and Bri t s  VM Comparat ive  Education  
and National Education Sys tems  (Butterwor ths Durban 1990)  70 –  7 .  
 
18 Council  on Higher  Educat ion (CHE) South Afr ican Higher Education in  the First  
Decade  of  Democracy  (2004)  22 –  23.  
 
19 Sect ion  14 of  the Republic  o f  South Afr ica Const i tu t ion Act 110 of  1983 .  
 
20 Sect ion 15  of  the  Republic  of  South Afr ica  Consti tut ion A ct  110 of  1983;  CHE 
Higher Education Reviewed:  Two Decades  of  Democracy  2016 65 ;  Cloe te et  a l .  
Transformat ion in  Higher  Educati on:  Global  Pressures  and Local Reali t ies  in  South  




other hand, referred to matters which had an impact on all racial 
communities.  By 1984, education was classified under “own affairs” as far 
as Whites, Coloureds and Indians were concerned. Education for White 
people resorted under the House of Assembly, education for people of 
colour under the House of Representatives and education for Indians was 
the responsibility of the House of Delegates. According to the Constitution 
of 1983, the education of African people was classified as “general affairs.” 
The responsibility for the education of Africans was vested in the 
Department of Education and Training.21 According to the National 
Commission on Higher Education’s  Framework for Transformation,22 one of 
the main characteristics of the higher education system throughout the pre -
1994 era was that it provided for a racially segregated higher education 
system consisting of historically White universities (HWUs) and historically 
Black universities (HBU’s).23  One of the Acts that played a key role during 
the pre-1994 era was the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 24, which officially 
divided educational institutions along racial lines. The Act stipulated that 
“Bantu”25 people would be excluded from quality academic education and 
training.26  According to section 2(a) of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, 27 
“the control of native education shall vest in the Government of the Union, 
subject to the provisions of the Act”.  In terms of section 3, the Department 
 
21 Cloete et  a l .  Transformation in  Higher Education:  Global Pressure s and Local  
Real i t ies in  South Africa  60.  
 
22 Nat ional  Commission  on Higher  Educat ion  (hereaf ter  NCHE) Framework for  
Transformat ion  (1996) .   The NCHE and th is  report  are  discussed more fully  in  para  2 .2  
below. Hereaf ter  referred to  the NCHE Report .  
 
23 Bitzer  E Higher  Educat ion in  South Afr ica  (Sun  Media Ste l lenbosch 2009)  11.  
 
24 Hereaf ter  referred to  as  the Bantu Educat ion Act of  1 947.  
 
25 According to  the def ini t ions o f  the Bantu Educat ion Act o f  1953,  “Bantu”  mean s  
“nat ive” which refers to  any person who is  or  i s  genera l ly  accep ted as a  member of  any 
aboriginal  race  or  tr ibe of  Afr ica.  
 
26 NCHE Report  29.  
 
27 For  more on the Bantu Ed ucat ion Act of  1953,  see in  general  Mabokela  RO Voices of  
Conf l ict:  Desegregating  South Afr ican Univers i t ies (Routledge Falmer New York 2000)  




of Native Affairs was responsible for the direction and control of native 
education. The Extension of the University Education Act 45 of 1959 28 
continued this system of racial divide by establishing racially based 
universities.  According to section 2 of the Extension of University 
Education Act of 1959, the Minister of Bantu Education was able to 
establish university colleges for Bantu persons. Section 3 allowed the 
establishment of university colleges for non-White people other than Bantu 
persons. According to section 17, no White people were allowed to attend 
those university colleges.  Prior to the promulgation of the latter Act, 
universities chiefly catered for White students, although there was no 
official legislation preventing Blacks from applying at these universities. 
The Extension of the University Education Act of 1959 formally restricted 
access to universities according to race: Blacks were only allowed in 
instances where equivalent programmes were not offered at a Black 
university, and this was only done after ministerial permission was 
obtained.  It was, in fact, a criminal offence for a non-White student to 
register at a historically White university without the written consent of the 
Minister of Internal Affairs. 29 The HWUs, although providing tuition in both 
Afrikaans and English, were dominated by Afrikaans executives and 
governing bodies that strongly supported the Apartheid government. 30 Black 
universities were forced to adapt according to the educational model used 
by White universities.31 By 1988, eleven higher education institutions had 
been created under the Extension of the University Education Act of 1953.32 
 
28 Hereaf ter  referred  to  as the  Extension  of  the  Univers i ty  Educat ion Act o f  1959.  For  
more on th is Act,  see in  genera l ,  Mabokela Voices o f  Conf l ict:  Desegregating South 
Afr ican Universi t ies  24  –  27.  
 
29 Sec tions 31 and 32 of  the Exten sion of  Univers i ty  Educat ion Act of  1959; NCHE 
Report  29.  
 
30 Cloete et  a l .  Transformation in  Higher Education:  Global Pressures  and Local  
Real i t ies in  South Africa  45.  
 
31 Bitzer  Higher Educat ion in  South  Africa  12.  
 
32 CHE “South African Higher Educat ion in  the Firs t  Decade of  Democracy”  (2004)  22 ;  




University education for Black people was formalised on 8 February 1916 
with the establishment of the South African Native College. In 1923 this 
college became a constituent college of the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) and was subsequently renamed the University of Fort Hare. Until 
1960, this was the only university specifically established for Black 
students.33 During 1961, the Colleges of the North and Zululand were 
established after the Extension of University Education Act of 1953 was 
promulgated. For the next ten years, these three colleges resorted under 
the wing of UNISA, which oversaw the curricula, examinations, degrees 
and academic affairs in general until 1970, when the colleges were granted 
full autonomy and university status.34 The University of Western Cape 
(UWC) started as a residential university for Coloured students and 
obtained autonomy in 1970. In 1961, the University College for Indians was 
established in Durban, also under the wing of UNISA, until it became an 
autonomous university in 1971 in the form of the University of Durban-
Westville.  It is clear that UNISA played an important role in the 
establishment of universities for the population marginalised under 
Apartheid.35 
 
The Universities Amendment Act of 1983 repealed the legislation that 
prohibited Black students from being admitted to White universities.  This 
Act was passed in response to increasing international pressure and 
political unrest in South Africa. Black people could, therefore, be admitted 
to White universities after the passing of this Act. 36 
 
 
33 Coetzee and  Geggus Universi ty  Educat ion in  the Republic  of  Sou th Afr ica  4 .  
 
34 Coetzee and  Geggus Universi ty  Educat ion in  the Republic  of  Sou th Afr ica  4 .  
 
35 Coetzee and  Geggus Universi ty  Educat ion in  the Republic  of  Sou th Afr ica  5 .  
 
36 Mabokela Voices  of  Confl ict :  Desegregat ing South Afr ican Univers i t ies  29.  
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Universities, colleges and technikons37 were clearly differentiated.38 The 
boundaries amongst these institutions were shaped by the Van Wyk de 
Vries Commission39 and the Goode Committee40, which distinguished 
between the functions of these institutions. 41  The Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission clearly specified the university as the leader at a tertiary level 
as well as confirming its institutional autonomy.42 The Commission 
furthermore confirmed that universities should be free from interference by 
the state, community, church, academics, students and others.43 
 
The National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) Report 
distinguished between the functions of universities, colleges and 
technikons as follows:  
A main function of universities is to educate students in a 
range of basic scientific (or scholarly) disciplines with a 
view to high level professional training; while that of 
technikons is to train students in the application of 
knowledge rather than in basic knowledge itself with the 
view to high level career training; and that of colleges is 
preparation for specific vocations such as nursing, 
teaching and policing. Universities engage in basic 
scientific research, technikons engage in developmental 




37 These three types of  inst i tu t ion are def ined in  the Higher  Education  Act o f  1997 .  
However ,  col leges  and  technikons  fa l l  outs ide  the scope of  this research and  are no t  
discussed  in  deta i l .  I t  should also be m entioned that  due to  var ious  mergers,  former 
technikons  were incorporated into  exis t ing un iversi t ies .  
 
38 NCHE Report  29 –  30.   
 
39 Depar tement van Nasionale Opvoeding “Hoofvers lag van d ie Kommissie  van  
ondersoek na  d ie Universi te i t swese”  1974.   Hereaf ter  re ferred to  as  the Van Wyk de 
Vries Commission .  
 
40 Goode Commit tee  1978  
 
41 NCHE Report  30.   Chapter  IV of  the Van Wyk de Vries Comm iss ion Report  d iscusses  
universi t ies whi le  col leges and other  forms of  ter t iary  inst i tu t ions are discussed in  
Chapter  VII .  
 
42 Van Wyk De Vries Commission Report  879.  
 
43 Van Wyk De Vries Commission Report  69.  
 




The Apartheid government considered that a public higher education 
institution was a legal entity created by the state and its actions should, 
therefore, be determined and controlled by the state.45 The Van Wyk de 
Vries Commission recommended substantial institutional autonomy for the 
HWUs, which resulted in weak state supervision and minimal government  
interference. It is clear that by the attainment of democracy in 1994, higher 
education in South Africa was in dire need of radical change and 
transformation. However, it should be noted that each university was 
founded by an Act of Parliament, thereby implying that its functions were 
prescribed by Parliament and that Parliament could terminate it.46 Thus it 
could be argued that, in principle, little autonomy existed within higher 
education during the pre-1994 era, yet at the same time, there was a policy 
dictating that a university was “…..an independent sphere of societal 
relationship.”47 Governance of these higher education institutions was 
complex. For instance, before 1994, the co-ordination of the higher 
education system was the responsibility of the Department of National 
Education. Its primary function was to set and monitor financial and 
academic norms and standards. Universities, technikons and colleges for 
Whites, Coloureds and Indians were each governed by a separate 
Department of Education. Six other Departments of Education were 
responsible for some of the colleges in the self-governing territories. To 
add to the confusion, four additional Departments of Education were 
responsible for universities, technikons and colleges in the independent 
states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 48 It is thus clear 
that under Apartheid, the governance framework of universities was 
fragmented and uncoordinated to say the least, which in turn resulted in an 
 
45 Cloete et  al .  Transformation in  Higher Education:  Global Pressures and Local  
Real i t ies in  South Africa  37.  
 
46 CHE “South African  Higher Educat ion in  the  First  Decade of  Democracy”  23.  
 
47 CHE “South African  Higher Education  in  the Firs t  Decade  of  Democracy”  23.  This  
impl ies that  a  universi ty  funct ioned separately  f rom the s tate .  
 




inefficient governance system.49 The post-1994 government faced an 
enormous challenge in transforming the system and addressing the 
inequalities of the past. The government needed to ensure that the higher 
education system was planned, directed and funded as a single 
coordinated system. It intended to reach these goals by introducing various 
policies, processes and documents50 aimed at restructuring higher 
education.51 
 
2.2 HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE POST-1994 ERA 
 
The current system of governance within higher education in South Africa 
is embodied in the Higher Education Act of 1997. Several policy documents 
such as the Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation 
of Higher Education52 and the National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) 
informed and amplified the Higher Education Act of 1997. 53 These policies 
and legislation, together with each institution’s statute, define co -operative 
governance and the roles and responsibilities of the Councils, Senates and 
Institutional Forums of higher education institutions.54 Transformation of 
higher education in South Africa began with the election of a new 
democratic government in 1994. Since then, policy development and the 
promulgation of legislation relating to higher education have been 
addressed. Since 1994, policy development was primarily influenced by the 
 
49 NCHE Report  41 -  42 .  
 
50 These documents,  l ike  the 1997 White  Paper ,  are  discussed in  para’s  2 .2 .2  –  2 .2 .3  
below.  
 
51 Waghid  Y “Democracy,  higher  education  transformation  and  c i t izenship  in  South  
Africa” 2003(17)  SAJHE 91.  
 
52 Hereaf ter  referred to  as  the 1997 White  Paper .  
 
53 CHE Higher Educat ion Reviewed:  Two Decades  of  Democracy  2016 63 –  64.   
Recent ly ,  the Nat ional  Development Plan 2 030 as wel l  as Afr ica 2063 has been  
implemented,  which  also includes educat ion.  
 
54 Hall  H,  Symes A and Luescher  TM “Governance in  South Afr ican Higher  Educat ion ”  




Constitution.55  The Constitution contains the Bill of Rights. The provisions 
of the Bill of Rights are   among other things applicable to both students 
and staff of universities. The Bill of Rights also includes the right to 
“academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.”56 
 
2.2.1 National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE)   
 
Policy development for the transformation of higher education in South 
Africa started with the appointment of the National Commission on Higher 
Education (NCHE).57 This Commission was given the mandate to develop a 
policy framework for the transformation of higher education, which by then 
included universities, technikons and colleges. The NCHE formed 
committees, task teams and working groups to embark on this investigation 
which in 1996 resulted in a report entitled A Framework for 
Transformation.58 In this report, the NCHE clearly enunciates the need for 
transformation and articulates the deficiencies, realities, opportunities and 
challenges in the higher education system. It furthermore establishes the 
principles upon which the new higher education system should be 
founded.59 This process began by the NCHE in 1995, ultimately led to the 
 
55 Hereinaf ter  referred to  as the  Consti tut ion;  see  Badat  S  “Theor is ing Ins t i tut iona l  
Change:  Post -1994 South Afr ican Higher  Educat ion” 2009(34)  Studies in  Higher 
Educat ion  459.  
 
56 CHE Higher Educat ion  Reviewed:  Two Decades o f  Democracy  2016 70 ;  s  16(1) (d)  of  
the Const i tu t ion as  well  as schedule  4 ,  par t  A of  the Const i tu t ion.  
 
57 Hereaf ter  referred to  as  the NCHE.  
 
58 This repor t  was submit ted to  the Min ister  of  Education in  fulf i lm ent of  the  
Commission’s terms of  reference and was published  in  Government Gaze tte  Nr.  16243 
(GN.  5460)  3  February 1995.   See  in  general ,  the  DHET “Guidelines  for  good 
governance  prac tice and governance i nd ica tors  for  Counci ls  of  South  Afr ican public  
higher  educat ion inst i tu t ions” December 2017 12 –  14;  Fiske and Ladd Elusive Equi ty:  
Educat ion Reform in  Post -Aparthe id South  Afr ica  208 –  209 ;  Mda T and Mothata S  
(eds)  Crit ical  Issues in  South Afr ican Educat ion  –  Af ter 1994  ( Juta  Kenwyn 2000)  4 .  
 
59 Ferre ira  MF A Framework for Cont inuous Improvement in  the South Afr ican Higher  




introduction of the Higher Education Act in 1997.60 In fulfilment of its terms 
of reference,61 the Commission needed to advise the Minister on the 
following:62 the goals and values of higher education in South Africa; the 
types of institutions and the nature of the system which would be best 
suited to realise these goals; the necessary restructuring of administration, 
governance and financing of the new system; and the specific measures 
needed to eliminate inequalities of the past and the appropriate 
mechanisms, structures and procedures to implement all of the 
recommendations.63 Chapter 7 of this report relates to co-operative 
governance, where it, amongst other issues, discusses the three models of 
relationships among the government and the higher education institutions. 
These models are state control, state supervision and state interference. 64 
The report then proposes a new model referred to as co-operative 
governance, which is broadly located within the framework of state 
supervision.65 The report also advocates for an institutional governance 
framework consisting of beneficial relationships between the institution and 
other social constituencies, as well as adequate internal decision-making 
arrangements.66 Proposals made regarding the restructuring of some of the 
governance structures like the Council, Senate and Institution Forum were 
implemented.67 Lastly, it was proposed that a new Higher Education Act be 
enacted repealing the Universities Act 61 of 1995, the Technikons Act 125 
 
60 Bitzer  Higher  Education in  South Afr ica  13 .   The Higher  Education  Act  of  1997 i s  
discussed  in  more de ta i l  in  para 2 .2 .3  be low.  
 
61 Government  Gaze tte  Nr.  16243 (GN. 5460)  3  February 1995.  
 
62 The Minis ter  of  Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining.  
 
63 NCHE Report  23.  
 
64 NCHE Report  174 –  175;  these models are discussed in  more de tai l  in  Chapter  3 ,  para  
3 .2 .2  below.  
 
65 NCHE Report  176.  See a lso  Clo ete  e t  a l .  Challenges of  Co-operat ive Governance 
(CHET, 2003)  4  –  8 .  
 
66 NCHE Report  199.  
 




of 1993 as well as the private Acts and institutional statutes that regulated 
the various higher education institutions at the time.  The report envisioned 
a single co-ordinated higher education system based on co-operative 
governance and the principles of equity, democratisation, development, 
quality, academic freedom and institutional autonomy.68 
 
It is significant that the NCHE Report was produced in only one year. It 
could be argued that a more extended period should have been spent on 
this endeavour. 
 
The most important recommendations made by the NCHE were the 
following: an increase in student enrolment numbers and broadening 
access to education to a higher number of social groups and classes; 
greater responsiveness to societal needs and interests; increased levels of 
co-operation and collaboration in governance structures; a higher 
education system that is designed, managed and funded as one 
coordinated system representing universities, technikons and colleges; 
alignment of qualifications with the National Qualifications Framework; a 
strategic public funding framework; and the establishment of a higher 
education quality committee responsible for various functions including 
programme accreditation and institutional auditing and distance 
education.69  
 
The NCHE Report was followed in 1997 by the publication of the 
Department of Education’s 1997 White Paper.  The 1997 White Paper 
responded to and formalised the recommendations contained in the NCHE 
Report by adopting them as government policy. 70 
 
68 NCHE Report  208 –  209; see also Grobbelaar  J  “Higher  Educat ion in  South Afr ica :  
Sta te Reform ini t iat ives during the f ir s t  decade  of  democracy” 2004(2)  JNGS  38.  
 
69 Bitzer  Higher Educat ion in  South  Africa  13.  
 
70 Ferre ira  A Framework  for Continuous  Improvement  in  the  South  Afr ican  Higher  
Educat ion Sec tor 55;  Fataar  A “Higher  education policy discourse in  South Afr ica :  a  




2.2.2 The 1997 White Paper 
 
The Department of Education’s Education White Paper 3: A Programme for 
the Transformation of Higher Education  was published on 15 August 1997 
following extensive investigation and consultation, initiated by the NCHE in 
February 1995 by President Nelson Mandela.71 The 1997 White Paper 
outlines the framework for the transformation of the higher education 
system as a single co-ordinated system.72 The goal was to overcome the 
fragmentation that existed during the pre-1994 era and address the 
inequalities of the past.73 The 1997 White Paper detailed the role of 
planning, funding and governance of this single, co-ordinated system, 
which would include universities, technikons, colleges as well as private 
higher education providers.74 In Chapter 175 of the 1997 White Paper, the 
various challenges, vision and principles are discussed, while Chapter 2 76 
focuses on the structure and growth of institutions. In paragraph 1.13, the 
1997 White Paper summarises transformation requirements as increased 
and broadened participation, responsiveness to societal interests and 
needs and cooperation and partnerships in governance. 77 The 1997 White 
Paper formulates national goals in paragraph 1.27 and its institutional 
 
71 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  18207 (GN. 1196)  15  August  1997  3.  Pr ior  to  the publica t ion 
of  the 1997  White  Paper ,  whi le  the  Draf t  White  Paper  on Higher  Educat ion appeared in  
Apri l  1997 ( Government  Gazet te  Nr .  17944 (GN.  712)  18 Apr il  1997) .  
 
72 For  more on the 1997  Whi te  Paper  see in  general  F iske and  Ladd Elusive  Equi ty:  
Educat ion Reform in  Post -Aparthe id South Afr ica  207;  Mda and Mothata (eds)  Crit ical  
Issues in  South African  Education a fter 1994  6  –  7 ;  Bitzer  (ed)  Higher Educat ion in  
South Afr ica:  A Scholarly  look Behind  the  Scenes  14 –  17;  Cloe te N and  Bunting  I  
Higher Educa t ion Transformat ion:  Assess ing Performance in  South Afr ica (CHET 
1999)  1  –  8; Gul t ig  J  “The Universi ty  in  Post -Apartheid South Afr ica :  New Ethos and  
new Div is ions” 2000(14)  SAJHE 40 –  42.  
 
73 CHE South Afr ican Higher Educat ion in  the  First  Decade o f  Democra cy  (2004)  26.  
 
74 CHE South Afr ican Higher Educat ion in  the Firs t  Decade  of  Democracy  26;  see in  
genera l ,  DHET “Guidelines for  g ood governance  practice and governance indicators for  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education ins t i tut ions” December 20 17 14.  
 
75 1997 White  Paper  7  –  15.  
 
76 1997 White  Paper  17 –  34.  
 




goals in paragraph 1.28. It also elaborates on institutional autonomy 78 and 
public accountability,79 concepts that were neither defined nor discussed in 
the Higher Education Act of 1997. Both institutional autonomy and public 
accountability were listed as part of the fundamental principles that should 
guide the process of transformation.80 The other principles include equity 
and redress, democratisation, development, quality, effectiveness, 
efficiency and academic freedom. Chapter 381 contains the governance 
model82 for institutions, while Chapter 483 deals with funding.  
 
The first sentence in clause 3.1 of the 1997 White Paper states, “…..the 
transformation of the structures, values and culture of governance is a 
necessity, not an option, for South African higher education”.  The same 
clause ends in a promise by the Ministry 84 that governance will be a 
fundamental policy commitment.85 Considering the various universities that 
have been placed under administration over the years, it is clear that the 
government has thus far not been successful in enforcing this promise.86  
 
Chapter 3 of the 1997 White Paper is of relevance to this research as it 
discusses the governance of higher education institutions. It provides the 
background to both the legislative framework as well as the institutional 
 
78 Para 1 .24 of  the 1997  Whi te  Paper .  
 
79 Para 1 .25 of  the 1997  Whi te  Paper .  Both these concepts are discussed in  detai l  in  
para 2 .4  below.  
 
80 Para 1 .17 –  1 .25  of  the 1997 Whi te  Paper .  
  
81 1997 White  Paper  35 –  43.   Governance  i s  the focus throughout  th is research.  
 
82 Governance remains  the  focus  throughout th is thes is .  
 
83 1997 White  Paper  45 –  55.  
 
84 At this s tage ,  i t  was  st i l l  the Department  of  Educat ion,  which was la te r  changed  to  
the Depar tment of  Higher  Education and Tra ining.  Hereaf ter  re ferred  to  as the “DHET”.  
 
85 1997 White  Paper  35.  
 
86 Governance a t  sys tem leve l  and ins t i tut ional  governance as contained in  Chapter  3  




governance framework for higher education institutions that were later 
incorporated in the Higher Education Act of 1997. The 1997 White Paper 
was soon followed by the promulgation of the Higher Education Act of 
1997, which provided the legal foundation for the policies that had been 
developed by the NHCE and confirmed in the 1997 White Paper.87 
 
2.2.3 The Higher Education Act of 1997 
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 (as amended) regulates higher education 
in South Africa.88 The Act gave legal form to the values, principles and core 
policies underpinning higher education.89 With the promulgation of this Act, 
the Minister of Education was given far-reaching powers to implement and 
enforce the structural changes needed for the transformation of the higher 
education system in South Africa.90 The amendments to the Act relate to 
particular developments in higher education, notably, governance and 
financial crises at an institutional level during the 1990s, concerns about 
the quality of education provided by private higher education providers, and 
the plan to restructure the higher education landscape by implementing 
various mergers. Some of these amendments, and more specifically, the 
changes pertaining to the appointment of an administrator led to a degree 
 
87 Ferreira  Framework for  cont inuous improvement in  the South  Afr ican Higher  
Educat ion sec tor  56.  
 
88This d iscuss ion centers  on the  Higher  Ed ucat ion Ac t  of  1997,  includ ing the  Higher  
Educat ion Tra ining Laws Amendment Act of  2012 and the Higher  Education  
Amendment Act of  2016.   The Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997 was amended severa l  
t imes,  by the Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act 55 of  1999; the Higher  Education 
Amendment Act 23 of  2001; The  Higher  Education  Amendment Act  63 of  2002;  the 
Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act 38 of  200 3; the Higher  Educat ion Act 39 of  2008;  
the Higher  Educat ion Laws Amendment Act 26  of  2010;  the Higher  Educat ion Laws 
Amendment  Act 21 of  2011;  and  the  Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining  Laws Amendment 
Act  23 of  2012.   For  more on the Higher  Education Act of  19 97,  see in  genera l  Mda and 
Mothata (eds)  Crit ica l  I ssues in  South African  Education –  Af ter 1994  12 –  13.  
 
89 CHE South Afr ican Higher Educat ion in  the Firs t  Decade  of  Democracy  29; see in  
genera l ,  the DHET “Guidelines  for  good governance pract ice and  gover nance indicators  
for  Counci ls  of  South Afr ican public  higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions” December 2017 15  
–  16.  
 




of unease amongst stakeholders. Fear of the threat to institutional 
autonomy began to rear its head.91 
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 replaced its predecessors, the 
Universities Act 61 of 1955, the Tertiary Education Act 66 of 1988 and the 
Technikons Act 125 of 1993. It did not repeal the Acts regulating private 
universities; these were only repealed in 2001, with the Higher Education 
Amendment Act 23 of 2001.92 The Higher Education Act of 1997 consists of 
nine chapters, of which eight are applicable to public higher education 
institutions. For the purposes of this research, only chapters four and six 
are discussed in detail:93  
• Chapter 4 concentrates on the governance and regulation of these 
public institutions and is therefore of direct relevance to this research  
This chapter deals  among other things with the composition of both the 
Senate and Council, committees, the Institutional Forum (IF), the role of 
principals of institutions as well as the institutional statutes and rules.94 
The chapter also deals with the Student Representative Council (SRC), 
student disciplinary action and admission to public higher education, as 
 
91 CHE South Afr ican Higher Educat ion in  the  First  Decade o f  Democracy  29.  
 
92A to tal  of  108 Acts was repealed.  1997 Whi te  Paper  36  -  37.  There was a  view that  
the repeal  of  the pr iva te  universi ty  ac ts might be an assaul t  on ins t i tut ional  au tono my.  
The Minis ter  was  of  the view tha t  th is  was  not  the  case ,  however ,  the Minis ter  
ins truc ted the CHE to invest igate the matte r .   The pr ivate  Acts were  therefore only  
repea led in  2001.  
 
93Chapter  1  deals wi th  def ini t ions,  the app licat ion of  the Act  and  det ermination  of  
policy.  Chapter  2  e laborates on the es tabl ishment of  CHE, i t s  functions and  
composit ion.  Chapter  3  deals wi th  the e s tab li shment of  a  publ ic  higher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ion,  inc luding the incorpora tion of  sub -divisions of  publ ic  h igher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ions .  The chap ter  then cont inues to  discuss the merger  and closure of  
ins t i tut ions .  Chapter  5  of  the Higher  Education  Act  of  1997 deals with  the funding of  
the public  inst i tu t ions,  namely,  the a l locat ion of  funds and records to  be kept .   Chapter  
6A focuses  on the es tabli shment,  func tions and duties  of  nat ional  inst i tu t ions fo r  
higher  learning,  whi le  Chapter  7  d iscusses the  r eg is tra t ion  of  pr ivate  higher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ions .  Chapter  8  includes genera l  prov is ions such as the name change of  a  
univer si ty ,  the seat  of  a  public  higher  education ins t i tut ion,  qua lif ica t ions,  l imi ta t ion  
of  l iabil i ty  of  the CHE and the s tate  and the  de lega tion of  powers.  Chapter  9 ,  the f ina l 
chapter ,  ou tl ines the  trans i t ional  arrangement,  which has now most ly  been  
accomplished s ince the Act’ s promulgation  in  1997.  
 




well as the co-operation among public higher education institutions. 
Notably, this chapter does not mention the core issues of governance, 
nor does it include any preventative measures to ensure good 
governance practices. Should one compare this chapter with the 
governance of companies as contained in Part F of the Companies Act 
of 2008, areas of improvement can be identified.95  
• Chapter 6 focuses on ministerial interventions and therefore bears 
direct relevance to this research. Since ministerial interventions in the 
affairs of public higher education institutions are reviewed and 
discussed. It includes the appointment, role and functions of an 
independent assessor appointed to a public higher education institution 
that is in distress,96 as prescribed in the Higher Education Act of 1997. 
The chapter furthermore considers the situations where an independent 
assessor can be appointed, as well as the appointment of an 
administrator, his/her role, powers, functions and duties. 
 
2.2.4 The National Plan for Higher Education 
 
In 2001, the National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) was published,97 
outlining the framework and the mechanisms for the implementation of the 
goals stipulated in the 1997 White Paper. The National Plan for Higher 
Education calls for further investigation into what would constitute an 
appropriate institutional landscape for higher institutions.98 The main aims 
of the NPHE are firstly to, ensure that higher education in South Africa 
achieved its transformation objectives formulated in the 1997 White Paper; 
 
95 A compar ison  of  the governance  of  companies versus the governance of  public  h igher  
educat ion ins t i tut ions fo l low in  Chapter  4 .  
 
96 Prescr ibed in  s  45 of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997.  
 
97 Government Gazet te  Nr.  22138 (GN. 429)  9  March 2001 .  For  more on the NPHE see  
Ntshoe IM “National  Plan for  Higher  Education in  South Afr ica:  A Programme for  
Equity  and  Redress or  Globali sed  Competi t ion  and Manager ia l i sm?” 2002(16)  SAJHE  7  
–  10.  
 
98 NPHE Report  sect ion  6.4;  CHE Higher Education  Reviewed:   Two Decades o f  




secondly, to ensure that there was coherence in the provision of h igher 
education at national level, thirdly, to ensure that all resources are used 
efficiently and effectively; fourthly, to ensure that there was accountability 
for the expenditure of public funds; and lastly, to ensure that the quality of 
academic programmes was approved.99 The drafting of the NPHE was 
informed by the institutional planning process, which had already 
commenced in 1998. It was further influenced by the higher education 
trends of the Department of Education, the report of the CHE as well as the 
responses of the various public higher education institutions. 100  
 
The restructuring of higher education in South Africa also included various 
mergers of public institutions.101 On 25 May 2001, the implementation plan 
for the NPHE was published.102 This plan made provision for a National 
Working Group to be established to advise the Ministry. The Working 
Group was also tasked with investigating the restructuring of higher 
education to ensure that it contributes to the NPHE. 103 The NPHE did not 
specifically deal with governance higher education at that time, as 






99 NPHE Report  13.  
 
100 CHE  “Towards a  New Higher  Education Landscape:  Meeting the Equi ty ,  Qual i ty  and  
Social  Developmen t Imperat ives of  South  Afr ica  in  the 21 s t  Century” ( June 2000) .  
 
101 Some of  the mergers that  took place inc luded  the Rand Afr ikaan se Universi ty  and  
Technikon Witwatersrand which then formed the Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg  
(Government  Gaze tte  r .  25737 (GN. 1702)  14 November 2003; the Univers i ty  of  Nata l  
and the Univers i ty  of  Durban -Westvi l le  which formed the Univers i ty  of  Kwa -Zulu  
Natal  (Government Gaze tte  Nr.  25737  (GN. 1688)  14 November 2011.  
 
102 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  22329 (GN. 466)  25 May 2001.  
 




2.2.5 Guidelines for good governance practice and governance 
indicators for Councils of South African Public Higher Education 
Institutions 
 
This document was issued by the Department of Higher Education and 
Training in December 2017 with the aim of improving good governance of 
university Councils. However, these guidelines appear to be a set of 
principles for Councils to improve their efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability; they do not constitute a statutory document.104 One of the 
reasons for the need for these guidelines was the fact that several 
universities had been placed under administration over the past few years, 
some of them more than once. These institutions were placed under 
administration as a result of independent assessors’ reports highlighting 
various governance, administrative and management failures.105 The 
guidelines also highlighted the fact that other than the 1997 White Paper 
and the Higher Education Act of 1997, no other governance standards had 
been provided to public higher education institutions to assist them in 
establishing appropriate norms and standards of governance. In the 
absence of such guidance, public higher education institutions were relying 
on the King Reports of Good Corporate Governance .106 The principles of 
King III are applied in the 2014 Reporting Regulations.107 King IV refers to a 
“governing body” instead of a “company” because its principles are 
applicable to all sectors and entities.108 There is a clear need for proper 
governance principles aimed specifically at public higher education 
 
104 DHET “Guidel ines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors for  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education insti tut ions” December 2017 11.  
 
105 DHET “Guidelines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  
Councils  of  South Afr ican publ ic  higher  educat ion inst i tu t ions”  December 2017  9 –  10.   
See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  below for  a  d iscuss ion on these fa i lures in  governance  in  
South Afr ican un ivers i t ies.  
 
106 The his tory of  the King  Reports  i s  d iscussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3  be low.  
 
107 Since then ,  King IV was in troduced in  2017.   King IV i s  discussed in  Chap ter  4 ,  para  
4 .4 .3  below.  
 
108 King IV  i s  d iscussed in  more de tai l  in  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  be low.  
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institutions. The need for improved governance practices is recognised in 
the DHET’s guidelines for good governance practices and governance 
indicators for Councils of South African Public Higher Education 
Institutions. However, only three recommendations are made in this regard. 
The DHET’s Guidelines for good governance practice and governance 
indicators for Councils of South African Public Higher Education Institutions 
was created with the aim of improving governance practices in higher 
education institutions.109 The major part of the document is devoted to 
highlighting governance inefficiencies and problems, whereas only three 
short recommendations are made. It is posited that these recommendations 
are inadequate, and more significant effort should have been made to 
provide clear and specific guidelines. 110 Furthermore, as reflected in the title 
of the document, it is intended only for Councils. This excludes its 
application to the day-to-day management or operational matters of the 
institution; which responsibilities fall to the Vice-Chancellor and the 
executive management.111 It is therefore proposed that provision be made 
for the accountability of executive management. King IV defines 
accountability as follows: “It is the obligation to answer for the execution of 
responsibilities. Accountability cannot be delegated, whereas 
responsibilities can be delegated without abdicating accountability for that 
delegated responsibility.”112 The difference between accountability and 
responsibility is that the former can be shared while the latter cannot be 
shared. Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. 
According to Stapenhurst and O’Brien, accountability can be described as 
the relationship between an individual or body and the functions performed 
by this individual or body are subject to another person or body’s oversight. 
 
109 DHET “Guidel ines for  good gov ernance prac tices and governance indica tors for  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education insti tut ions” December 2017 4.  
 
110 See Chapter  6  below for  al l  the recommendations per ta ining  to  the Higher  Educat ion  
Act  of  1997 and the 2014 Reporting  Regula t ions .  
 
111 Section  30 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997 .  
 




The individual or body conducting the functions must divulge information or 
justify their actions. Accountability in governance is important, as ongoing 
evaluation will ensure that officials perform effectively.113 Responsibility is 
defined in King IV as “taking ownership of a duty, obligation or liability.” 114  
 
Both accountability and responsibility form part of principle one of King IV.  
Council members and the executive management are therefore responsible 
for the execution of their responsibilities even if they were delegated. 
Moreover, Council members and the executive management of a higher 
education institution must exercise their duties in the best interest of the 
institution.115 The governance distinction between responsibility and 
accountability is that responsibility can be shared while accountability 
cannot be shared.  Therefore, the Council may delegate their responsibility, 
but will ultimately remain accountable for all decision making.  
 
Although the publication of these guidelines was a commendable initiative, 
the document only contains three short recommendations.116 The first 
recommendation propose that the scorecard provided in the Guidelines be 
submitted to the DHET as part of the university’s annual performance plan.  
This seems to be a sound proposal. The second recommendation relates to 
the separation of the institution’s institutional statute and its institutional 
 
113 Stapenhurst  R and O’Brien M “Accountabi l i ty  in  Governa nce” World Bank 1 ;  see  
also Crowther  D e t  a l .  ( eds)  Governance,  Accountabil i ty  and  Sustainable Development  
(Cambridge  Scholars Publishing  2015)  103; Kaler  J  “Responsibi l i t ies ,  Accountabi l i ty  
and Governance” 2002(11)  Business Ethics:  A European Review  328.   
114 King  IV  16;  Kaler  suggests  that  i f  someone’s “responsib il i t ies”  are referred  to ,  
reference i s  made to  a  si tua tion where some thing happened or  fai led to  happen.   The 
consequences of  the ac t ions of  a  person’s responsib il i t ies can be e i ther  posit ive or  
negat ive.   When the consequences a re posi t ive ,  the  responsible person might  receive 
praise and a  reward:  when i t  i s  negative ,  the person might  receive  blame and possib le  
punishment :  Kaler  2002(11)  Business Ethics:  A European  Review  327 –  328.  
115 King IV ,  p r inc iple 1 .  
116 For these recommendations,  see DHET “Guidelines for  good governance  pract ice and  
governance  ind ica tors  for  Councils  o f  South Af r ican public  h igher  education 




rules. Institutions can then incorporate provisions of good governance and 
competency frameworks in their institutional rules. The last 
recommendation states that the DHET will review the standard institutional 
statute.117  Furthermore, the DHET indicates that it may seek to amend the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 to provide for smaller Councils , as larger 
Councils have hampered effective governance in higher education 
institutions.118 
 
2.3 GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK OF A HIGHER EDUCATION 
INSTITUTION 
 
2.3.1 Legislative framework 
 
The Department of Education was established as part of the post-1994 
government. In May 2009, it was divided into two departments: the 
Department of Basic Education (DBE) 119 and the Department of Higher 
Education and Training.120 The formal separation of the two departments 
took effect on 1 April 2010.121 Higher education in South Africa includes 
 
117 To view the scorecard ,  see DHET “Guidelines for  good g overnance pract ice and 
governance  ind ica tors  for  Councils  of  South Afr ican public  h igher  education 
insti tut ions” December 2017 55 –  66.  
 
118 DHET “Guidel ines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  
Councils  of  South Afr ican publ ic  higher  education inst i tu t ions” December 2017 68.   
Smaller  Councils  might  be more effec tive since fewer  members  on a Council  might 
work be tter  tog ether  in  the best  in teres t  of  the inst i tu t ion.   Larger  Councils  prov ide  for  
a  larger  pool of  people who  wil l  d isagree w ith  one another  and tend to  be less 
effec t ive .  
 
119 See more on the Department  of  Basic Educat ion on  
http: / /www.education.gov.za/TheDBE/AboutDBE/tab id/435/Defau lt . aspx  (Date  of  use:  
17 May 2018) .   The DBE is tasked with  al l  pr imary and secondary educat ion in  South  
Afr ica.  
 
120 The  DHET is  responsible fo r  h igher  educat ion in  South Afr ica.  Sec t ion 1  of  The  
Higher  Educat ion Laws Amendment Act 26 of  2010 amended the Higher  Education  Act  
of  1997 to  change the  def ini t ion of  “Department of  Educat ion” to  “Depar tment of  
Higher  Education and Training” and “Minis te r”  to  “Min i s te r  of  Higher  Educat ion and  
Train ing”.  
 




public and private higher education institutions.122 The current system of 
governance of public education was formally established in the Higher 
Education Act of 1997. The DHET derives its mandate from section 29 of 
the Constitution, which lists education at all levels, including tertiary 
education, as a functional area of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence.123 The promulgation of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 led to the repeal of various Acts, which in turn resulted in a more co-
ordinated and structured framework.124  
 
There are two other statutory bodies involved in the governance of higher 
education institutions in South Africa: the Council of Higher Education 
(CHE)125 with its Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC), and the 
South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).126 SAQA was initially 
established in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority Act 58 of 
1995127 but is now governed by the National Qualifications Framework Act 
 
122 Sect ion 20  of  the  Higher  Educ at ion Act of  1997 (publ ic)  and s  51 of  the  Higher  
Educat ion Act  of  1997 (pr iva te) .  This s tudy focuses on public  h igher  educatio n 
ins t i tut ions;  however ,  a  br ief  overview is prov ided of  the structure of  pr ivate higher  
educat ion ins t i tut ions since the Compani es Act of  2008 i s  appl icable to  these 
ins t i tut ions  (but  i s  no t  app licable to  publ ic  higher  education  inst i tut ions) .  The  
Companies Act of  2008 conta ins a  par t ia l  codif icat i on of  d irector’ s  duties.   I t  i s  
recommended tha t  the Higher  Education Act of  1997 be amended to  include similar  
provis ions as the Companies Act of  2008.  
 
123 For  more on  the  Department of  Higher  Educat ion and Train ing,  see  
ht tp: / /www.dhet .gov.za/Si tePages/AboutUS.aspx  (Date of  use :  17 May 2018) .  
 
124 Section  76 of  Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997.  
 
125 A sta tutory body in  terms of  s  4  o f  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997.  
 
126 Es tabl i shed in  terms of  s  3  of  the  South Afr ican Qualif ica t ions Author i ty  Act  58 of  
1995.   
 
127 Hereaf ter  referred to  a s the SAQA Act.  The South Afr ican Qual if icat ions Authori ty  
Board  i s  a  body of  12 members appointed by the Min is ter  of  Higher  Ed ucation and  
Train ing.  This Act was repea led  in  terms of  s  37  of  the  National  Quali f icat ions  
Framework  Act 67  of  2008.  I t s  mandate  i s  to  advise the Min ister  of  Higher  Education 
and Tra ining on NQF matters in  terms of  the  NQF Act.  SAQA must  also perform i ts  
functions subjec t  to  the  NQF Act  and oversee the implementa t ion of  the NQF as wel l  as 
to  ensure the achievement of  i t s  object ives .  See the NQF Act for  more deta i l  per ta ining 
to  their  functions.   Th is s tudy does  not  focus on SAQA as  th is is  not  relevan t  to  the  
purposes of  the research.  For  more on the South Afr ican Qualif ica t ions Author i ty  




67 of 2008.128 CHE was established in 1997 as a statutory body to provide 
independent advice to the Minister relating to matters of transformation and 
development of higher education and to manage quality assurance. 
Chapter 3 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provided for the 
establishment of the CHE, its mandate and functions. In terms of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997, the Minister is obliged to accept the advice 
provided by the CHE or offer reasons for not accepting such advice. 129 The 
CHE plays an essential regulatory and advisory role in the governance of 
higher education institutions, and all indications are that it will continue to 
play this critical role in the future.  
 
Another role player within the legislation framework of higher education is 
Higher Education South Africa (HESA), which was formed on 9 May 2005, 
and was the successor to the two statutory representative bodies for 
universities and the former technikons.130 HESA subsequently changed its 
name to Universities South Africa (USAf),  a membership organisation 
representing South Africa’s universities. 131 Although USAf is not a statutory 
body and has no status in law, it serves an essential function in areas such 
as strategic research, stakeholder engagement and sector support . Higher 
education in South Africa went through significant restructuring during 2004 
and 2005, which involved mergers of universities and technikons and the 
creation of the new comprehensive universities. USAf’s mandate is to 
facilitate the development of informed public policy on higher education 
and to encourage cooperation between universit ies and government, 
industry and other sectors of society in South Africa. 132  When the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 was amended in 2012, many organisations like USAf 
 
128 Hereaf ter  referred to  as  the NQF  Act .  I t s  ob jec t ives are  l is ted in  s  5  of  the NQF Act.  
 
129 1997 White  Paper  39.  
 
130 Technikons  are now univers i t ies of  technology.  
 
131 For  more on USAf,  see ht tps: / /www.usaf .ac.za/  (Date of  use :  17 May 2018) .    I t s  
name changed on 22 Ju ly 2015.   
 




felt excluded from the participation process. 133 This resulted in the 
establishment of the Legal Advisory Committee at USAf, which is 
responsible for technical comment on draft legislation that has a direct 
impact on higher education.  It also advises USAf on the impact of specific 
pieces of legislation on the functioning of institutions. 134  
 
It is clear that the legislative framework of higher education post-1994 has 
undergone dramatic changes. Not only is there more structure, but 
organisations like USAf and the CHE have been established to assist 
institutions and to facilitate the relationship between the institutions and 
government, an area which was previously lacking.  
 
2.3.2 Institutional governance 
 
The 1997 White Paper made it patently clear that all universities must 
manage their own affairs. In terms of section 20(4) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1997, every public university is a juristic person.  Although the 
Higher Education Act of 1997, together with a university’s institutional 
statute135 and the reporting regulations136 for public higher education 
institutions, is the only governing legislation for these institutions, it differs 
slightly for private higher education institutions. Registration for public 
higher education institutions takes place in accordance with section 51 of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997. However, for an institution to be 
recognised as a private higher education institution, it needs to be 
registered as a juristic entity in terms of the company laws 137 of South 
 
133 I t  i s  unclear  why HESA fel t  exc luded,  as i t  was in  fac t  included in  the agenda for  the  
public  hear ings  he ld  on 11 Sep tember  2012.  
 
134 For  more on  USAf’s Legal  Advisory Commit tee  and i t s  mandate,  see  
https: / /www.usaf .ac.za/governance -s truc tures /   (Date of  use :  17 May 2018) .  
 
135 Section  33 of  the Highe r  Education Act of  1997 .  
 
136 The 2014 Reporting  Regulations  are  d iscussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  below.  
 




Africa.138 Private higher education institutions are required to comply with 
the Companies Act of 2008 as well as limited provisions in the Higher 
Education Act of 1997.  Private higher education institutions must also 
comply with the Department of Higher Education and Training’s 
Regulations for the Registration of Private Higher Education Institutions .139 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 is prescriptive with regards to public 
higher education institutions since they obtain most of their funding from 
government, yet, it is less so with regards to private institutions which are 
primarily regulated by the Companies Act of 2008 and are privately 
funded.140 It is essential to understand the difference between private and 
public higher education institutions and the fact that due to their public 
nature, public higher education institutions will always be publicly 
accountable. One of the most significant differences between public and 
private higher education institutions is the level of institutional governance 
prescribed for public higher education institutions and not for private 
institutions. The latter framework prescribed by the Higher Education Act of 
1997 is a set of formal governance structures for public institut ions like the 
Council, Senate, Institutional Forum (IF) and Student Representative 
Council (SRC).141 There are no similar requirements for private higher 
education institutions. 
 
(a)  Private higher education 
 
Although the focus of this thesis is not on private higher education, it is 
briefly referred to as the Companies Act of 2008 applies to private higher 
education institutions. The Companies Act of 2008 provides a clear 
 
138 Section 51(1)(a)(b)  of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997.   I t  i s  important  to  note tha t  
public  inst i tu t ions a re not  sub ject  to  the Companies Act 2008.  
 
139 Government Gazet te  Nr.39880 (GN. 383)  31 Marc h 2016.   These regulat ions were  
published to  assist  w i th  ent i t ies that  want to  regis ter  pr iva te h igher  education  
ins t i tut ions .  
 
140 Pr ivate higher  educat ion is  discussed in  para 2 .3 . 2(a)  be low.  
 




mandate for directors and the management of the company. Furthermore, it 
provides for a standard of conduct for directors as well as liability in the 
event of a breach of the duties owed to the company.  Moreover, the 
Companies Act of 2008 also provides for the removal of an errant director. 
All of these statutory provisions assist in improving corporate governance 
practices in companies, and similar provisions will be beneficial to public 
higher education institutions.142 The end of Apartheid saw a rapid growth in 
private higher education in South Africa. 143 Private higher education 
institutions are discussed in Chapter 7 of the Higher Education Act of 1997. 
Section 51 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides that no person 
other than a public higher education institution or an organ of state may 
provide higher education unless that person is registered or conditionally 
registered in terms of the Higher Education Act of 1997 and registered as a 
juristic person in terms of the Companies Act of 2008.  In terms of section 
50 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, the Director-General is the 
Registrar of private higher education institutions. The Minister may 
furthermore designate any employee of the DHET to assist the Registrar in 
the performance of his/her duties.  All applications for the registration of 
private higher education institutions must be made to the Registrar144 , and 
these institutions will only be registered if they comply with the prescribed 
requirements for registration.145 
 
There is no need for the Higher Education Act of 1997 to deal with private 
institutions in detail as they are registered as companies and accordingly 
 
142 See a  discuss ion on these  provis ions  con ta ine d in  the Companies Act of  2008 in  
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2  be low.  
143 See in  genera l ,  Mabize la M “The evolu tion  of  pr ivate prov ision o f  h igher  educat ion  
in  South  Afr ica” 2002(20)  Perspec tive in  Education  41 –  51;  CHE Higher Educat ion 
Reviewed:  Two Decades of  Demo cracy  2016 84.  
 
144 Section  52 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997 .  
 
145 Sec tion 53 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997.  See a lso Baloro v  Universi ty  o f  
Bophuthatswana  1995 (4)  SA 197 (B) and Niekara Harriela l l  v  Universi ty  of  Kwazulu -
Nata l  2017 ZACC 38; 2018 1 BCLR 12 (CC) for  examples of  case law confirming  tha t  a  




managed as such. This consequently implies that the governance of these 
institutions must comply with the provisions of the Companies Act of 2008.  
There is no administration process for private higher education institutions, 
and when such institutions are mismanaged or fall on hard times, they are 
dealt with in the same way as any other company, which, in many 
instances could lead to liquidation proceedings. It is also important to note 
that the HEQC of the CHE is also responsible for the accreditation of the 
academic programmes of these private higher education institutions.   
 
It should be noted that although the Higher Education Act of 1997 is less 
prescriptive towards private higher education, this sector is still  closely 
monitored by the DHET. Although the DHET cannot intervene in any of 
these private institutions, it is within its power to withdraw the registration 
certificate of a private higher education institution in the event of non-
compliance with any provisions of the DHET. This would preclude the 
institution from offering any services to students. In the event of an 
application for liquidation, the DHET, through the CHE, would form a task 
team to investigate and make a recommendation to the Minister. However, 
the DHET would not have any role to play in the liquidation proceedings of 
these private higher education institutions. 
 
(b) Public higher education 
 
As stated earlier, the Higher Education Act of 1997 is more prescriptive 
with regards to the governance of public education institutions due to them 
being funded by the government. As stipulated in the 1997 White Paper, it 
is the responsibility of higher education institutions to manage their own 
affairs; the DHET does not intend to micro-manage these institutions and 
promotes institutional autonomy.146 Section 26 of the Higher Education Act 
of 1997 specifies that the institutional governance structure of a higher 
 
146 This i s  where  an ins t i tut ion has  a  cer tain  degree  of  se lf - regulat ion and  




education institution contains a Council, a Senate, a Principal, a Vice-
Principal, a Student Representative Council and an Institutional Forum and 
such other structures and offices as may be determined by the institutional 
statute of a higher education institution.147 Even as far back as the Van Wyk 
de Vries Commission in 1972, the Council and the Senate have been 
perceived as the two most crucial management structures of a university. 148 
The Council is the supreme decision-making body of a university and is 
ultimately responsible for the governance of the institution while the Senate 
is the highest decision-making body on academic matters. Senate reports 
to Council.149   
 
For the purposes of this research, several institutional statutes of public 
higher education institutions were reviewed. The information relating to the 
Council, Senate, IF and SRC contained in these institutional statutes is 
discussed in the paragraphs below. 
 
 (i) The Council 
 
In terms of section 27 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, each university 
must establish a Council. The Council must govern the institution subject to 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 as well as the institutional statute of that 
institution. It is the responsibility of each Council to oversee order and 
good governance at the institution.150  
 
 
147 Inst i tu t ional  statu tes and ins t i tut iona l  rules are made in  compl iance with  s  32 of  th e  
Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  This is  discussed in  more detai l  be low.  
 
148 Van Wyk de  Vries Commis sion Report  109.  
 
149 Sec tion 28(1)  of  the Higher  Education Act o f  1997.  See in  general ,  Cloete et  al .  
Transformat ion in  Higher  Edu cation:  Global  Pressures  and Local Reali t ies  in  South  
Afr ica  233 .  
 




The Higher Education Act of 1997 dictates the appointees of the Council as 
follows:151 the Principal of the institution, the Vice-Principal of the institution, 
not more than five appointees by the Ministry, members of Senate elected 
by the Senate, academic employees of the institution elected by such 
employees, students of the institution elected by the SRC, employees other 
than academic employees elected by such employees and such additional 
persons as may be determined by the institutional statute of that institution. 
The Higher Education Act of 1997, by way of each university’s institutional 
statute, provides considerable leeway in constituting the external 
membership of a Council by specifying only that direct ministerial 
appointments to the Council be limited to a maximum of five members,152 
thereby preventing Councils from being controlled by state 
representatives.153 It further specifies that members of the Council “…..must 
be persons with knowledge and experience relevant to the object ives and 
governance of the public higher education institution concerned,”154 and that 
they “must participate in the deliberations of the Council in the best interest 
of the public higher education institution concerned.” 155 By determining the 
composition of a Council, the Higher Education Act of 1997 ensures that 
there is broad-spectrum participation among the various stakeholders as 
well as co-operative governance. However, taking into consideration that 
the Council of a university is the highest decision-making body, similar to a 
board of directors of a company, it is concerning that, it includes students 
and other employees who may not have the relevant insight, qualification 
or experience. It may be questioned whether it is wise to have students 
form part of a university Council when they may not have the required 
 
151 Section  27(4)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
152 Section  27(4)(c)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
153 CHE  “Governance in  South Afr ican Higher  Educat ion” 2002 36.  
 
154 Sect ion 27(7)(a)  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997; see DHET “Guidelines  for  
good governance prac tice and governance indicators for  Councils  of  South Afr ican  
Publ ic  Higher  Education Inst i tu t ions” December 2017 37 –  39 for  their  suggest ions on  
membership cr i ter ia .   
 




maturity nor qualifications to make sound decisions in the best interests of 
the institution and whether participation should not be via another forum. 156  
Case studies conducted by the CHE and USAf suggest that larger Councils 
are difficult to manage and to maintain cohesion of. In fact, large Councils 
are prone to factionalism and absenteeism. In some cases, Vice-
Chancellors have indicated that consensus in strategic debates in large 
Councils has been difficult to achieve and they have accordingly proposed 
smaller Councils. The size of a Council is dependent on how its internal 
membership is constituted: if each category of internal representatives has 
only one representative, the Council size might range between 20 and 24 
members and therefore still adhere to the 60% rule. 157 This can be 
determined in the institutional statute of each institution in terms of section 
27(5). Each institution is therefore able to determine the size of its Council. 
In agreement with both CHE and USAf, it is thus posited that Council sizes 
should be smaller. 
 
The functions and responsibilities of a Council can be summarised as 
follows:158 formulating the institution’s mission and purpose; appointing the 
 
156 During the last  decade,  publ ic  h igher  education  ins t i tut ions were faced  wi th  s tuden t  
protests  and  picket ing,  in  some ins tances  the  inst i tu t ions  had  to  c lose  some or  al l  of  
their  campuses.   I t  i s  concerning that  in  some instances some SRC members par take in  
the pro tests .  I t  may be  tha t  the same SRC members  s i t t ing on  the  Council  are also 
par t icipat ing in  the student  unres t .   See in  general ,  Luesher -Mamashela TM “Student  
Representat ion in  Universi ty  Decision Making:   Good Reasons,  a  new Lens?”  2013 (38)  
Studies  in  Higher Educa tion  1445  –  1454; CHE Higher  Educat ion Reviewed:  Two 
Decades o f  Democracy 2016 50 –  51.  
 
157 Sect ion 27(6)  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997; DHET “Guidelines fo r  good  
governance  and  governance  ind ica tors for  Councils  of  South  Afr ican Public  Higher  
Educat ion Inst i tu t ions”  December 2017 29 .  
 
158 The funct ions and responsib il i t ies l i sted here a re a  combination of  the functions and  
responsib il i t ies  contained in  the inst i tu t iona l  s ta tutes  of  ten  publ ic  universi t ies.  
Although there are twenty -six  public  un iversi t i es,  some of  them use a  s tandard  
ins t i tut iona l  statu te .  The ten  inst i tu t ional  s ta tutes  were  selected from publ ic  
universi t ies  tha t  have  customised ins t i tut ional  statu tes and  consis t  of  a  mix of  
comprehensive universi t ies as wel l  as un iversi t ies tha t  were r ecen tly  es tabli shed .  These  
ins t i tut iona l  sta tutes  dif fer  f rom one ano ther .   However ,  as  long as they comply with  
the prov isions of  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997,  they  may  dif fer  f rom one another .  
See  DHET “Guidelines  for  good  governance  pract ice  and  gov ernance ind ica tors for  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education insti tut ions” December 2017 40 –  42 
for  their  d iscuss ion on the function ing of  council  as wel l  as the pr imary functions of  
the Council .   
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Vice-Chancellor and other senior management; evaluating and supporting 
the Vice-Chancellor; assuring proper management; being accountable for 
financial resources and institutional assets; monitoring the transformation 
process; assuring student access and success; assuring order and a safe 
campus environment; maintaining institutional autonomy; setting up and 
serving on council committees and taking stock of the Council’s own 
performance.159 One of the responsibilities of the Council is to ensure that 
the institution is well managed and to maintain order and governance of 
institutions. However, it is not the function of the Council to micro-manage 
the institution by involving itself in the day-to-day management of the 
institution; this is the responsibility of the executive management led by the 
Vice-Chancellor.160   
 
According to Ncayiyana and Hayward, there are various ways in which a 
Council can ensure that the institution is well managed. The Council should 
ensure that it hires executive leaders with integrity, dedication, loyalty and 
excellent managerial skills in addition to the skills and experience required 
for the specific position. The Council has the authority to reject 
appointments that do not meet criteria and would therefore not be in the 
best interests of the institution. The Council should have a firm grasp of its 
responsibilities as the overseer of resources, the ultimate employer of all 
staff and, through the Senate, the overseer of student admission policies 
and academic programmes. The Council should insist on regular reports (at 
every Council meeting) from the Vice-Chancellor on the state of the 
institution, accompanied by appropriate analyse and data, including full 
financial disclosure discussed at least on a quarterly basis. The Council 
should satisfy itself that financial and other management systems are in 
 
 
159 Ncayiyana DJ and Hayward FM Effect ive Governance:  A Guide for  Council  Members  
of  Universi t ies and Technikons (CHET South Afr ica  1999)  9 .   Two of  these functions  
should be di scussed in  more detai l ,  i .e .  ensuring good management  and preserv ing 
ins t i tut iona l  au tonomy as these have direc t  bear ing on th e curren t  research.  
 
160 DHET “Guidelines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  




place and ensure that the institution conforms to the provisions of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 and other requirements prescribed by the 
DHET and the CHE. Councils of higher education institutions should 
assiduously guard the autonomy of institutions. The Higher Education Act 
of 1997 affirms autonomy against undue interference by the state or other 
external influence.  161  
 
For the purposes of this research, the institutional statutes of various 
universities have been reviewed. Of the 26 public universities, only two 
institutional statutes make reference to fiduciary relationships.162 It confirms 
the common law position that a member of a Council has a fiduciary 
relationship with the university. According to these statutes, a member of a 
Council must promote the interests of the university, act in good faith and 
with due care and skill. These are similar to the fiduciary duties of 
directors, as confirmed in section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008.  163  
 
(ii) The Senate 
 
In terms of section 28 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, each university 
must establish a Senate which is accountable to the Council for the 
academic and research functions of public higher education institutions. 164 
The Senate comprises the following: the Principal, the Vice-Principal(s), 
academic employees of the institution, employees of the institution  other 
 
161 Sect ion  34 of  the  Higher  Educat ion  Act  of  1997; the  inst i tu t ional  statut e  of  each  
public  higher  education inst i tu t ion.  S ee  a lso Ncayiyana  and Hayward  Effec tive  
Governance:  A Guide for Council  Members of  Universi t ies and  Technikons 9.  
   
162 I t  i s  impossib le to  summarise  the inst i tu t ional  statu tes of  al l  exis t ing universi t ies in  
this thes i s;  therefore,  the researcher  considered three ins t i tut iona l  s ta tutes of  public  
higher  education ins t i tut ions and summari sed  the con ten t  for  the purposes of  this  
chapter .  These ins t i tut ional  statues  were chosen from public  un ivers i t ies that  have  
customised ins t i tut iona l  s tatu tes and  compr ises of  tradi t iona l  and comprehensive 
universi t ies.  
 
163 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .5  below f or  a  d iscuss ion on f iduciary  dut ies in  terms of  the  
Companies Act  of  2008.  
 




than academic employees, members of the Council, members of the SRC 
and such additional persons as may be determined by the institutional 
statute of the institution.165 The majority of the members of a Senate must 
be academic employees of the public higher education institution 
concerned.166   
 
According to section 29 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, Council and 
Senate may establish committees to perform any of their functions and may 
also appoint any person as a member of such committees.167 A Senate may 
not take decisions in a political or economic vacuum; it should take into 
account the impact its decisions will have on those it will affect . The Higher 
Education Act of 1997 clearly distinguishes between the matters the 
Council may decide upon “after consultation” with Senate and matters that 
can only be resolved if Senate “concurs” with the Council. 168 
 
A Senate should also take into account the purpose of a university when 
making its decisions.169 The functions and responsibility of a Senate can be 
summarised as follows:170 providing academic leadership and debating 
matters of academic principle; promoting an institutional culture of high 
academic and ethical standards; ensuring the academic quality of 
programmes, research and community engagement activities; determining 
and recommending to the Council policy regarding admission, teaching, 
learning, assessment, research, quality assurance, community engagement 
 
165 Sect ion  28(2)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
166 Section  28(4)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
167 Section  27(1)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
168 DHET “Guidelines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education insti tut ions” December 2017 21.  
 
169 Morrow W Bounds o f  Democracy:  Epis temologica l  access  in  h igher  education  
(Human Sciences Research Counci l  2009)  108.  
 
170 For  the purposes of  th is research,  three un iversi t ies were cho sen whose inst i tu t iona l  




and other matters that form part of its functions; co-determining with the 
Council the language policy of the university; determining guidelines for the 
appointment and promotion of academic employees, advising the Council in 
this regard and making recommendations on the appointment of academic 
employees; determining and submitting recommendations to the Council on 
the organisation and structuring of teaching, learning, research and 
community engagement; determining and submitting recommendations to 
the Council on the introduction or suspension of degrees, diplomas, 
certificates, programmes, courses and subjects as well as making 
recommendations pertaining to each school, college or faculty, including 
the establishment or disestablishment of schools, colleges or facu lties; 
determining the rules for degrees, diplomas, certificates and other 
academic programmes; considering and approving recommendations from 
its committees, including faculty boards; ensure legal compliance in regard 
to academic matters; determining and recommending to the Council on 
matters related to academic development and support services, 
professional specialist services for students, student discipline, the 
constitution of the SRC and other student matters of an academic nature; 
determining and submitting recommendations to the Council on matters 
delegated or entrusted by the Council; establishing committees to promote 
its functions; determining the principles, conditions and criteria for the 
award of scholarships and academic prizes; supervising and controlling all 
examinations held by the university, in accordance with the provisions laid 
down by the Senate; making recommendations as to membership positions 
of the various faculty boards; and  fulfilling such other functions and tasks 
as determined by the Council.  Scrutiny of the various institutional statutes 
of the various public universities has revealed that only one institution’s 








 (iii) The Institutional Forum 
 
The role of the Institutional Forum (IF) is to advise the Council on issues 
affecting the institution such as the implementation of the Higher Education 
Act of 1997 and the national policy on higher education; race and gender 
equity policies; the selection of candidates for senior management 
positions; codes of conduct, mediation and dispute resolution procedures; 
the fostering of an institutional culture which promotes tolerance and 
respect for fundamental rights and creates an appropriate environment for 
teaching, research and learning; and performing such functions as 
determined by the Council.171 The IF is required to consist of the following 
representatives: the management as determined by the institutional statute; 
the Council; the Senate; academic employees; employees other than 
academic employees; students; and any other category determined by the 
institutional statute.172   
 
It should be noted that the IF does not have decision-making powers and is 
not able to override any decisions made by either the Council or Senate. 
However, the amended Higher Education Act of 1997, now stipulates that 
the Council must consider the IF’s advice or provide written reasons if the 
advice is not accepted.173 
 
(iv) The Student Representative Council 
 
In terms of section 35 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, the 
establishment and composition, manner of election, term of office, 
functions and privileges of the Student Representative Council (SRC) must 
be determined by the statute and rules of each institution. The SRC is 
 
171 Section  31(1)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
172 Section  31(2)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
173 Sect ion 31(1A)  inser ted by s 9  of  the  Higher  Education  Amendment  Act of  2016 .   
See  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion on  the amendments  to  s  31(2)  of  the  High er  




accountable to the Council, the Vice-Chancellor/Rector and the student 
body/community. The functions and powers of the SRC can be summarised 
as follows:174 representing the student community and acting in its interest 
concerning relevant academic and non-academic matters; supporting and 
upholding the vision, mission, values and goals of the univers ity; liaising 
with Council, Senate, the Vice-Chancellor/Rector and management, the 
SRC of other institutions and the general public; promoting student 
participation in student affairs; and promoting academic diligence and 
excellence among students. As already mentioned above, it is suggested 
that the role and effectiveness of the SRC should be revised to ensure that 
this body operates effectively and in the best interests of its higher 
education institution. The SRC is not discussed further, but SRC members 
who are also members of Council will be subject to the rules that apply to 




In terms of section 32 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, a Council of a 
university may make an institutional statute subject to section 33. Section 
32(2) is prescriptive and states:  
An institutional statute or institutional rules in connection 
with the composition of the Senate may not be amended 
or repealed except after consultation with such Senate; 
the academic functions of the public higher education 
institution concerned, including the studies, instruction 
and examinations of students and research may not be 
made, amended or repealed except with the concurrence 
of the Senate of such institution; the composition of the 
students’ representative Council may not be amended or 
repealed except after consultation with such students’ 
representative Council; and the disciplinary measures 
and disciplinary procedures relating to students, may not 
be made except after consultation with the Senate and 




174 For the purposes of  this research,  three universi t ies were chosen whose inst i tu t iona l  




Section 33 confirms that all institutional statutes of public higher education 
institutions must be submitted to the Minister for approval. If the 
institutional statute is approved, it must be published in the Government 
Gazette, and will then come into operation on the date mentioned in the 
notice.   
 
According to section 29 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, the Council 
and Senate of a public higher education institution may each establish 
committees to perform any of their functions and may appoint persons who 
are not members of the Council or the Senate as members of the 
committees.175 The composition, manner of election, functions and 
procedures at meetings and the dissolution of a committee or joint 
committee are determined by the statute or rules of the institution.176 It is 
important to reiterate that section 30 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 
confirms that the Principal of a public higher education institution is 
responsible for the management and administration of that institution. 
Since the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides minimal prescriptions as 
to the content of institutional statutes, the statutes of public higher 
educations, as well as the committees in these institut ions, may differ from 
institution to institution.177 As long as the institutional statute complies with 
the provisions of the Higher Education Act of 1997, the content of the 
statute may vary among institutions to fit the needs of each entity. Except 
for differences in the terminology of certain designations, the management 
structures of a university look very similar. The institutional statutes clarify , 
for example, the roles and responsibilities of senior management such as 
 
175 Section  29(1)  of  the Higher  Educa tion  Act of  1997.  
 
176 Section  29(4)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
177 For  the purposes of  th is research,  three un iversi t ies were chosen whose inst i tu t iona l  
statu tes were compared  to  see the composit ion of  the ins t i tut ions,  the commit tees  
es tabl i shed  and how they are managed  in  terms of  these inst i tu t iona l  statu tes.   Since 
there are current ly  26  ins t i tut ions ,  i t  was not  poss ible to  compare al l  of  these 




the Vice-Chancellor/Rector, Vice-Chancellor/Vice-Rector, Registrar and 
Dean.  
 
 (vi) Functions of the Chancellor 
 
The manner in which the Chancellor is elected is prescribed in the 
institutional statute of each public university. As the titular head of the 
university, the Chancellor has no executive powers. The functions of a 
Chancellor can be listed as follows: conferring all university degrees and 
awarding all diplomas and certificates of the university; constituting and 
dissolving congregations of the university; performing such other functions 
on behalf of the university as assigned to him/her by the Council , and at all 
times embodying the aspirations and values of the university and actively 
advancing the interests of the university. In the absence of the Chancellor, 
the Vice-Chancellor/Rector performs the functions of the Chancellor; in the 
absence of the Vice-Chancellor/Rector, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Deputy 
Rector will perform the functions.178 
 
 (vii) Functions of the Vice-Chancellor/Rector  
 
The Vice-Chancellor/Rector is appointed by the Council. Together with the 
executive management of the institution, this role is responsible for the 
management and operational requirements of the institution.179 The main 
functions of the Vice-Chancellor/Rector can be listed as follows: he/she is 
the Principal, chief executive and accounting officer of the university; the 
Vice-Chancellor/Rector is the legal, administrative and academic head of 
the university; the Vice-Chancellor/Rector reports to Council; the Council 
may assign additional duties to the Vice-Chancellor/Rector; by virtue of 
his/her office, the Vice-Chancellor/Rector is a member of all committees of 
 
178 These duties are a  summary from the three ins t i tut iona l  s ta tutes  used for  the  
purposes of  this research.  
 
179 DHET “Guidelines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  




the Council and Senate, unless Council determines otherwise; in the 
absence of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor/Rector may exercise any 
official duty of the Chancellor and he/she may delegate any functions, 
duties and powers to a member of management.  In one of the institutional 
statutes that was reviewed for the purposes of this research, it is stipulated 
that the Vice-Chancellor candidate must be a person who is not disqualified 
from acting as a Vice-Chancellor/Rector in accordance with the legislation 
regulating the governance of companies180 listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE),181 and must have knowledge and experience 
relevant to the objectives and governance of the university; and be 
appropriately academically qualified. This will ensure that a duly qualified 
person occupies this essential managerial role. 
 
(viii) Functions of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Deputy Vice-Rector 
 
The deputy Vice-Chancellor/Deputy Vice-Rector and the Registrar are 
appointed by Council. They are accountable to the Vice-Chancellor/Rector.  
Their functions can broadly be listed as follows:182 assisting the Vice-
Chancellor/Rector with the management, administration, supervision and 
control of the university; maintaining responsibility for the portfolios and 
functions allocated to them by the Vice-Chancellor/Rector and which are 
approved by Council; and, should the position of a deputy Vice-
Chancellor/Deputy Vice-Rector and Registrar become vacant, appointing 
an official to perform those duties until that position is filled.  At this 
juncture, it is essential to mention that the Registrar also fulfils the 
functions of the university secretariat.  
 
 
180 Companies Act of  2008 .   
 
181 For  a  discussion on  the  JSE,  see  C hapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .2  be low.  
 
182 For the purposes of  this research,  three universi t ies were chosen whose inst i tu t iona l  
statu tes  were compared and a combined summary of  the functions of  the Vice -




 (ix) The role of the Registrar 
 
As indicated above, the Council is tasked with overseeing the governance 
of the university. According to the DHET, the institutional statute and/or 
institutional rules must make it clear that the Registrar is the secretary of 
both the Council and the Senate.183  In reviewing the various institutional 
statues that were selected for the purposes of this research, it was inferred 
that the Registrar plays an essential role in the legal and governance 
compliance management within the university. The various statutory bodies 
and other structures within a university play a significant role in compliance 
management.184 According to the institutional statutes of the universities, 
the Registrar’s roles and responsibilities can be summarised as follows: to 
act as secretariat to Council and to provide support to other governance 
structures of the institution; to act as compliance officer for the institution; 
to attend to nominations and elections; to shoulder responsibility for 
administrative support of the convocation, academic administration of the 
institution and records management. It is recommended that the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 is amended to clarify that the Registrar is also 
responsible for compliance and governance.185 
 
In 2012, Barac and Marx undertook a study to ascertain the effectiveness 
of current corporate governance practices from a Registrar’s perspective. 
They obtained the information by forwarding questionnaires to the 
Registrars of all the higher education institutions at that time. The findings 
of both the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study indicated that 
the participating Registrars supported very high levels of compliance with 
 
183 DHET “Guidelines fo r  good governance practice and governance indica tors fo r  
Councils  of  South Afr ican public  higher  education insti tut ions” December 2017 40.  
 
184 Mul ler  M “Key Functions and At tr ibutes of  a  Univers i ty  Registrar” training manua l  
(HESA June 2015)  9 .  Prof  Mar ie  Muller  was the form er Registra r  of  the Universi ty  o f  
Johannesburg  and have granted  the  researcher  exclusive  access to  her  t raining  manual  
and documents.  
 




the King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (King III)  and 
fully supported the reporting responsibility of their higher education 
institutions. However, the Registrars perceived the actual compliance of 
their higher education institutions to the King III principles and their 
adherence to the reporting mentioned above responsibilities to be at a 
much lower level.186  According to Barac and Marx, the role of the Registrar 
has evolved over the years into a vital role regarding academic innovation 
and corporate governance. The Registrar fulfils a vital role in the Council 
concerning secretarial functions, administrative functions as well as 
management functions.187 Furthermore, the Registrar’s role has evolved into 
a role similar to that of a company secretary, as defined in the Companies 
Act of 2008.188 King IV requires a company secretary to function as an 
important corporate governance mechanism. 189 The duties of a company 
secretary, as listed in section 88(2) of the Companies Act of 2008, are as 
follows: providing the board of a company collectively and individually with 
guidance as to their duties, responsibilities and powers; making the board 
aware of any law relevant to or affecting the company; reporting to the 
company’s board any failure on the part o f the company or a board member 
to comply with the Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of  the company 
or the Companies Act of 2008; ensuring that minutes of all shareholders ’ 
meetings, board meetings and the meetings of any committees of the board 
or the company’s audit committee are correctly recorded in accordance 
with the Companies Act of 2008; and certifying in the company’s annual 
financial statements whether the company has filed required returns and 




186 Barac  K and Marx  B “Corporate  Governance Ef fect iveness and Value added a t  South  
African Higher  Education Ins t i tu t ions:  A Regis trar’s View” October  2012 JEF  369.  
 
187 Barac and Marx Octob er  2012 JEF  357 .  
 
188 Barac and Marx October  2012 JEF  352 .  
 




(x) Deans and Executive Directors 
 
The functions of Executive Deans and Executive Directors, who form part 
of management, are prescribed by the Council.190 They are also appointed 
by the Council.  
 
 (xi) Universities office of the ombud 
 
Various public universities have an office of the ombud. This office is 
established as an independent and impartial office that works 
independently from the formal structures of the university . It assists in 
resolving disputes, conflicts and grievances. Currently, it is not mandatory 
for all universities to have these offices, but the DHET has encouraged all 
universities to establish an office of the ombud.191  There is no Ombudsman 
Act in respect of higher education as the case is in Ontario, Canada where 
the Ombudsman's Act of 1990192 was amended during 2014 to provide the 
provincial ombudsman with jurisdiction over universities.193 This provincial 
ombud has the power to investigate any complaints relating to 
universities.194 In the opinion of the author, the ombud at public universities 
does not contribute to improving governance and compliance at 
universities.  They are more focused on transformation and resolution of 




190 For  more on Executive  Deans and Executive Directors,  see in  genera l  Seale O and  
Cross M “Executiv ism and Deanship  in  Selected  Sou th  Afr ican  Universi t ies”  2017  (44)  
Oxford Review o f  Education  275 –  290.  
 
191 Makamandela-Mguqulwa Z “Every Vars i ty  should have an Om bud”  2015-10-16 Mail  
& Guardian ) .  
 
192 R.S.O 1990,  Chapter  O.6.  
193 Section  1 of  the Ombudman’s  Act of  1990.  
194 Sec tion 14 of  the Ombudman’s Act of  1990; see also  Chapter  5 ,  para 5 .5 .2(b)  for  a  






This chapter explores the regulation and transformation of higher education 
in the post-Apartheid era. With the attainment of democracy, it was clear 
that the higher education sector was in dire need of change. Since 1994, 
numerous changes were implemented and effected, leading to the 
establishment of a single, co-ordinated higher education system instead of 
the fragmented and uncoordinated system previously in place. This in itself 
resulted in improved governance in higher education institutions. New 
legislation was promulgated, and various policies were implemented to 
assist universities in their governance practices. The changes that  were 
implemented after the end of the previous dispensation all promoted 
institutional autonomy to a certain degree. Complete and unfettered 
autonomy can never be granted to public higher education institutions and 
was never promised by the DHET, as the Minister remains accountable for 
higher education institutions.  However, with the promulgation of the Higher 
Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012, various 
stakeholders felt that the institutional autonomy that was promised was 
now under threat.195 Subsequently, the Higher Education Amendment Act of 
2016 was promulgated in an attempt to clarify some of these changes, 
indicating that higher education institutions should instead focus on 
conducting their affairs more transparently, curb mismanagement and 
implement better governance practices. The Minister will not unnecessarily 
intervene in the affairs of a public higher education institution, and 
ministerial interventions will only be used as a last resort. The Minister 
nonetheless has the mandate to account to Parliament. 
 
This chapter also provides an overview of institutional governance 
structures such as the Council, Senate, IF and SRC as well as their roles 
and functions in the institutions. The roles and functions of the Vice-
 
195 This re fers to  the amendments as ref lected in  the Higher  Education and Train ing  




Chancellor/Rector, Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Deputy Vice-Rector, Registrar 
and Dean were also discussed. The role of the Registrar was specifically 
considered since this position is informally known as the governance and 
compliance officer of an institution.196 Although the Higher Education Act of 
1997 makes provision for the governance framework of a higher education 
institution, it is silent on the accountability of the Council and executive 
management. In this instance, much could be learnt from the Companies 
Act of 2008, which not only makes provision for the incorporation of 
standards of director’s conduct but now also makes provision for the partial 
codification of director’s duties and the personal liability of these directors 
in the event of mismanagement.197 The strict compliance and governance 
practices in a private higher education institution indicate that the 
implementation of similar practices as well as compulsory ethics and 
compliance training for Council, executive management and other 
employees should be considered. It should be noted that private higher 
education institutions could be held accountable in terms of the Companies 
Act of 2008, which includes the personal liability of directors.198 The 
Companies Act of 2008 is much more prescriptive with regards to 
accountability and transparency. Currently, there is no real deterrent 
contained in the Higher Education Act of 1997 to prevent mismanagement 
within these institutions. The various independent assessor reports bear 
witness to the mismanagement and lack of proper governance practices 
within various public higher education institutions. 199  However, there is little 
in place to ensure that the Council and executive management of a 
university will act in the best interests of that institution. Taking into 
account the various institutions that have been placed under administration 
 
196 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3 .2  below for  the  recommendat ion of  formally  inc luding the  
Registrar  of  a  public  univers i ty  in  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997.  
 
197 Sec tions 76  and 77 of  the Companies Act  of  2008; see Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 . 5 ,  4 .2 .6  
and 4.2 .8  be low for  a  d iscussion on these  sect ions.  
 
198 The l iab il i ty  of  directors i s  descr ibed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2 .8  be low.  
 
199 See Chapter  3 .  Para  3 .3 .2  below for  the discussion on  the var ious independent  




and the lack of proper governance and mismanagement in these 
institutions reflected in the reports issued by the independent assessors, it 
can be considered a fact that higher education, and especially its 
governance principles, are in dire need of transformation. It is a 
recommendation below that the fiduciary duties of the Council, Senate and 
executive management need to be clarified within the Higher Education Act 
of 1997. The Higher Education Act of 1997 should include a partially 
codified standard of conduct for management, as well as impose 
appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Simply dismissing a member of 
management for mismanagement or for making decisions that were not in 
the best interest of the university does not address the problem of 
accountability.200
 
200 See Chapter  6 ,  par a 6 .3  below for  the recommendat ions per tain ing to  the Higher  
Educat ion Act  of  1997.       
84 
 
CHAPTER 3: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
As mentioned above, the DHET is the government department tasked with 
overseeing higher education in South Africa.1 However, the extent of the 
Minister’s powers in respect of the affairs of a higher education inst itution 
needs to be considered. The preamble of the Higher Education Act of 19972 
confirms that “…..higher education institutions should enjoy freedom and 
autonomy in their relationship with the State within the context of public 
accountability and the national need for advanced skills and scientific 
knowledge.”3 According to Waghid, the regulation of higher education 
institutions by the government implies that the state exercises power over 
institutions.4  Furthermore, the state, which “regulates” assumes a position 
of authority, whereby higher education institutions are given orders and 
must abide by them.5  According to Hall and Symes, there has been a trend 
in university governance in South Africa, revealing an increase in state 
control. This has been expressed through legislation, primarily through the 
various amendments of the Higher Education Act of 1997. An 
understanding of the accountability of government for the use of any public 
funding is required.  Hall and Symes explain that: 
……what is currently missing in the discourse of 
governance is a conceptual device that acknowledges the 
legitimate role of the state in steering the public  higher 
education system, while also recognising the rights of 
individual institutions to autonomous governance over 
 
1 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .1  above for  a  d i scuss ion of  the DHET.  
 
2 The Higher  Educat ion  Act of  1997 i s  discussed in  de ta i l  in  Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .2 .3  
above.  
 
3 See para 3 .2  be low for  a  d iscuss ion of  publ ic  accountabi l i ty ,  inst i tu t ional  autonomy 
and co-operat ive governance.  
 
4 Waghid Y e t  al .  “In Defense  of  Inst i tu t iona l  Autonomy and  Academic Freedom:   
Contest ing  Sta te  Regula t ion of  Higher  Educat ion” 2005 SAJHE  (19)  1178.  
 
5 Waghid Y e t  al .  2005 SAJHE  (19)  1177 –  1178.  
85 
 
their central business of research, teaching and 
learning.6 
 
The regulation of South African higher education redresses both the 
inequalities and the institutional racial differentiations of the pre-1994 era, 
while at the same time developing the overall capacities of universities. 7 
The author endorses these objectives.   
 
This chapter also discusses the concepts of institutional autonomy, public 
accountability, co-operative governance and conditional autonomy and how 
they relate to one another.8 An overview of universities that were placed 
under administration between 2008 and 2012 is provided below, providing 
details of three of these institutions.9 This chapter also discusses 
ministerial interventions as prescribed by the Higher Education and 
Training Amendment Act of 2012 and the Higher Education Amendment Act 
of 2016 and the threat to institutional autonomy caused by these 
amendments.10 The latter discussion concentrates on amendments 
improving governance,11 amendments relating to ministerial interventions,12 
as well as interventions affecting private higher education institutions.13   
 
6 Hall  M and  Symes A “South  Afr ican Higher  Educat ion in  the  Fir st  Decade of  
Democracy :  From Co-operat ive Governance to  Condi t iona l  Autonomy” 2005 30(2) 
Studies in  Higher  Education  199  –  212.  For  more on state  con trol  an d regulat ion in  
genera l ,  see Mbali  C “Performance Management in  Higher  Education” 2006(13)  
Alterna tion  168  –  172.  
 
7 King R “Analysing  the  Higher  Education  Regulatory  Sta te” 2006  Economic  & Socia l  
Research Council  (Discussion paper  no.  38)  7 .  
 
8 See para 3 .2  below for  a  discussion  of  these concepts.  Another  concep t  tha t  i s  close ly 
l inked  to  inst i tu t iona l  autonomy is  academic freedom.  According to  Hall ,  the c lassic  
form of  “academic f reedom” is  the ins t i tut ional  form of  a  human r igh t .   See  Hall  20 08 
(20)  SAJHE 8.   Academic freedom will  no t  be d iscussed fur ther  as i t  does not  relate  to  
this research topic.  
 
9 See para  3 .3 .2(b)  below for  the  discussion on these  univers i t ies.  
 
10 These acts are discussed more ful ly  in  para 3 .4  below.  
 
11 See para  3 .4 .2  be low for  a  discussion  on these amendments.  
 
12 See para  3 .4 .3  be low for  a  discussion  on these amendments.  
 
13 See para  3 .4 .4  be low f or  a  discussion  on these amendments.  
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3.2 INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, CO-
OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND CONDITIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
3.2.1 Institutional autonomy and public accountability 
 
Before discussing the various amendments to the Higher Education Act of 
1997, it is crucial to understand the concepts of “institutional autonomy”, 14 
“public accountability”,15 “co-operative governance”16 and “conditional 
autonomy,”17 and how these relate to one another.18  At system level, the 
governance of higher education institutions is a balance between 
institutional autonomy and public accountability, which is typically  referred 
 
 
14 The Oxford Dict ionary def ines “autonomy” as  fol lows: “ Freedom from ex ternal  
control  o r  inf luence ;  independence.”  See Waghid Y et  a l .  2005 SAJHE  1177 –  1195; 
Kori  E “Chal lenges  to  Academic  Freedom and  Inst i tu t ional  A utonomy in  South  Afr ican  
Univers i t ies” 2016 (v i)  IJTE  45 –  52; Du Toi t  A “From Autonomy to  Accountabi l i ty :  
Academic  Freedom under  Threa t  in  South Afr ica?” 2000 (26)  Social  Dynamics  84 –  89  
for  more on ins t i tut iona l  autonomy and i t s  h is to ry in  South Afr ican  un ivers i t ies.   For  a  
ful l  d iscussion on ins t i tut ional  au tonomy, see  Van Pletzen JH The Impl icat ions of  
Current  Leg is lat ive Changes for Academic Freedom and Inst i tu t ional Autonomy of  
South Afr ican Higher Education Ins t i tut ions  (Published MA thesis  Univers i ty  of  Free  
Sta te  2015) .  
 
15 The  obl igat ions of  agencies and public  enterpr ises who have  been  trus ted with  publ ic  
resources,  to  be answerable to  the f i scal  and the soc ia l  responsibi l i t ies  that  have been  
assigned to  them. These  companies and agencies  need to  be accountable  to  the public  at  
large  and  carry ou t  the  duties  assigned  to  them responsib ly.   Also  see  Ljeom a EOC and 
Sambumbu AM “A Framework for  Improving Publ ic  Accountab il i ty  in  South  Afr ica” 
2013 (48)  JPA  282 –  298 for  more on public  accountabi l i ty  and i t s  benef i t s .  See 
Munzhedzi  PH “Foster ing Publ ic  Accountabi l i ty  in  South Afr ica :  A ref lect ion on  
chal lenge s and  successes” 2016 (12)  Journal o f  Transd iscip linary Research in  Southern  
Afr ica 1  –  7 .  
 
16 Accord ing to  the NCHE, co -opera tive governance entai ls  autonomous civi l  socie ty  
consti tuencies work ing co -opera tive ly with  an asser t ive government.  See para 1 .4 .2  of  
the NCHE Report  16.  
 
17 Condi t iona l  autonomy is the  combination  of  procedura l  and substant ive au t onomy as 
independent var i ables.  See Hal l  M and  Symes A “Co -operat ive Governance or  
Condi t ional  Autonomy? Princip les for  Governance of  South  Afr ican  Higher  E ducat ion” 
2003 CHE Kagisano  21 ;  this  concep t  wil l  be d iscussed in  para 3 .2(c)  be low.  
 
18 This thes is does not  deal  with  inst i t u t ional  autonomy, public  accountabil i ty  and  co -
operat ive governance in  deta i l ,  as these are top ics each worthy  of  their  own research .   




to as co-operative governance.19 The 1997 White Paper20 describes 
institutional autonomy  as follows: 
The principle of institutional autonomy refers to a high 
degree of self-regulation and administrative 
independence with respect to student admissions, 
curriculum, methods of teaching and assessment, 
research, establishment of academic regulations and the 
internal management of resources generated from private 
and public sources. Such autonomy is a condition of 
effective self-government… institutional autonomy is 
therefore directly inextricably linked to the demands of 
public accountability.21 
 
The 1997 White Paper then explains public accountability as follows: 
The principle of public accountability implies that 
institutions are answerable for their actions and decisions 
not only to their own governing bodies and the 
institutional community but also to the broader society. 
Firstly, it requires that institutions receiving funds should 
be able to report how, and how well, money has been 
spent.  Secondly, it requires that institutions should 
demonstrate the results they achieve with the resources 
at their disposal. Thirdly, it requires that institutions 
should demonstrate how they have met national policy 
goals and priorities22   
 
In its simplest form, accountability can be described as the requirement to 
give an account of how a responsibility that has been delegated to an 
institution or person has been carried out. 23 Accountability and oversight 
are constitutional requirements in all the spheres of government in South 
Africa, and their foundation is embedded in the Constitution.24  It could be 
 
19 Bergen  E e t  a l .  (eds)  Leadersh ip and  Governance in  Higher  Education:  Handbook  fo r  
Decis ion-makers and Admin is trators (Raade Academic 2013)  98.   
 
20 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .2  for  a  discussion on the 1997 Whi te  Paper .  The 1997 Whi te  
Paper i s  used to  d iscuss the pr inc iple of  ins t i tut iona l  a u tonomy in  this instance as the  
Higher  Education Act of  1997 only makes mention of  the pr incip le in  i t s  preamble.   
The 1997 White  Paper  can therefore serve as au thori ty  for  the discussion of  the  
pr incip le of  inst i tu t ional  autonomy.  
 
21 Para 1 .24 of  the 1997  Whi te  Paper  13.  
 
22 1997 White  Paper  13.  
 
23 Witthof t  G “Accountab il i ty  and good governance in  the publ ic  sec tor” 2003 Audit ing  
SA  13.  
 
24 See  Chapter  3  of  the  Const i tu t ion ;  Munzhedzi  2016 Journal of  Transdisc ipl inary  
Research in  Southern Africa  1; Malan L “ In tergovernmental  Rela t ions and Co -operat ive  
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argued that in the context of governance, public accountability is relatively 
under-explored compared to academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy.25 In other contexts, public accountability has been well explored; 
for instance, in the local government sphere. 26  
 
In 2005 the CHE27 established a task team to undertake an independent 
assessment of higher education institutions, and specifically, to investigate 
government involvement in higher education.28 Prior to this investigation, 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 had been amended several times. 29 The 
CHE argued that these amendments arose in response to governance 
crises and mismanagement of universities. 30 The amendments occurred 
almost on an annual basis, and most of them related to issues of 
 
government in  South Afr ica :  The Ten -Year Review” 2005 (24)  Poli te ia  226 –  243; 
Edwards  T “Co -operat ive Governance  in  South Afr ica,  with  Specif ic  Reference to  the  
Challenges of  In tergovernmenta l  Rela t ions” 2008 ( 27)  Pol i teia  65 –  85.  
 
25 The CHE Report  on the independent task team on higher  education,  ins t i tut iona l  
autonomy and academic freed om “Academic  Freedom, Ins t i tut ional  Autonomy and  
Publ ic  Accountabi l i ty  in  South Afr ican Higher  Educat ion (2008) ,  here inaf ter  referred  
to  as the CHE HEIAAF Report  40.   See a lso Kearns KP “Ins t i tut iona l  Accountab il i ty  in  
Higher  Educat ion:  A Strateg ic Approac h” 1998 (22)  Publ ic  Product ivi ty  & Management  
Review  143 –  155 for  a  discuss ion of  ins t i tut ional  accountabi l i ty .  
 
26 Sikhakane  BH and Reddy PS “Public  Accountabi l i ty  a t  the Local  Government  
Sphere” 2011  (4)  African Journal  of  Public  Affairs  85 –  99;  Kearns  KP 1998  (22)  
Public  Productiv i ty  & Management  143.  
 
27 See meeting  repor t  of  the  Educat ion Port fol io  Committee “Inst i tut ional  Autonomy 
and Academic Freedom:  Br ief ing by Counci l  fo r  Higher  Education”  (meet ing da te :  22 
May 2006)  h t tps : / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting/6902/  (Date of  use :  3  Sep tember  
2018) .   
 
28 See  Singh  M and  Lange L  (ed s)  “Submiss ion by the  Higher  Educat ion Quali ty  
Commit tee  to  the CHE HEIAAF Task Team” 2007 25(3)  Perspec tives in  Educat ion  1  –  
10 and the execut ive summary of  the HEIAAF Report .   See a lso  Du Toit  A “Losing the 
Academic  Freedom Plo t? The CHE and the Debate on Ins t i tut iona l  Autonomy and 
Publ ic  Accountab il i ty”  2013 (8)  Kagisano  28 –  54.  
 
29 See Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .2 .3  above  for  a  d iscussion of  the  Higher  Education Act of  1997  
and i t s  amendments;  Kori  2016  IJTE  50  –  51.  
 
30 The 1999 amendments,  for  ins ta nce,  a l lowed the Min is ter  to  appoin t  an  adminis trato r  
for  a  dist ressed inst i tu t ion for  a  per iod  of  s ix  months .   The  2001  amendments  al lowed  
the Min is ter  to  appoin t  an admin is tra tor  to  take over  the  au thori ty  of  the Council  or  
management  of  an  inst i tut ion  f or  a  per iod  no t  exceeding  two years.   Th is  i s  where  the 
concern regard ing the  threat  to  ins t i tut ional  autonomy orig ina ted.  See Kor i  E 2016  




governance and financial crises that had arisen in various institutions.31 The 
CHE investigation was undertaken against a background of concerns and 
claims of a threat against institutional autonomy, academic freedom and 
increased government intervention into the affairs of higher education 
institutions. An assessment of the nature of government regulation, 
institutional autonomy and public accountability was therefore explicitly 
included in the mandate of the task team.32 The task team was required to 
deliver a report on the nature of the involvement of government in higher 
education and on whether or not there was more interference by the 
government than was healthy for the progression and transformation of 
higher education in South Africa.33 The task team realised that there was no 
universal understanding of institutional autonomy. 34 They identified various 
forms of accountability, namely, collegial or professional accountability, 35 
 
31 The CHE HEIAAF Report  1 .  
 
32 The CHE HEIAAF Report  v i i  –  x i ;  1  –  3 .  The HEIAAF del ivered i t s  report  to  the  CHE 
in August  2008.  I t s  ob jec tives  were to  c r i t ica l ly  ana lyse the nature  and modes of  
government  and o ther  regula tory bodies’  invo lvement in  higher  educat ion and i t s  
t ransformation and development;  ident ify  and  cr i t ica l ly  assess the concept ions of  
academic freedom, ins t i tut ional  autonomy and public  accountab il i ty  held by key higher  
educat ion ac tors ;  and produce for  the considera t ion of  the CHE a repor t  on the  na ture  
of  the  involvement  of  government  and  regu latory bodies  in  higher  education  on var ious 
concept ions of  academic freedom, ins t i tut iona l  autonomy and public  accountab il i ty  as  
wel l  as  the ir  eff icacy,  especial ly  wi th  respect  to  higher  education t ransformation and 
development.  
 
33The CHE HEIAAF Report  69.  The task team began i ts  enquiry in  July 2005 wh en  the  
members agreed on their  terms of  reference.  Six mechanisms for  the purpose of  
gather ing informat ion and conducting their  res earch  were  adopted which included the  
fol lowing: an overview of  the then recen t  and current  debates in  South Afr ican higher  
educat ion surrounding  academic freedom,  inst i tu t iona l  autonomy and public  
accountabi l i ty ,  which was comple ted dur ing October  2005; i n  July 2005 the HEIAAF 
invited var ious s takeholders to  submit  submissions wi thin the scope of  the HEIAAF 
enquiry;   the proces s  of  commiss ioning research began in  November 2005 and  
subsequently  f ive independent  research  projects rela t ing  to  the identif ied  i ssues  
commenced in  March 2006; the HEIAAF met with  var ious ind ividuals who could  
contr ibu te the ir  relevan t  knowledge  and expe rt i se  to  reach ing the objec tives and a ims 
of  the HEIAAF; the HEIAAF engaged inst i tu t ional  and other  s takeholders in  debates in  
var ious reg ions during  March –  June 2006;  and the HEIAAF convened a seminar  in  
Apri l  2007 to  ref lec t  on their  research outcomes.   See CHE HEIAAF Report  5 -6 .  
 
34 The  CHE HEIAAF Report  35.   For  a  ful l  d iscuss ion of  a l te rnat ive  concepts of  
ins t i tut iona l  au tonomy, see  the  CHE HEIAAF Report  35  –  38.  
 
35 This  refers  spec if ical ly  to  academic and ins t i tut iona l  autonomy.   For  ins tance,  peer  
review is one  way of  academics  hold ing one another  to  in tel lectua l  account.   Further  to  
this,  scien ti s ts  and  scholars of  an  ins t i tut i on are accountable for  the administrat ion in  
90 
 
functional and hierarchical accountability 36 and political and public 
accountability37 and financial and fiduciary accountability. 38 According to the 
task team, the various university Councils might interpret financial and 
fiduciary accountability differently, and their interpretation would depend on 
whether they view institutional autonomy to be substantive or functional. 
Functional autonomy refers to where an institution can function on its own 
without any external interference.39 Substantive autonomy, on the other 
hand, considers the rights of academic self-government in accordance with 
academic values to be central to institutional autonomy, all the while 
recognising rights, duties and obligations.40 A functional approach might 
lead to a complete breakdown of accountability (professional, functional, 
public and financial), and it might lead to a gross failure of institutions and 
the way in which they are managed.41    
 
The 1997 White Paper and the Higher Education Act of 1997 indicate that 
South African higher education is subject to a system of state supervision. 
In these systems, public higher education institutions are guided and 
informed by policies, which aim to ensure academic quality and public 
 
connect ion to  profess ional  conduct  and agreed adminis tra t ive procedures.  See the  CHE 
HEIAAF Report  41; Du Toit  A “Autonomy as a  Social  Compact” 2007 CHE 96 –  99.  
 
36 This  refers  to  the context  of  bureaucracy  and management.  Functional  autonomy  
refers to  when  an inst i tu t ion i s  ab le to  function  independent ly  wi thout undue 
interference from ex ternal  par t ies.   See the CHE HEIAAF Report  36.   In  the ins tance of  
hierarchical  au tonomy,  competencies and  dut ies are  s truc tur ed  so that  each off ic ial  i s  
answerab le to  the nex t  level  of  superior i ty .  See the CHE HEIAAF Report  42.  
 
37 This  refers  to  the context  of  democrat ic  pol i t ics.   Representat ives are  responsib le  for  
carrying ou t  the mandate tha t  they were g iven when e lec ted.  In  a  governance contex t ,  
the complex ity  of  this  type of  au tonomy become c lears  in  the  du ties of  Council  
members (especial ly  ex t ernal  Counci l  members) ,  who act  more as  lay  governors,  the ir  
decisions in  the ins t i tut ional  and public  in teres t .   See the CHE HEIAAF Report  42.   
 
38 This per ta ins  to  the contex t  of  en terpr ise and public  monies .  In  this ins tance ,  
reference is  made  to  sound f inancia l  expendi tu re,  which i s  due  to  stakeholders and the 
public  in  genera l .  See  the CHE HEIAAF Report  42.  
 
39 The CHE HEIAAF Repor t  36 .  
 
40 The CHE HEIAAF Report  35  –  36.  
 




accountability and are partially funded by the government. Such inst itutions 
are granted institutional autonomy with oversight responsibility vested in 
their Councils.42 The 1997 White Paper43 is prescriptive about delineating 
the Minister’s powers as well as his/her duties and obligations. The CHE 
HEIAFF Report is also very clear that ministerial interventions should be 
considered as a last resort. 44 The Minister of Higher Education and Training 
has a responsibility to Parliament with regards to the proper exercise of 
his/her duties and functions.45 During her budget presentation in 2007, the 
Minister of Education46  emphasised the following:  
It has been distressing to note and act on serious if not 
criminal governance and fiduciary lapses at some of our 
institutions… some of our institutional leaders have 
treated public finances as their personal accounts. 
Others have failed to give institutional leadership. HESA 47 
must act speedily to address these lapses and avoid 
state intrusion in academic affairs… The financial lapses 
have convinced me that stronger objective oversight 
mechanisms must be established to protect public 
finances and the reputation of honest hard-working Vice-
Chancellors and academics. 48  
 
 
42 The CHE HEIAAF Report  20 .   The state  supervision sys t em d iffers f rom state  con tro l  
system. In  the la t ter ,  the state  exerc ises direc t  contro l  over  higher  education  
ins t i tut ions .   See al so King 2006 Economic & Social  Research Counci l  7  –  9 .  
 
43 See paras 3 .5 ,  3 .6  and 3 .7  of  the  1997 Whi te  Paper .  
 
44 The CHE HEIAFF Report  21 .  
 
45 In  terms of  s  91 of  the Const i tu t ion of  the Republic  of  South Afr ica Act of  1996,  th e  
Cabine t  consis ts  of  the Pres iden t ,  Deputy Pres ident  and Ministe r .  The Pres ident  
appoints the  Deputy Pres ident  and  Ministers  and assigns  them the ir  powers  and  
functions;  the Presiden t  may also dismiss them.  Sec tion 92 of  the Const i tu t ion  
provides tha t  the Deputy President  and Minis te rs are responsible for  the powers and  
functions of  the execu tive assigned to  them by the Pres iden t .  The Members of  Cabinet  
are accountab le co llect ively to  Par l iament to  exercise thei r  powers and perform the ir  
functions.   Fa ilu re o f  the  lat ter  cou ld lead  to  the  removal  of  a  Minis ter  by the 
President .   
  
46 Ms Naledi  Pandor ,  who was the Min ister  of  Educat ion pr ior  to  Basic Educat io n and  
Higher  Education  being  divided into  two separate  depar tments .   
 
47 HESA became Universi t ies  South  Afr ica  (USAf)  on 22  July  201 5.   See Chapter  2  para  
2 .3 .1  above for  a  d iscussion on  USAf .  
 
48 Speech by Ms Naledi  Pandor ,  tabl ing depar tmenta l  budget  vo te for  the 2007/2008  
f inancia l  year  29 May 2007 7,  see ht tp: / /www.amesa.org.za/Pando r .pdf  (Date of  use:  17 




It is clear from this warning that not only has public accountability been 
problematic within some institutions for many years, but that the DHET will 
intervene in failing institutions where abuse of public funds and 
mismanagement of institutions are found to have occurred. The Minister 
provided a clear indication that where institutions practise academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy which does not result in accountable 
actions, the government is of the view that there is a need for sectorial self -
regulation, external regulation or “ob jective oversight”, or a combination of 
the latter concepts to restore the balance between institutional autonomy 
and accountability.49  It might thus be argued that these reasons prompted 
the promulgation of the Higher Education Training and Amendment Act of 
2012 and subsequently, the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016.50  
 
The task team specifically recommended that a mechanism to promote 
accountability of Councils be identified. The ultimate goal was to achieve 
this without increased government interference. There was also a need for 
the induction of Council members, for the clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities of Council members and for an annual evaluation of the 
efficiency of Council.51 University Councils,52 Senates53 and Institutional 
 
49 The CHE HEIAAF Report  42 .  
 
50 These two Acts are d iscussed more ful ly  in  para  3 .4  be low.  
 
51 The CHE HEIAAF Report  45; Higher  Education South Afr ica (HESA) “The Chal lenge  
of  Renewal and Engagement :  Public  Higher  Educ at ion in  South  Afr ica” 2007 
(Unpubl ished draf t  report  submitted to  the Pres ident ia l  Work ing Group on Higher  
Educat ion meeting  he ld in  Pre tor ia  on 8 May 2007)  34 –  35;  Fr iedman S and Edighej i  O 
“Eternal  (and  Interna l)  Tensions?  Conceptua l is ing Public  Accoun tabil i ty  in  South 
African Higher  Education” 2008 CHE 34 –  38.  
 
52 Build ing  the  f iduciary  capaci ty  o f  Councils  has  been  a  peren nia l  theme of  South  
Afr ican h igher  educat ion governance.  The HEIAAF task team re i tera ted the  need  for  a  
more inclusive const i tuency  representat ion on Councils  to  enhance  accountabi l i ty  
without increas ing government con trol ,  bet ter  induction of  Counci l  memb ers to  c lar i fy  
the roles and responsibil i t ies of  members as  wel l  as the annual  se lf -eva lua tion of  
Councils .  See the HEIAFF Report  45.   For  a  discuss ion on univers i ty  Councils ,  see  
Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .3 .2(b) ( .1) .  
 




Forums54 have essential roles to play in contributing to institutional 
autonomy.55 Co-operative governance is given expression through the 
interrelationship between these bodies. Their functions underpin the 
principles of autonomy and accountability. 56 The HEIAAF task team 
conceded that there was no universal understanding or practice of 
institutional autonomy. The task team considered various forms 57 of 
institutional autonomy, including absolute autonomy, 58 the “TB paradigm”,59 
substantive autonomy,60 functional autonomy61 and instrumental autonomy.62 
According to the task team, substantive autonomy is the most valid form of 
institutional autonomy for public higher education institutions.  Institutional 
autonomy endorses the following: it is an idea which promotes both the 
 
54 For  a  discussion on  the  Inst i tu t ional  Forum,  see Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .3 .2(b.3) .  
 
55 See Chapter  2  para 2 .3  for  a  d iscussion  of  these  ins t i tut iona l  structures.  
 
56 The CHE  HEIAAF Report  20  –  22.  
 
57 The CHE HEIAAF Report  38  –  40.  
 
58 This i s  where  univer s i t ies are  completely  free  o f  any external  inf luence.  According  to  
the CHE HEIAAF  task team, th is type of  autonomy would  be impossib le to  achieve in  
pract ice  and i t  was no t  considered fur ther .   See general ly ,  Hexmoore  H “A Model of  
Absolute Autonomy and  Power :  Toward Group Effec ts :  2002 (14)  Connect ion Science  
323 –  333.  
 
59 This i s  central  to  inst i tu t ional  au tonomy:  giving the r ight  of  academic se lf -
government  in  accordance with  academic va lues and see ing i t  as coterminous  with  
freedom from ex terna l  interfe rence .   See  genera l ly ,  Fr iedmanand Edigheji  2006  CHE  4  
–  5 ,  Hall  2006 (20)  SAJHE  8  –  12.  
 
60 This type of  au tonomy also t akes the r ight  of  academic self -government in  
accordance wi th  academic values  to  be central  to  ins t i tut ional  au tonomy. Howeve r ,  i t  
explici t ly  acknowledges  coexist ing r igh ts ,  dut ies and ob liga tions.   See Van Ple tzen 
Impl icat ions of  Curren t  leg is lat ive Chang es for Academic Freedom, Inst i tu t ional  
Autonomy of  South African Higher Education Ins t i tu t ions  38  –  39.  
 
61 According  to  the task  team, “what  matters  i s  whether  the  univers i ty ,  taken as  an  
ins t i tut iona l  whole,  i s  able  to  funct ion independently  without undue  interference by  
external  par t ies or  forces.   Functional ly ,  i t  is  i r relevant  whether  the universi ty ,  in  i t s  
in ternal  governan ce s tructures,  mainta ins academic  freedom in the sense of  scho lar ly  
f reedom and academic rule ,  or  not .”  In  o ther  words,  a  univers i t y  might well  have  
functional  inst i tut iona l  autonomy whi le  in ternally  d ismantl ing academic ru le  and 
res tr ict ing scholar ly  f ree dom in var ious ways.  
 
62 This  type of  au tonomy renders ins t i tut iona l  autonomy redundant  as wel l  as  rendering  
the f reedom of  academics  and  s tuden ts  in  the inst i tu t ion  potent ial ly  vo id,  because  the  
universi ty’ s purpose and governance become al igned with  the p o l i t ica l  goa ls of  




public good and forms part of the values of the academy,  and is accepted 
as an integral part of the higher education’s social role and accountability; 
it views the practice of institutional autonomy by institutions to be linked to 
a defence mechanism by institutions of academic freedom as exercised by 
the various stakeholders and connected to the essential goals of the 
society;  there is recognition that threats to academic freedom may 
originate from inside as well as outside of the institutions; it prov ides a 
viable platform for the building of trust among society, the state and the 
higher education sector; and it recognises that there are mutual rights, 
duties and accountabilities on the part of the academy, institutional 
leadership, government and society to ensure that there is proper 
governance in the best interests of the public. 63  
 
The task team made various conclusions and recommendations in the 
HEIAAF Report which include the following: substantial autonomy, which is 
integral to higher education’s social role and accountability, should be 
promoted in the South African context of institutional autonomy; 
improvements should be made in the steering of higher education and good 
governance on all levels;64 government should review its strategies for 
giving effect to its democratic accountability in higher education, and 





63 The CHE HEIAAF Report  38; and  in  genera l ,  Dressel  PL (ed)  “The Natu re  and  
Components of  Autonomy” 1980(26)  New Direct ions for Ins t i tut ional Research  5  –  9 .  
 
64 These leve ls  inc lude system, sec t or ial ,  inst i tu t ional  and academic.  
 
65 “Democrat ic  accountab il i ty” includes the fol lowing: the const i tu t ional  obliga tion of  
government to  both promote and uphold academic freedom; the provis ion of  resources 
by government to  ins t i tut ions to  enab le them to  fu lf i l  thei r  obligat ions in  meeting their  
public  goals;  government must  be able to  explain  i ts  decisions and ac tions to  higher  
educat ion stakeholders;  and have the capaci ty  to  ensure that  there  i s  accountab il i ty  by  
ins t i tut ions .  For  a  summary on the conclus i ons and recommendations of  the report ,  see  
the CHE HEIAAF Report  71 –  76.  This thesis  prov ides only a  summary of  the  





3.2.2 Co-operative governance and conditional autonomy 
 
Intergovernmental relationships66 are intended to promote and facilitate co-
operative governance and decision-making by ensuring that policies and 
activities across all spheres encourage service delivery to meet the needs 
of the public.67 Intergovernmental relationships refer to the three spheres of  
government as provided for in the Constitution.68 In terms of the 1997 White 
Paper, co-operative governance assumes a proactive, guiding and 
constructive role for government as well as a co-operative relationship 
between the state and higher education institutions.69 One implication of 
this is, for example, that institutional autonomy is to be exercised in tandem 
with public accountability; another is that the DHET’s oversight role does 
not involve responsibility for the micro-management of institutions.70  Lastly, 
the DHET will undertake its role in a transparent manner. 71 It has been 
established by the South African courts that public higher education 
institutions are organs of state.72 The values and principles of public 
 
66 For  more  on intergovernmental  re lat ions,  see M athebula FML “South Afr ican  
Intergovernmental  Rela t ions:   A Defin it ional  Perspective” 2011 (46)  JPA  834 –  851.  
 
67 Edwards  2008 Pol i te ia  66; Mofolo  MA “Intergovernmenta l  Rela t ions System for  
Publ ic  Par t icipat ion in  the Local  Sphere  of  Government” 2016 JPA  230 –  243;  Reddy 
PS “Intergovernmental  Rela t ions in  South Afr ica” 2001 (20)  Pol i te ia  21  –  37.  
 
68 The three spheres of  government are  na tional ,  p rovincial  and loca l .  DHET forms par t  
of  the  nat ional  sphere of  government.   See  s  41 of  the 1996  Const i tut ion;  an d  in  
genera l ,  see Edwards  2008 Pol i teia  65;  Malan  2005  Pol i teia  228 –  241;  Mdliva ME Co-
opera tive Governance and Intergovernmenta l  Relat ions in  South Afr ica:  A Case Study 
of  the Eastern  Cape  (Published  Master’ s thes is  Univers i ty  of  KwaZulu  Natal  2012)  22  
–  23.  
 
69Zulu TSS Co-opera tive Governance in  South Afr ica:  A Case Study  of  
Intergovernmenta l  Rela tions in  the Provision  of  Housing  (Published Master ’s thesis  
Univers i ty  of  KwaZulu  Natal  2014)  19 –  30 ;  Edwards 2008 Poli te ia  66 –  83 for  a  
genera l  d iscuss ion of  cooperat ive  governance in  South Afr ica;  DHET “Guidel ines for  
Good Governance Pract ice  and Governance  Ind ica tors  for  Counci ls  of  So uth Afr ican  
Publ ic  Higher  Educat ion  ins t i tut ions” December 2017 20 –  23.   
 
70 Para 3 .33 of  the 1997  Whi te  Paper ;  Du Toit  A 2015 HESA VI.  
 
71 1997 White  Paper  3 .7 .  
 
72 Nutesa v Central  Universi ty  of  Technology  (2008)  ZALC 146;  (2009)  4  BLLR 369 
(L.C.) ;  (2009)  30 ILL 1620 (LC);  Baloro v Univers i ty  of  Bophutha tswana  1995 4 SA 
197 (B),  
96 
 
administration therefore also apply to higher education institutions as 
organs of state. According to the NCHE Report, these principles include 
responsiveness to public needs and encourage the public to participate in 
policymaking, accountability and transparency, fostered by providing the 
public with accurate information.73 Considering this, Du Toit emphasises 
that although higher education institutions are public universities and thus 
can be interpreted as organs of state, they are not an arm of government 
and have always maintained a degree of institutional autonomy.74 
 
The 1997 White Paper confirmed that the Department of Education must 
adopt a model of co-operative governance for higher education in South 
Africa based on the principle of autonomous institutions working co-
operatively with a proactive government and in a range of partnerships. 75 
Higher education institutions are granted institutional autonomy76 with 
oversight responsibility vested in a Council 77 established by the Higher 
Education Act of 1997.78  According to the 1997 White Paper as well as the 
 
73 The NCHE Report  194 .  For  more on  governance and  transparency  in  genera l ,  see  
Mofolo 2016  JPA  230 –  243; Cloete F and Auriacombe CJ “Governance and 
Transparency  in  South Afr ica” 20 07  (26)  Po li te ia  193 –  199.   
 
74 Du Toit  2014 HESA  50.  
 
75 Para 3 .6  and 3.7  of  the  1997 White  Paper .  For  more on  co-operat ive g overnance  see  
in  genera l  du  Toit  A “Autonomy as  a  Social  Compact” 2007  CHE 111  –  120;  Crous C 
Corpora te Governance in  South Afr ican  Higher Education Ins t i tut ions  (Unpublished 
PhD thesis  Univers i ty  o f  the Free State  2017)  124.   Co-operat ive governance assum es a  
proact ive,  guid ing and  construct ive role  for  government.   I t  a l so  assumes a co -
operat ive re la t ionship between the s tate  and  hi gher  education ins t i tu t ions.  One  
impl ica t ion  of  th is i s ,  for  example,  tha t  ins t i tu t iona l  au tonomy is to  be exercised  in  
tandem with  publ ic  accountabi l i ty .  Another  is  that  the DHET’s overs ight  role  does  not  
involve  responsib il i ty  for  the  micro -management of  ins t i tut ions.  See para 3 .33  of  the  
1997 Whi te  Paper .  A third  implicat ion i s  that  the DHET wi ll  undertake i t s  ro le  in  a  
transparen t  manner .   See a lso the NCHE Report  171 –  180 for  comments on  co -
operat ive governance pr ior  to  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  199 7 .  
 
76 For  a  discuss ion of  ins t i tut iona l  autonomy pr ior  to  South  Afr ica  a t tain ing democracy,  
see  Du Toit  2007 CHE  101 –  104.  
 
77 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .2  above.  
 




Constitution,79 a Minister has a duty to provide leadership, and must 
ultimately take responsibility for all his/her actions and decisions. 80   
 
A state-supervised higher education system is usually categorised by its 
framework policies aimed at ensuring academic quality and public 
accountability. Resources are provided by the government to enable the 
institution to fulfil its obligations towards the public. 81 These state-
supervised higher education institutions are granted institutional autonomy, 
with oversight responsibility vested in a Council. State-supervised 
institutions differ from state-controlled institutions as the state exercises 
direct control of the institutions.82   
 
The NCHE Report discusses three types of models to be considered 
pertaining to the relationship between government and higher education 
institutions to be considered.83 The first of these is the state control model 
where all key aspects of the institution are controlled exclusively by the 
government.84 This system is one that has operated in Europe over the last 
 
79 Section  92 of  the Const i tut ion .  
 
80 1997 White  Paper,  clause 3 .5 .  
 
81 The CHE HEIAAF Report  20 .  
 
82 The  CHE  HEIAAF Report  20.  For  information  about  sta te  con trol  and  sta te  
superv is ion in  gener al ,  see  Koh ler  J  and  Huber  J  (eds)  Higher Education Governance 
between  Democra tic  Culture,  Academic  Aspirat ions  and Market  Forces  (Counci l  for  
Publ ish ing Europe 2006)  85 –  88.  
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39;  Cloe te  e t  al .  (eds)  Transformation in  Higher Educat ion:  Global  Pressures and 
Local Real i t ies  54; DHET “Guidel ines for  good governance prac tice and governance  
indicators for  Councils  of  South Afr ican public  h igher  education insti tut ions”  
December 2017  12 .  
 
84 Moja T,  Muller  J  and Cloete N “Towards New Forms of  Regula t ion in  Higher  
Educat ion:  The Case of  South Afr ica” 1996 (32)  Higher Education  144 –  147;  HEIAAF 
Task  Team “Overv iew of  Recent  and Current  Debates in  South Afr ican Higher  
Educat ion:  Academic  Freedom, Inst i tu t ional  Autonomy and Public  Accountabi l i ty”  
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decades.85 France is an example where a system of state control is still 
practised.86  
 
The second model is one of state supervision where the government 
provides the framework within which the institutions operate and dictates 
how they should produce the output capacity. In this model, the 
government uses “regulation by directives” and “regulation by incentives”. 87  
This model has been popular in countries such as the United States of 
America (USA), Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.88  
 
The third model pertains to state interference and is not based on a 
systematic control or intervention policy. The government intervenes once 
a higher education institution no longer conforms to the government’s 
development path. This was the model practised during the pre-1994 era in 
South Africa.89  
 
The NCHE proposed a model of co-operative governance.90 The 
Department of Education opted for this model because it recognised the 
 
85 The NCHE Report  174 –  175;  Sayed Y “The Governance  of  the South Afr ican Higher  
Educat ion System:  Balancing State  Contro l  and State  Superv ision in  Co -opera tive  
Governance?” 2000 (202)  IJED  477;  Neave  G and Van Vught F (eds)  Government  and 
Higher Educat ion Rela t ionsh ips Across Thr ee continen ts:  The Winds  of  Change  ( IAU 
Press United Kingdom 1994)  9  –  11.  
 
86 Te ixeira  P  et  al .  (eds)  Markets  in  Higher  Education:   Rhetoric  or  Reali ty?  (Kluwer  
Academics Dordrecht  2004)  311.  
 
87 Hall ,  Symes and  Luescher  “Governance  in  South Afr ica  Higher  E ducat ion” 2002  CHE 
31; Van Pletzen Implications of  Current  Leg is lat ive Changes for Academic Freedom, 
Inst i tu t ional Autonomy of  Sout h African Higher  Educat ion Inst i tu t ions  34 –  36.  
 
88 The NCHE Report  175;  see Chapter  5  below for  a  discussion  of  the models used in  
the USA and  Canada;  Sayed Y 2000  (202)  IJED  477  –  478 ;  Neave,  Van Vught  (eds)  
Government  and  Higher  Education  Relat ionships Across  Three  Cont inents:  The  Winds 
of  Change 3 –  5 ;  9  –  14;  Moja ,  Mul ler  and Cloete 1996 (32)  Higher Education  147 –  
148;  Van Pletzen Implications of  Current  Leg islat ive Changes for Academic Freedom,  
Inst i tu t ional Autonomy of  South African Higher  Educat io n Inst i tu t ions  36 –  38.  
 
89The NCHE Report  175.  
 
90 Coetzee T “Co -opera tive Governance and Good Governance:  Reali ty  or  Myth?” 2010  
(35)  Journal  of  Contemporary  History  86 –  90;  Cloe te et  al .  Challenges  of  Co-
opera tive Governance  4;  DHET “Guidelines for  good  governance pract ice  and 
99 
 
need to transcend the adversarial relations between the state and society. 
This model of co-operative governance is “based on the principle of 
autonomous institutions working co-operatively with a proactive 
government and in a range of partnerships.” 91 According to Hall and Symes, 
the NCHE conceptualised co-operative governance as a version of the 
“state supervision” model.92  
 
The 1997 White Paper confirms “…that co-operative governance assumes 
a pro-active, guiding and constructive role for government.”93 It is clear from 
the 1997 White Paper that there needs to be a co-operative relationship 
between higher education institutions and the state, and that institutional 
autonomy needs to be exercised in conjunction with public accountability. 94 
The National Commission emphasised that both academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy were vital for a well-functioning higher education 
institution in the post-1994 era.95 Co-operative governance depends on 
three key assumptions: differentiation and sharing of functions and powers; 
policy formation, decision-making, implementation and monitoring are 
separate, yet connected functions; and multiple levels and facets of policy-
making, decision-making, implementation and monitoring.96 The Higher 
Education Act of 1997 does not grant unfettered autonomy or 
independence. In fact, it clearly states that autonomy must be linked to 
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accountability.97 It is clear from the above information that although higher 
education institutions have a certain degree of institutional autonomy and 
remain responsible for their day-to-day management, the DHET remains 
responsible and accountable to Parliament for higher education on a 
national level. 
 
The NCHE Report analyses co-operative governance in detail.98 According 
to the NCHE, co-operative governance has certain implications: firstly, 
there is a relationship between the state and higher education institutions.  
It was the NCHE’s objective to mediate the opposition between state 
intervention and institutional autonomy. It states, “….the directive role of 
the state is reconceived as a steering and co-ordinating role. Institutional 
autonomy is to be exercised within the limits of accountabili ty”.99 It is 
important that the state and higher education institutions work together and 
that they reconcile the concept of self-regulation with the concept of a 
central authority making decisions.100 The second implication refers to the 
relations among higher education institutions and the organs of civil 
society. This implication indicates that higher education institutions should 
establish new partnerships and collaborations with commercial enterprises, 
parastatals, research bodies and non-governmental organisations. These 
local stakeholders will have an interest in participating in the governance of 
higher education institutions.101 A third implication relates to the relationship 
both among higher education as well as relationships within institutions. 
Higher education institutions face an increased demand for recurrent, 
continuing and adult learning as well as more flexible modes of delivery.  
Institutions will, therefore, have to form collaborations with one another to 
 
97 The NPHE Report  19.  
 
98 Hall ,  Symes and Luescher  2002 CHE 31.  
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alleviate some of the pressure of these increased demands.102 The NCHE 
supported institutional autonomy in the higher education context but stated 
that the latter must be exercised “within the context of increased 
accountability implied by the principle and the system of co-operative 
governance”.103 It is clear from the information above that a model of co-
operative governance can only be successfully implemented in the higher 
education environment if the state and higher education institutions work 
together. In line with the NCHE recommendations with regards to a model 
of co-operative governance, the government should assist higher education 
institutions by “steering” them rather than wanting to “control” them. 
 
Both the 1997 White Paper and the subsequent Higher Education Act of 
1997 recognise co-operative governance.  According to Hall and Symes, 
the DHET did not regard co-operative governance as a success, and this 
model “failed in the heart of political realities.” Hall and Symes instead put 
forward a model of conditional autonomy. They propose that higher 
education institutions should retain substantive autonomy, but that the 
state should limit their procedural autonomy. They indicate that there has 
been an increase in state control noted in university governance. 104  
 
According to Hall and Symes, conditional autonomy “recognises the role of 
the state in the steering of the state in this system and its outcomes 
through procedural controls, while respecting the autonomy of individual 
institutions in the substantive fields of their intellectual work” .105 Waghid 
expresses that this is a viable option to consider, and agrees with Hall and 
Symes that conditional autonomy could potentially minimise state control or 
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interference in institutions.106 The CHE also supports the notion of 
conditional autonomy.107 
 
However, according to Divala, the concept of conditional autonomy is 
problematic.  He theorises that the state will be unable to maintain its 
position in providing funding to universities for public good without 
imposing any conditions to this funding. 108 Public higher education 
institutions will always have to consider the public and its interests, which 
could lead to public higher education institutions functioning with in a 
framework of public expectations, making the substantive autonomy 
unfeasible.109  The HEQC also voiced its concern by stating that the 
distinction between substantive and procedural autonomy may be more 
theoretical than practical and that it would be advisable for this concept to 
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This section reviews the changes to the Higher Education Act of 1997 
brought about by both the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment 
Act of 2012 and the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016. These 
amendments provided the Minister with greater power to intervene in the 
affairs of higher education institutions. 111 The Higher Education and Training 
Laws Amendment Act of 2012 was perceived to be too open-minded and 
not duly examined. Furthermore, stakeholders opined that the government 
wanted to deal with the various higher education concerns by implementing 
policies and amending the Higher Education Act of 1997. 112 Stakeholders 
also seem to believe that the Higher Education and Training Laws 
Amendment Act of 2012 was “pushed through,” and that there was very 
little public participation to ensure that the voices of all higher education 
stakeholders were heard. Several universities were placed under 
administration between 2008 and 2012 due to poor governance practices.113  
Considering the above information, it is clear that there was a need for 
change in governance practices in higher education institutions. 
Subsequently, the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016 was 
published, clarifying some of the 2012 amendments. The process followed 
by the DHET to recommend the amendments included personal invitations 
to higher education stakeholders to comment on the Bill. The process also 
allowed more time for stakeholders to comment on the Bill , and there was a 
longer consultation process than had been the case with the Higher 
Education and Training Amendment Act of 2012. 
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Governance in South African universities remains a challenge if one 
considers the number of institutions that have been placed under 
administration.114 HESA’s report discusses various serious problems that 
led to the governance failures at some public higher education institutions. 
Some of the governance issues mentioned include, for instance, 
factionalism in Councils, Council members’ involvement in procurement 
processes to promote themselves, and non-adherence to meeting 
processes and procedures.115 The HESA report provides a summary of the 
most common issues raised in assessors’ reports , notably, governance 
failings related to the functioning of Councils, fraudulent relationships 
among the Councils and the Vice-Chancellors and staff of the institutions, 
ineffective institutional structures and management failures and 
challenges.116 The report also discusses the lack of experience of Council 
members explicitly, stating that such members are particularly 
troublesome. These inexperienced members have become involved in the 
operational matters of the institutions and pursue their own agendas to  
advance themselves and not the institution. In some cases, new Council 
members were not provided with formal induction workshops to assist them 
in strengthening their knowledge and understanding of the institution. 117  
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The various independent assessor reports list unacceptable conduct by 
certain Council members, which is of particular concern. Examples of such 
behaviour include, among other things, interference with procurement 
processes to advance their own interests; non-declaration of any conflict of 
interest that may exist in any matter that is being discussed by the Council; 
promoting factionalism amongst Council members to pursue various 
“hidden agendas”; trying to overturn some of the decisions made by the 
Vice-Chancellor; and attempting to isolate the Vice-Chancellor.118 The non-
adherence to proper meeting processes and procedures should be 
considered a serious governance failure. In some instances, the 
independent assessors found that minutes of meetings were inadequately 
prepared or in other cases, there were no minutes of meetings at all. Items 
were added to the agenda under “general", when in fact these items should 
have been accompanied by important documents which were needed for 
proper decision-making by the Council.119  
 
Another concerning governance issue highlighted in HESA’s report was the 
fraudulent relationships among the Council, the Vice-Chancellor and other 
staff members. In most of the independent assessor reports, the 
relationships among Council members and the Vice-Chancellor as well as 
the executive management were signalled as concerns. In some cases, 
Council members would side with executive management while in other 
cases the relationship between the Vice-Chancellor and the chair of 
Council became so strained, that it negatively affected the governance and 
management of the institution. It also became apparent that in some 
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instances, the leadership exercised by the Vice-Chancellor and executive 
management was questioned, notably where Vice-Chancellors acted 
indecisively.120 It would, therefore, appear that Vice-Chancellors failed to 
exercise proper and accountable leadership.  
 
During the period 1997 – 2000, the Minister of Education appointed 
assessors for five failing institutions where there were serious allegations 
of a breakdown in governance, maladministration as well as near collapse 
of their institutions. During that period, the Minister was within his rights to 
appoint an assessor in terms of section 43 of the Higher Education Act of 
1997. An independent assessor was usually appointed to investigate the 
affairs of an institution where there was serious financial or 
maladministration at an institution; when the effective functioning of the 
Council of an institution was undermined; the Council had failed to resolve 
these issues, or the appointment would be in the best interest of an 
institution. The independent assessor then had to report the findings to the 
Minister.  The Higher Education Act of 1997 at that time did not yet provide 
for the appointment of an administrator.  By 1999, the various assessor’s 
reports were indicative of the fact that intervention was needed at multiple 
institutions. This resulted in the amendment of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 during 1999,121 which allowed for the appointment of an administrator 
that would replace the Council of the institution as well as the Vice-
Chancellor or both.122 After the passing of these amendments in 1999, three 
institutions were placed under administration, namely the Vaal Triangle 
Technikon, the University of Transkei and the University of the North.123 
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This research supports the amendments providing for the appointment of 
an administrator, as this officer plays a vital role in restoring sound 
corporate governance at institutions. 
 
Some of the independent assessor reports mention ineffective institutional 
structures such as the Senate and the Institutional Forum. These are 
essential structures in any public institution. However, according to these 
reports, it would appear that these bodies had become weak and 
ineffectual at those particular institutions.124   
 
Apart from the universities that were investigated by independent 
assessors or those that were placed under administration as discussed in 
this research, there are also instances of misconduct at universities that 
are worth mentioning. The Department of Higher Education and Training 
did not involve themselves in these matters but instead left it to the 
universities to resolve.125 Two examples are the University of Johannesburg 
and the University of Western Cape. In the first matter, the Chairperson of 
Council, as well as the Deputy Vice-Chancellor Finance of the University of 
Johannesburg, stepped down from their positions during June 2017, 
pending a forensic investigation after irregularities emerged regarding the 
commercialisation processes of the university.126 These allegations included 
the issuing of fraudulent invoices and the syphoning off money intended for 
a university project into their private companies.127 Subsequently, the 
 
124 HESA “Analysis of  recent  assessor  repor ts of  u niversi t ies in  SA” 2012 (Unpubl ished  
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board on 17 October  2012)  14.   I t  i s  important  to  note tha t  s  31 of  the Higher  Educat ion 
Act o f  1997 was amended to  state  tha t  the Council  must  consid er  the  IF’s  adv ice or  
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Chairperson of Council resigned from his position, and the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor’s services were terminated. 128 Moreover, a further forensic 
investigation was requested after various allegations were made regarding 
possible irregularities by the then Vice-Chancellor and the Chairperson of 
the convocation.129 
 
The second matter is the decision in Williams and another v UWC and 
Others 2015 (25437/2015) WC. This case dealt with the situation where 
two members of the UWC Council were suspended after they attended 
certain student meetings relating to the #FeesMustFall  movement. The 
applicants challenged this decision in court and stated that their 
suspensions were unlawful. They requested the court to reinstate them as 
Council members. UWC opposed this application. The applicants were 
appointed to the Council, representing the Convocation. It was also brought 
to the attention of the court that the chair of Council had been declared a 
delinquent director in terms of section 162(5(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies 
Act of 2008.  The court found in favour of the applicants as the Council had 
not followed due process in respect of two Council meetings dated 26 
November 2015 and 30 June 2016. Therefore, the court declared that any 
decisions about the applicants taken by the respondents were invalid and 
set them aside. The applicants were restored as full Council members. 
These two instances are indicative that there is a need to strengthen 
governance.  
 
Considering the abovementioned governance issues identified by the 
independent assessors during their investigations, it becomes patently 
clear that there is an urgent need for the improvement of governance in 
 
128 Conf irmed in  a  UJ c ircular  da ted 4 December  2017.   See in  general ,  Seale  L “Fraud  
Suspect  Fights Back”  2017-12-02 Saturday Star .  See Tshwane T “2 Senior  UJ Off icia ls  
to  Face Cour t  over  Fraud Charges”  2017-10-24  EWN .   Davies M “UJ Pro fessor  Accused 
of  Thiev ing Mil l ions Resigns”  2017-10-29 Huffpost .  
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public higher education institutions.  Discussed below are three examples 
of specific universities that were placed under administration. 130 
 
(b) Examples of universities placed under administration 
 
Between 2008 and 2012, six universities were placed under 
administration.131 A few of these universities were investigated or placed 
under administration more than once.132 It is posited that this prompted the 
introduction of the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 
2012, and subsequently, the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016.  
The independent assessors appointed for these universities were 
unanimous in their views that Council members did not fully understand 
their roles and functions and that this had been at the root of the problems 
experienced at those universities, ultimately leading to those institutions 
becoming dysfunctional. Various higher education stakeholders had 
indicated their concern with regard to Council members after so many 
universities had been placed under administration. They considered that 
 
130 I t  i s  no t  the in ten tion of  this research  to  provide a  detai led account of  the  
independent assessors’  reports or  t heir  f ind ings;  ra ther  the  focus i s  to  highl ight  the 
governance  ir regular i t ies a t  these inst i tu t ions.   These  s ix  ins t i tut ions were  chosen  
because  of  the  type  of  ir regu lar i t ies tha t  was  invest igated,  which relates  to  
mismanagement by executive management and  the Counc il  as wel l  as o ther  governance 
fai l ings.   
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(Unpubl ished repor t  prepared for  the HES A workshop on 19 July 2012 and adopted by 
the HESA board on 17 October  2012) .  
 
132 These un iversi t ies include MUT, VUT, Fort  Har e,  Univers i ty  of  Durban Westv il le  




the Council members might not have been suited for their positions, or at 
the very least, unaware of their fiduciary duties. 133  
  
(i) Mangosuthu University of Technology (MUT) 
 
This institution was chosen for this research due to the repetitive 
investigations into the affairs of this institution, as well as the nature of the 
investigations. The investigation highlights both governance and 
management issues at the institution. During 1999, an independent 
assessor was appointed to investigate an ongoing dispute at MUT. The 
assessor submitted his report to the Minister of Education in September 
1999.134  
 
In 2008, the Council of MUT again requested the Minister’s intervention 
and the appointment of an independent assessor. An assessor was 
subsequently appointed, and it was clear from the terms of reference that 
there were serious concerns regarding governance and management at the 
institution.135 The purpose of the investigation was to advise the Minister of 
Education as well as the Council of the institution on the sources and 
nature of the governance, management and administrative problems as 
these problems may have been impacting the effective functioning of the 
institution.    
 
The terms of reference for the independent assessor included the 
following: to conduct an investigation and report on the current situation  at 
the institution in terms of the organisation, management and governance 
 
133Macupe B “Poor  Leadersh ip Cr ipples Tert iary Inst i tu t ions”  2012-07-30 Sunday  
Times.   
 
134 Government Gaze tte  Nr .  20485 (GN. 2132)  12 Sep tember  1999; here inaf ter  referred  
to  as the 1999 MUT Indep endent  Assessor  Report .  Th is  repor t  wil l  no t  be discussed in  
deta i l ,  as  i t  does  not  re late  to  governance,  bu t  rather  to  str ikes an d d isputes  be tween  
the management and unions.  
 
135 Government Gaze tte  Nr.  31480 (GN. None)  1  October  2008; hereinaf ter  referred to  




structures, processes, systems, policies and competencies, which include 
issues of accountability and responsibility; and to identify any authorities 
which have been delegated to the Vice-Chancellor and management in 
contravention of the statutes or good corporate governance. 136 One of the 
findings by the independent assessor was that Council had abdicated its 
responsibility for a prolonged period and that it had not exercised sufficient 
fiduciary duty for the affairs of the institution. The independent assessor’s 
report was tabled at Council in June 2008 indicating the various corporate 
governance issues which included among other things:  the institution had 
no audit committee and there was no internal audit function;137 the external 
auditors were of the view that the Vice-Chancellor, and not the Council, 
was their client, which indicates that the Vice-Chancellor wanted to assume 
the role of Council. For instance, the engagement letter of the external 
auditors was signed by the Vice-Chancellor without proper authorisation 
from the Council. Furthermore, there was an indication that the Council had 
not had sight of any findings made by the external auditors for several 
years, which again indicates poor corporate governance practices. There 
was also no evidence of any delegation of authority by the Council to 
management (good governance dictates that Council should have a 
delegation in place to set the limits at different levels of the inst itution and 
finally to the Council).  According to the Higher Education Act of 1997, the 
Council is the policy-making body of an institution. However, there was no 
evidence that any new policies or amendments to existing polices had been 
served before Council or Council committees and Council and sub-
committee minutes were brief and not indicative of the actual discussions 
that took place at the meetings.  It came to light that the Vice-Chancellor 
assumed responsibility for drafting the agendas and approving the minutes 
of these meetings, with no input from Council members.138  Furthermore, the 
independent assessor could not find any evidence that the tender 
 
136 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  31480 (GN. None)  1  October  2008 .  
 
137  This i s  a  fundamen tal  corporate governance requirement.  See King IV  55 –  56.  
 




committee was functioning as no minutes of meetings could be found, 
despite the fact that large tenders were awarded or renewed. There was 
also a finding that an excess of half a million rands worth of equipment had 
been purchased for the Vice-Chancellor’s farm. There were no tender 
documents for the purchase of the equipment.139 There was also a serious 
breach of governance relating to contracts. In many instances, contracts 
had not been fully signed, which could have rendered them unenforceable. 
Despite this, payments had been made to contractors based on unsigned 
contracts. The external auditors had raised concerns about these unsigned 
contracts on a number of occasions, all of which were ignored.140 
 
The independent assessor’s report furthermore elaborated extensively on 
governance and management structures and other problems at the 
institution, and it seems that the institution had not been following good 
corporate governance practices.  For instance, the Council had failed on 
numerous occasions to exercise its responsibilities and obligations. It 
became clear that the Council allowed the Executive Committee of the 
institution to exercise all its powers and functions without limitation, 
oversight or ratification. The Executive Committee had passed a resolution 
in 1998 that provided the Vice-Chancellor with powers to act in respect of 
“a management and administrative function”, which was in fact, a function 
of the Council, in accordance with the MUT statute. Council accepted this 
resolution and never attempted to review it, which is not indicative of good 
corporate governance or effective management.141 This resolution was in 
clear contravention of the MUT statute and the Higher Education Act of 
1997. The tender committee also did not follow good corporate governance 
practices since procurement took place without a proper tender process. It 
was also found that appointed companies did not enter into written 
contracts, as the Vice-Chancellor was reluctant to sign such contracts.  It 
 
139 2008 MUT Independent assessor  repor t  6  –  8 .  
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became apparent that there was no practice in place for Council members 
to declare any interest and that employees of the institution lived in fear of 
the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor had installed a system that 
enabled him to survey the building in which his offices were located and 
had authorised the installation of an illegal system to record the telephone 
conversations of various employees secretly. It became apparent to the 
independent assessor that the management practices rather were 
guidelines, and compliance was voluntary. Moreover, the management 
practices were centralised under the authority and direct control of the 
Vice-Chancellor.142 Consequently, the independent assessor recommended 
that Council formally suspend the Vice-Chancellor pending further 
investigation and the formulation of charges against this individual; that 
Council requests the Minister to repeal the MUT statute and appoint an 
administrator in terms of the Higher Education Act of 1997.  
  
The administrator was appointed in January 2009143 with terms of reference 
to, amongst other things: take over the authority of the management and 
administration of the institution; identify and initiate processes and 
initiatives to restore proper management and administration at the 
institution; assist Council to restore adequate governance at the institution, 
including constituting proper Council sub-committees;  amend the statute of 
the institution; and conduct a forensic investigation, as recommended by 
the independent assessor.144  
 
 
142 2008 MUT independent  assessor  report  16.  
 
143 No Government Gazet te  could be found.  Upon request ,  the DHET conf i rmed tha t  the 
adminis tra tor  was  appointed  as of  27 January 2009,  and he assumed his du ties on 1  
February 2009.   This in format ion was confirmed by emai l  on 8 Febr uary 2018 by the 
DHET. The admin is tra to r  delivered h is f ina l  report  as ear ly  as 18 July 2009,  which i s  a  
short  per iod of  t ime in  which to  have a t tended to  the admin is tra t ion of  this inst i tu t ion,  
especial ly  in  l igh t  of  the ser ious a l legat ions of  f raud and c or rupt ion.   The repor t  was  
not  very deta i led wi th  respect  to  the processes that  had been implemented.  The repor t  
al so con tained no infor mation  on the changes made to  the  tender  commit tee.  
 




The administrator had attended to the following:145 the Vice-Chancellor, who 
faced serious charges, was suspended;146 a new Council was constituted;147 
the forensic investigation, as recommended by the independent assessor, 
was concluded and recommendations were made for the consideration and 
implementation of the administrator.148 He also prepared and submitted a 
new institutional statute for the Minister’s consideration. 149 As indicated in 
the independent assessor’s report, some of the contracts that had been 
concluded did not follow proper governance processes. Although the report 
indicated problems with the process relating to the conclusion of contracts 
in general, the administrator’s report only referred to cleaning and catering 
contracts.150 It is, therefore, unclear whether the full contracting process of 
the institution had been revised or not. Finally, the administrator also 
attended to various policies, plans, procedures and programmes to assist 
the management, administration and governance of the institution. The 
implementation and continuation of the latter should have been a top 
priority.151 It is clear from the independent assessor’s findings that this 
institution faced serious corporate governance challenges and that it 
operated with a weak executive management. The Council did not 
understand its role and function and allowed a Committee to make 
decisions and act on its behalf. Moreover, the Vice-Chancellor seemed to 
 
145 The admin is tra tor’ s report  wi l l  no t  be discussed in  deta i l ;  only matte rs relat ing to  
governance  are referenced .  
 
146 The suspension of  the  Vice -Chancellor  turned into  a  legal  bat t le ,  with  the Vice -
Chancel lor  lodg ing an  urgent  appl ica t ion in  t he labour  cour t ,  which was later  
withdrawn.   Sen ior  counse l  represen ted both par t ies dur ing the discip linary process .  
The appoin tment of  a  new Vice-Chancel lor  had to  wai t  unti l  the legal  process had been 
concluded  or  the  conclusion  of  h is contract  reached,  which  was  a t  the end  of  2009 .   
MUT administra tor’ s report  1 .  
 
147 This new Counci l  ref lected sign if ican t  change in  the form of  new members and th e  
reinsta tement o f  cer ta in  external  members of  Council .  
  
148 MUT administrator’ s report  2  –  3 .   
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have total disregard for the fiduciary duties owed towards the institution, 
and instead, he was running a form of dictatorship.152 None of these 
elements is conducive to a well-functioning institution.    
 
Despite the administrators’ best efforts, it seems that there is still no end in 
sight to the leadership and governance challenges at the institution.  In 
2011, the CHE attended to an audit of the institution. 153 In February 2015, 
the Executive Committee of Council took a decision to conduct a forensic 
investigation into the affairs of the institution to address the lack of 
information provided by management to Council and various procurement 
issues.  This led to a number of interactions between the Minister and the 
Council. In March 2016, the Minister raised concerns to the Council 
regarding the various outstanding issues at the institution. He requested 
the Council to address these concerns and provide him with a report.  
Should the Council fail to do so, an independent assessor would be 
appointed. It became apparent that both the Council and management were 
uncertain as to which governing functions were vested in Council and 
which were vested in management. The Minister advised the Council that, 
with the concurrence of the Council, an independent assessor could be 
appointed without suspending the operations of the Council or executive 
management of the university. The Minister advised that it would be in the 
best interests of the university to allow such an investigation as it would be 
neutral. The Minister received no response from the Council and wrote 
follow-up letters in June and September 2016, reiterating his concerns that 
were initially raised in March 2016.  The university eventually replied and 
confirmed that a forensic investigation had been conducted in July  2016. 
The Minister received a copy of the report submitted by the forensic 
investigation team, identifying the various shortcomings at the institution. 
These shortcomings included inter alia, ineffective policies and procedures 
 
152 2008 MUT independent  assessor  report  13,  15 –  17.  
153The CHE’s report  was submit ted  in  January 2012,  see  
ht tp: / /www.che.ac.za /si tes /defau lt / f i les/ ins t i tu t ional_audits/ inst i tu t iona l_audits_2011_




and a number of instances where senior management had failed to follow 
the policies or procedures of the institution. 154 In April 2017, there was a 
rather large reconstitution of the Council.155 Subsequently, in October 2017, 
the newly elected chairperson of the Council requested the Minister to 
approve the Council resolution taken in September 2017 to appoint an 
independent assessor to investigate the affairs of the university and report 
to the Minister.156 In May 2018, the Minister appointed an independent 
assessor for this institution.157 His terms of reference were to among other 
things, identify the source and nature of the problems facing the institution, 
particularly those relating to the governance and management; indicate 
governance and management failures; propose measures to restore good 
governance and management; provide a report on the current situation of 
the university governance and management, and report on the functions 
and powers of the Council committees.   
 
The independent assessor’s report158 made a few interesting statements 
and recommendations. The fact that an independent assessor has been 
appointed three times, while an administrator was appointed twice, shows 
that the institution is facing a governance crisis.  One of the main issues 
that is clear from the latest independent assessor’s report is the fact that 
 
154 This informat ion was obtained from a presen tat ion by the DHET to  the Portfo l io  
Commit tee  of  Par l iament on 13  September  2017.  See h ttps : / /pmg.org .za/committee-
meet ing/25005/  (Date of  use :  3  Sep tember  2018) .  
 
155 Presen tat ion made by MUT to the Portfo l io  Commit tee of  Par l iament on 13  
Sep tember  2017.  
 
156 This  informat ion was  obta ined  from a  presenta t ion  done  by the DHET to the  
Portfo l io  Committee regar ding the status a t  some of  the universi t ies .   This meet ing  
took place on 22 November 2017,  see ht tps: / /pmg.org .za /commit tee -meet ing/25563/  
(Date of  use :   3  Sep tember  2018) .   To  date the appointmen t has not  been made.  
 
157 Government  Gaze tte  Nr.  41643 (GN. 514)  22  May 2018.  S ee in  general  Pi tyana  NP 
“Communique from the Independent  Assessor” 25  May 2018  
https: / /www.mut.ac .za /communique-from-the- independent -assessor /  (Date of  use :  3  
Sep tember  2018) .  
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independent  assessor  report .   23 Novem ber 2018.  For  re ference purposes,  the  bot tom 
page number of  the  Government Gazet te  i s  used.   Here inaf ter  referred to  the  




there is a breakdown between the Council and its management.  Further to 
this, the Council did not have an understanding about who would be a “fit 
and proper” person to serve on Council.  The question arose as to whether 
the right level of skilled and experienced Council members had been 
recruited to serve on MUT’s Council. The independent assessor confirmed 
that all Council members must act in the best interest of their institution, 
and also referenced the fact that board members of companies may be 
held personally liable for any wrongdoing during their term of office as 
directors in terms of the Companies Act of 2008. 159 Further to this, the 
independent assessor referred to the office of the Registrar, which is 
critical to governance and management within the institution. In this 
instance, despite the Registrar being in office for 20 years, he did not seem 
to understand that he was the custodian of the laws, policies and rules of 
the institution. According to the independent assessor, the Registrar’s 
function should be similar to that of a company secretary,  and he/she 
should at all times act with authority and with the relevant knowledge of the 
laws and policies of the institution binding on Council and the management. 
The author subscribes to this view. The independent assessor was of the 
opinion that the Registrar was unable to advise the institution about 
matters relating to compliance, nor was he able to confront and address 
wrongdoing160  
 
Despite the appointment of previous independent assessors and 
administrators as well as a forensic investigation concluded during 2017, 
the management and governance problems persist at this institution. Some 
of the findings of the independent assessor included  among other things 
the following: there were no clear systems of accountability at the 
institution;  there was a serious threat of a total breakdown of governance 
 
159 2018 MUT Independent assessor’s repor t  2018 20 -21.   See the discussions on  
l iab il i ty  for  breache s in  terms of  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .8  below.  Recommendat ions are  
also made in  Chapter  6  below regard ing amending the Higher  Education  Act of  1997  to  
include similar  provis ions.  
  




systems unless the trust between the Council and management could be 
restored; all members of the Council should be required to undergo 
assessment by an independent body; all elected Council members should 
act in the best interest of the university and not the external stakeholders 
that elected them; there is a need for a review of the management system 
to address non-performance and lack of capacity; the casual attitude of the 
Registrar and his lack of understanding of governance and compliance is of 
great concern; new Council members should be carefully elected to ensure 
that good governance is their key priority; the Council should adopt a 
procedure to discipline Council members for the violation of the code of 
conduct as well in instances where they fail to act in the best interest of the 
university; the relationship between the chair of Council and the Vice-
Chancellor, as well as the Council and the Executive Management, must be 
restored; and the university must establish an office of the ombud.161    
 
The recommendations made by the independent assessor were as follows: 
The Minister of Higher Education and Training should consider the 
introduction of a separate office of a University ombud. This office should 
be independent, and its powers and mandate should be provided for in the 
Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. The university must ensure that it 
implements proper policies and procedures to assist the institution in 
addressing the various shortcomings in areas like human resources and 
supply chain management. Instead of appointing an administrator and 
placing the institution under administration, the university shou ld be 
assisted with a development approach over a five-year period of time. 
However, the Council should be disbanded in its entirety and replaced with 
new appointees - these appointments should follow a thorough nomination 
and election process and credible individuals should be appointed to 
Council. A comprehensive review of the strategic plan for the university 
must be undertaken.162  
 
161 2018 MUT Independent assessor’s repor t  107 –  113.  
 
162 2018 MUT Independent assesso r s’  repor t  66 –  74.  
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The fact that this institution faced the same types of governance problems 
relating to an ineffective Council, the breakdown of the relationship 
between the Council and the executive management, the lack of 
accountability as well as the Registrar’s lack of understanding of 
governance and compliance are of great concern. The 2018 independent 
assessor’s report indicates that the Registrar has been in office for over 20 
years. This problem should have been discovered and addressed during 
the 2008 investigation into the affairs of the institution. No information 
could be found on the current status of the institution, but it would not be 
surprising if an administrator is appointed again. 
 
(ii) University of Zululand (UniZulu) 
 
The reason for including the University of Zululand is that the allegations 
that were made relating to mismanagement and corruption as well as the 
fact that their governance problems seem to be continuing. The 
mismanagement occurring at the institution was clearly contributing to the 
governance problems.163 Currently, UniZulu is faced with renewed 
allegations of mismanagement and corruption, despite it having been 
placed under administration in 2011.164 In November 2010, DHET appointed 
an independent assessor to investigate the affairs of this institution. 165 The 
terms of reference that were provided to the independent assessor  during 
2010 among other things included the following: to conduct an investigation 
into the management structures and their efficiency; and to conduct an 
investigation into the financial policies and procedures of the university, 
with specific emphasis on internal audit processes as well as tender and 
procurement processes.   
 
 
163 Although  the  focus i s  on governance,  some of  the ser ious management i ssues were 
also discussed as  they  contr ibu ted to  the overa l l  governance problems a t  the 
ins t i tut ions .  
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The independent assessor’s report was published in March 2011 and 
identified both management and governance issues.166 The findings in the 
report were of a serious nature, and urgent action was required to ensure 
that the mismanagement and irregularities were addressed and corrected. 
The findings included the following: There was a dysfunctional relationship 
between the Council and the Vice-Chancellor; certain Council members 
were serving perpetual terms; some Council members were not competent 
to serve on Council; there were various governance shortcomings with 
regards to the functioning of the Council, and the Council assuming an 
operational role within the institution. Internal and external reports were 
submitted to the Council for corrective action, but there was no evidence 
that any action had ever been taken. There were serious irregularities with 
regards to tender and procurement processes that needed to be 
addressed, with evidence pointing to Council members and their family 
members being involved in companies or businesses that received tenders 
from the institution.   
 
According to the independent assessor, the institution was in serious 
trouble, and immediate intervention was required to assist it to recover. 
The independent assessor made the following recommendations to the 
Minister: the Council must be dissolved, and an administrator must be 
appointed to take over its function; a new Council must be constituted 
which will act in the best interests of the institution and that  any conflict of 
interest must be avoided during the course of their appointments as 
Council members; the audit findings of the CHE must be implemented; 167 
and a forensic investigation must be conducted to investigate and establish 
the cause of the various malpractices. 
 
 
166 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  34156 (GN. 172)  25 March 2011.  
 
167 The audi t  report  was published in  December 2010 and ca n be viewed a t  
ht tp: / /www.che.ac.za /si tes /defau lt /f i les/ inst i tu t ional_audits/ inst i tu t iona l_audits_2010_
unizul_execu tive_summ ary.pdf  (accessed on :  3  Sep tember  20 18) .  The recommendations 




In April 2011, the Minister of Higher Education and Training appointed an 
administrator to the institution and provided him with a term of reference.168   
The administrator submitted his final report to the Minister in March 2013. 169 
Included in his mandate was to take authority over the Council for a period 
of two years, and to restore good governance and administration. The 
administrator, with the assistance of the Council and the Council 
committees, developed various policy guidelines to restore good 
governance and good governance practices. 170 Throughout his 
administration term, the administrator maintained full-time involvement in 
the governance and associated fiduciary responsibilities as well as the 
administration of the institution.  This included the development of formal 
structures and protocol to restore good governance and administration. The 
administrator also drafted a new statute for the university, which was 
gazetted in October 2012.171 Various audits were conducted during the 
administration period, and the findings and recommendations were 
implemented. These audits uncovered serious and repeated transgressions 
of the institution’s policy and procedures and included acts of fraud, theft 
and corruption by Council members, management, employees and students 
of the institution. Disciplinary action was brought against the implicated 
students and staff, and criminal charges were filed where applicable. 
Following this, the institution reviewed its policies and procedures to 
prevent a recurrence of such practices.172 The administrator indicated that it 
was crucial for the institution that there be an institutional commitment from 
 
168 Government Gazet te  Nr.  34212 (GN. 343)  15 April  2011 .  
 
169 The confident ia l  administrator’ s f ina l  repor t  as wel l  as the inter im repor ts were made 
avai lable to  the  researcher  for  the purposes of  th is s tudy.  The  in ter im reports  were 
submitted in  May 2012 and June 2012 while  the  f ina l  repor t  was submitted in  March  
2013.  
 
170 Final  adminis tra tor’ s report  2 .   These included rules for  the appointment  of  seni or  
management,  codes of  conduct  for  members of  Council ,  s tuden ts  and staff  as wel l  as a  
policy on  fraud and corruption.  
171 Government  Gaze tte  Nr.  35784 (GN. 843)  12 October  2012 .  
 




all staff to good governance and administration. He cautioned that all of the 
policies drafted and implemented during his term were no guarantee of 
good governance and stressed that there must be a commitment and good 
example set by senior management to uphold these principles. 173 The 
administrator also constituted a new Council before the end of his term.  
 
However, despite the administration period and the implementation of 
various policies and procedures to improve and strengthen the governance 
of the institution, problems persisted.  During 2014, the institution was 
faced with a number of issues relating to its academic welfare.  Following 
violent student protests during 2015, the Minister of Higher Education and 
Training met with the Council of the institution. 174 It was decided to appoint 
a task team to assist the Council in dealing with the continued challenges 
that the institution was facing. However, after the failure of the Council to 
co-operate with the DHET to draft the terms of reference for this task team, 
the Minister again met with the Council and requested them to submit a 
report to him regarding the post-administration period.175 The Minister 
reviewed the reports received from Council and subsequently forwarded a 
letter to the chairperson of Council reiterating the DHET’s concern over the 
slow progress at the university on various matters, which included poor 
governance practices and maladministration. The Minister requested the 
Council to provide him within fourteen days with reasons as to why he 
should not appoint an independent assessor again to investigate these 
allegations. The Council then submitted a full report to the Minister by 
December 2016. The Minister also requested the CHE to conduct an 
institutional audit,176 which was duly completed.  A report was submitted to 
 
173 Final  admin istra tor’ s report  12.  
 
174 This  meet ing took p lace on 28 Apr il  2015.  
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176 This information was conta ined in  a  presen ta t ion by  the  DHET to the Por tfol io  
Commit tee of  Par l iament on 13 September  2017.  See the presentat ion,  




the Minister for review and consideration. The CHE was provided with a 
mandate to investigate the affairs of the institution and establish how the 
administrator’s recommendations, which included recommendations 
relating to governance, were implemented.177 The Minister was also 
concerned about the continued negative media reports regarding the 
allegations of mismanagement and corruption at the institution. 178 The fraud 
and mismanagement occurred as a direct result of poor governance 
practices. However, the institution denied these allegations in 2017 when it 
appeared before the Portfolio Committee in Parliament.179 Following this, 
the Minister of Higher Education and Training provided the institution with a 
deadline by which it needed to reopen the investigation into alleged fraud 
and mismanagement. Although the university had investigated these 
allegations, the Minister was not satisfied and requested that the Council 
appoint independent forensic investigators to conduct a similar 
investigation.180 The current status of governance at the university is 
unknown, except that no appointment for an administrator could be found in 
the Government Gazettes. 
 
(iii) Central University of Technology 
 
The Central University of Technology (CUT) is considered due to the legal 
dispute, which ensued between the Minister of Higher Education and 
 
177 This repor t  inc luded  17 recommendat ions and 4 commendat ions .   One of  the 
recommendat ions  of  the report  was that  the  governance of  the  in st i tu t ion  must  improve.   
h t tps: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /25928 / (Date of  use :  18 Sep tember  2019) .  
 
178 Govender  P “Blade Reads the Riot  Act to  UniZulu”  2016-11-9 Mail  & Guardian ;  
Ntuli  N “Cla im s of  Mismanagement and Maladminis tra t ion Hound the Ins t i tut ion ”  
2017-08-27 Sunday Tribune .  
 
179 See  the  minutes  of  the meeting  held on 13 September  2017 ,  
ht tps: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /25005/  (Date of  use:  3  September  2018);  ENCA  
“Pandor  to  In tervene at  the Univers i ty  of  Zululand af ter  Al leged Corrup tion” 2018-05-
05.   
 
180 I t  i s  be lieved that  the  Minis ter  issued th is d irec t ive direct ly  to  the  Council  in  a  
confiden tial  document,  as no published d i rec t ive could be found.  See Makhaye C and  
Mkhize N “Univers i ty  of  Zulu land  gets  Deadl ine to  Reopen Fraud  Probe” 2018-06-28  




Training and the Council of CUT when an administrator was appointed for 
the institution.181 Moreover, the discussion below relating to the finding 
against the Minister of the Department of Higher Education and Training 
also played a role in the subsequent enactment of the Higher Education 
Amendment Act of 2016.182 
 
An independent assessor was appointed on 28 February 2012 to 
investigate the affairs of the institution.183 The allegations included an abuse 
of power, misuse of funds and poor governance practices, administration 
and management of the university. Some of the findings made by the 
independent assessor were the following: the Council had inadequately 
handled an anonymous memorandum sent to the Minister containing 
allegations of mismanagement and misuse of funds;184 the Council had not 
adhered to good governance principles and had displayed an undesirable 
level of compliance with its fiduciary responsibilities, and there had been 
financial mismanagement at the institution.185   
 
The independent assessor made the following recommendations to the 
Minister:  the Council must be dissolved and an administrator appointed to 
 
181 Macfar lane D “Blade puts CUT’s Finances under  the  Microscope”   
2012-03-06 Mail  & Guardian . ;  Pre tor ius C “Universi t ies  may take  Minis ter  to  Court  
over  Autonomy”  2012-12-16 Univers i ty  World News .  
 
182 See the Univers i ty  of  Pre tor ia ’s submiss ion on the Higher  Education  and Train ing  
Amendment Bi l l  2012 (8 October  2012)  ht tps: / /pmg.org.za/committee -meet ing/14944/ .  
The Higher  Education Amendment  Act of  2016  i s  discussed  in  para 3 .4  below.  
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184 One of  the aspects tha t  was s ingled out  as of  par t icu lar  concern was  th e so-cal led  
KPMG Report ,  which was a  f ir st  aborted a t tempt at  an invest igat ion in to  the affa ir s  of  
CUT.  Although  the  ex is tence  of  th is report  was  f ir s t  denied ,  the  independent  assessor  
could es tab li sh  beyond  reasonable doubt tha t  the KPMG repor t  existed and  had  indeed 
been handed in  a t  the Registra r’s off ice .  Subsequ ent  to  the KPMG investiga tion ,  there 
was also an invest igat ion by adv.  Jannie Lubbe.   The CUT a lso denied the existence of  
this repor t ,  a l though adv.  Lubbe conf irmed i t s  existence to  the indepe ndent asse ssor .  
The independent assessor  was therefore of  the o pinion that  the Min is ter  had been 
mis led concern ing the exis tence of  these reports .   
 
185 This research concent rates on the f indings per tain ing to  governance.   For  a l l  the  
f indings,  see the indep endent assessor’s report  15 –  16 as wel l  as  CUT’s on 




fulfil the duties of Council while a new Council was being established; the 
Vice-Chancellor must be placed on special leave, pending the outcome of a 
further investigation;186 the administrator must pay special attention to the 
alleged conduct of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Institutional Planning, 
Partnerships and Communication; the KPMG investigation must be 
reactivated, and a forensic audit concluded.187 
 
Following these recommendations,188 the Minister appointed an 
administrator for the institution. The administrator’s terms of refe rence 
included the following: take over the authority of the Council of the 
university for a period not exceeding 12 months; take over the authority of 
the university management and restore proper governance, management 
and administration at the university; steer the university back to operational 
sustainability through the appointment of new Council members and the 
establishment of an effective Council; conduct a forensic audit into the 
various allegations of irregularities;  draft and submit a new institu tional 
statute for the university; implement the necessary governance and 
management operations, and undertake a review of past and present 
labour relations matters. The CUT refused the appointed administrator 
access to the campus and approached the court. 189  
 
 
186 However ,  in  the event  that  i t  was  dec ided tha t  the Vice -Chancel lor  continue  in  h is  
posi t ion,  the new Council  would  have  to  dec ide  on his future  as well  as the terms and  
condit ions of  h is appointment.  According  to  the  independent assessor ,  var ious  
al legat ions of  abuse of  power and v ict imisat ion had been made aga ins t  th e Vice-
Chancel lor  and i t  would  therefore have been best  i f  the invest iga tion could have been 
continued in  h is absence .  See independent assessor’s report  4  –  5 .  
 
187 Only  the recommendat ions  re lat ing to  governance are  inc luded  here .  For  al l  the  
recommendat ions ,  see  the  independent assessors’  report  3  –  5 .   KPMG was ins tr uc ted to  
undertake an  invest igat ion by the  Counci l  pr ior  to  the  independent assessor  being  
appointed.  
 
188 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  35457 (GN. 476)  20 June 2012.  
 
189 Minister o f  Higher Education and  Tra ining and Others v  Mthembu and Others,  
Council  o f  Central  U niversi ty  o f  Technology,  Free  Sta te v  Minister  of  Higher  
Educat ion and Train ing  and Others  (2776/2012,  2786/2012)  ZAFSHC 144.  See  also 
Macfar lane D “Heavy -handed Nzimande Prepares to  Face -off  against  CUT” Mail  & 




In doing so, the CUT became the first university to challenge the Minister’s 
appointment of an administrator, who had the power to dissolve its Council. 
The Council of CUT lodged an urgent application190 for the review and 
setting aside of the Minister’s decision to appoint an administrator for the 
institution. On the same day, the Minister also applied to the court191 for an 
order compelling the CUT Council to give effect to the notice and to 
transfer authority, powers, functions and duties to the administ rator.192 
Daffue J granted leave for both applications to be heard simultaneously. 
The court had to determine whether the Minister had exercised his powers 
lawfully, reasonably and within the powers afforded to him by section 41A 
of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997.193 The following disputes were 
raised between the parties: whether or not the CUT Council had locus 
standi in the review application with regards to the interpretation of section 
41A;194 whether the Minister’s decision was based on procedural grounds; 
 
190 Minis ter of  Higher Education and Train ing and others v  Mthembu and others  ( ca se  
nr .  2786/2012)  in  the Free Sta te  High Cour t ,  Bloemfonte in .  
 
191 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Fr ee Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Tra ining  and ot hers  ( case  nr .  2776/2012)  in  the Free  Sta te  
Higher  Court ,  Bloemfontein .  
 
192 The lega l  represen tat ives  for  both  par t ies  argued that  the “ Plascon -Evans  ru le”  
should  be  appl ied  in  adjudicat ing the two applic at ions .   In  terms of  th is  rule ,  the  
undispu ted  al lega t ions  in  the founding  aff idavit s ,  observing  the al legat ions  in  the  
answer ing aff idavi ts  tha t  are no t  clear ly  un tenable;  have to  be taken in to  considerat ion 
in  order  to  f ind whether  a  proper  cas e  has been  made ou t  by  the respect ive appl ican ts.   
See  Plascon-Evans Pain ts  Ltd v  Van Riebeeck  Paints (Pty)  Ltd  1984 (3)  SA 623  (AD) at  
634 H –  635  C.   In  the  CUT case,  th is  was d iff icul t  s ince  the al lega tions contained  in  
the founding aff idav it  of  the Min i s ter’ s appl icat ion were also rel ied upon by the 
Minis ter  in  h i s answer ing aff idav it  in  the Council  app licat ion and vice versa.   See para  
14 of  the Minister of  DHET v Mthembu  dec is ion.  
 
193 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Technology,  Free S tate v  The Mi nis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  15.  
 
194 This sec tion prov ided for  the fo l lowing: “ I f  an audit  o f  the f inancial  records of  a  
public  higher  educat ion  inst i tu t ion,  or  an  invest iga tion  by an  independent ass essor  as  
contempla ted in  s  47,  revea ls f inancial  or  other  maladmin is tra t ion of  a  ser ious  
undermin ing of  the e ffective function ing of  a  public  higher  educat ion inst i tu t ion,  the  
Minis ter  may,  a f ter  consul ta t ion wi th  the Council  of  the publ ic  h igher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ion concerned,  i f  prac ticable,  and notwithstanding  any  other  provis ions of  th is  
Act ,  appoint  a  person as admin is tra tor  to  take  over  the au thori ty  of  the council  or  the  
management of  the ins t i tu t ion and perform the funct ions relat ing to  governance or  
management on behalf  of  the inst i tu t ion for  a  per iod determined by the Minis ter ,  and 
such per iod may no t  exceed two years.   The Min is ter  may extend the per iod referred to  
in  subsec tion (1)  once  for  a  fur ther  per iod not  exceeding six  months,  withstanding 
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whether a proper case had been made out for the Minister’s declaratory 
orders; and whether the Minister had made out a proper case for the 
interdicts sought.195 The court found that the CUT Council had the relevant 
locus standi to challenge the Minister’s decision.196 
 
The CUT Council argued that section 41A does not provide for the takeover 
of both the governance and management functions. They furthermore 
argued that the wording of section 41A was clear and accordingly, the 
administrator could only take over the Council or the management of the 
institution, but not both. The CUT Council argued that the word “or” in 
section 41A(1) should not be construed to mean “and” or “and/or”.197  The 
DHET, on the other side, argued that it was suitable to interpret “or” also to 
mean “and/or.” Furthermore, it was the legislature’s intention to provide for 
a solution where the investigation concluded by the independent assessor 
revealed financial or maladministration of a serious nature or the serious 
undermining of the effective functioning of a university. It did not matter 
whether or not the problems were caused by the Council or the 
management of the institution or both.198 The court found that it was not the 
legislature’s intention that the Minister could act only in the event of either 
financial or other maladministration of a serious nature; or whether there 
was a serious undermining of the effective functioning of a public higher  
education institution.  Furthermore, the court held that where financial or 
 
subsec tion (1) ,  i f  a  Council  i s  deemed to  have res igned as con templated  in  s  27(8) ,  the 
Minis ter  must  appoint  a  person for  a  per iod of  no longer  than s ix  months as an  
adminis tra tor  on behalf  of  the ins t i tut ion to  take over  the au thori ty  of  the Counci l ;  
perform the Council’ s  functions r elat ing  to  governance;  and  ensure tha t  a  new Council  
is  consti tuted.”  
 
195 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  15.  
 
196 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Technology,  Fre e S tate v  The Minis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o th ers  para  23.  
 
197 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Technology,  Free S tate v  The Minis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  26 –  27.  
 
198 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Tech nology,  Free S tate v  The Minis ter o f  




other maladministration exists, the serious undermining of the effective 
function of the institution may also exist. The court found it 
incomprehensible that the Minister should not be able to act where a 
university was defective and embroiled by severe governance and 
management issues. According to the court, it was commendable that 
governance and management should be kept separate, and it was clear 
that the legislature’s intention was for the Minister to appoint one person as 
an administrator to take over both the authority of the Council as well as 
the management of the institution. If it had been the legislature’s intention 
to keep these two functions separate, it would have provided for the 
appointment of two administrators instead of one. Therefore, the Minister’s 
appointment of one administrator could not be regarded as ultra vires.199   
 
Moreover, the CUT Council also alleged that the DHET’s case was 
procedurally flawed, referring to three particular issues, namely, the 
assessor’s report; the consultative process in section 41A(1) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997; and the Minister’s decision to appoint the 
administrator.200 With reference to the assessor’s report, CUT alleged that 
the report was vague insofar as there were no findings pertaining to the 
Council at the time;201 that the report was sent to the Council without any of 
the annexures attached to it;202 and the report was published in the 
Government Gazette before it was provided to the Council. The CUT 
Council was of the opinion that it had not been provided with a fair and 
adequate opportunity in compliance with the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 to present a response to the DHET and that the 
 
199 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  29 -  30.  
 
200 The Counci l  o f  Central  Univer si ty  of  Technology,  Free S tate v  The Minis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  32.  
 
201 The  author  agrees wi th  this  sta tement,  as there were  no substant ial  f indings made  
against  the  Counci l  in  the independent  assessor  report .    
 
202 These annexures were  not  a t tached to  the report  pub lished in  the  Government  




DHET had come to a conclusion that the independent assessor’s findings 
were correct before he had even met with the CUT Council.203 It should be 
noted that there was no express requirement for the Minister to provide the 
independent assessor’s report to CUT’s Council before its publication.  
Furthermore, the bulk of the report was not so vague that it was not  
reasonably possible to respond to it. The Council was provided with 
enough time to consider the independent assessor’s report and provide the 
Minister with a lengthy reply and supporting documents.204 The CUT Council 
was displeased that the Minister did not provide them with reasons for his 
decision to appoint an administrator. The Minister, however, felt that he 
had considered both the report of the independent assessor as well as the 
CUT Council’s response and made an informed decision to accept the 
findings and recommendations of the independent assessor.205 The court 
found that there had been no procedural unfairness on the part of the 
DHET.206 The CUT Council also challenged the DHET on substantive 
grounds. This included that the Minister had no power to dissolve the 
Council, nor was the Minister empowered to appoint an administrator to 
take over both the governance and management functions of CUT. They 
felt that the Minister had exceeded his power as section 41A(1) does not 
provide the Minister with the power to dissolve an institution’s Council. The 
court agreed that the Minister did not have the power to dissolve the 
Council of the institution.  The next substantive ground relied on by the 
CUT Council was their opinion that the Minister could not simultaneously 
take over both the Council and the management of the institution. The 
 
203 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  32.  
 
204 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  33.  
 
205 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Technology,  Free S tate v  The Minis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  33.  
 
206 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Ministe r o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and others para  34.  The Court  fur thermore found tha t  
even if  i t  was wrong regards to  the f ind ing of  no procedura l  unfa irness,  i t  is  apparent  





court, however, felt that it was not the intention of the legislature that the 
Minister must appoint two administrators to fulfil these two duties. 207 
Furthermore, it was contended that section 41A(1) also did not authorise 
the Minister to rewrite the institutional statute of the institution, however, on 
this point the court found in favour of the Minister in light of the provisions 
of section 32 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, and the fact that the 
authority granted in terms of section 32 would have been taken over by an 
administrator should one have been appointed.208 
 
The court commented that universities should enjoy freedom and autonomy 
in their relationship with the State, within the context of public 
accountability.209  It is essential for the Minister and the DHET to accept that 
universities are autonomous, and they should not be allowed to intervene 
in the affairs of a university unless the jurisdictional facts in section 41A(1 ) 
are shown to exist.   
 
Moreover, the court found CUT’s response to the independent assessor’s 
report impressive, but the court confirmed that it expected the Minister to 
deal with allegations and documentary proof as contained in their response 
prior to making his decision to appoint an administrator.  The court found 
that the Minister’s affidavits were vague and that the jurisdictional 
requirements, as contained in section 41A(1), had not been met. The 
Minister’s decision had to be set aside since the appointment of the 
administrator was unlawful; however, there was not sufficient justification 
for setting aside the independent assessor’s report , and the court, 
therefore, did not grant this order.210   
 
207 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  of  Technology,  Free S tate v  The Minis ter o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o thers  para  38 –  39.  
 
208 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technolog y,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  
Higher Educat ion and Train ing a nd o thers  para  40  
 
209 Ins t i tu t ional  autonomy and public  accountabi l i ty  are  d iscussed above  in  para 3 .2 .1 .  
 
210 The Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free Sta te v  The Minister o f  




The Minister was granted leave to appeal the decision,211 but the parties 
subsequently came to an agreement, and the Minister did not proceed with 
his appeal. The parties agreed that a retired judge would be appointed to 
oversee matters at CUT and would make recommendations to the 
Minister.212 Although the report was submitted, its contents were not made 
public, and it seems that very little has changed at the university. 213 The 
CUT judgment made legal history in the higher education environment.  
However, it should not preclude the Ministry from fulfilling its mandate with 
regards to universities where there are allegations of mismanagement or 
poor governance practices, as the decision was based on the specific 
facts.214 It is posited that this judgment prompted the revision of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 relating to the issuing of a ministerial intervention, 
the appointment, role and powers of both the independent assessor and 
administrator.215 
 
The DHET has indicated that good progress has been made at CUT since 




211 See  in  general ,  Higher  Education  News  “Minister  Gran ted  Leave  to  Appeal  to  pu t  
CUT under  Administrat ion”  2012-09-26.   
 
212 Information ob ta ined f rom Mr  Eben Boshoff ,  lega l  adv isor  to  the Minis try ,  in  an  
interv iew conducted  on 28 July  2014.    
 
213 Var ious at tempts  were  ma de to  obta in  an update on the status of  this un ivers i ty  
subsequent to  the report  being submit ted to  the DHET. However ,  no response was  
rece ived from the DHET in  th is  regard .  No public  informat io n could be found on  the  
progress ion of  the matte r .  
 
214 For  the  purposes of  this  research a  request  for  informat ion in  terms of  the Promot ion  
of  Access to  Informat ion Act  2  of  2000 (PAIA) to  was submit ted to  the CUT per ta ining 
to  information regarding their  cour t  case that  was not  publ icly  avai lable.  The request  
was gran ted,  but  subsequent emai ls  to  the Regis trar  of  the un iversi ty  have no t  been  
answered .   
 
215 See para 3 .4 .3  below for  a  d iscuss ion on the amendments relat ing to  the  
adminis tra tor  and the indep endent  assessor .  
216 The DHET provided an update by way of  an inter v iew with Ms.  Pear l  Whit t le ,  the  
responsib le person for  Universi ty  adminis trat ion,  on 13 January 2018.  
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3.4 AMENDMENTS TO THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1997 
 
3.4.1 Introduction  
 
A comprehensive review was undertaken by a Ministerial Task Team, 
constituted in 2013 at the request of several Vice-Chancellors and USAf.  
The task team was provided with terms of reference, which provided for  
among other things the following: taking the relevant changes in the higher 
education landscape into consideration; checking the Higher Education Act 
of 1997 and subordinate legislation for inconsistencies and contradictions; 
making recommendations on unresolved aspects relating to the transitional 
arrangements indicated in the Higher Education Act of 1997; considering 
the debates and issues on institutional autonomy and public accountability, 
and assessing whether these concepts were adequately covered in the 
Higher Education Act of 1997; considering appropriate measures and 
requirements related to the independent assessment, administration and 
post-administration processes of institutions; considering the institutional 
types and making recommendations regarding any changes; advising on 
the extent of any recommended changes; consulting with all relevant higher  
education stakeholders in carrying out this task, and developing and 
submitting a revised Higher Education Act of 1997 to the DHET for 
consideration.217   
 
The first draft Amendment Bill was submitted to the DHET in November 
2014 for its consideration, while the first official draft of the Bill was 
published a year later, in November 2015. Not all the recommendations 
made by the task team were accepted, notably, the recommendation on the 
regulation of universities establishing or acquiring an interest in a separate 
legal entity.218   
 
217 The task team was requested to  comple te a  rev ised draf t  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  
of  1997 by Jun e 2014 to  enable th is draf t  to  be tabled before Par l i ament in  June 2015.  
 
218 I t  was recommended as  par t  of  s  20(5)  of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997.   See  the  
recommendat ions  proposed in  th is study in  Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  be low.  
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The DHET widely consulted with various stakeholders and allowed 
adequate time for stakeholders to submit their contributions on the Bill. The 
Higher Education Amendment Bill 2015 was published for comment, and 
according to the DHET, it sought to clarify various issues and lessen the 
vagueness of the powers afforded to the Minister.219 Some of the 
amendments were aimed at improving the governance of higher education 
institutions. The amendments were incorporated in the Higher Education 
Act of 1997 by the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016 and are 
discussed below. 
 
3.4.2 Amendments relating to the improvement of governance 
 
Commendable amendments have been made to section 27 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 with regards to the institutional governance of a 
public higher education institution. Section 27(5B) 220 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 previously provided that a member of Council of a 
public higher education institution was not eligible for reappointment under  
the circumstances contemplated in sections 49A(4)(a)221 and 49E222 of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 or if he/she had been implicated in the report 
of the independent assessor duly appointed to investigate the matters of an 
institution. This provision was changed to include a reference to sections 
49A(4)(a) and 49B(1)(1) of the Higher Education Act of 1997. Specific 
provision is now made in respect of a Council member against whom an 
independent assessor has made an adverse finding, instead of simply 
implicating the member in his/her report. Such a member of Council would 
not be eligible for appointment, election, re-appointment or re-election as a 
 
 
219 See the Department  o f  Higher  Educat ion and Train ing’s br ief ing  on the Highe r  
Educat ion Amendment  Bi l l  (B36 -015)  (meet ing da te:  27 January 2016)  
ht tps: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /21947 / (Date of  use :  3  Sep tember  2018) .  
 
220 This was  amended by s 8(c)  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  2016.  
 
221 This provided for  the in terven tion by  the  Min ister .  
 




member of a Council of any public university. This section, therefore, 
widens the scope of disqualification of a Council member against whom an 
adverse finding was made. However, the legislation does not provide 
guidance regarding the implicated Council members’ continued 
appointment. The section should provide for an implicated Council member 
to be removed and not be able to continue with his/her duties in this 
capacity.  Furthermore, it is proposed that the scope of this provision 
should have been extended to include members of executive management 
who may not necessarily have been part of the Council of a higher 
education institution. Considering the findings that have been made by 
independent assessors against various members of executive management 
in the universities placed under administration, it would be in the best 
interests of public higher education institutions to widen the scope of 
disqualification of Council members in such a manner.223  
 
Section 27(7)(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for a 
declaration of a potential conflict of interest on an annual basis, unlike the 
previous provision which only required members to declare a conflict of 
interest upon assuming office. This amendment is welcomed as an interest 
may arise at any time after a member assumes office. However, a conflict 
of interest is not adequately defined, which may lead to inevitable conflicts 
of interest not being declared.224 Business, commercial and financial 
activities may have other implications and interests, other than just 
financial gain.  Although this amendment is welcomed, it will also increase 
 
223 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3  below for  the proposed  amendments to  the Higher  Educat ion  
Act  of  1997.  
 
224 Sect ion 27(7)(c)  of  the  Higher  Educati on  Act  of  1997 as  amended  by  s  8(e)  of  the  
Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act of  2016.  See  the def in i t ion of  “confl ict  of  in teres t”  
in  King IV on page 11,  which s ta tes the fo l lowing: “A conf l ic t  of  in terest ,  used in  
rela t ion to  members of  the govern ing body an d  i t s  committees,  occurs when there  i s  a  
direc t  or  indirec t  confl ict ,  in  fac t  or  in  appearance ,  between the in terests  of  such  
member  and  tha t  o f  the organ isat ion.   I t  app lies  to  f inancial ,  ec onomic  and o ther  
interes ts  in  any  opportunity  f rom which the orga nisat ion may benefi t ,  as well  as use  of  
the proper ty  of  the organisat ion,  includ ing information .”  I t  a lso appl ies  to  a  member’s  
rela ted  par t ies  hold ing such  in teres ts .  See Chapter  6 ,  para  6 . 3  below with  regards to  




the administrative burden on the institution as these declarations must be 
made annually, the records must be managed and stored, and the accuracy 
and completeness of the information must be determined. 
 
Section 27(7)(e) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 states that a Council 
member may not have a conflict of interest with the institution nor may a 
member have a direct or indirect financial, personal or other interest in a 
matter discussed at any meeting. The member must also inform the 
chairperson of the meeting in writing of the existence of such a conflict. 
Section 27(7A) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 previously provided for 
a person to inform the chairperson of a meeting of any conflict or possible 
conflict of interest of a Council member in writing before the meeting. The 
amended section 27(7A) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 now includes 
reference to Council committees, not only to Council.225 Section 27(7C) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 provided that a committee of Council with 
delegated functions in terms of section 68(2) of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 may not take a decision on a matter considered by it if any member of 
the committee has a conflict of interest. Section 27(7C) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 was amended to widen its scope to include any 
employee with delegated functions in terms of section 68(2) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997, instead of only referring to a committee of the 
Council having delegated functions. It furthermore now dictates that the 
individual concerned, having the conflict of interest or possible conflict of 
interest, may not take part in consideration of or decision on the matter - 
the matter must instead be referred to Council, having noted the 
individual’s interest in it.226 The amendments relating to the widening of the 
scope of a conflict of interest are welcomed. 
 
 
225 Section  8(g)  of  the Higher  Education  Amendment Act of  2016 .  
 





Section 27(8) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 confirmed that in the 
event of 75% of the membership of Council resigning, it would be deemed 
that the whole Council had resigned.  In this event, section 27(9) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 confirmed that a new Council must be 
constituted in terms of the institutional statute by the administrator 
appointed in accordance with section 49G of the Higher Education Act of 
1997  within a period of six months.227 It, therefore, appears that the 
amendments to section 27 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 are aimed 
at improving the governance of public higher education institutions, and 
they are thus welcomed. 
 
Section 31 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 relates to the IF, prov iding 
that the IF must advise the Council on certain issues. Previously, it was 
silent on whether or not the Council must consider or accept the advice 
provided.  This section was amended by adding that the Council must 
consider the advice given by the IF and provide written reasons if the 
advice is not accepted.228 This amendment is welcomed as it strengthens 
the position of the IF229 and will contribute to improving good governance at 
institutions.  
 
Section 34(1) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides that all 
employees must be appointed by Council while section 34(2) provides that 
all academic employees must be appointed by Council after consultation 
with Senate. Section 34(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 was 
amended to include specific reference to the appointment of both the 
Principal and the Vice-Principal.230  
 
227 This sec tion was amended by s  8( j)  o f  the Higher  Education  Amendment Act  of  
2016.  
 
228 Section  31(1A) ,  inser ted by s 9  o f  the Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act of  2016.  
 
229 See  USAF’s  submission to  the Por tfol io  Commit tee  on  Higher  Educat ion and  
Train ing on the Higher  Educat ion Amendment Bi l l  (Bi l l  36 -2015)  ht tp : / /pmg-asse ts. s3-
websi te-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/160217UniSAf.pdf  (Date of  use :  3  September  2018) .  
 




Section 34(4)(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 now provides that 
employees must, in writing, before they assume office as well as in the 
event of any new interest arising, declare any business, commercial or 
financial conflict of interest.231 This amendment is welcomed, although it 
may become an administrative burden to ensure that interests are properly 
declared and that their accuracy is verified. 232 
 
Section 34(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provided that: 
…an employee may not conduct business directly or 
indirectly with the public higher education institution at 
which he or she is employed that entails or may entail a 
conflict of interest with the public higher education 
institution, unless the Council of such public higher 
education institution is of the opinion that (a) the goods, 
products or service in question are unique; (b) the 
supplier is a sole provider; and (c) it is in the best 
interest of the institution. 
 
This section was amended to state now that not only should the Council be 
of this opinion, but it also needs to make a specific decision to that effect.233 
This amendment is welcomed as it is aimed at minimising the possibility of 
corruption when contracts or tenders are awarded. 
 
Section 34(6) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 was amended to provide 
that an employee may not on behalf of the public higher education 
institution concerned, contract with himself or herself or his or her relative 234 
 
 
231 This sec tion  was  amended by s 10(b)  of  the H igher  Educat ion Amendment Act o f  
2016.   
 
232 See the submission on  the Higher  Education Amendment  Bi l l  of  2015 by Prof  Derek  
van der  Merwe on behalf  of  the  South Afr ican Parastata l  and  Ter t iary  Inst i tut ion s 
Union (SAPTU) dated 9  February 2016.  
 
233 This sect ion was amended by s 10(d)  of  the  Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act o f  
2016.  
 
234 A defin it ion of  “re la t ive” was inser ted by s 1  of  the Higher  Educat ion Amendmen t  
Act  of  2016 and states  the fol lowin g: “re lat ive” in  re la t ion to  any person  means the  
spouse or  par tner  of  that  person ;  anybody rela ted to  tha t  person or  his or  her  spouse  
within the third  degree of  consanguini ty  or  aff ini ty;  or  any adoptive child  with in the  
f irs t  degree of  consanguinity .  I t  fur thermore  a lso now includes a  def in i t ion of  “spouse” 
which means a  person’s  par tner  in  a  marr iage recognised as such in  te rms of  the laws 
of  the Republic  or  a  foreign country or  concluded in  terms of  rel igious r i tes.  
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or any entity in which the employee or any relative has a direct or indirect 
financial, personal, fiduciary or other interest.235 Previously, this section did 
not include mention of a relative of an employee nor did it include mention 
of a fiduciary interest. This is a welcome amendment as previously, any 
relative of an employee could benefit from tenders or procurement deals 
without declaring his/her relationship with the employee. Section 34(7) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 clarifies that the contracting, as referred 
to in subsection 6, refers to receiving any indirect or direct financial, 
personal, fiduciary or any other gain that was not included in the 
employee’s employment contract.236 
 
The changes to section 34 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 as a whole 
are welcomed, as they are aimed at improving governance relating to the 
declaration of interest by employees. Neither employees nor their relatives 
may contract with the institution without the Council making a decision as 
to whether or not the goods, services or products are unique to the 
supplier; the supplier is a sole provider; and whether the contract will be in 
the best interests of the institution. These amendments might encourage all 
institutions to improve their procurement and tender processes and ensure 
that proper registers are maintained to record all conflicts. 
 
3.4.3 Amendments relating to ministerial interventions 
 
(a) Issuing of a ministerial directive  
 
The Higher Education Amendment and Training Laws Amendment Act of 
2012 introduced section 49A to the Higher Education Act of 1997. This 
section gave rise to concern amongst stakeholders as it provided the 
Minister of Higher Education and Training with greater powers to intervene 
 
 
235 This was  amended by s 10(d)  of  th e  Higher  Edu cat ion Amendment Act o f  2016.  
 




in the affairs of a public higher education institution; thereby threatening 
institutional autonomy.237 In accordance with this section, the Minister could 
dissolve the Council and appoint an administrator to take over the functions 
of the Council. This section was subsequently replaced by section 42 of the 
Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016.238 Section 42 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 now provides that the Minister may issue a directive 
to the Council of a public higher education institution 239 if the Minister, after 
having complied with the provisions of subsection (3), 240 believes that the 
Council or the management of that institution is involved in financial 
impropriety or the institution is being otherwise mismanaged; is unable to 
perform its functions effectively; has acted in an unfair, discriminatory or 
wrongful manner towards a person to whom it owes a duty under the Act or 
any other law;241 has failed to comply with any law; has failed to comply with 
any directive given by the Minister in terms of section 39 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997,242 or has obstructed the Minister or a person 
authorised by the Minister in performing a function in terms of this Act. The 
directive issued in terms of section 42(1) of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 must contain certain information.243  Previously, section 49A of the 
 
237 This sect ion was inser ted by s 11 of  the Higher  Educat ion Amendment  and Train ing  
Laws Act  of  2012.  
 
238 This sec tion was inser ted by s  16 of  t he Higher  Education Amendment Act  of  2016.   
 
239 This was prev iously conta ined in  s  49A, which was introduced by the Higher  
Educat ion and  Tra ining Laws Amendments Act of  2012.  
 
240 This  subsect ion prov ides  tha t  the  Minister  must ,  before making  a  dec is ion,  give  
notice to  the Council  of  the in ten tion to  i ssue a  direc t ive;  pro v ide the Council  wi th  the  
reasons for  the in tended direct ive ;  and give the Council  a  reasonable opportuni ty  to  
make representat ions .  
 
241 This mat ter  i s  s t i l l  no t  properly  addressed in  the High er  Educat ion  Amendment Ac t  
of  2016,  as i t  i s  s t i l l  too broad and remains  open to  exploi ta t ion by a disgrun tled 
employee or  student  who wants to  “get  back”  at  the ins t i tut ion.  
 
242 Sect ion 39,  as amended by s 12  of  the Higher  Education  Amendment Act  of  2016,  
makes provis ion for  the al locat ion of  funds by  the Min iste r .  
 
243A direc tive contempla ted in  subsect ion  (1)  must  state  the  nature and extent  of  the  
def ic iency ;  the  negat ive impact  o f  the  def iciency on  the inst i tu t ion  and  or  h igher  
educat ion in  an open and de mocrat ic  soc ie ty ;  the s teps which should be taken  to  
remedy the  s i tuat ion;  a  reasonable  per iod wi thin which the  s teps contemplated in  
subparagraphs above,  or  any other  steps  contemplated by the h igher  educat ion 
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Higher Education Act of 1997 only required that the directive state the 
nature of the deficiency; the steps which must be taken to remedy the 
situation; and it provided the institution with a reasonable period of time in 
which it needed to adhere to the directive. Section 42(1)(c) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 may prove problematic as this provision might be 
misused by staff or students. Furthermore, such an individual may have 
other remedies in law. The Minister might be placed in a position where he 
or she takes on the role of the courts or the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). 244   
 
It is recommended that this provision be deleted from this section in 
Chapter 6 below.245The revised section 42(2) of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 now also states that the directive must state the negative impact of 
the deficiency on the institution and must indicate to Council the manner in 
which it needs to provide the information to the Minister.   
 
Formerly the 2016 amendment in section 49A(4) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1997 stipulated that before the Minister made a decision under 
section 49A(1), the Council had to receive notice of the intention of the 
Minister to issue a directive; provide the Council with a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations to the Minister, and consider the 
representations made by the Council. Section 42(3) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 now requires that the Council be provided with the 
reasons for the intended directive.246 USAf suggested that the latter section 
 
ins t i tut ion and approved by the Min ister ,  mus t  be taken;  and the  manner  in  which  the 
Council  of  the publ ic  con cerned must  prov ide wri t ten information to  the Min is ter  in  
respect  o f  compliance with  the d irec t ive.   
  
244 See USAf’s proposed  amendments to  the Higher  Education Amendment Bi l l ,  
submitted to  the  Por tfo l io  Committee dated  15  February 2016  8   
ht tps: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /22032/  (Date of  use:  3  Sep tember  2018);  and  the  
Univers i ty  of  Cape Town’s  submission  to  the  Por tfol io  Commit te e  dated 8  February  
2016 https: / /pmg.org.za/committee -meet ing/22010/  (Date  of  use:  3  September  2018) .  
 
245 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3 .10 below for  this recommendat ion.  
 




should also provide that the Council must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to rectify the failure. However, this recommendation was not 
accepted. It is posited that this latter amendment would have been a 
positive change as not all failures are egregious; some may be readily 
rectified without intrusive intervention. 247 
 
A necessary amendment was affected to subsection (4). Previously, 
section 49A(4) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 stipulated that “if the 
Council fails to comply with the directive within the stated period, the 
Minister must dissolve the Council and appoint an administrator to take 
over the functions of the Council”. The la tter provision is indicative of how 
the Minister could assert his powers over the institutions. Several higher 
education stakeholders criticised this provision as it provided the Minister 
with the power to dissolve the Council of an institution. The new section 
42(4) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for a more reasonable 
clause and confirms that should the Minister have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the Council of a public higher education institution has failed to 
comply with the issued directive or has failed to remedy the deficiency 
within a reasonable period of time, the Minister may, depending on the 
circumstances, appoint an independent assessor;248 or appoint an 
administrator;249 or take any other appropriate action allowed by the Act or 
any other law. The previous section 49A of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 was unreasonable insofar as it endowed the Minister wi th the power 
to appoint an administrator and dissolve the Council  immediately, thereby 
threatening the autonomy of the institution. The amendment of section 
42(4) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides the Minister with 
additional options to consider before appointing an administrator and is 
thus welcomed.  
 
247 See  USAf’s  proposed  amendments  to  the Higher  Educat i on  Amendment  Bil l ,  
submitted to  the  Port fol io  Commit tee on  15 February 2016 7  
ht tps: / /pmg.org.za /commit tee -meeting /22032/  (Date of  use :  3  Sep tember  2018) .  
 
248 In  terms of  s  44.  
 




The previous subsections 49A(5)250 and (6)251 of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 were not repeated in the amended section 42. Section 42 of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 is a more reasonable and fairer clause, 
enabling the Minister to issue a directive where the possibility of 
mismanagement or financial failure exists. Where the institution is not able 
to comply with the directive, the Minister will be able to appoint an 
independent assessor or administrator, depending on the circumstances, or 
take any other steps he/she thinks are appropriate to address the issue. 
Considering that various universities were placed under administration 
within a short period in the recent past, there is a distinct need for the 
Minister to have the power to issue a directive when the circumstances in 
section 42(1) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 are triggered. Some 
universities are facing renewed allegations of mismanagement, despite 
being previously placed under administration.252 The power assigned to the 
Minister under section 42 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 is not 
absolute and should therefore not be perceived as a threat but rather as a 
tool to assist the Minister where appropriate. These amendments are 
positive and clarify the position and powers of both the independent 
assessor as well as the Minister. Although the Higher Education Act of 
1997 allows the Minister to place a university under administration, his/her 
powers are restricted in some ways. It is clear from the considerable 
number of universities that have either been investigated or have been 
placed under administration due to poor governance and ineffective 
institutional management, that there was a need for the amendments as 
contained in the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016. Although there 
 
250 This sec tion prov ided  that  i f  the Minis ter  appoints an admin is tra to r  in  terms of  
subsec tion  4.   The adminis tra tor  must  perform all  the funct ions  of  the Council  and  an  
employee of  the public  higher  educat ion inst i tut ion  in  quest ion must  comply wi th  a  
direc t ive given by the administrator .  
 
251 This sect ion provided that  the costs associa ted with  the appointment of  an  
adminis tra tor  shal l  be  fo r  the account of  the publ ic  higher  education ins t i tut ion .  
 
252 The Universi ty  of  Zulu land was p laced under  adminis tra t ion in  2011.  I t  seems tha t  
th is  un iversi ty  i s  aga in  faced  with  al lega tion  of  mismanagements.  See Fengu Z “No 




are stakeholders who feel it constitutes a threat to institutional autonomy, 
there are sound reasons for implementing them as they are aimed at 
improving governance at public higher education institutions. 
 
(b) The independent assessor and administrator 
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 confers a legal right on the Minister of 
Higher Education and Training to seek independent assessment and advice 
on the condition of a higher education institution when circumstances of 
mismanagement are present at such an institution.253 Both the independent 
assessor and the administrator have essential roles to fulfil with regard to 
investigations of troubled higher education institutions. Their assessments 
and subsequent reports will guide the Minister in determining the way 
forward for that institution. In terms of section 43 of the Higher Education 
Act of 1997, the CHE must appoint an independent assessment panel 
consisting of at least three suitable persons. 254   
 
Section 45 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 specifies the circumstances 
under which an independent assessor may be appointed.255 These include 
the following:  where a Council of a public higher education institution has 
requested such appointment in writing; where circumstances arise at an 
institution involving financial or other maladministration of a severe nature; 
where circumstances seriously undermine the effective functioning of the 
public higher education institution; where the Council of the institution has 
failed to resolve such circumstances; where the circumstances in section 
 
253 Pr ior  to  the Higher  Educat io n and Tra ining  Laws Amendment Act  of  2012,  an  
independent  assesso r  was  appoin ted  in  terms of  s  44 of  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  
1997.    
 
254 These persons must  have knowledge and experience of  higher  education,  must  no t  be  
members of  the CHE and must  comply  with  any  other  requirements  determined  by the  
CHE.  
 




42(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 arise; and where the 
appointment is in the best interests of the institution. 256 
 
Section 45A of the Higher Education Act of 1997 describes the 
investigation procedure that should be followed by the independent 
assessor.257 This section was initially introduced in the Higher Education 
Training and Amendment Act of 2012 and was subsequently amended by 
the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016.  Section 45A(4) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997258 introduced an important change, as it now makes 
specific reference to a “…Council member, employee, student or service 
provider or any other person or representative of an entity with a business 
or other relationship with the institution”, instead of only referring to “…any 
person..” as contained in the Higher Education Act of 1997.259 It, therefore, 
clarifies the concept.   
 
Section 45A(8) of the Higher Education Act of 1997260 was also amended. 
In the event of any adverse findings against a person, the independent 
assessor must give such person notice of the detrimental implication or 
possible adverse finding, and provide such person with all the relevant 
documentation and evidence affecting his/her rights, interests or potential 
interests obtained during the investigations conducted by the independent 
assessor and afford such person the opportunity to respond in a manner 
that is expedient under the circumstances. This person must also be 
 
256 The previous s 45(a)  d id  not  requ ire the Council  to  request  the appointment o f  an  
independent assessor  in  wri t ing.   Ref erence to  the c ircumstances  in  s  42(2)  was newly 
inser ted ,  and s 45(d)  now refers  to  the bes t  in te res ts  of  the ins t i tut ion.  
 
257 Amendment by s 20  of  the Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act of  2016.  
 
258 Inser ted by  s  9  of  the Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining Amendmen t Act 23 of  2012.  
 
259 The reference  to  “any  person”  was  inser ted  b y s  9  of  the Higher  Educat ion and  
Train ing Laws Amendment Act o f  2012 and  was  very broad.  
 




afforded the opportunity to be heard by way of giving evidence.261 
Previously, this section, as inserted by the Higher Education and Training 
Laws Amendment Act of 2012,262 did not contain such provisions. It only 
provided that the independent assessor directs any person to submit an 
affidavit or to appear before the independent assessor to give evidence 
and to produce any document in his/her possession relating to the 
investigation. Furthermore, the independent assessor may request an 
explanation from any person whom he/she reasonably suspects of having 
information. The amended version, as inserted by the Higher Education 
Amendment Act of 2016, seems to be fairer towards any person implicated 
in an investigation, affording this person greater rights, and is therefore 
welcomed.263 
 
Section 45A(9) of the Higher Education Act of 1997264 stipulates that the 
independent assessor must allow a legal representative or a representative 
from a trade union of which a person is a member, to assist the implicated 
person. Previously it only stated that the independent assessor may allow a 
legal representative.265 The previous version of this section as contained in 
the Higher Education Amendment and Training Act of 2016,  thus only 
provided therefore that the independent assessor had the discretion 
whether or not to allow such assistance, and would only allow a legal 
representative. The amended version contained in the Higher Education 
Amendment Act of 2016 offers more affordable options to the implicated 
person and is therefore welcomed. 
 
261 Sec tion 33(1)  o f  the Const i tu t ion as wel l  as  the provisions of  the Promot ion of  
Adminis tra t ive Jus t ice Act  3  of  2000  bears reference.  According ly,  admin istra t ive 
act ions  must  be  lawful ,  reasonable and procedurally  fair ,  and any person whose r igh ts 
have been adversely  af f ected as the r igh t  to  be given  wr it ten  reasons  for  the act ion 
taken agains t  him/her .   
 
262 Inser ted by  s  9  of  the Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining Laws Amendment Act  of  2012.  
 
263 Amended by s 20(b)  of  the Higher  Education  Amendment  Act of  2016 .  
 
264 Amendment by  s  9  of  the Higher  Educat ion and  Train ing Amendment Act 23 of  2012.  
 




Section 45B, as inserted by the Higher Education and Training Laws 
Amendment Act of 2012, was also considered a content ious amendment.266 
It stipulated that an independent assessor be competent to enter any 
building or premises of the institution and to copy any documents on those  
premises which in his/her opinion had a bearing on the investigation. The 
higher education stakeholders felt that this endowed the independent 
assessor with too much power to enter any building or premises and to 
copy any documents without the Council or management being made 
aware of what documentation was taken. The amended section 45B of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 now states that the independent assessor 
must provide a signed inventory of any copied documents to the person(s) 
to whom the custody of the documents is entrusted, thus offering some 
measure of protection and awareness to the inst itution.267 This amendment 
is also welcomed. 
 
Section 47 of the Higher Education Act of 1997, which provides for the 
functions of an independent assessor, was substituted by section 10 of the 
Higher Education Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012, and subsequently 
amended by the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016. 268 It states that 
the independent assessor must conduct an investigation at the higher 
education institution concerned; report in writing to the Minister on his/her 
findings of the investigation, together with the reasons on which the 
findings are based; and suggest in the report appropriate measures, 
providing the reasons why the measures are needed. The Minister also has 
the discretion to extend the period in which the independent assessor must 
conduct his/her investigation and report to the Minister.  Furthermore, after 
receiving the report from the independent assessor, the Minister must 
provide a copy of the report to the Council within a period of 90 days, table 
the report before the National Assembly and publish the report in the 
 
266 Inser ted by  s  9  of  the Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining Laws Amendment Act  of  2012.  
 
267 Amended by s 21 of  the  Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act  of  2016.  
 




Government Gazette. The 2012 version of this section did not provide the 
Minister with the discretion to extend the period in which the independent 
assessor must conduct the investigation and report to the Minister. 
Furthermore, it also did not stipulate that the Minister should provide a 
copy of the report to the Council of the institution within a period of 90 days 
- it only required the Minister to provide the report as soon as practicable. 
The amended version indicates that the independent assessor must act 
within a certain time frame, and the Minister must provide the institution 
with the report within a certain time period.  
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 did not previously provide for the 
indemnification of an independent assessor. The Higher Education 
Amendment Act of 2016 now provides for this in section 49A.269  
Accordingly, the Minister will be liable for any loss or damage suffered by 
another person which arose from an act or omission of an independent 
assessor as a claim against the state.  However, an independent assessor 
will only be indemnified if he or she was not guilty of certain conduct.270 This 
is a commendable amendment because the independent assessor can 
exercise his/her function without fear of liabi lity, although he/she may 
forfeit this indemnity under certain circumstances.    
 
Section 41A of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for the 
appointment of an administrator. Thus, if an audit of the financial records of 
 
269 Sec tion 24 of  the Higher  Education Amendment Act of  2016 substi tuted s 49A and  
provided for  the indemnif icat ion of  an  independent assessor .  
 
270 These  acts inc lude  in tentional ly  exceeded  his /her  powers ;  made  use  of  a lcohol  o r  
drugs;  d id  not  act  in  the course and scope  of  his /her  terms of  reference;  acted 
reckless ly  or  in ten tional ly;  without  pr ior  consu ltat ion  with  the State  At torney,  made an 
admission that  was de tr imental  to  the best  in te res ts  of  h igher  education  or  fai led to  
comply with  or  ignored  s tand ing ins truc tions,  of  which he or  she was  aware  or  could 
reasonably  have been  aware of ,  which  led to  the  damage or  reason  for  the  c laim,  
exclud ing damage ar is ing  from the use of  a  vehic le  for  off ic ial  purposes;  and  in  the 
case of  a  loss ,  damage or  claim ar is ing from the use of  a  vehicle  for  o f f icial  purposes, 
the independent  assessor  used the  veh icle  wi thout  author isa t ion ;  and not  possess  a  
valid  d r iver ’s l icense or  other  appropriate  l icense;  d id  no t  use the  vehic le  in  the 
interes t  of  higher  education ;  a l lowed  unauthor ised persons to  handle the veh ic le ;  or  




a public institution or an investigation by an independent assessor reveals 
financial or other maladministration of a severe nature or the serious 
undermining of the effective functioning of an institution, the Minister may, 
after consultation with the Council of that institution, appoint an 
administrator to take over the authority of the Council or the management 
of the institution and perform the function relating to governance or 
management of that institution. This section did not provide for the 
administrator to take over all the functions of the institution.271 Section 49B 
was inserted by the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 
2012.272 This was one of the controversial amendments that provided cause 
for concern to the various higher education stakeholders. Section 49B(1) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997273 allowed the Minister to appoint an 
administrator after consultation with the Council of that institution, to take 
over the management, governance and administration of that institution 
under certain circumstances.274 Many stakeholders felt that it would not be 
appropriate for one person to take over all of these functions. 275 The Higher 
Education Amendment Act of 2016 amended section 49B(1) to refer only to 
 
271 See  the  ma tter  of  Minister  of  Higher Educat ion and Train ing and o ther v  Mthe mbu 
and Others,  Counci l  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free  Sta te  v  Min is ter o f  
Higher  Education  and  t raining  and Others  where  the CUT argued tha t  s  41A(1)  d id  no t  
provide for  the  s imu l taneous takeover  of  governance and management functions.   The  
cou r t ,  however ,  po inted out  that  i f  i t  was  the leg isla ture’s  in tent ion to  keep these  
functions  separa te ,  i t  would have prov ided for  the appoin tment of  two admin istrators 
ins tead  of  only one.   
 
272 Sec tion 11 of  the Higher  Educat ion and Tra ining Laws Amendment A ct of  2016 .   
Sec tion  8 of  the Higher  Educat ion and  Tra ining Laws Amendment Act of  2016 provided  
that  s  41A(1)  and (2)  be  dele ted.  
 
273 Subst i tu ted by s 25 of  the Higher  Educat ion Amendment Act  of  2016.  
 
274 Reference  to  “or”  was removed in  this  sect ion.  These c ircumstances inc lude an aud it  
of  the f inancial  records of  a  publ ic  higher  educat ion inst i tu t ion or  a  report  by an  
independent assessor  o r  any other  report  o r  in format ion revea ling f inancia l  or  other  
maladminis tra t ion of  a  ser ious nature or  ser ious undermi n ing of  the effective 
function ing of  the public  h igher  education  ins t i tut ion;  o r  i f  the circumstances  
contempla ted in  s  42(4)  ar i se;  i f  the Council  of  the  publ ic  higher  education  inst i tu t ion  
requests such appoin tment;  of  the Council  of  the public  h igher  ed ucat ion inst i tu t ion is  
deemed to  have resigned  as contemplated  in  s  27(8) .  
 
275 See the submiss ion by  the Univers i ty  of  Pre tor ia  da ted October  2012 27 –  28;  and  
the submission by the Centre fo r  Const i tu t ional  Righ ts “Higher  Education and Train ing 
Laws Amendment Act Fail ing the Test .”  
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the appointment of an administrator by the Minister under certain 
circumstances.  Although section 49B(1) of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 no longer includes mention of the administrator “…taking over the 
management, governance and administration of the public higher education 
institution,” the Act still provides for this in section 49F.  After reviewing 
and considering the various independent assessor reports for the 
institutions that were investigated or placed under administration, it 
became clear to the author that the amended provisions of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 relating to the mandate of the administrator are 
commendable.  The administration process will be used as a last resort by 
the Minister, but the amendments make it possible for the Minister to 
appoint an administrator, take over certain functions of a troubled 
institution, and assist it to become a healthy and well-functioning institution 
within a certain period of time.  In many of these cases by the time that the 
Minister appoints an administrator, there are already factions within the 
Council and they are not functioning effectively. If the Council is not 
functioning properly, it will be unable to execute its duties towards the 
institution. Thus, there is a definite need for the Higher Education Act of 
1997 to provide for the appointment of an administrator.  
 
Section 49B(1A) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 was added, stating 
that the Minister must, before appointing an administrator, provide notice to 
the Council of his/her intention to appoint an administrator; provide the 
Council with the reasons for the appointment; provide the Council with a 
reasonable opportunity to make written representations and consider the 
representations made by the Council of the institution concerned. This 
clause allows the public institution to be heard before the Minister places 
the institution under administration. This opportunity may affect the 
decision made by the Minister and was not previously provided to 
institutions. Section 49F276 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 clarifies the 
role and mandate of an administrator, a change that is welcomed. The 
 




administrator will be responsible for the following:  to take over the role, 
powers, functions and duties of the Council concerned;  carry out the role, 
exercise the powers, perform the functions and execute the duties of the 
Council concerned to the extent that such role, powers, functions and 
duties related to governance; take over and execute the management of 
the public higher education institution concerned; identify and initiate 
processes and initiatives that restore proper governance and management, 
and ensure that a new Council for the higher education institution 
concerned is appointed and constituted in accordance with the institutional 
statue as soon as practicable.  However, section 49F does not give the 
administrator carte blanche: it confirms that the Minister may confine the 
mandate of the administrator or determine the mandate of the administrator 
to include only specifics tasks.  
 
Section 49G277 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 clarifies the process of 
appointing an administrator upon the resignation of an institution’s Council.  
In such an instance, the Minister must appoint an administrator for a period 
not exceeding six months to take over the role, powers, functions and 
duties of the Council and ensure that a new Council is constituted. A public 
higher education institution cannot function without a Council, and this 
section clarifies the role of an administrator in the event that the whole 
Council resigns.  
 
Section 49H278 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 deals with the 
termination of an administrator’s term of office, 279 while section 49I of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 deals with the directive issued by the Minister 
 
277 Sect ion 49E,  as inser ted by s 11  of  the Higher  Educat ion and Training  Laws  
Amendment Act o f  2012,  provides  that  an inst i tut ion’s Counci l  be  dissolved once a n  
adminis tra tor  i s  appoin ted.   
 
278 As inser ted by s 28 of  the Higher  Education and Training Laws Amendment Act o f  
2016.  
 
279 These  c ircumstances  include  when the  Council  of  the  ins t i tut ion is  c onst i tu ted ;  the  
expiry of  the te rm of  the appoin tment;  the resigna tion or  death of  the administrator  or  




to Council, duly appointed by the administrator after his/her term of office 
has terminated.280 The Minister may issue the latter directive after taking the 
administrator’s report into account. This directive may then be issued to the 
Council of the public institution concerned in the event that the Minister has 
reasonable grounds to believe that certain matters relating to the effective 
functioning of the institution and the execution of its mandate require 
specific or continued attention of the Council and the management of the 
institution.   
 
Section 49J of the Higher Education Act of 1997281 provides for 
indemnification of the administrator, by making the indemnification provided 
to the independent assessor in section 49A of the Higher Education Act of 
1997 applicable to an administrator. This is also a positive addition, as it 
means that the administrator will only be indemnified if he or she is not 
guilty of certain conduct. The Minister will, therefore, take the responsibility 
in the event of any claims from third parties resulting from the 
administrator’s actions. 
 
It is clear that the changes effected in 2016 provide the Minister with 
greater power to intervene in the affairs of a public institution. However, the 
amendments introduced by the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016 
can be considered as a positive development as they do not merely provide 
the Minister with carte blanche: instead, they provide him/ her with a 
mandate with which he/she must comply before placing a university under 
administration. Moreover, the Higher Education Act of 2016 provides 
greater clarity on matters such as the mandate and functions of the 
independent assessor and the administrator, which matters that had 
previously given cause for concern to various stakeholders.  
 
 
280 As inser ted by s 28 of  the Higher  Educat ion and Train ing Laws Amendment Act o f  
2016.  
 







This chapter discussed the concepts of institutional autonomy, public 
accountability, co-operative governance and conditional autonomy in 
relation to how they affect higher education institutions.282 It is essential to 
understand these concepts, how they relate to one another and the fact 
that complete institutional autonomy has never been promised to public 
higher education institutions. Complete autonomy will never be possible in 
higher education as public funding is being used by these institutions, 
demanding public accountability.  
 
This chapter includes an overview and discussion of some institutions that 
were placed under administration or investigated between 2008 and 2012. 
Three of these institutions were discussed in some detail to highlight their 
governance shortcomings and the need for corporate governance reform in 
the higher education environment.283 One of these institutions, the CUT, 
took the Minister of Higher Education and Training to court to prevent the 
DHET from appointing an administrator after an investigation was 
conducted by an independent assessor. In this matter, the CUT was of the 
view that an administrator could not take over both the Council as well as 
the management of the institution.  However, the court found that it was not 
the intention of the legislator to appoint two administrators for these two 
functions. Furthermore, the CUT felt that the DHET’s case was 
procedurally flawed in three ways namely the assessor ’s report, the 
consultation process with the Council relating to section 41A(1) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997, and the decision to appoint an administrator.  
In this instance, the court found that the Minister’s appointment of an 
administrator was unlawful, but there was no justification to set aside the 
 
282 See para 3 .2  above for  a  d iscuss ion on autonomy, publ ic  accountab il i ty  and co -
operat ive governance .   This i s  however  not  a  ful l  d iscuss ion as these topics are  
complex and ex tensiv e.   
 




independent assessor’s report.284 This judgement made legal history, as this 
institution became the first university to take the Minister to court and 
prevent the appointment of an administrator. The court found in favour of 
the institution, and it is likely that this judgment gave rise to the 
amendments contained in the Higher Education and Training Amendment 
Act of 2012 and the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016.   
 
Furthermore, this chapter provides a critical overview and discussion of the 
ministerial interventions contained in both the Higher Education and 
Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012 and the subsequent Higher 
Education Amendment Act of 2016. Emphasis was placed on the 
amendments relating to the improvement of governance 285 and amendments 
pertaining to ministerial interventions.286 
 
Many higher education stakeholders argued that institutional autonomy was 
threatened by the promulgation of the Higher Education and Training 
Amendment Act of 2012. Some went as far as to threaten legal action 
against the DHET. It is suggested that the higher education stakeholders 
invest the same type of energy into improving governance at public 
institutions and eliminating mismanagement, fraud and corruption. 
Considering the findings of the various independent assessors and the 
continued allegations of inadequate governance practices, 
mismanagement, fraud and corruption at public institutions, it is clear that 
more significant efforts are necessary from all stakeholders to address 
these matters. It seems that stakeholders may be placing too much 
emphasis on the threat to institutional autonomy and the provision for 
ministerial interventions. It is clear that these ministerial interventions will 
 
284Minister o f  Higher Educ ation and Train ing and Others v  Mthembu and Others,  
Council  o f  Central  Universi ty  o f  Technology,  Free  Sta te v  Minister  of  Higher  
Educat ion and Tra ining  and Others  (2776/2012 ,  2786/2012)  [201 2]  ZAFSHC 144  (13 
August  2012) .  See the d iscuss ion above  in  para 3 .3 .2(b) .  
 
285 See para  3 .4 .2  above for  a  discussion  of  these amendments.  
 




only be used as a last resort by the Minister. 287 It is important to note that 
although the Minister still has the power to place an institution under 
administration and dissolve its Council, the Minister is provided with a 
mandate that needs to be complied with before the institution can be 
placed under administration.  In other words, there are various “layers” 
contained in the Higher Education Act of 1997, preventing the Minister from 
placing an institution under administration at the first sign of trouble. The 
Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016 provides the Minister with 
greater options than to place an institution under administration 
immediately. This is more in line with natural justice. Whilst the rules of 
natural justice, requiring procedural fairness and ensuring that a fair 
decision is reached by an objective decision-maker based upon logical 
proof, clearly underpin the amendments, the Minister still has the authority 
to intervene should it be required. The large number of universities placed 
under administration between 2005 and 2008288 indicate that drastic 
changes were necessary to improve governance practices and curb 
mismanagement in institutions. Recently, it became known that several 
universities are facing renewed allegations of maladministration and 
mismanagement and that most of these institutions have faced 
 
287 See for  instance the in terac tions be tween the Minister  and UniZulu as wel l  as MUT.  
Some of  the  media reports  ind ica ted  h ow long  the Minster  t r ied to  ass is t  some of  the  
t roubled  in tui t ions.   See for  ins tance Fengu  M “No Progress  on UniZulu Assessment”  
2017-07-27 City  Press . ) .  Th is  ar t icle  published  in  2017  rep or ted  on the  fact  that  a lmost  
a  year  e lapsed af ter  the  Min ister  ha d advised  the troubled Counci l  of  UniZulu of  his  
inten tion  to  appoin t  an independent assessor .  A year  af ter  this  ar t ic le  was published,  
the Minister  had st i l l  not  appoin ted an independent as sessor .  As a  matter  of  fact ,  
recen tly ,  the  Minister  i ssued a di rec t ive  to  the Counci l  of  th is  ins t i tut ion to  probe 
cla ims of  ir regu lar  tender  processes,  i r regular  staf f ing and human resource prac tices  
and possib le f inancia l  mismanagement.  A ser ies of  foren sic invest iga tions wi l l  be 
conducted  at  th is  ins t i tu t ion ;  see  Myen i  G “UniZulu Forensic  Probe i s  Long 
Overdue”2018-06-01 Zululand  Observer.  
 
288 See sect ion 3.3 .2  above for  a  discussion  of  the univers i t ies placed under  
adminis tra t ion.  On  the  rules of  natural  just ice ,  i .e .  the  audi  al teram partem  ( the  r igh t  
to  be heard)  and the nemo judex in  parte sua  (no person may judge their  own case)  
rules genera l ly ,  see general ly  Tai tz  J  “The  appl ica t ion  of  the  audi  al teram partem rule  
in  South Afr ican adminis tra t ive law”  1982(45)  THRHR  254 –  273;  Corder  H “The  
conten t  of  the audi a l teram partem ru le  in  South Afr ican adminis trat ive  law” 1980(43)  
THRHR  156 –  177;  Vermeule  A “ Contra  Nemo ludex  in  Sua  Causa :  The  Limi ts  of  
Impart ial i ty” 2012(122)  The Yale Law Journal  384 –  420;  and Hess  RU “Nemo Iudex in  
Sua Causa and the challenge procedure  under  the Uncitral  Model Law” 2018(50)  




administration before.289 Allegations of fraud, corruption and misconduct at 
the University of Johannesburg (UJ)290University of the Western Cape 
(UWC), emphasises the need for adequate regulation. There is no 
indication that the DHET is involved in any investigation in these 
universities, confirming that the Department does, in fact, respect 
institutional autonomy at public universities. However, the continuing 
problems in public higher education institutions confirm the need for the 
Minister to have the power to intervene in the affairs of an institution under 
certain circumstances such as, for instance, where institutions fail to 
comply with directives issued by the Minister after repeated allegations of 
mismanagement, fraud or corruption. 
 
The DHET should act in an advisory capacity and be kept informed of all 
developments at universities facing allegations of corruption, fraud and 
mismanagement. The review of both the independent assessors’ reports as 
well as the administrators’ reports of the universities that were placed 
under administration provides proof that higher education institutions 
require strong leadership.  Council must be aware of its mandate and must 
make decisions in the best interests of the institution; it should also avoid 
taking on an operational role within the institution. On the other hand, 
senior management, including the Vice-Chancellor, should take control of 
the management and operational requirements of the university. It is 
imperative that all institutions have sound governance policies and 
procedures in place to ensure effective management of the institution and 
to curb self-interest and corruption, especially in the awarding of tenders. If 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 were amended to include a standard of 
conduct for Council members and senior management, these members 
 
289 For ins tance,  UniZulu and MUT see www.pmg.org.za  for  the ir  presen tat ions to  the  
Portfo l io  Commit tee ;  Fengu  “No progress  on UniZulu  assessment”  2017-07-23 
News24.Other  universi t ies that  have also been impl ica ted in  con tinued  al legat ions of  
f raud are Wal ter  Sisulu Univers i ty  (WSU)  and Cape Pen insula  Universi ty  of  
Technology  (CPUT) .  Se e Phakathi  B “Fraud  and  Chaos:   The  Four  Univers i t ies  keeping  
Government Awake a t  Night”  2017-11-24 Business Live .  
 




would arguably be more mindful of their actions.  Recommendations in this 
regard are made in Chapter 6 below. 291
 
291 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3 .4  below for  these recommendat ions.   
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter focuses on the applicable company law and current corporate 
governance principles as contained in the King IV Report on Corporate 
Governance (King IV).1 Corporate governance principles in respect of 
higher education institutions as contained in the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations are also discussed.2 In addition, it also considers whether the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 might be revised to incorporate some of the 
principles as provided for in the relevant company law as well as corporate 
governance principles. No in-depth analysis of corporate law is provided, 
nor is it the intention of this research to suggest that public higher 
education institutions be incorporated as companies. Instead, possible 
amendments to improve corporate governance and accountability practices 
in public higher education institutions are suggested. According to Dlamini: 
… the growing influence of corporate culture in higher 
education makes universities look like subsidiaries for 
business enterprises instead of making universities 
the Bureau of Knowledge Production and Licensing 
Degrees. Business is about domination and profit-
making, which is divorced from the ‘ideal university’ 
as education is a public good. 3  
 
Universities must focus on education and knowledge production. The South 
African public cannot afford to lose public higher education institutions to 
stringent and expensive corporate governance practices, driven by ever-
 
1 Publ ished by th e Ins t i tute  of  Directors on 1 November 2016.  See para  4 .4 .4  below for  
a  discussion of  King IV .  
 
2 See para  4 .4 .4  be low for  a  discussion  on the 2014 Reporting Regulat ions.  
 
3 Dlamini  R “Corporat i sat ion  of  Universi t ies  Deepens Inequali t ies  by Ig noring Socia l  




increasing demands from shareholders to optimise dividends. 4 Yet, some 
principles of corporate governance are also fundamentally important to 
higher education institutions. According to King IV, the governing body 
must continuously practise accountability and transparency. In this 
instance, the Council of a higher education institution must ensure that it 
takes on an effective leadership role by adopting King IV and determining 
the direction of following effective corporate governance practices. Not all 
the principles of King IV are applicable to higher education institutions: one 
example is shareholder activism. The mindful application of King IV must 
be beneficial and conducive to the efficient functioning of a higher 
education institution.  A higher education institution should not become an 
overregulated and stringent legal environment, which may infringe on 
academic freedom, thus making it difficult to conduct its business in an 
effective way. 
 
In the comparative jurisdictions that are discussed later in this chapter, 
public higher education institutions are structured as corporations. 5 It is not 
attempted, nor is it possible within the limited scope of this thesis, to 
provide an in-depth analysis of the relevant aspects of company law as 
most of these topics are worthy of being research topics on their own. The 
intention is to draw on the more clearly enunciated principles of company 
law and corporate governance for guidance on strengthening the 
governance of higher education institutions in South Africa.  
 
Section 66 of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that the business and 
affairs of a company must be managed by, or under the direction of its 
board.6 The board thus has the authority to exercise all the powers of the 
 
4 Dlamini  2018 (32)  SAJHE  57; Habib A “Transcending  the Past  and  Reimagining  the 
Future of  the South Afr ican Universi ty” 2016 (42)  Journal of  Sou thern Afr ican S tudies  
45.  
 
5 See Chapter  5  be low for  a  discussion  of  these comparat ive jur i sd ic t ions .  
 
6 Section  66(1)  of  the Companies Act of  2008; see also Delport  PA (ed)  Henochsberg 




company and perform any of its functions, except where the Act or the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation states otherwise. 7  This provision 
endows the board with broader powers than was previously the case, as it 
is clear that the powers are derived from a statute and not the company’s 
constitution. Furthermore, they extend to both the “business” and “affairs” 
of the company.8 Similarly, in terms of section 27(1) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997, a Council of a higher education institution must 
govern the institution; while section 30 confirms that the Principal or Vice -
Chancellor of a public higher education institution is responsible for the 
management and administration of the institution. 9  The board of directors 
of a company can be compared to a Council of a higher education 
institution. The chief executive officer holds a similar position to that of a 
Vice-Chancellor of a higher education institution.  
 
The common law and statutory duties and liabilities of directors are briefly 
considered in this chapter, with a view to recommending that some of these 
 
7 Pr ior  to  the Companies Act of  2008 ,  the  regulat ion of  director’s duties was lef t  
large ly to  common law.   The common law duties are those of  good fai th ,  honesty  and  
loyal ty .  In  add it ion,  d irectors must  a lso exerc ise a  du ty of  care and  ski l l ,  which is  not  
considered  a  f iduc iary  duty.  See  Cassim F e t  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  ( Juta  
Cape Town 2012)  507;  Havenga MK Fiduciary Dut ies of  Company Directors wi th  
spec if ic  regard to  Corporate Opportuni t ies  (Published  LLD thesis  Univers i ty  of  South  
Afr ica 1995)  11 ;  Job CO Common Law Duties  and Se ct ion 76 o f  the Companies Act  71 
of  2008 compared  (Published LLM thesis  Universi ty  of  Pretor ia  2012)  6  –  15.  In 
Navigator  Property  Inves tments (Pty)  Ltd  v  S i lver Lakes Cross ing Shopping Centre  
(Pty)  Ltd  [2014]  JOL 32101 (WCC) at  para 33 the fol lowing was  c onfirmed “‘I t  i s  
necessary  to  re i terate  that  the  direc tors  of  comp anies  are  empowered  by s  66 of  the 
Act ,  as well  as by  the ir  company’s a r t icles  to  manage the company’s business ,  to  
t ransac t  on i t s  behal f  and to  de lega te the ir  powers and  funct ions.  They ex erc ise thei r  
powers co llect ively ,  by  major i ty  vo te,  as a  board.  In  te rms of  the Act,  the ul t imate 
power in  a  company  is  now with  the  board of  directors,  and not  with  the  shareholders.”  
See  in  general  Yeats  JL (ed)  Commentary on  the  Companies Act  of  2008 ( Jutatstat  
online publica t ions 2017)  2 -1249 -  1256.  
 
8 For  more  on the prov is ions  of  s  66  see in  general ,  Havenga 2013  TSAR  262. ;  Cass im 
et  a l .  Contemporary  Company Law 480 –  481;  Delpor t  et  al .  Henochsberg  on the  
Companies Act  71 of  2008  249 –  253.  The Companies Act of  1973 did not  have similar  
provis ions and the  powers  w ere  regu lated by  the company’s Art ic les of  Associat ion,  
which  usual ly  only refer red to  the “business” of  the company.  
 
9 See Chapter  2 ,  para  2 .2  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the  higher  educat io n landscape in  
South Afr ica post -1994.  
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duties and liabilities be included in the Higher Education Act of 1997 .10  
These duties include not only the fiduciary duties of directors11 but also 
their duties of care and skill.12 Director’s duties were, for the first time in 
South African company law, partially codified in the Companies Act of 
2008. In addition, this Act provides for a statutory business judgment rule.    
 
The sections, which follow, provide a brief comparison between the duties 
and liabilities contained in sections 76 and 77 of the Companies Act of 
2008 and section 60 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 13   The Banks Act of 1990 
specifically applies to the regulation and supervision of the business of 
public companies, namely, banks. The Companies Act of 2008 also applies 
to banks, as they are companies.  The relevant provisions in the Banks Act 
of 1990 relate to the duties of bank directors, their compliance role and 
certain corporate governance provisions, which have been included in the 
Act. The Companies Act of 2008 does not contain similar provisions in 
respect of compliance or governance, and for that reason, the Banks Act of 
1990 may be instructive. De Jager infers that financial institutions are 
viewed as companies with a higher public impact than that of other 
companies.14 Financial institutions are highly regulated, and compliance 
with various statutory instruments is imperative. Therefore, in the exercise 
of their duties, directors of banks are held to a higher standard than their 
counterparts in most other industries.  
 
 
10 See Chapter  6 ,  para  6 .3  b elow for  these recommendat ions.   See Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2 .4  
above for  a  discussion on the common law f iduciary du ties.  
 
11 See para  4 .2 .5  be low for  a  discussion  of  the f iduciary du ties .  
 
12 See para  4 .2 .6  be low for  a  discussion  of  the duty of  care  and ski l l .  
 
13 For  a  comparison with  the Banks Act of  1990 ,  see para 4 .3  be low.  
 
14 De Jager  JJ  The Management o f  Banks in  South Africa:  Legal and  Governance  




This chapter also includes a brief overview of the liability of directors, 15 the 
removal of directors16 and delinquency provisions17 in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008. These aspects have been included as it may be 
useful to include similar provisions in the Higher Education Act of 1997. 18  
 
South African higher education institutions are facing a difficult time as a 
result of recent developments in the sector. 19 It has been demonstrated that 
corporate governance practices in higher education institutions are 
inadequate and require improvement.20 It is subsequently suggested that 
the governance framework of higher education institutions should include a 
partially codified standard of conduct for Council and executive 
management, as well as a business judgment rule to promote honest 
conduct by Council and executive management members acting in the best 
interests of their institutions. It is also suggested that the Higher Education 
Act of 1997 should provide for the removal of Council members and 
executive management, as well as having them declared delinquent and 






15 See para 4 .2 .8  below for  a  discussi on of  the  l iab il i ty  of  d irec tors in  terms of  the 
Companies Act  of  2008.  
 
16 See para  4 .2 .9  be low for  a  discussion  of  the removal of  d irectors.  
 
17 See para  4 .2 .10 be low for  a  discussion  of  dec lar ing a d irec tor  de linquent.  
  
18 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3  below fo r  spec if ic  recommendat ions in  th is regard.  
 
19 Var ious un iversi t ies  were placed  under  adminis trat ion before  and af ter  the at tainment  
of  democracy in  1994.  Even as recent ly  as May 20 18,  an independent asse ssor  was 
appointed for  the  Univers i ty  of  Zulu land.  See  Chapter  3 ,  para  3 .3 .2(b)  above  for  a  
discuss ion  of  the administrat ion process of  some of  these  inst i tu t ions.  
 
20 See Chapter  3  para 3 .3  above for  a  discussion  of  the  min ister ia l  in terventio ns into  the  
affair s  of  public  h igher  education  ins t i tut ions as  wel l  as  a  d iscussion  regard ing the  
universi t ies tha t  were p laced under  administ rat ion.  
 








The Companies Act of 2008 came into effect on 1 May 2011,22 largely 
replacing the Companies Act of 1973.23 The Companies Act of 1973 was 
outdated and in need of reform to reflect changing business trends and 
developments.24   
 
4.2.2 Types of directors 
 
A company is a juristic entity that exists separately from the company 
management and shareholders. It can therefore not act on its own behalf, 
and its board of directors is responsible for managing the affairs of the 
company.25 Fiduciary duties are not only owed by directors, but also by 
 
22 For  more on  the  company law reform pro cess,  see  general ly ,  Mongalo TH “An 
Overview of  Company  Law Reform  in South  Afr ica :   From the Guidel ines to  the  
Companies Act 2008” 2010 (1)  Acta Juridica  x i i i  –  xxv.  The  focus here  i s  on f iduciary  
duties  and l iabi l i t ies  in  terms of  the Companies  Act  of  20 08  to  the exten t  that  they may 
provide gu idel ines in  the higher  ed ucat ion sec tor .  
 
23 Chadwick N “The South Afr ican Companies Act of  1973” 1974 (14)  Zimbabwe Law 
Journal  144 –  161.   
 
24 The  Companies Act  of  1973 was  bulky,  complex and excessively  technica l .  Many  of  
the t rad it ional  company  law doctr ines  that  were inheri ted from the English law,  were  
ei ther  abandoned  or  modif ied  considerab ly,  and new concepts  were  developed  in  the 
Act of  2008 .  The Companies Act of  2008 repea led most  of  the prov is ions of  the 197 3  
Act ,  with  the  except ion  of  Chapter  14 which provides for  the  l iq uida tion and winding  
up of  companies to  a  cer tain  extent .  See in  general ,  Mongalo 2010 Acta Juridica  x i i i  –  
xxv; Knight  P  “Keep i t  Simple  and Set  i t  Free :   The new Ethos  of  Corpora te  
Formation” 2010 Acta  Juridica  3  –  42;  Cass im F The Practi t ioner’s  Guide t o the 
Companies  Act  o f  2008  (Juta  Cape Town 2015)  2 .   For  more  on company reform, see in  
genera l  Mongalo TH Modern Company Law for  a  Competi t ive South African Economy  
(Juta  Cape Town 2010)  x i i i  –  xxv  for  more  informat ion on  the  process  fol lowed in  the  
corporate law reform which resul ted in  the  promulgat ion of  the Companies  Act o f  2008.  
For more on  th is subjec t  matter ,  see Locke  N “The meaning  of  ‘So lven t’  for  Purposes  
of  Liquidat ion in  terms of  the Compan ies Act 71 of  2008:  Boschpoort  Ondernemings  
(Pty)  Ltd v  Absa Bank Limi ted ” 2015(27)  SA Merc LJ 153  –  162.  
 
25 For  more  on the jur is t ic  personali ty  of  companies see genera l ly ,  Coetzee  L  “The 
Fiduciary Rela t ionsh ip between a Company and i t s  Dire c tors” 2014 ( 35)  Obiter  286;  
Pre tor ius JT  e t  a l .  Hahlo’s South Afr ican Company Law through  the  cases  6 t h  ed (Ju ta  
Kenwyn 1999)  7 .  One  of  the  prov is ions that  st i l l  has l imited appl ica t ion  in  terms of  the 
transi t iona l  ar rangements i s  s  424 of  the Companies Act of  1973,  which provides for  
the l iabi l i ty  of  directors in  the e ven t  of  reckless and fraudulent  t rading.  Sec tions 22  
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senior managers, senior employees, prescribed officers and  members of an 
audit committee or board committee.26  Similarly, duties are not only owed 
by Council members of a public higher education institution, but also its 
executive management and those employees who form part of the Council 
committees. 
 
Executive and non-executive directors are distinguished in company law, 
although the distinction is not specifically provided for in the Companies 
Act of 2008.27  Councils of higher education institutions have similar 
positions in their internal and external Council members’. 28 A non-executive 
 
and 77(3)(b)  of  the Companies Act of  2008 also dea l  with  the issue of  f raudulen t  and  
reckless trad ing by d irectors of  a  company.  Phungula S "Lessons to  be Learned from 
Reckless and Fraudulent  Trad ing by a Company:  s  424(1)  of  the  Companies Act  of  1973  
and s 77(3)(b)  of  the Companies Act of  2008” 2016 (28)  SA Merc LJ  238 –  249.  The 
l iab il i ty  o f  directors i s  discussed  in  para 4 .2 .8  below.  
 
26 The  def ini t ion  of  a  “direc tor”  in  the Companies Act of  2008 i s  ver y wide  and  
includes  al l  types of  directors such as  al ternate  direc tors,  execut ive d irectors,  nominee  
direc tors,  ex o ff icio  d irectors as  wel l  as shadow direc tors .  Accord ing to  the def ini t ion  
conta ined in  sect ion 1,  a  “d irec tor”  means  a  member of  the board o f  the company,  as  
contempla ted in  sect ion  66,  or  an a l ternate director  of  a  company and includes  any  
person occupying the posi t ion of  a  d irec tor  or  al te rnate director ,  by whatever  name 
designated.  This  def ini t ion therefore  includes  people who are  not  forma l ly  appointed to  
the posi t ion  but  are ac t ing in  the  posit ion.  I t  a l so includes  persons who may no t  be  
regarded  as “directors”  but  have  a  differen t  t i t le  such as “prescr ibed off icer” or  
“manager”,  and who  are  responsib le for  the management of  the a ffai rs  o f  the company .  
See s 76(1)(a)  and (b) .  This i s  the case even though the members of  these committees  
are not  members of  the company’s board of  directors and do not  have any voting r igh ts.  
See  in  general ,  Cass im Pract i t ioners Guide  to  the Companies  Act  o f  200 8 64;  
Mupangavanhu  BM Directors’  Standards o f  Care,  Ski l l ,  Di l igence ,  and the Business 
Judgment Rule in  v iew o f  South  Afr ica’s Companies Act  71 of  2008:  Future  
Impl icat ions for Corporate Go vernance (Publ ished DPhil  thesis  Univers i ty  of  Cape 
Town 2016)  21 –  26.  A prescr ibed off icer  i s  def ined as a  person who exercises genera l  
execut ive con tro l  over  and management of  the  whole or  a  sign if ican t  port ion of  the 
business and act ivi t ies o f  the comp any; or  regula r ly  par t ic ipa tes to  a  mater ial  degree in  
the exerc ise  of  genera l  execu tive contro l  over  and management  of  the whole  or  a  
sign if icant  port ion of  the business and act ivi t ies of  the company.  For  more on this 
subject  mat ter ,  see in  general ,  Idens ohn K “The Meaning of  ‘Prescr ibed Off icers’  under  
the Companies Act  of  71 of  2008” 2012 (129)  SALJ  717 –  735 Cassim  Practi t ioners  
Guide to  the Companies  Act  o f  2008  64 –  65; Coetzee L “The Fiduciary Rela t ionsh ip 
between a  Company and  i t s  Directors”  2014(35 )  Obiter  296 –  304.  
 
27 See in  general ,  Cassim Practi t ioners Guide t o  the Companies Act  o f  2008 65; Stevens  
R “The Legal  Nature  of  the Duty of  Care a nd Ski l l :   Contrac t  or  Del ict?”  2017 (20)  
PELJ  2 ;  Coetzee 2014 Obiter  298 –  302.  
 
28 Accord ing to  s  27(6)  of  t he Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997,  at  leas t  60% of  the  




director is a person who is a director of the company but is not a full -time 
employee while an executive director participates in the day-to-day 
management of the business and is also a full-time employee. A non-
executive director is not required to give continuous attention to the affairs 
of the company.29 In many instances, non-executive directors plead 
ignorance when it comes to the effective functioning of boards. 30 The 
unitary board structure is adhered to in South Africa. Both executive and 
non-executive directors are equally involved and accountable for the proper 
functioning of the board.31  In Howard v Herrigel NNO,32 it was found that 
different types of directors should not have different types of duties. The 
court held that the legal rules should be the same for all directors across 
the board. In the assessment of a director’s compliance with his/her duties 
it should, however, be taken into consideration whether the di rector is 
engaged in the management of the affairs of a company on a full-time or 
part-time basis. In Howard v Herrigel, the court found that once a director 
had taken up office as a director, he/she stood in a fiduciary relationship 
with the company and was required to act in good faith towards the 
company.33 King IV favours independent directors as they add value, skills, 
knowledge and experience that might not otherwise be available to the 
 
29 Coetzee 2014 Obiter 298; Cass im e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  478 –  480 ;  
Cassim The Practi t ioner’s Guide  to  the Companies Act  o f  2008  64  –  65.  
 
30 The current  corpora te fai lure re la t ing to  Ste inhoff  i s  a  good example .  See para 4 .4 .1  
below for  a  d iscuss ion of  this corporate fa i lure.  
 
31 In  European  countr ies  such as  Germany,  the  Nether lands  or  Denmark,  a  two -t ier  
board structure is  used.  For  more on  th is  subject  mat ter  see  in  general  Du Plessis  JJ  
“The German Two -Tier  Board and  the Ge rman Corporate Governance Code”  2004 
European Business Law Review  1139 –  1164;  Lessambo FI  The In ternat ional Corpora te 
Governance Sys tem  (Pa lgrave MacMillan UK 2013)  114 –  115;  Block  D and G erstner  A 
“One - t ier  vs two-t ier  board s truc ture :   A Comparison be t ween the United  Sta tes and 
Germany” 2016 Penn Law Legal Scholarsh ip Reposi tory  4  –  70 .  
 
321991 (2)  SA 660  (A) 58 .  Also see Dorchester  Finance  Co Ltd  Stebbing  (1989)  BCLC 
498 (Ch) (Uni ted King dom) where i t  was held in  terms of  English law that  there was no 
difference  in  the  dut ies owed  by execu tive and non -execut ive Direc tors ;  Janse van  
Rensburg  JP A Crit ica l  Analysis  of  a  Non -Execut ive Directors’  Responsib il i ty  to  
Register for VAT  (Published MCom thes is  North-West  Univers i ty  2016)  13;  Van  
Dors ten JL  Rights,  Powers and Dut ies o f  Directors  (Obiter  Publ ishers CC 1992)  20;  
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board. They also bring an objective and independent view to the table, 
which can increase the effectiveness of the board. 34   
 
Section 27(6) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 stipulates that at least 
60% of the Council members must be independent. Council members, 
whether external or internal, have the same duties and must act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the institution to ensure good corporate 
governance and accountability. 
 
4.2.3 Fiduciary obligations and the fiduciary relationship between a 
director and his/her company 
 
A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the best interests of 
another.35 Philips v Fieldstone Ltd and Another36 confirms that the principles 
that govern the actions of a person who occupies a position of trust 
towards another were adopted in South Africa from the equitable remedy o f 
English law.37 A fiduciary relationship requires at least an undertaking by 
 
34Delo it te’ s “King IV: Independent Directors –  Bolder  than Ev er” 
f i le : / / /C:/Users/corl iavdw/Downloads/za_Delo it te_KingIV_Independent_Directors_010
32017.pdf  (Date of  use :  3  February 2018) .  King IV is  discussed more fully  in  para  
44.4.3  below. See  pr inciple 7  of  King IV .   
 
35 For  more on f iduciary  rela t ionsh ips ,  see in  genera l  Havenga Fiduciary Dut ies of  
Company Direc tors wi th  spec if ic  regard to  corporate opportun it ies  8 ;  De Jager  The  
Management  of  Banks  in  South Africa:   Legal  and Governance  Princ i ples  283 ;  Havenga 
MK “Breach  of  Director’s Fiduciary Duties :   L iabi l i ty  on What Basis?”  1996 (8)  SA 
Merc LJ  366;  Ngaleka  VP A S tudy o f  the Impact  of  Company Legis lat ion on the  
Fiduciary Dut ies o f  Directo rs with  regard to  contracts with  the Company  (LLM thesis  
Univers i ty  of  Cape Town  2014)  12 –  14.  According to  Blackman,  in  Roman -Dutch law 
the term “f iduciary  duty” i s  regu lar ly  used in  connect ion wi th  the management of  the  
affair s  of  one person by another ;  see Blackman MS The Fiduciary Doctrine and i t s  
applica tion  to  Directors  of  Companies  (Published PhD thesis  Univers i ty  of  Cape  Town 
1970)  245; Rahman L Defin ing the Concept “Fiduciary Duty” in  the South African Law 
of Trusts  (Unpublished  LLM thesis  Univers i ty  o f  Western  Cape  2006)  1 ;  Hofer  v  Kevit t  
No 1996 (2)  SA 402 C 407 B; Coetzee  2014 Obiter  286–  290.  
 
36  2004(3)  SA 465 (SCA) .  
 
37 Phil ips v  Fie ldstone  and Another  (2004)  1  All  150 SCA at  30 .  The English doctr ine 
of  undue inf luence i s  usually  assoc ia ted wi th  the f iduc iary re lat ionship ;  see Blackman 
The Fiduciary  Doctrine and i t s  appl ica tion  to  Directors and  Companies  70.  The or igin  
of  the doct r ine is  no t  important  for  the purposes  of  this research .   However ,  safe to  say  
that  consider ing a l l  th e academic wr i t ing and common law, i t s  existence and  
importance cannot be denied.  For  more on the  background of  the English f iduciary  
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someone to act in relation to a matter in the interests of another, in a 
manner, which is understood by both parties.38 As companies started to 
evolve, there was an increasing need to be able to seek redress against 
defaulting directors who were not acting in the best interests of their 
companies. Commentators have pointed out the sui geris nature of a 
director’s fiduciary obligation.39 A director should be perceived as fiduciary 
sui generis,40 which means that his/her duty is deemed unique. This is a 
view that the author shares.41 Fiduciary duties are imposed on directors for 
the protection of the company and its shareholders; any breach of fiduciary 
duty will result in liability for the director.42  Like directors, Council members 




rela t ionship ,  see Hayton D “English Fiduciary  Standards and Trust  Law” 1999 (32)  
Vanderb il t  Journal of  Transnational Law  555 –  609;  Sea ly LS “Fiduciary  
Rela t ionships”  1962 (69)  Cambridge  Law Journal  69 –  72 .  For  more  on the or igin  of  
this doctr ine,  see in  general  Blackman The Fiduciary Doctrine and i t s  Applica tion to  
Direc tors  and Companies  242  -  243 ;  Aberdeen Rai lway Co v Bl ack ie Bros  1  Macq  
(1854)  HL 461 (United Kingdom) 461; Baxter v  Bening field  4  (1896)  N.L.R 143 
(Uni ted Kingdom) 143;  Robinson  v Randfon tein  Esta tes Gold  Mining  Company 1921  
AD 168.  
 
38 Job Common Law duties and sect ion 76 of  the  Companies Act  71  of  2008 comp ared  7 .  
 
39 Havenga Fiduciary  Dut ies o f  Company Directors wi th  Spe c if ic  Regard  to  Corporate 
Opportuni t ies  7 ;  Havenga M K “Director’ s  Fiduciary  Duties  under  our  future  Company  
Law Regime” 1997 (9)  SA Merc LJ  310 –  324.  
 
40 Havenga Fiduciary Dut ies of  Company D irec tors wi th  spec if ic  Regard  to  Corporate  
Opportuni t ies  8 ;  for  more on the f iduciary pr inc iple,  see p  8  –  11; Four ie  JSA “Die Su i 
Gener is Aksie teen Direkteure weens Verbreking van Vert rouenspl igte” 1995 (3)  
Stel lenbosch Law Review  408 –  416 ;  Havenga 1996 (8)  SA Merc LJ  366 –  367.  
 
41 Havenga  has indica ted tha t  there are  two requirements  to  establ ish a  f iduc iary  
rela t ionship :  f ir st ly ,  the  f iduc iary  should  be  ab le to  exerc ise some d iscret ion  or  power , 
and i t  must  be able to  unila teral ly  exerc ise tha t  discre t i on or  power in  the in terest  of  
the beneficia ry.  Fourie  argues tha t ,  the  su i  generis  ac t ion should be  treated  as a  form 
of  l iab il i ty  wi thin the law of  de lic t .  Fourie  1995 Stel lenbosch Law Review 408 –  416;  
Havenga 1996(8)  SA Merc LJ  367; Havenga M “Direc tor ’ s Co - l iabi l i ty for  Del icts” 
2006 (18)  SA Merc LJ  234;  Havenga Fiduciary Dut ies of  Company Direc tors with  
Speci f ic  Regard to  Corporate opportun it ies  10.  
 
42 Grove AP Company Directors:  F iduciary Dut ies and the Duty o f  Care and Ski l l  
(Publ ished LLM thesis  Univers i ty  of  Pr etor ia  2012)  7 .  
 




4.2.4 Common law fiduciary duties in South Africa 
 
Director’s common law fiduciary duties are well established in South 
Africa.44 Prior to the promulgation of the Companies Act of 2008, the rights 
and duties of directors were mainly derived from contracts concluded with 
the company, the Memorandum and Articles of Association, statute(s) and 
the common law.45 The common law provided for duties of good faith, 
honesty and loyalty.46 The common law also provided for the duty to 
exercise reasonable care and skill, which is not a fiduciary duty. 47 In 
common law, once a person accepts an appointment as a director, that 
person stands in a fiduciary relationship towards that company and is 
obliged to display good faith towards that company. 48  
 
44 The  Companies Act  of  1973 did  not  contain  a  s tandard  of  conduct  l ike  the Companies  
Act of  2008 does.  Ins tead,  the common law had to  be re l ied upon when i t  came to  
f iduciary du ties.   See  Robinson v Randfon te in  Estates  Gold Min ing  Co Ltd  1921 AD 
168,  where the  cour t  he ld tha t  “a f iduc iary  relat ionsh ip exists  where one man  s tands  to  
another  in  a  posi t ion of  confidence involv ing a duty to  p rotect  the interests  of  tha t  
o ther .”   See Lesofe I  Impl icat ion of  the Partial  Codif icat ion of  t he Direc tor Dut ies  
under the new Companies  Act  (Publ ished LLM thesis  Universi ty  of  Pre tor ia  2016)  7  –  
8 .  Under  the Companies  Act of  2008,  the common law f iduciary st i l l  applies,  but  i t  has 
also been  par t ia l ly  codif ied.  
 
45 For  more on  the  or ig in  of  f iduciar y dut ies in  genera l ,  see  Havenga  Fiduciary Dut ies  
of  Company Directors  with  Speci f ic  Regard  to  Corpora te Opportunit ies 11 –  22;  
Bouwman N “An Appraisal  of  the Modif icat ion of  the Director’ s  D uty of  Care and 
Ski l l”  2009 (21)  SA Merc LJ  509 ;  Grove Company Di rectors:  F iduciary  Dut ies and the 
Duty  of  Care and  Ski l l  4 .  
 
46 Par t ial  codif ica t ion i s  d iscussed  in  para 4 .2 .5  be low.  
 
47 See in  general ,  Cass im et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  507 for  the dif ference on  
these du ties.  However ,  Du Plessis  is  o f  the  opinion th at  there should not  be a  
dis t inct ion be tween f iduciary du ties and the duty of  care and ski l l .  For  more on this  
opinion  see  Du Plessis  JJ  Maatskappyreg te l ike Grondslae van d ie  Regsposis ie  van 
Direk teure  en Besturende Direkteure (Publ ished LLD thes is  Univers i te i t  van die 
Oranje-Vrystaa t  1990)  109; Havenga  Fiduciary Duties  of  Company Direc tors  wi th  
Speci f ic  Regard  to  Corporate Opportun it ies 319 –  321 .  The d ist inct ion between these  
duties is  becom ing increas ing ly b lurred.  
 
48 See in  general ,  De Jager  The Management o f  Banks in  South  Afr ica:   Legal and  
Governance Princ iples  283;  Ngaleka A Study of  the Impact of  Company Legis lat ion on 
the Fiduciary Duties o f  Direc tors with  Regard to  Contrac ts with  the  Company  12 –  14;  
Robinson v  Randfon te in  Estate Gold Mining  Co 1921 AD 177 .  According  to  the  
judgment in  Phi l ips v  Fields tone Ltd and Another  (2004)  1  All  150 SCA at  27,  “There  
is  no magic in  the term ‘f iduciary duty’ .  The exis tence of  such a du ty  and i t s  nature 
and exten t  are quest ions of  fac t  to  be adduced  from a thor ough considerat ion of  the 
substance of  the  re lat ionship.”   Bel lairs v  Hodnett  and  another  1978  (1)  SA 1109 (A)  a t  
1130F.  See in  general  Cyberscene Ltd and Others v  i -Kiosk Interne t  and Inform at ion  
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The powers provided to directors in terms of section 66 must be exercised, 
keeping in mind the fiduciary obligations. It is the board of director’s duty to 
manage and monitor employees and to make business decisions. 49 The 
board of directors, therefore, has the authority to exercise any powers and 
perform any functions of the company, except where the Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise.50 This differs from the position described 
in the Companies Act of 1973, which did not provide directors with the 
power to manage the business of the company.  51  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 introduced a partial codification of the 
directors’ duties.52 The existence of fiduciary duties is not dependent on a 
formal appointment of that director; rather, it commences as soon as the 
person starts to act in that capacity. 53  A person who accepts a position as 
 
(Pty)  Ltd  2000 (3)  SA 806 (C);  Da S ilva  v  CH Chemica ls  (Pty )  Ltd  2008 (6)  SA 620  
(SCA); Cassim et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  509 –  517 .  
 
49 Ferr i s  2013 Without  Pre judice  12  –  13;  van  Tonder  JL  A Primer on  The  Director’ s  
Oversigh t  Funct ion as a  Stand ard of  Directo r ’s  Conduct  under  the Companies Act 71 of  
2008” 2018(39)  Obiter  302 –  305.  
 
50 Sect ion 66(1) .  See Cass im The Practi t ioner’s  Guide to  the  Companies  Act  71  of  2008  
63.  
 
51 For  more  on  th is  posi t ion,  see  in  general  Delport  PA “Share I ssues  and Sha reholder  
Protect ion” 2013 (4)  De Jure  1056 –  1059; Cassim The Pract i t ioner’s Guide to  the 
Companies  Act  71  of  2008  63; Ferr i s  “Managing  a company”  2013 Without Pre judice  12  
–  13; Mota M “Managing under  the Companies Act :  2011 Without  Prejudice 18 –  19.  
 
52A dist inct ion should be drawn be tween complete  codif icat ion and pa r t ial  codif icat ion.  
Par t ia l  codif ica t ion  c lar if ies  the  law for  d irectors and makes i t  more  access ible .  I t  is ,  
however ,  not  an exhaustive  or  comprehensive code of  f iduc iary du ties.  South  Afr i ca ,  
through the par t ia l  cod if icat ion of  director ’s duties,  fo l lowe d internat ional  t rends as  
st ipulated by  the United Kingdom’s and other  common law jur isd ict ions.  I t  i s  c lear  
f rom the above compar ison tha t  par t ial  cod if icat ion of  di rec tor’ s du ties wi thin t he 
South Afr ican Companies Act of  2008 is  more sui ted than total  c odif ica t ion,  as 
direc tors have a  c lear  guide line of  what their  du ties  are,  whi le  reta ining  some 
f lexib il i ty  in  the use of  the common law. See in  general  s  76(3)  of  the  Companies Act  
of  2008;  Mupangavanhu  BM “Fiduciary Duty  and Duty of  Care under  Companies Act  
2008: Does  South Afr ican law insist  on the Two Duties  be ing kep t  Separa te?”  2017  
S tel lenbosch  Law Review 150  –  152;  Cass im et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  507  –  
508;  Esser  and  Coetzee  J “Codif ica t ion of  Director’ s Duties” 2004 (12)  Juta Business  
Law  30;  Van Tonder  2015 (36)  Obiter 704.  
 
53 Job Common Law duties and sect ion 76 o f  the Companies Act  71 of  2008 Compared  7 ;  
Pre tor ius Hahlo’s  South  African Law through the Cases  279 ;  Coetzee 2014  Obiter  287 




director undertakes the legal responsibility to ensure that as director, they 
understand the nature of their duties. 54 
   
4.2.5 Partial codification of directors’ duties in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008 
 
Section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008 does not exclude the common 
law. Thus, the common law duties that have not been expressly amended 
by section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008, or those that are not in conflict 
with this section, still apply.55  In terms of the Companies Act of 2008, the 
fiduciary duties of directors are mandatory, prescriptive and unalterable 
and apply to all companies.56  Briefly, they entail that directors should not 
exceed their powers, and may therefore not act illegally, dishonestly or 
ultra vires57 the company, nor may they act beyond the powers entrusted to 
them. It is required from directors, when acting in this capacity, to exercise 
their powers and perform their duties in good faith, for proper purpose and 
in the best interest of that company.58 The management function of 
directors can be divided into two parts: decision-making and oversight. The 
decision-making function relates to the consideration of company policy 
matters and decisions relating to the company future. The oversight 
function relates to the monitoring and supervision of employees who carry 
out their functions in the best interest of the company. Both these functions 
must be done in the best interest of the company. According to van Tonder , 
a director would have discharged his/her decision-making function if he/she 
took all reasonable steps to become informed about the company matters.  
 
54 Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law 509.  
 
55 Delport  e t  a l .  Henochsberg on the Companies Act  71 o f  2008  290;  Yeats et  al .  
Commentary on the Company Act  of  2008  p2-  1277; Van Tonder  2015 (36)  Obiter  704.  
 
56 Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  507.  
 
57 This means  tha t  one  i s  act ing beyond one 's  lega l  power or  au thori ty .  
 
58 Pretor ius  Hahlo’s South African  Law through the  Cases  279 ;  Grove Company 
Direc tors:  Fiduciary du ties and the duty of  care and sk i l l  8 ;  Van Tonder  Obiter  2018  
(39)  305.  
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However, section 76 does not provide for any standards for the discharge 
of the oversight function.59 Although directors may delegate management 
powers to other persons, their obligations in terms of the Companies Act of 
2008 as well as the common law remain with them.60 Apart from their 
fiduciary duties, directors also have a duty to act with care and skill, which 
regulates these duties.61  Yet it should be highlighted that the common law 
fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill often overlap. 62 A breach of 
any of these duties can result in liability of the director in question. 63  
 
For a director to act bona fide, he/she will need to act honestly. This 
imposes a subjective duty on the director. Objective duties also apply for 
instance, a director cannot be excused for failing to comply with an 
objective duty simply because he/she was acting honestly. The objective 
duty is thus not subservient to the duty of honesty.64 The objective 
standards may include the duty of the director to act in the best interests o f 
the company; the duty of the director not to exceed his/her powers;65 the 
 
59 Van Tonder  Obiter  2018 (39)  305 –  306;  s  76(4)(a)( i) ;  van Tonder  2016  (36)  Obiter 
563.  
 
60 Delport  P New Entrepreneurial  Law  (LexisNexis South Afr ica 2014)  139 –  140.  
 
61 Van Tonder  Obiter  2018 (39)  305; van Tonder  2016 (36)  Obiter  563.   Th is  i s  
discussed  more fu lly  in  para 4 .2 .6  below.  
 
62 De Jager  The Management o f  Banks  in  South Africa:  Legal  and governance princip les  
288.  
 
63 Coetzee and  van Tonder  2014 Obiter 306 –  308 .  
 
64 Grove Company Directors:  F iduciary  dut ies and the du ty o f  care and  ski l l  8 –  9 .  
 
65 A director  must  not  act  outs ide of  his /her  powers i . e .  ac t  i l lega lly ,  d ishonestly  or  




use of the director’s powers for proper purpose ;66 and the director’s 
obligation to exercise his/her independent and unfettered discretion. 67 
 
(a) Avoiding conflicts of interest, using company information for 
own benefit and secret profits 
 
The duty to avoid a conflict has been firmly established in the international 
common law.68 In the matter of Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Injectaseal CC69 the two incorporators of Injectaseal CC used to be 
employees of Sibex Construction.  One of them was the managing director, 
while the other was a general manager. These two employees resigned 
and started a business, the defendant company in the matter, in direct 
competition with Sibex Construction. During his last month of employment 
at Sibex Construction, one of these employees submitted a tender to Sasol 
and Natref, the main clients of Sibex Constructions. Subsequently, 
Injectaseal CC sent a letter to Sasol inviting their business. This letter had 
a price list attached, which prices were lower than those tendered by Sibex 
 
66 In  Howard  Smith  v  Ampel Petroleum Ltd  (1974)  1  Al l  ER 1126  (PC)  (United  
Kingdom) i t  was he ld that  a  director’ s duty to  use his/her  powers  for  proper  pu rpose 
also serves as a  tes t  to  determine i f  the act  was for  the benef i t  of  the company.  See Job  
Common Law Dut ies and sec tion 76 o f  the Companies Act  71 of  2008 Compared  6  –  16 
for  a  ful l  d iscuss ion of  these du ties ;  Grove Company Direc tors:  F iduciary Dutie s  and 
the Duty o f  Care and  Sk il l  8  –  9 .   
 
67 See genera l ly ,  S v  Shaban  1965 (4)  SA 646 (W); Novick  v  Comair Hold ings  Ltd  1979  
(2)  SA 116  (W )  Fulham Footbal l  Club Ltd  v  Cabra Estates  plc  (1994)  1  BCLC 363 (Ch 
and CA); Howard v Herriga l  NO 1991 (2)  SA 660.  A director  cannot simply ac t  as a  
“puppet”  for  ano ther  or  s imply “rubber  s tamp” decisions.  See  Grove Company 
Direc tors:  F iduciary du ties  and the  duty o f  care  and sk i l l  9 ;  Cil l iers  HS  Corpora te Law  
3 r d  ed (LexisNexis  South Afr ica)  141 –  147.  
 
68 See   in  genera l ,  Ci l l iers  HS and  Benade  ML Company Law  4 t h  ed  (But terworths 
Durban 1982)  327;  Cassim e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law 534  –  536;  S v Hepker  
1970 (3)  SA 702  (W) at  706 where i t  i s   s ta ted  “that  i t  i s  c lear  f rom law tha t ,  in  the  
absence of  any thing con trary in  an agent ’s mandate,  he i s  obliged to  act  for  th e benef i t  
of  his pr incipal ;  hence,  i f  he  ac ts  for  the benef i t  of  h imsel f  or  someone  else,  then even  
through the act  fa l l s  wi thin the scope  of  h is mandate,  i t  is  never the less  unauthor ised;” 
see  a lso  Rex v  Milne & Erle igh  (7) ,  1951 (1)  SA 791 (A.D) at  828D -E;  North-West  
Transporta tion Co Ltd  v  Beatty  (1887)  12 AC 589 (PC) (Canada)  593 –94; Yeats  
Commentary  on the Companies Act of  2008 2  –  1274 –  1275;   Van Dors ten  Rights,  
Powers and Dut ies o f  Di rec tors  192.  
 
69 1988 (2)  SA 54 (T)  a t  66D. See in  genera l ,  Cass im e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law  
534; Havenga M “Company Direc tors –  f iduciary duties,  corpora te opportuni t ies and 
confiden tial  information” 1989 SA Merc LJ  122 126.  
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Construction. Sibex Construction then approached the court to interdict 
Injectaseal CC from benefiting from their quotation to Sasol. The court 
ordered Injectaseal CC to withdraw any quotation or tender to either Sasol 
or Natref pending the determination of the court of granting a final interdict.  
It was clear to the court that both these employees used the knowledge 
that they gained while acting as agents for Sibex Construction to the 
advance of Injectaseal CC.  The court granted the interdict in favour of 
Sibex Construction. This judgment confirmed that fiduciary duties are not 
restricted to company directors only, but are also extended to any company 
official acting on behalf of the company.70 The common law principle 
relating to the duty to avoid a conflict of interest is influenced by the case 
of Keech v Sanford.71  As fiduciaries of the company, directors have a duty 
to avoid a conflict of interest between their companies and their own 
personal interest. Directors may not, without the informed consent of their 
board, use information that has come to their attention during the course 
and scope of their duties as a director to make a profit or retain a profit that 
was made by them.  According to Cassim, the duty to avoid a conflict is the 
core duty of a fiduciary.72 Van Dorsten states that the basic duty to avoid a 
 
70 Pre tor ius JT et  a l .  Student Case Book  on Business Enti t ies  3 r d  ed ( Juta and Company 
2004)  101 –  103;  Havenga MK “Company Direc tors –  f iduc iary du ties,  corporate 
opportuni t ies and conf idential  information ”  1989 SA Merc LJ  122 –  131 .  The cour t  
confirmed  the  s ta tement  made by the c ourt  in  Canadian Aero Service Ltd v  O’Malley  
(1973)  40 DLR (3d)  37 1  (SCC)as fo l lows: “Persons in  posit ions of  trus ts may  be less  
tempted to  place themselves in  a  posi t ion where duty conf l ic ts  with  interes t  i f  the 
courts recognised and enforced the str ic t  e thic  in  this a rea of  law.”  
 
71 Keech v  Sanford  (1726)  Se l  Cas Ch (Uni ted Kingdom) 6.  See  Cassim et  a l .  
Contemporary  Company Law 534 .  In  th is  case i t  was he ld tha t  a  trus tee should no t  be  
al lowed to  make a prof i t  out  of  a  trus t  by renewing a lease for  his ow n benefi t ;  see  in  
genera l  Lucas AR “Municipal  Counci l lo rs  -  Disqualif icat ion for  Interes t  -  Applicat ion  
of  the Rule in  Keech v .  Sanford  -  R. ex re l  Anderson v.  Hawrelak ;  Starr v .  Ci ty  o f  
Calgary” 111 1966 –  1967 Alberta  Law Review  331 –  332.  
 
72 See Imageview Management Ltd v  Jack  (2009)  BCLC 725 a t  739 (CA) (Uni ted  
Kingdom).  See  fur thermore the case  of  Sibex Construc tion  (SA)  (Pty)  Ltd v  In jec taseal  
CC  (1988)  (2)  SA 54 (T)  at  66 D,  where the court  refer red to  the judgment in  the case  
of  Canadian Aero Service Ltd v  O’Malley  (1974)  40 DLR (3d)  371 (SCC) (Canada)  and  
highlighted the fo l lowing: “an examinat ion of  the case law in  th is court  and in  the 
courts of  o ther  jur i sd ic t ions on the f iduc iary duties of  directors and  sen ior  off icers  
shows the  pervasiveness of  a  str ic t  e thi c  in  th is  area o f  law.  Persons  in  posit ions of  
trus t  may be less tempted to  place themselves in  a  posit ion where duty confl ic ts  with  
in teres t  i f  the cour ts recognised and  enforced the s tr ict  e th ic  in  th is  area of  the law.”   
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conflict of interest in terms of the common law provides for various other 
duties, inter alia, the duty to act bona fide in the interest of the company; 
the duty to account for profits; the duty not to misappropriate opportunities 
proposed to or pursed by the company; the duty not to compete improperly 
with the company; and the duty to disclose an interest in contracts with the 
company.73 
 
Section 75 of the Companies Act of 2008 governs the declaration of 
personal financial interests of directors. 74 Accordingly, a director who has a 
personal financial interest in respect of a matter to be considered by the 
board, or who knows that a related person75 has such an interest in the 
matter, he/she must disclose the interest and its general nature before the 
meeting considers the matter and must also disclose any material 
information known to that director. 76 A director who, after the company has 
approved it, acquires a personal financial interest in an agreement or other 
 
See Cass im e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law 534; Van Dors ten Rights,  Powers and  
Dut ies of  Directors  192 –  193.  
 
73 Van  Dors ten Rights,  Powers and  Duties  of  Direc tors  192 –  193.  Sect ion 238 of  the  
Companies  Act  of  1973 provided for  a  duty  of  a  d irector  to  disc lose  in teres ts  in  
contracts.   See in  general ,  Kunst  JA,  Delport  PA and  Vors ter  Q (e ds)  e t  a l .  
Henochsberg on the Companies Act  of  1973  (LexisNexis online publicat ions 1994)  444 
–  449.  
 
74 “Personal  f inancial  in terest”  i s  def ined in  the Companies Act of  2008  to  mean  (a)  a  
direc t  mater ial  in terest  of  that  person of  a  f inancia l ,  monetary or  economic na ture or  to  
which a monetary value  may be a t tr ibuted;  bu t  (b)  does no t  include any interes t  he ld by 
a person  in  a  uni t  t rus t  or  co llect ive  investment scheme in  terms of  the  Col lec t ive  
Investment  Schemes Act of  2005,  unless tha t  person has direc t  control  over  the 
investment decisions o f  that  fund or  investment.  See in  genera l  Delpor t  e t  al .  
Henochsberg on the Companies Act  of  2008  292;  Mthimunye-Bakoro v  Petroleum Oil  
and Gas Corpora t ion of  South Africa (SOC) Limited ( 12476/2015)  [2015]  ZAWCH 113;  
2015 (6)  SA 338 (WCC).  
 
75 “Related  person”  i s  def ined in  s  2  of  the Companies Act of  2008  as fo l lows: “an  
individual  i s  rela ted to  another  ind ividual  i f  they are  marr ied,  or  l ive toge ther  in  a  
rela t ionship s imi lar  to  a  marr iage ;  or  are separated by no more  than two degrees of  
natura l  or  adopted consanguinity  or  aff ini ty .”  
 
76 See in  general ,  Havenga MK and Locke N Monograph Corpora tions and Partnersh ips  
(South Afr ica)  in  International  Encyclop edia of  Laws  (Wolters Kluwer Internat ional  
BV, Nether lands 2013)  8 4;  Cassim R “Post -Resignat ion Dut ies  of  Directors :  The  
Appl ica tion of  the Fiduciary Duty no t  to  Misappropriate  Corpora te Opportuni t ies”  2008 
(125)  SALJ 731 –  753  for  more on corporate opport uni t ies and th e res ignation of  
direc tors;  Wiese  T Corporate Governance in  South Afr ica wi th  Interna tional  
Comparisons  2 n d  ed ( Juta Cape Town 2017)  73  –  76.  
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matter in which the company has a material interest, or who knows that  a 
related person has acquired such an interest in the matter, must promptly 
disclose the nature and extent of that interest and the material 
circumstances relating to his/her acquisition to the board of directors or the 
shareholders.77 A director may not attend the meeting after he/she has 
made full disclosure and may not participate in the meeting. The director 
also may not execute any document on behalf of the company in relation  to 
this matter.78 A decision by the board or a transaction or agreement 
approved by the board in the circumstances as described above, is valid 
despite any personal financial interest by a director or related person if it 
was approved following disclosure; or whether it was approved without a 
disclosure but then subsequently ratified by an ordinary resolution after 
disclosure or it has been declared valid by a court.  
 
Non-disclosure of personal financial interest may in certain circumstances 
amount to fraud and subsequently, criminal liability.79 In accordance with 
section 75(2) of the Companies Act of 2008, the duty to disclose does not 
apply if the decision may generally affect all of the directors of the 
company in their capacity as directors; in respect of decisions generally 
affecting a class of persons of which the director is a member unless the 
only members of that class are the director or persons related to the 
director; and if a person holds all the beneficial interest of all the issued 
securities of the company and is the only director of the company. 80 
 
 
77 Sect ion  75(6);  see  Havenga and Locke  Monograph Corporat ions and Partnersh ips  
(South Afr ica)  in  In t ernational  Enc yclopedia o f  Laws  85;  Wiese  Corporate Governance 
in  South Africa:  Wi th In ternat ional Comparisons  68 –  76.  
 
78 Havenga 2013 TSAR 264.  
 
79 Sect ion 75(7) ;  see para 4 .2 .8 .  See  in  general ,  Havenga and Locke Monograph  
Corpora tions and Partnerships (S outh Afr ica)  i n  Internat ional Encyclopedia of  Laws  
85.  
 
80 Wiese Corporate  Governance  in  South Africa:  With  In ternat ional  Comparisons  73  –  
76;  Naidoo R Corporate  Governance:  An  Essent ial  Guide for South Afr ican Companies  
(LexisNexis South  Afr ica 2016)  215 –  217.  
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Section 75 is limited to matters of a financial, monetary or economic 
nature, and this could prove to be problematic as a conflict of interest can 
arise for reasons that are unrelated to the aforementioned. 81 The Higher 
Education Act of 199782 makes provision for the declaration of both 
personal and financial interests by Council members. The Principal, Vice-
Principals and academic employees declare any interests including any 
business, commercial or financial activities undertaken for financial or other 
gain that may raise a conflict or a possible conflict of interest with the 
public higher education institution concerned. According to section 34(5) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997, an employee may not conduct business 
directly or indirectly with the public higher education institution where a 
conflict of interest has been identified. Section 34(6) and (7) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997 also refers to relatives of employees and the 
possible direct or indirect conflict of interest that might arise from 
contracting or procuring services or contracts with them. The Higher 
Education Amendment Act of 2016 specifically includes reference to 
“fiduciary or other interest,” in these subsections. 
 
Section 76(2)(a) and (b) must be read together with section 75. 83 In terms of 
section 76(2), directors may not use information that has come to their 
attention as directors of the company for their personal advantage, and 
should avoid a conflict of interest (the no-conflict rule); and they have a 
duty not to make a profit from their fiduciary position as director (the no-
profit rule).84 Although these two principles are separate from each other, 
 
81 S teyn C and Ever ingham G The New Companies Act  Unlocked  (Siber  Ink 2010)  248;  
Wiese Corporate  Governance in  South Africa:  Wi th Internat ional Comparisons 73 –  76.  
 
82 Section  27 of  the Higher  Education Act of  1997 .  
 
83 Sec tion 75 re la tes to  the disclo sure of  person al  f inancial  in terest .  Delport  et  a l .  (ed)  
Henochsberg  on the Companies  Act  71  of  2008  287;  Yeats et  al .  Commentary  on the  
Companies Act  o f  2008 p2-1274 –  1276;  
 
84 See Ndebele I  “No Confl ict” Duty o f  Company Direc tors  (Published LLM thesis  
Univers i ty  o f  Pretor ia  2014)  1  –  41 fo r  a  d iscussion  of  the no -conf l ict  rule;  Cass im 
2008 SALJ 732 –  733;  Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  549  –  554;  Delport  e t  
al .  (ed)  Henochsberg  on  the Companies Act  71  of  2008  290(8);  Lesofe  Impl ica tion o f  
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they are still closely related. Further to this, directors may not use any 
information that came to their attention to cause harm to the company or 
any subsidiary of the company85  knowingly86.  
 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 87 is a good example of 
a director whose interests conflict with those of the company. 88  In this case  
 
the Part ial  Codi f ica t ion  of  the Direc tor Dut ies under the new Companies  Act ;  Yeats  e t  
a l .  Commentary on the Companies Act  o f  2008 p2 –  1278 –  1279.  
 
85 This a lso refer  to  corporate oppor tuni t ies.  See  Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company 
Law  535,  550.  These  sect ions  are  a  fur ther  deterrent  fo r  directors  not  to  use their  
posi t ions  as  directors  for  personal  ga in.  See  in  genera l ,  Pre tor ius  Hahlo’s  South  
African  Law through the Cases  303;  Cooks v  Deeks  (1916)  1  AC 554  (PC) (Canada) ;  
Regal  (Hastings)  Ltd v  Gul l iver  (1942)  1  Al l  ER 378 ;  (1967)  2  AC 134 (HL) (Uni ted  
Kingdom); Industr ial  Development Consu ltants  Ltd  v  Cooley  (1972)  1  WLR 443;  (1972)  
2  All  ER 162 (Uni ted Kingdom) ;  Canadian Aero Serv ice Ltd v  O’Malley  (1974)  40 DLR 
(3d)  371 (SCC) (Canada );  Ci l l ier s Corpora te La w  142.   
 
86 Sect ion 1 of  the Companies Act of  2008 def ines  “knowing”,  “knowingly” or  “knows” 
when used wi th  respec t  to  a  person  and  in  rela t ion to  a  par t icular  mat te r ,  to  mean  tha t  
the person e i ther  had actua l  knowledge of  tha t  matter ;  was  in  a  posi t ion whe re the  
person  reasonable  ought  to  have  ( i)  had actual  knowledge;  ( i i )  invest igated  the mat ter  
to  an  ex ten t  that  would have prov ided  the  person with  ac tua l  knowledge;  or  ( i i i )  taken  
other  measures which ,  i f  taken,  would  reasonably be expected to  have provid ed  the  
person  with  ac tua l  knowledge of  the  matter .  Accord ing to  Ga rner  BA Black’s  Law 
Dic tionary  10 t h  ed (Thomson Reuters Uni ted States 2014)  1003,  “knowingly” i s  def ined 
as :  “ in  such  a  manner  that  the  ac tor  engaged  in  prohib ited  conduct  with  the  knowledge  
that  the soc ia l  harm that  the law was designed to  preven t  was pra c tical ly  cer ta in  to  
resu lt  del iberate ly .”  See Levenste in  E  “The Personal  L iab il i ty  o f  Directors”  2011 
Without Pre judice  22;  Blackman  et  al .  Commentary on the Companies Act  of  1973  on s  
424 of  the  Companie s Act  of  1973 521  –  554 ;  Esser  IM and Havenga  M K (eds)  e t  a l .  
Corpora te Governance Annual Review 2012  (LexisNexis  South Afr ica 2012)  135.  
 
87 1921 AD 168.   See in  genera l ,  Havenga Fiduciary Dut ies o f  Company Direc tors  wi th  
Speci f ic  Regard  to  Co rporate Oppor tuni t ies  361  –  362  who argues  that  th is  mat ter  was 
not  str ict ly  a  case of  the  appropriat ion of  a  corporate  opportun ity ,  but  an appl ica t ion  of  
the no  prof i t  ru le .  See a lso ,  Havenga  Direc tors’  Fiduciary Dut ies o f  company Directors 
with speci f ic  regard  to  corporate opportun it ies  317;  Pretor ius  Hahlo’s  South  Af r ican 
Law through the  Cases  305;  Coetzee   2014 (35)  Obiter 287 –  288;  Job Common Law 
Dut ies and  Section  76  of  the  Companies Act ,  71 of  2008 Compared  13;  Legodi  PK 
Direc tor’s Fiduciary Duty to  Account for Corporate opportuni t ies  (Published thesis  
Univers i ty  of  Limpopo 2010)  21 -24;  Blackman et  al .  Commentary on  the Companies  
Act  on s 424 of  the Companies Act of  1973  290(8) .  See Davis D et  a l .  Companies and 
other Business S tructures  3 r d  ed (Oxford Press Cape  Town 2013)  121; Symington v  
Pre toria-Oos Privaat  Hospi taal  Bedryfs (Pty)  Ltd  2005 (5)  SA 550 (SCA) at  562 where 
the cour t  referred to  the  si tua tion where a  direc tor  makes a  prof i t  through a breach of  
his f iduc iary du ties to  the company.  In  th ese c i rcumstances a  d irec tor  wil l  no t  be ab le 
to  re tain  such bene fi t ;  Esser  IM Recognit ion  of  Various  Stakeholder In teres ts  in  
Company Management”  (Published LLD thesis  Universi ty  of  South Afr ica 2008)  208; 
Ndebele  ‘No Confl ic t’  Duty of  Company Direc tors 14-  20.  
 
88 See in  genera l  Havenga Director’s Fiduciary Dut ies of  C ompany Direc tors with  
Speci f ic  Regard to  Corporate Opportun it ies 317; Pre tor ius Hahlo’s South Afr ican Law 
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the court confirmed that “where one man stands to another in  a position of 
confidence involving a duty to protect the interests of that other, he is not 
allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense or place himself in a 
position where his interests conflict with his duty.” 89 Volvo v Yssel90 relies on 
the finding in Robinson v Randfontein. In Volvo v Yssel91 Volvo sued Yssel 
for breach of his fiduciary duty that they alleged he owed to Volvo. Yssel 
disputed that he owed the company a fiduciary duty since he was not in 
their direct employ since he worked for a labour brokerage firm. Yssel 
made a secret profit by not disclosing commission he was earning when he 
facilitated for other staff members to be transferred to the same labour 
brokerage firm he was working at. Neither Volvo nor the other employees 
were aware of the substantial commission Yssel were earning.92 The court a 
quo dismissed the claim, but the subsequent appeal was successful. The 
court found that Yssel was in a position of trust and should, therefore, have 
acted in the best interest of Volvo and not in self-interest.93 In Volvo v Yssel 
 
through the Cases  305 ;  Coetzee 2014 (35)  Obiter 287 –  288 ;  Job Common Law Dut ies 
and Sect ion 76 o f  the Companies Act ,  71 of  2008 Compared  13 ;  Legodi D i rec tor’s  
Fiduciary Duty  to  Account for  Corpora te Opportun it ies  21  -24;  Blackman e t  a l .  
Commentary on the Companies Act  on s 424 of  the Companies Act of  1973  290(8) .  See 
also,  Davis  e t  a l .  Companies and  o ther  Business S tructures  121;  Symington v  Pre toria -
Oos Privaat  Hospi taal  Bedry fs (Pty)  Ltd  2005 (5)  SA 550  (SCA)  at  562 where  the cour t  
referred  to  the  si tuat ion where a  direc tor  makes  a  prof i t  through  a  b reach of  his /her  
f iduciary dut ies to  t he company.  In  these c ircumstances a  director  wi l l  not  be ab le to  
reta in  such  benef i t ;  Esser  Recognit ion o f  Various S takeholder In teres ts  in  Company 
Management”  208 ;  Ndebele ‘No Confl ic t’  Duty of  Company Direc tors 14-  20.  
 
89 Havenga argues  tha t  th is  mat ter  was no t  str i ct ly  a  case of  the appropriat ion of  a  
corporate opportun ity ,  but  an appl ica t ion of  the  no prof i t  rule ,  see  Havenga Fiduciary 
Dut ies o f  Company Directors  wi th  Spec if ic  Regard to  Corpora te Opportunit ies  362 for  
the di fference between the no prof i t  ru le  and  a  secre t  prof i t ,  p  359 .  
 
90 (247/08)[2009]  ZASCA 82.  F or  a  discussion  of  th is mat ter ,  see  Van Jaarsve ld M 
“Annual Survey of  Labour  Law” 2009 (1) .  
 
91 (247/08)[2009]  ZASCA 82.  
 
92 Volvo v Yssel  (247 /08) [2009]  ZASCA para 3  –  12;  for  more on this case ,  see Roodt  
Inc “A director  or  any  other  company off icer  who owe s i t  a  f iduc iary duty i s  not  
permi tted to  make a  prof i t  f rom his posi t ion wi thout the company 's consent”  
http: / /www.roodtinc.c om/arch ive /ne wsle t te r104 .asp  (Date of  use:  3  February 2018) ;  
Dha rmaratne K “A Considerat ion whether  Directors should Stand in  a  Fiduciary 
Rela t ionship wi th  the  Company’s Related and Inter - rela ted Companies” 5  -7   
ht tp: / /www.cgblaw.co .za/f iduciary -re lat ionship.pdf  (Date of  use:  3  February 2018) .  
 
93 Volvo v Ysse l  (247 /08)[2009]  ZASCA para 19 -20.  
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the court relied on the judgment in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd,94 
which provides an excellent summary of the position in South Africa 
pertaining to fiduciary obligations as follows: “Where one man stands to 
another in a position of confidence involving a duty to protect the interest of 
that other, he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense 
or place himself in a position where his interests conflicts with this 
duty……..”95   
 
In Dorbyl Ltd v Vorster96 the plaintiff company claimed the secret profits 
made in a transaction from the defendant who was an executive director of 
the plaintiff company at the time when this secret profit was made. The 
defendant claimed that the benefits he received could not have been 
perceived as being corporate opportunities for the company that he was a 
director of. The court disagreed and found that he was in a fiduciary 
relationship with his company and that he had breached his fiduciary duty 
owed to the company when he failed to inform the company of the offer 
made to him.97  In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver98 the court confirmed that 
it takes a conflict of interest seriously. Regal operated a cinema in London. 
Gulliver, one of the directors of Regal proposed that they buy two more 
cinemas. This was however declined by the other directors.  Gulliver 
together with some of the other directors resigned from Gulliver and 
 
 
94 Phil l ips v  Fie lds tone Afr ica (Pty)  Ltd  2004 (3)  SA 465 (SCA) .  See Botha MM “The  
Role and Dut ie s of  Director s in  the Promot ion of  Corporate Governance:  A South  
African Perspective” 2009 (30)  Obiter 708.  
  
95 Davis et  al .  Companies and  o ther Business S truc tures  in  South Africa  24;  Havenga  
MK “Appropr iat ion of  Corpora te Opportunit ies  by Direc tors  and E mployees :  Phi l l ips v  
Fie lds tone (Pty)  Ltd  2004 3 SA 465 (SCA; 200 4 1 Al l  SA 15 (SCA)” 2007 2007 TSAR  
169 –  178.  
 
96 Dorbyl  Ltd v  Vorster  2011 (5)  SA 575  (GSI) .  See Delpor t  et  a l .  ( ed)  Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act  71  of  2008  293.  
 
97 Davis e t  al .  Companie s and other  Business  Structures  122 ;  Havenga 2013 TSAR  257  –  
268;  Havenga Directors’  Fiduciary Dut ies and Corpora te Opportun it ies  345 –  350.  
 
98 Regal (Hastings)  Ltd v  Gul l iver  (1942)  1  Al l  ER 378; (1967)  2  AC 134  (HL) (United  
Kingdom) 1 ;  see in  general  Prent ice DD “Regal (Hastings)  v  Gull iver :  The Canadian 




opened a rival company who then bought these cinemas and operated 
them successfully. The new directors of Regal bought a claim against 
Gulliver and the other former directors to account for the profit they made. 
They argued that Gulliver and the other former directors used an 
opportunity that they became aware of while they were still directors of 
Regal to advance their own interests. It was Gulliver and the other 
defendants defence that Regal had declined the opportunity in the first 
place and therefore they did nothing wrong. The court however found that 
despite the fact that Regal declined the opportunity, Gulliver and the other 
defendants still used an opportunity that they became aware of during  their 
directorship at Regal to their own benefit. Accordingly, Gulliver and the 
other defendants had to account for the profit they made from this 
opportunity.99 In Kensal Rise Investments (Pty) Ltd v Marcus William 
Marchant,100 the court found that the defendant had advanced his own 
interests by making a profit to the detriment of the plaintiff company and 
found in favour of the plaintiff. In this matter, it was common cause that, as 
director, the defendant was in a fiduciary relationship with the company.  
Furthermore, the plaintiff company pleaded that the defendant also owed a 
fiduciary duty to the company not to allow his personal interests to conflict 
with the interests of the plaintiff.101 The matter relates to a contract of sale 
of the defendant’s equity interest in four companies, together with this loan 
claims against two additional companies. The defendant was also a 
director of one of the companies which was subject to the sale mentioned 
above.  He knowingly misrepresented the financial status of this  company 
to the plaintiff company. The company alleged that the contract was 
voidable because of the defendant’s breach of the fiduciary duty. The court 
agreed and voided the agreement and ordered repayment of AUS 
 
99 For  a  discussion of  th is case,  see in  general ,  Cassim et  al .  Contemporary Company 
Law  553.  
 
100 (1523/2013)  [2014]  ZAKZDHC 47.  
 
101The plain tif f  company a l leged breach of  ss  76(2)(a)( i)  and ( i i ) ;  Kensa l  Rise 
Investments (Pty)  Limited v  Marchant  (1523/2013)  [2014]  ZAKZDHC para 7(7)(e)  –  




$850 000.102 In Kruger Investments Group Limited and Another v Nuberry 
Holdings Limited and Others, the court confirmed that the remedies of 
fiduciaries who breach their fiduciary duties are essentially  similar, whether 
they be company directors, employees or agents. 103 The court confirmed a 
rule nisi obtained against the first respondent company (Nuberry) in respect 
of the acquisition by the fourth respondent, a director of both applicant 
companies, for his own benefit, of corporate opportunities regarding the 
purchase and transfer of shares and loan claims in two of the respondent 
companies. The applicants had developed business relationships with 
these two companies for some years. The court confirmed that in such 
situations, the fiduciary is deemed to have acquired the property on behalf 
of the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship, and that the fiduciary has an 
obligation to account for the property or obligation so acquired. It was 
further confirmed that the principle only provides a cause of action and that 
the property does not automatically become the property of the company.104 
The principles enunciated above also apply in respect of  Council members 
as well as executive management who should not exploit opportunities 
earmarked for their university for their own personal gain. Recently, it 
became known that the Chair of Council of the University of Johannesburg 
as well as one of the senior executives, exploited corporate opportunities in 
the university’s commercial domain for their own benefit.105 Further to this, 
some of the independent assessors ’ reports of the universities that were 
placed under administration indicated apparent breaches of fiduciary duties 
 
102 Kensa l  R ise Inves tments (Pty)  Limited v  Marchant (1523/2013)  [2014] ZAKZDHC  
para 43;  see also Kruger Inves tmen ts Group  Limit ed and Another v  Nuberry Hold ings 
Limi ted and Others  (14184/15)  [2015]  ZAWCHC; Delpor t  (ed)  Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act  o f  2008  297.  
 
103 (14184/15)  [2015]  ZAWCHC  para.  36 .  
 
104 Kruger Inves tments Group Limi ted and  Another  v  Nuberry Holdings  Limited and  
Others (14184/15)  [2015]  ZAWCHC  para 37-41 ;  51.  The cour t’ s use of  the 
“construc tive trus t”  analogy,  i s  in  the author’s v iew, unfortunate  as a  f iduciary i s  not  
recognised as a  trustee in  South  Afr ican  law.  
 
105 Seale L “High rank ing UJ Leaders A ccused of  Swindl ing R25m” Sunday Independent  
(date  published :  30 Ju ly 2017; Seale L “Senior  Managers Accused of  Swindl ing UJ 




in the actions of both Council members as well as executive 
management.106 Council members owe common law fiduciary duties and a 
duty of care and skill to their institutions.  However, it is unclear whether all 
Council members are aware of these duties and can be held personally 
liable in the event of a breach of these duties. In many instances, Council 
members and the executive management are under the impression that 
they are acting in the best interests of the university when executing their 
duties, when in fact they are using information that they gained for their 
own personal benefit. It is therefore essential that the Higher Education Act 
of 1997 should be amended to provide a standard of conduct for Council 
members and executive management to ensure both clarity and 
accountability. Personal liability is not expressly provided for in the Higher 
Education Act of 1997.  In addition, the DHET do not verify compliance of 
each public higher education institution against the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations. Furthermore, the 2014 Reporting Regulations still refer to 
King III, and have not been updated to comply with the provisions of King 
IV.  The King Code of Corporate Governance are a voluntary code, thereby 
making a strong argument that personal liability should be provided for in 
the Higher Education Act of 1997. 
  
Section 76(2)(b), of the Companies Act of 2008 underlines the important 
common law principle that directors are the custodians of corporate 
information.107 This section places a compulsory duty on a director to 
provide the board at the earliest opportunity with any information that came 
to his/her attention unless that director believes that the information is 
irrelevant, already available or known to the public and/or other directors. 108  
 
106 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2(b)  above for  a  d iscussion of  the univers i t ies tha t  were  
placed  under  admin istrat ion  and more spec if ical ly  the  discussion o f  the independent 
assessors’  repor ts.   
 
107 Ndebele ‘No Conf l ic t ’  Duty o f  Company Directors 2014 14-  20;  Yeats  e t  a l .  
Commentary  on the  Companies  Act  o f  2008 p2 –  1278  –  1279:  Delport  et  al .  (ed)  
Henochsberg on the Companies Act  71 of  2008  297 –  298.  
 
108Cassim e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  553 –  554;  Delpor t  et  al .  (ed)  
Henochsberg  on the Companies  Act  71  of  2008  295;  Yeats et  al .  Commentary  on the  
Companies Act  o f  2008 p2-1279.  
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It is important to note that in recent times, public higher education 
institutions have become increasingly more involved in commercial 
activities for the purposes of producing third stream income. Council 
members and members of executive management should not use any 
information that comes to their attention for their own benefit, and they 
should at all times declare any interest they might have in the form of 
directorship or shares in external companies. The recent matter of the 
University of Johannesburg proves the need for the Department of Higher 
Education and Training to require universities to report on the interest they 
hold in any commercial companies.109  
 
(b) The duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the 
company  
 
The duty of good faith is provided for in the common law and now partially 
codified in section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008. This section provides 
that a director of a company when acting in that capacity, must exercise the 
powers and perform the functions of director in good faith for a proper 
purpose and in the best interests of the company. Henochsberg reasons 
that the codification of director’s duties will provide clear guidelines for 
directors, as they will be able to identify the scope of their duties. The 
codification will save directors time, effort and money in complying with the 
law, as there would be clear guidelines as to how directors should act. 110 
 
The duty of care and skill regulates the performance of these duties by 
directors.111 Good faith depends on honesty, which requires a subjective 
 
 
109 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below for  recommendat ions in  th is regard;  see a lso 
Chapter  3 ,  para  3 .4 .2(a)  above for  a  discussion on these al lega tions.   
 
110 Delport  Henochsberg on the Companies Act  of  2008  298(1) .  
 
111 Sec tion 76(a)  and (b)  of  the Companies Act o f  2008.  Van Tonder  2015(36)  Obiter  
705 –  706.  In  the mat te r  of  Da Si lva and o thers v  CH Chemica ls (Pty) ,  i t  was found 
that  “ i t  i s  a  well -es tab li shed  rule of  common law that  direc tors  have a  f iduciary du ty to  
exerc ise the ir  powers  in  good fai th  and in  the  best  in teres t  o f  the  company.”  In  the  
English case of  Shut t leworth v  Cox  (1926)  2  KB 9 (Uni ted Kingdom) the cour t  
183 
 
element. It is a well-known principle that directors must exercise their 
powers bona fide in what they, and not the court, believe to be in the best 
interests of the company.112  A fiduciary duty can also be breached in 
circumstances where the director was acting honestly. Mere incompetence 
of a director is not necessarily a breach of the fiduciary duty. 113 It is an 
inevitable part of the duty of good faith that a director must exercise 
independent judgement in their decisions and must also act within his/her 
limits of scope of authority.114 The courts, however, found that there were 
limits to the subjective test.115 
 
emphasised  that  the  tes t  wi l l  l ie  wi th  whether  a  reasonable man would  have  regarded 
the ac t ions o f  the  direc tors  to  have been  in  the bes t  in te rest  of  the  c ompany,  see in  
genera l  Grove Company Directors:  Fiduciary  duties  a nd the du ty  of  care  and sk i l l  27.  
In  a  more recen t  case,  Visser  Si trus (Pty)  Ltd  v  Goede  Hoop Si trus  (Pty)  Ltd and Others  
2014 (5)  SA 179 (WCC),  the court  found that  the board  did  ac t  in  the  bes t  in terest  of  
the company when they  refused a  transfer  of  shar es which they bel ieved  not  to  be in  the 
bes t  in teres t  of  the company and the  court  agreed.  For  more on the la t ter  case,  see  in  
genera l  See  Swar t  C and Lombard  M “Vonnisbespreking :  Statu têre Aandeelhouers  
Beskerming –  d ie  Reregte l ike Beoordeling  van Onderdr ukkende  en Onredelike 
Benadeelende Direksiebeslui te” 2015 (12)  Li tNetAkademies 387 –  397;  Delpor t  (ed)  et  
al .  Henochsberg  Commentary on  the  Companies  Act  2008  294;  Le  Roux  P and  Mason  J  
“The  ‘Rocky’  Road has  been  paved,  or  has i t?  Directors’  Righ t  to  Refus e  Transfer  of  
Shares :  Visser Si t rus (Pty)  Ltd v  Goede Hoop S it rus (Pty)  Ltd and  Others 2014  (5)  SA 
179 (WCC)” 2014 De Rebus  40 –  41; Mupangavanhu BM “The Lawfulness of  a  
Memorandum of  Incorp oration clause  tha t  permi ts a  Company Board to  Refuse Transfer  
of  Shares wi thout  Reasons:   Analysis of  V isser S i t rus (Pty)  Ltd  v  Goede Hoop S it rus  
Pty)  Ltd” 2017 (31)  Speculum Juris  191 –  204 for  a  discussion of  th is case .  Sect ion 163 
of  the Companies Act of  2008 al lows  a shareholder  to  app ly to  cour t  for  rel ief  i f  an ac t  
of  the  company has  had a result  that  i s  unfai r ly  pre judicial  to  i t .  See in  general  Le  
Roux and Mardon 2014  De Rebus  40;  Omar v  Inhouse Venue Technical  Management  
(Pty)  Limited  and Others (14227/2014)  [2015]  ZAWCHC 10; 2015 (3)  SA 146  (WCC);  
Pakade N.O.  and Others v  Lukhanj i  Leisure (Pty)  Ltd  and Others (3390/2016)  [2017]  
ZAECGHC. Le Roux and Mardon 2014 De Rebus  41.  
 
112 See Re Smith & Fawcett  Ltd  (1942)  Ch 304 at  306;  Cass im e t  al .  Contemporary  
Company La w  523 –  524 .  
 
113 See in  general  Cass im et  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  514,  524;  Mil ls v  Mi ll s  
(1938)  60 CLR 150 (Austral ia)  and Howard Smi th v  Ampel Petroleum Ltd  (1974)  1  Al l  
ER 1126 (PC) (United Kingdom) ;  See Lesofe  Impl icat ion of  the par tia l  codi f ica t ion o f  
the Director duties under  the  new Companies  Act 16  -18;  Job Common Law Dut ies and  
Sect ion 76  of  the  Companies Act ,  71 o f  2008 compared  21 –  22;  Grove Company 
Direc tors:  Fiduciary Duties and the Duty o f  Care and Skil l  23 –  32;  Delport  (ed)  e t  a l .  
Henochsberg  Commentary  on the Companies  Act  2008  294  –  298 ;  Mupangavanhu 2017  
Stel lenbosch Law Review  150 –  152 .  
 
114 Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law 514; 524.  
 
115 In  Shutt leworth v  Cox  (1926)  2  KB 9 (United Kingdom) the court  stated  that  th e tes t  
wil l  be  whether  a  reasonable man would have regarded the ac t  of  the director’ s to  be in  
the bes t  in teres ts  of  the  company.  This was  also confirmed in  Teck Corp Ltd v  Mil lar  
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Section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 codifies the common law 
principle that a director must act in the best interests of the company 
he/she is a director of. The provision makes it clear that the duty is owed to 
the company. As stated by Cassim, there is, in common law, “….copious 
authority for the view that the word ‘company’ in this context refers not to 
the legal entity itself, but rather to the interests of the collective body  of 
present and future shareholders”.116 As already stated above, the higher 
education environment will benefit from codifying these common law duties 
so that they are clear to Council members and members of executive 
management.   
 
4.2.6 The duty of care, skill and diligence  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 also provides for a partial codification of the 
duty of care, skill and diligence,117 which is also provided for in common 
law. In addition to the fiduciary duties owed by directors as discussed 
above,118 they also owe a duty of care and skill to the company.119 In 
general, directors will be liable for negligence in the performance of their 
 
(1972)  DLR (Canada)  tha t  there must ,  however ,  be reasonable grounds for  the  
direc tor’ s be l ief  that  they were act ing in  the best  in teres t  of  the  company.  See  
genera l ly ,  Cassim et  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  524;  Lesofe  Impl icat ions of  the  
Partial  Codi f ica tion  of  the Directors’  Dut ies under the new Companies Act  16 –  17.  
 
116 Cass im e t  al .  Contemp orary Company Law  515;  see also Havenga 2013 TSAR  257;  
Mupangavanhu  2017 Ste l lenbosch  Law Review 150 –  152;  Van  Tonder  2015(36)  Obiter  
712 –  720 ;  Esser  Recognit ion  o f  Various  S takeholder interes ts in  Company Management  
211.  The stakeholder  de bate i s  not  d i scussed here.  
 
117 Accord ing to  Garner  Black’s Law Dic t ionary  5552 –  553,  di l igence i s  def ined as the 
“constan t  app licat ion to  one’s business  or  duty ;  persevering  effor t  to  accomplish 
something undertaken.   The a t ten tion  and care required f rom a person in  a  given  
si tua tion,  care ,  heedfulness.”   See also Van Tonder  2018 (39 )  Obi ter  306.  
118 These f iduciary dut ies are discussed  in  para 4 .2 .5  above.  
 
119 For more on the common law duty of  care and ski l l  in  genera l ,  see Bekink M “An 
Histor ica l  Overv iew of  the  Direc to r ’ s  Duty  of  Care  and Ski l l :  From the  Nineteen th 
Century to  the Companies  Bil l  of  2007”  2008 (20)  SA Merc  LJ  95  –  116 ;  Kennedy-Good 
S and Coetzee L “The Business Judgment Rule  (Par t  2)” 2006 (27)  Obiter  279 –  283;  
Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Co mpany Law  554 –  561;  Mupangavanhu 2017 
Stel lenbosch LR 148 –  152;  Esser  IM  and Delport  P “ The Duty of  Care,  Sk il l  and  




duties. The extent to which directors may be held liable may vary. A breach 
of a duty of care and skill is dealt with in accordance with the law of 
delict.120 In general, the law of delict determines the circumstances in which 
a person is obliged to bear the damage he/she has caused another.121 The 
courts had a more lenient approach by applying a subjective test to 
determine a directors’ negligence, which is based on the skill, experience 
and the ability of a specific director as influenced by the decision in Re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd .122 However, the test for a 
director’s breach of duty of care and skill has been challenged in recent 
years. Du Plessis points out that since the decision reached in the 
Australian decision in Daniels v Anderson123 the South African courts have 
also changed their approach and are now following a more objective 




120 This en tai l s  that  the f ive elements o f  del ic t  must  be proven for  l iabi l i ty  to  ar i se the  
l iab il i ty  for  breach i s  based  on Roman-Dutch law.  These elements  are conduct ,  
wrongfulness,  faul t ,  causa tion and damage.  For  more on these f ive elements,  see in  
genera l ,  Neeth ling J and Potg ieter  JM Neethling-Potgieter Law of  Del ic t  7 t h  ed  
(LexisNexis South Afr ica 2015)  9 ,  10,  25 –  265 ;  Nethavhani K The Business Judgment  
Rule:  Undue Erosion of  Director’s Duty  of  Care,  Sk il l  and Dil igence  (Publ ished LLM 
thesis Universi ty  of  Pre tor ia  2015)  6  –  13.   Kennedy-Good and Coetzee  2006 Obiter  
281 –  283;  Stevens 2017 (20)  PELJ 1 –  23 ;  Kanamugire  JC and Chimuka TV “The 
Director’ s Duty  to  Exercise Care and  Skil l  in  Contemporary South  Afr ica and the 
Business Judgment Rule” 2014 Medi terranean Journal o f  Soc ial  Science  70.  
 
121 Neethl ing and Potg ie te r  Neeth ling-Potg ieter  Law o f  Delict  3; Telematrix  (Pty)  Ltd  
t /a  Matric  Vehic le  Tracking  v  Adverti sing  Standards Authori ty  SA 2006 1 SA 461  
(SCA).  
 
122[1911]  1 .  Ch.D.  425,  437  Cass im e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law  555 –  556;  see  
Re Brazil ian Rubbe r Plantations & Estates Ltd  (1911)  Ch 425 (CA)  437; Fisheries 
Deve lopment  Corporat ion of  SA Ltd  v  Jorgensen:   Fisher ies Development Corpora tion  
of  SA Ltd v  AWJ Investments (Pty)  Ltd  (1980)  (4)  SA 156 (W).  
 
123 16 ACSR 607 CA (NSW) at  664 -665 .  
 
124 Du Pless is  J  “A Comparat ive  ana lys is of  Director’ s  Duty of  Care,  Ski l l  and 
Dil igence in  South Afr ica and in  Austra l ia” 2010 Acta Jurid ica 285 -  286;  Kanamugire 
and Chimuka 2014(20)  Mediterranean  Journal of  Socia l  Science  72;  Delpor t  
Henochsberg  on the  Companies  Act  o f  2008  298.   Two ear l ier  Aust ral ian cases  rela t ing  
to  dormant  or  si len t  d irectors,  Statewide  Tobacco Services Ltd v  Morley  (1990)  8  ACLC 
827 and Commonweal th  Bank of  Austral ia  v  Friedrich  (1991)  9  ACLC 946 also conf irm 
the objec tive  approach.   
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Section 76(3)(c) states that a director of a company when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director 
with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the same functions in relation to the 
company as those carried by that director; and having the general 
knowledge, skills and experience of that director. 125 The purpose of this 
section is to set the standard of the director’s conduct in relation to the duty 
of care, skill and diligence. There are an objective and subjective aspects 
to this section.126 In terms of the objective element, all directors who carry 
out the same function in relation to the company must adhere to the same 
standard; there is no regard to any one director’s particular abilities. The 
subjective aspect pertains to a director’s general knowledge, skills and 
experience. The combined effect of the objective and subjective standards 
is that there is a minimum standard that all directors need to adhere to, 
irrespective of their particular skills, knowledge and experience. However, 
where a director has a higher degree of skills, knowledge and experience, 
he/she will be held to a higher standard.127 The statutory duty of care, skill 
and diligence impose a less subjective test 128 and a slightly more 
 
125 See  in  general ,  Nethavhani  The Business  Judgment  Rule:  Undue Erosion  of  
Direc tor’s Duty of  Care ,  Skil l  and Dil igence  14  –  16;   Maharaj  N A Discussion o f  the 
Duty  of  Care ,  Sk il l  and Di l igence to  be Exerc ised by  a  Direc tor  in  l igh t  of  the 
Companies Act  71 o f  2008,  as well  as the Com mon Law and an Overv iew o f  the  
Business Judgment Rule:   A Company Law Perspec tive  (Published LLM Thesis  
Univers i ty  of  KwaZulu Natal  2015)  28 –  33;  Leach J The correct  Understanding o f  the  
Business  Judgment Rule  in  sect ion  76 (4)  of  the Compa nies Act  71  of  2008:  Avoiding  
the American Mistakes (Publ ished LLM thesis  Universi ty  of  Cape Town 2014)  11 –  13.  
 
126 Delport  et  a l .  (ed)  Henochsberg on  the  Companies Act  71 o f  2008  295.  
 
127 Nethavhani  The Business Judgment Rule:  Undue Erosion  of  Direc tor’s  D uty  of  Care,  
Skil l  and  Dil igence  14;  Cassim e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  559 .  In  the mat ter  of  
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd S tebbing  (1989)  BCLC 498 (Ch) (Uni ted Kingdom) ,  two of  
the th ree d irec tors were  held l iab le for  negl igence since they had h igher  ski l l s  then the  
th ird  d irec tor ,  who was exonerated.  See in  genera l ,  Jo b Common Law Duties and  
sec tion  76 of  the Companies Act ,  71 o f  2008 Compared 22 –  23.  
 
128 However ,  desp ite  th is,  the du ty st i l l  contains  an object ive as well  as a  sub jec tive 
test .  See Nethavhani The Business  Judgment  Rule:  Undue  Erosion o f  Direc tor’s Duty  o f  
Care,  Ski l l  and  Dil igence 14.  The ob jec tive  s tandard re lates  to  al l  d irectors who carry  
out  the  same funct ions  and must  adhere to  the same standards whi ls t  the  sub ject ive 
standard per ta in s to  par t icular  direc tor’ s general  knowledge,  sk il ls  and experience .  See 
Nethavhani The Business Judgment Rule:  Undue erosion o f  direc tor’s Duty of  Care,  
Skil l  and Di l igence  14.  
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demanding standard of care on directors and prescribed officers of the 
company than the common law.129 The common law relies more on a 
subjective approach whilst the Companies Act of 2008 adopted an 
objective-subjective approach.130 “Care”, and “skill” is not exactly the same. 
In the Australian case of Daniels v Anderson,131 the court indicated that skill 
refers to the knowledge and experience that a director has as well as to the 
technical competence of a director. Therefore, the skill would refer to the 
technical competence of a director while care refers to the manner in which 
the skill is applied.132 
 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen , Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 133 remains 
the leading South African case on the duty of care and skill. The decision 
 
 
129 Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law  558;  Job Common Law Dut ies and Sect i on  
76 of  the Co mpanies Ac,  71 of  2008 Compared  22 –  24;  Bouwman 2009 SA Merc LJ  509  
–  534.  
 
130 Nethavhani  The Business Judgment Rule:  Undue Erosion  of  Direc tor’s  Duty  of  Care,  
Skil l  and Di l igence  15;  for  more on s 76(3)  o f  the Companies  Act o f  2008,  see in  
genera l  Mupangavanhu  BM Direc tor’s  Standard of  Care,  Sk il l  and Di l i gence and  the  
Business Judgment Rule  in  View of  South Afr ica’s Companies Act  71 o f  2008:  Future  
implica tions  for Corporate Governance (Publ ished  DPhi l  thesis  Univers i ty  of  Cape 
Town 2016)  107 –  141.  
 
131 Daniels v  Anderson  (1996)  16 ASCR 607 (NSW); (1995)  37  NSWLR 438  
(Austra l ian) .  On this matter  see in  general ,   Nett le  G “ The Changing Posi t ion  and  
Duties of  Company Directors” 2018 (41)  Melbourne Univers i ty  Law Review  10 –  11;  
Fl int  G “Non -Executive Director s’”  Genera l  Law Duty of  Care  and Delegat ion of  Duty :  
But do we need a Common Law Duty of  Care”  1997 (9)  Bond Law Review  198 –  215 ;  
Tomasic R et  a l .  Corporat ions Law in  Austra lia  2 n d  ed (The Federat ion Press New 
South  Wales Austra l ia  2002)  31 9-  320; Du Ples sis  JJ  “Open Sea or  Safe  Harbour?  
Amer ican,  Austra l i an and South Afr ican business judgment ru les compared (Part  1)” 
2011 (32)  The Company Lawyer  349.  
 
132 Maharaj  A Discuss ion of  the  Duty of  Care,  Sk i l l  and Di l igence to  be exercised by a  
Direc tor in  l ight  of  the  Companies Act  71 o f  2008,  as  wel l  as the  Common  Law and an  
Overv iew o f  the Business Judgment Rule:  A  Company Law Perspec tive  15.   
 
133Fisheries  Development  Corpora tion  o f  SA Ltd  v  Jorgensen ,  Fisheries  Development  
Corpora tion o f  SA Ltd v  A WJ Investments (Pty)  Ltd  1980 (4)  SA 156 (W) a t  165.  See  
genera l ly ,  Pretor ius Hahlo’s  South  Afr ican  Law through the Cases  281 –  282;  Loos A 
(ed )  Directors’  Liab il i ty :  A Worldwide Review  (Wol ters Kluwer In ternat ional  2010)  5  –  
7 ;  Cassim e t  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  556. ;  Job Common Law Dut ies and  
Sect ion 76 o f  the Compa nies Ac,  71 o f  2008  compared  12;  Botha 2009 Obiter  709  –  




relied on early English case law such as in re Brazilian Rubber plantation 
and Estates Ltd,134 which was the first real attempt by English courts to 
highlight the importance of director ’s duties.135 Since the judgments in re 
Brazilian Rubber plantation and Estates Ltd  and re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd,136 there have been considerable developments regarding 
the standard of director’s conduct in English law.  In Re D’Jan of London 
Ltd,137 a director was found to have been negligent for failing to read a 
proposal prepared by an insurance broker, and which contained incorrect 
information, before signing it. Due to the incorrect information, the 
insurance company refused to pay out a claim relating to fire damage to 
the property of the company. The company subsequently went into 
liquidation, and the liquidators decided to sue the director to recoup monies 
owed to creditors. The judgment was in favour of the applicant as the court 
agreed that the director had been negligent in exercising his duty of care 
and skill. When the degree of care, skill and diligence expected of a 
 
134 In  Re Brazil l ian Rubber plan tat ion and Estates Ltd  (1911)  1  CH 425 (United  
Kingdom)  425.  See  general ly ,  Preto r ius  Hahlo’s South  Afr ican  Law through the  Cases  
280;  Cass im et  a l .  Contemporary  Company Law  555 –  556.  
 
135 For  more on this matter ,  see Pretor ius Hahlo’s South African Law through the Cases  
280 –  281;  Bekink 2008  SA Merc LJ  99.  Cass im et  a l .  Contemporary Company Law  556 
–  557;  Butcher  Directors Duties:  A Ne w Mil lenn ium, A New Approach?  40 -  41;  Cahn A 
and Donald DC Comparat ive Company Law: Test  and Cases on the Laws Governing  
Corpora tions in  Germany,  the UK and the USA  (Cambridge Univers i ty  p ress United  
Kingdom 2010)  370; Cheff ins BR Company Law: Theory,  S tructure and Operat ion  
(Oxford Univers i ty  Press United Kingdom 2008)  323,  539.   
 
136 In  Re City  Equi table Fire Insurance Co Ltd  (1925)  1  CH 407 (Uni ted Kingdom).  
 
137 Re D’Jan of  London Ltd  (1994)  1  BCLC 561 (Ch) (United Kingdom). ) .  See Butcher  
Direc tors’  Dut ies :  A New Mil lenn ium, A New Approach?  57 –  58 ;  Birds J  et  al .  Boyle & 
Birds  Company Law  6 t h  ed ( Jordans Uni ted Kingdom 2007)  623;  Cheff ins  Company 
Law: Theory,  Struc ture and Operat ion 265,  314 ,  539,  545.   In  th is mat ter ,  a  company 
had suffered a shor tfa l l  in  i t s  funds as a  resul t  of  i t s  managing direc tor  committ ing  
fraud and  who was convicted for  this  cr ime.  The  l iqu ida tor  of  the  company then  wanted  
to  hold  the o ther  d irectors equal ly  l iable  f or  the losses causes to  the  company  s ince 
they had fa i led to  pick u p the fraud be ing committed by the managing director .  
Ult imate ly ,  these d irectors were  not  found a t  fault  due to  a  clause that  was inser ted  in  
the company’s consti tut ion.  The judge held tha t  d irec tors mus t  use the  degree of  care  
which an ord inary man  might  be expected to  take in  the circumstances .  The judge 
added that  a  d irector  need on ly exh ibi t  the sk il l  of  a  person of  his  knowledge and 
experience.  See Mahara j  A Discuss ion of  the Duty o f  C are,  ski l l  and  dil igence to  be  
exerc ised by  a  director in  l ight  of  the Companies Act  71  of  2008,  as well  as  the  
Common Law and an Overv iew of  the Business Judgment rule:  A  Company Law 




director is determined, courts will take into account the nature of the 
company, the nature of the decision taken, the position of, and the nature 
of the responsibilities undertaken by the director. 138 Directors collectively 
and individually have a continuing duty to acquire and maintain sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the company’s business to enable them to 
discharge their duties as directors.  At the minimum, a basic knowledge of 
the company’s business is required. 139 In the author’s opinion, this 
knowledge and understanding must also include knowledge of the 
company’s governance documents like the Memorandum of Incorporation, 
shareholders agreement, company resolutions, policies etc. However, while 
the Companies Act of 2008 does not require any qualifications or 
experience for directors, the Higher Education Act of 1997 requires that 
Council members “must be a person with knowledge and experience 
relevant to the objects and governance of the public higher education 
institution concerned.”140 In the author’s opinion, Council members must 
also know and understand the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill 
owed to the institution. 
 
A director may rely on certain persons to assist him/her in discharging 
his/her duties.141 However, the director retains the liability imposed by the 
obligations.142 Directors will not be liable for mere errors in judgment. In 
 
138 Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law  560.  
 
139 See  Barings PLC no  5  (2000)  BCLC 523  (United Kingdom); Cassim e t  al .  
Contemporary Company Law  560 –  561.  
 
140 Section  27(7)(a)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
141 Sec tion 76(4)(b) .  See genera l ly ,  Bouwman 2009 SA Merc LJ  514 –  515;  Cassim et  al .  
Contemporary  Company Law  558;  Yeats  e t  a l .  Commentary  on  the  Companies  Act  o f  
2008  p2-1283; Delpor t  e t  al .  Henochsberg on the  Companies Act  of  2008 289.  
 
142 Delo it te  “Director  Dut ies” (2013)  26 ;  F isher ies  Development Corpora tion of  SA Ltd  
v  AWJ Investments (Pty)  Ltd 1980 (4)  SA 156 (W) where the fol lowing  was stated  “ in  
respect  of  dut ies  tha t  may proper ly  be  le f t  to  some o ther  off icia l ,  a  di rector  i s ,  in  the 
absence of  grounds fo r  suspic ion,  jus t i f ied in  trus t ing  tha t  off icial  to  perform such 
duties honestly .  He is  enti t le d to  accept  and  rely  on  the  judgment,  informat ion and  
advice  of  the  management,  unless there a re proper  reasons  for  querying such .  
Similar ly ,  he is  not  expected  to  examine entr ies in  the company’s  books.  Obviously ,  a  
direc tor  exerc is ing reasonable care wou ld no t  accep t  information  and advice  bl indly.  
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Leven v Feld and Tweeds Ltd143 for instance, the court found that it was not 
the duty of the court to take over the functions of directors and to consider 
what was in the best interests of the company’s business. In summary, the 
Council may delegate functions to Council committees, but it does not 
divest them from responsibility. 144 
 
Council members, as well as executive management, owe a duty of care 
and skill, and this duty should also be clarified in the Higher Education Act 
1997 similar to the clarification contained in the Companies Act of 2008. As 
with the fiduciary duties that are discussed above, it will be a 
recommendation that the duty of care and skill is also included in the 
Higher Education Act of 1997. It is of utmost importance those Council 
members as well as the members of the executive management act with 
the necessary care and skill in executing their duties and making decisions, 
and that they fully understand this obligation.145 
 
4.2.7 The business judgment rule 
 
The business judgement rule has been applied in the United States for over 
160 years and has been considered one of the cornerstones of American 
corporate governance. It started as a common law interpretation relating to 
a director’s duty of care and skill.146 The rule protects business decisions 
 
He would accept  i t  an d  he would be en ti t led to  rely  on i t ,  bu t  he  would give i t  due  
considera t ion and exerc ise h is own judgment in  the l igh t  thereof .”   
 
143Leven v Feld  and Tweeds Ltd  (1951)  2  SA 401  (A) 402C-D. See Mafikeng Ma il  (Pty)  
Ltd v  Centner (No  2)  (1996)  4  SA 607 (WLD) 613G-H.; Muswaka L “Director’ s Dut ies 
and the  Business Judgment Rule in  South  Afr ican Company Law: An Analys is” 2013  
(3)  Interna tional Journal of  Humanit ies and Social  Sc ience  90.  
 
144 Section  29(2)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997.  
 
145 See Chapter  6  be low for  the recommendat ions in  this regard.  
 
146 See Chapter  5 ,  para  5 .4  below for  a  discuss ion of  the business judgment rule  in  the 
USA. Leach The Correc t  Understanding of  the Business Judgment  Rule  in  sec tion 76(4)  
of  the Companies Act  of  2008:   Avoid ing the  American mis takes  13;  Dyke MJ  The  
Business Judgment Rule –  I t s  Appl ica tion in  South Africa  (Published LLM thesis  
Univers i ty  of  South Afr ica 1995)  1  –  37.  On the other  hand,  in  Canada  the co urts a re 
concerned  about  the reasonableness  of  a  di rector’ s dec is io n.  See  Cass im e t  a l .  
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made by directors in good faith even when the decisions made might be 
erroneous.147 One of the best formulations of the business judgment rule 
can be found in Aronson v Lewis148 which states the following: “….it is a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." 149  
 
The business judgment rule was developed alongside the duty of care, and 
it specifically relates to decision making. 150 This rule does not provide a 
complete defence against the process that was followed but aims to protect 
the final decision. Even in the event of a decision made in good faith, a 
director will not be excluded from liability if it is found that the decision was 
made without due care.151  A director can only benefit from this rule if a 
 
Contemporary Company Law  563 ;  Chapter  5  for  a  ful l  d iscussion of  the business 
judgment  ru le  in  the  USA; Kennedy -Good S and Coetzee  L  “The Business  Judgment 
Rule (Part  1 )”  2006 (27)  Obiter 66 –  67; Jones  E “Direc tor’ s Duties :  Negl igence  and 
the Business  Judgment  Rule ” 2007 (19)  SA Merc  LJ  326  for  more  on the business 
judgment  ru le  in  the  USA.  However ,  th is  rule  has  not  been  cod if ied in  the  USA;  they  
are st i l l  re lying on  the  common law.  
 
147See  in  genera l ,  McMillan  L “The Business  Judgment  Rule  as  an  Immunity  Doctr ine”  
2013 (4)  Will iam & Mary Business Law Review 526 –  527;  Knepper  WE and Bai ley DA 
Liabil i ty  of  Corporate  Off icers  and Directors  5 t h  ed (The Michie Company 1993)  53 –  
89;  the Revised Model Business Corpora tions Act §4 .01.  The Bu siness Judgment Rule  
in  the  USA wil l  be d iscussed more ful ly  in  Chapter  5 ,  para 5 .4  below.  
 
148 Aronson  v  Lewis  473 A.2d  805 (Del 1984)  (United States) ;  Cahn,  Donald  
Comparative Company Law: Test  and Cases on the Laws Govern ing Corpora tions in  
Germany,  the U K and the USA  372 ;  Knepper  and  Bailey Liabi l i ty  o f  Corporate Off icers 
and Direc tors 53; Lombard S “ Importat ion of  a  Sta tutory Business Judgment Rule in to  
South Afr ican Company Law: Yes  or  N o?” 2005(68)  THRHR 616.  
 
149 Aronson  v Lewis  473 A.2d 805 (Del 1984)  (Uni ted States)  a t  305;  In  In  Re  Wal t  
Disney  Derivat ive Lit igation  411 (2005)  Del (Uni ted Sta tes)  i t  was made c lear  tha t  
under  the  business judgment  rule ,  a  d irector’ s’  ac t ion  does  not  t r ig ger  l iab il i ty  jus t  
because  i t  was no t  up to  s tandard .  See  Cahn,  Don ald Comparative  Company Law:  Test  
and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporat ions  in  Germany,  the UK and the USA 372,  
383 –  415.  
 
150 Havenga MK “The Business Judgment Rule :  Should we fol low the  Aust ral ian 
Example?” 2000(12)  SA Merc LJ  27; Jones 2007(19)  SA Merc LJ  327.  
 
151 Leach The Correct  Understanding of  the Business Judgment Rule in  section 76(4)  o f  




decision was made.152 The office held by a director, by its very nature, 
imposes various risks, duties and obligations. It is inevitable that a director 
at some point will face difficult decisions and that not all of them will have 
positive results. The protection offered by the business judgement rule 
could encourage acceptance of positions as directors and partake in the 
risk-taking activities of the company.153  Since the rule protects directors, it 
might also encourage more competent people to become directors. It has 
the effect that decisions made by directors are not subjected to judicial 
second-guessing. Furthermore, it will also prevent shareholders from 
approaching the courts to interfere in the management of a company.154   
 
Section 76(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides for a partially codified 
version of the business judgment rule.155 This section relates to the 
decision-making function of directors and provides that a director will 
satisfy his/her obligations if he/she has taken reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about a matter; he/she had no personal financial interest 
in the matter or had disclosed any interest as required by section 75, and 
the director rationally believed that the decision was in the best interests of 
 
152 Havenga 2000 SA Merc LJ  28;  Francis v  Uni ted Jersey Bank  432 A 2d 814 (1981) 
Sct  NJ (Uni ted Sta tes) .  
 
153 Davis  e t  al .  Companies and o ther Business S truc tures  in  South Africa  124 –  125 ;  
Smith v  Van Gorkom  488 A.2d (Del.  Supre  1985)  858 (Uni ted States) ,  which i s  
considered one of  the le ading cases on the business judgment rule  and discussed more  
fully  in  chap ter  5  be low; Bouwman 2009 SA Merc  LJ  524 ;  Nethavhani The Business 
Judgment Rule:  Undue Erosion o f  Direc tor’s  Duty of  Care,  Ski l l  and  Dil igence 21 –  22.  
 
154 Brehm v Eisner  (2000)  746 A 2d 244 ,  266 (Del  Sup)  (Uni ted States) .  In  this case the  
court  s ta ted that  i f  judges fa i led to  respec t  the decisions of  directors  made in  good 
fai th ,  th is  would have  the effect  that  the courts would become “super -direc tors”,  
measuring mat ters of  degree in  business decis ion making and execu tive  compensat ion;  
Bouwman 2009  SA Merc  LJ  524 ;  Nethavhani  The Business  Judgment Rule:  Undue  
Erosion o f  Director’s Duty of  Care,  Sk il l  and Di l igence 524.  
 
155 For  more on this sect ion,  see  in  genera l  Davis (ed)  et  a l .  Compan ies and o ther 
Business  Struc tures in  South Afr ica  124;  Van  Tonder  2015 Obiter 710  –  711;  Delpor t  
(ed)  et  al .  Henochsberg on the Companies Act  71 of  2008  297;  Muswaka 2013 
Internat ional Journal o f  Humani t ies and Socia l  Sciences 91 –  92;  Leach The Correct  
Unders tanding o f  the Business Judgment Rule in  sec tion 76(4)  o f  the C ompanies Act  of  




the company.156 Section 76(4)(a) supplements section 76(3)(b) and (c) by 
providing that it would be considered that a director has fulfilled the 
requirements of section 76(3)(b) and (c), if “…..the director has taken 
reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter; either the 
director had no material financial interest in the subject matter of  the 
decision and had no reasonable basis to know that any elated person had a 
personal financial interest in the matter or the director complied with the 
requirements of section 75 with respect to any interest contemplated in this 
subparagraph, and the director made a decision or supported the decision 
of a committee or the board with regard to that matter, and the director had 
a rational basis for believing, and did believe that the decision was in the 
best interests of the company.”157 If these requirements have been met, the 
merits and the wisdom of business decisions fall outside the scope of 
juridical review.158 The business judgment rule will not apply where directors 
have failed to comply with their oversight and monitoring functions; as well 
as in instances where directors renounced their duties to oversee the 
management the company and they fail to act in the best interest of the 
company.  However, even in the event where a director is aware of any 
wrongdoing or consequences and decisions not to act or fails to act, it still 
amounts to a business decision. According to Van Tonder, the oversight 
function may create an incentive for directors to react on suspicion of 
 
156 See also Davis (ed)  et  a l .  Companies and o ther Business  Struc tures  in  South Afr ica  
124;  Van Tonder  2018 (39)  Obiter 314; Muswaka 2013 (3)  In ternat ional  Journal of  
Humanit ies and Social  Scien ce 89 –  90 ;  van Tonder  2016 (36)  Obiter  563 –  564.   The  
decision-making  function is  discussed in  para 4 .2 .5  above.  
 
157 See in  general ,  Cass im et  a l .  Contemporary  Company Law  564;  Shut t leworth v  Cox  
Bro thers  & Co (Maidenhead)  Ltd  (1927)  2  KB 9 (CA)  23 (Uni te d Kingdom); Leach  The 
Correc t  Understanding  of  the Business Judgment Rule in  Sec tion 76 (4)  of  the  
Companies Act  71 o f  2008:   Avo iding  the  American  Mistakes  19;  Nethavhani  The 
Business Judgment Rule:  Undu e Erosion o f  Direc tor’s Duty of  Care,  Ski l l  and  
Dil igence 21 –  22;  Yeats e t  a l .  Commentary on  the Companies  Act  of  2008  p2-1282 –  
1284; Muswaka 2013(3)  Internat ional Journal of  Humani t ies and Social  Science  90 –  
92.  
 
158 See the mat ter  of  Austral ian Securi t i es  and Inves tment  Commission  v Rich  (2009)  
NSWSC (Austral ia) ;  Delport  e t  al .  ( ed)  Henochsberg on the Companies  Act  71 of  2008  




wrongdoing and therefore gain the benefit of the business judgment rule, 
and rightly so.159  
 
Although common law principles can address some of the concerns related 
to corporate governance in higher education law, the author suggests that 
this is an opportune time to follow the example of South African company 
law and to provide for a partial codification supplemented by common law. 
A statutory provision of the business judgment rule might provide Council 
members with the necessary assurance that their decisions will be 
protected if they were made in the best interests of the institution.  
 
4.2.8 Liability for breaches of duty 
 
Many directors of companies are not aware of their duties nor that  they can 
be held personally liable in the event of a breach of these duties.  Viviers 
provides a concise summary of the forms of liability directors may be 
exposed to criminal liability (section 214 of the Companies Act of 2008) in 
instances where directors are trading in such a way that it defrauds 
creditors; civil liability (section 218 of the Companies Act of 2008),160 which 
provides for joint and several liability for a breach of directors duties; 
breach of fiduciary duties (section 76(3)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act of 
2008 where a director will be held personally liable for any loss, damage or 
 
159 Van Tonder  2018 (39)  Obiter  314 –  315.  
 
160 Section  218(2)  sta tes,  “ any person who cont ravenes any provision of  this Act  i s  
l iab le to  any o ther  person for  any loss or  damage suffered by tha t  person as a  resul t  of  
that  con travent ion.” See  Chemfi t  Fine Chemica ls (Pty)  Ltd t /a  SA Premix v  Maake and 
Others  (5772/2016)  [2017]  Z ALMPPHC 29 –  38 where the court  found that  the  
applicant  should suc ceed in  his al terna tive c laim in  i t s  Notice of  Motion since sect ion  
218(2)  is  a  genera l  enabling remedy.   In  the matter  of  Hlumisa Investment Hold ings  
(RF) Limi ted  & another  v  Kirkins  & Ot hers  (100390/2015)  [2018]  ZAGPPHC 863 ,  the  
shareholders  of  Afr ican  B ank Investments Limited  fa i led  in  their  c laim in  terms of  
sec tion 218(2)  of  the Companies Act of  2008 against  the d irec tors  and audi tors of  
Afr ican Bank.  The shareholders were a l leging tha t  due to  the conduct  of  the defendants  
there was a  drop in  the share  pr ice,  which resu l ted in  a  loss  to  the shareholders.   The 
loss tha t  was c la imed  was the  reduction  in  the value  of  the shareholders’  shares in  the 
company,  which i s  in  fact  a  loss suffered  by the company,  Afr ican Bank Investments 
Limi ted and Afr ican Bank.   There was no al legation of  unlawfu l  conduct  made agains t  
the directors and the auditors.  Section 218(2)  requires that  a  loss must  occur  “as a  




costs sustained by the company; breach of the duty of care and skill 
(section 76(3)(c)) of the Companies Act of 2008 where a director will be 
held responsible in terms of civil law for any loss, damages and costs 
sustained by the company;  liability for breaching the Companies Act of 
2008 in which instance a director will be held personally liable for any 
direct or indirect consequences of a breach of his/her duties; and liability 
towards the shareholders of the company under certain circumstances.161 
Directors should, therefore, ensure that they thoroughly understand their 
duties and obligations to ensure that they avoid any potential liability. 
 
One of the most litigious areas relating to personal civil liabilities relates to 
fraudulent and reckless trading.162 Section 77 of the Companies Act of 2008 
provides for the liability of directors and prescribed officers. 163 Subsection 
(2)(a) incorporates the common law principles relating to director’s 
fiduciary duties in respect of specific duties, providing that “….a director of 
 
161 Viviers D “The Liabi l i ty  of  Company Directors” October  2018  PhatsShoaneHenney 
Attorneys  ht tps : / /www.phinc.co.za /NewsResources /NewsArticle .aspx?Ar tic leID=2651  
(Date of  use :  18 November 2018) .  
 
162 See genera l ly  Sigwadi M “Compromise and Personal  Liabi l i ty  under  Sect ion 424 of  
the Companies Act  61  of  1973” 2003 (15)  SA Merc LJ  387 –  395;  Cass im FHI  
“Fraudulen t  or  Reckless  Trad ing a nd  Sect ion 424 o f  the Companies Act”  1998 SA Law J  
162 –  172;  Havenga MK “Cred ito rs,  Direc tors and Personal  Liab il i ty  under  Sect ion 424 
of  the Companies Act”  1992 (4)  SA Merc LJ  63 –  69;  Hambidge EG and Luiz SM 
“Compromise and Personal  Liabi l i ty  under  Sect ion 424 of  the Companies Act:  Two 
Judicia l  Approaches”  1991 SA Merc LJ  123  –  128;   Phungula  2016(37)  Obiter  695 -  702  
for  a  ful l  d iscuss ion  of  s  424  of  the  Companies Act  of  1973;  Phi lotex (Pty)  Ltd  v  
Snyman; Brain tex (Pty)  Ltd v  Snyman  1998 (2)  SA 742 WLD;  Cape Specif ic  L td v  
Lubner Control l ing  Investments  (Pty)  Ltd and  Ot hers  1995 (4)  SA 790  A;  Ex Parte De 
Vil l iers and  Another  NNO: in  re Carbon Developments ( in  l iqu idat ion)  1993 (1)  SA 493  
A; Fisheries Development Corpora tion  of  SA Ltd v  Jorgenson and  anot her;  F isheries 
Development  Corpora tion of  SA Ltd v  AWJ Inves tments ( Pty)  Ltd and others  1980 (4)  
SA 156 W.  For  more  on  the  history  and  a fu l l  d iscuss ion of  s  424,  see Blackman e t  a l .  
Commentary on the Companies Act  of  1973  521 –  554.  
 
163See in  genera l  Cass im et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  582.  Sect ion 20(6)  of  the 
Companie s Act of  2008 also deals wi th  l iabil i ty .  I t  s ta tes the fol lowing “Each  
shareholder  of  a  company has a  c laim for  damages  aga inst  any person who 
inten tional ly ,  f raudulen tly  or  due to  gross n egligence causes  the company to  do  
anything inconsis ten t  with  th is A ct;  or  a  l imi tat ion,  res tr ict ion or  quali f icat ion 
contempla ted  in  th is  sec tion,  unless  that  ac t ion  has  been  ra t if ied  by the  shareholders  in  
terms of  subsect ion (2) .”  See also Grove  Company Direc tors:  Fidu ciary  Dut ies and  the 
Duty o f  Care and Sk il l  39;  Yeat s et  a l .  Commentary on the Companies  Act  of  2008  p2-




a company may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the 
common law relating to the breach of a fiduciary duty, for any loss, 
damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any 
breach by the director of a duty contemplated in this section.”164   
 
Section 77(2)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008 links the statutory duties to 
the common law fiduciary duties.165 Section 77(2)(b) of the Companies Act 
of 2008 further provides that a director of a company may be held liable 
based on the common law principles relating to delict for any losses or 
damages which the company may suffer due to a breach of the duty of care 
and skill (set out in section 76(3(c)) of the Companies Act of 2008: losses 
due to a breach of the Companies Act not specifically mentioned in section 
77 of the Companies Act of 2008; and losses due to the contravention of 
any provisions of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.    
 
 
164 This  sect ion  i s  supplemented  by s  218(2)  of  the  Companies Ac t  of  2008 ,  which  s ta tes 
that  a  person who has contravened any prov is ion of  the Act ,  i s  l iable to  any other  
person for  any loss or  damage suffered by tha t  person as a  resu lt  of  tha t  contravent ion.  
See in  genera l ,  Davis e t  al .  Companies  and other Business St ruc tures  in  South Africa 
125 –  127;   Hendrikse JW and Hefer -Hendr ikse L Corpora te Governance Handbook:  
Princip les and Pract ice  2 n d  ed ( Juta South Afr ica 2012)  285; Cass im e t  al .  
Contemporary Company Law  582 –  586 ;    Bradstreet  R “Implicat ions o f  the re -enacted  
discret ionary  power  to  grant  Judicia l  Relief  to  Directors in  te rms of  sect ion 77(9)  of  
the Companies Act of  2008” 2015(27)  2015 SA Merc LJ  147 ;  Stevens AG A  Crit ica l  
Analysis of  sect ion 77(2)(a)  of  the Companies  Act  2008 in  l ight  of  the Common Law 
Remedy o f  Disgorgem ent  (Publ ished LLM Thesis  Univers i ty  of  Cape Town 20 16)  35  –  
52.   See also s 20(6)  of  the Companies Act of  2008,  which prov ides tha t  each 
shareholder  has a  c la im for  damages  aga inst  any  person who in ten tionally ,  f raudulent ly  
or  due  to  gross  neg ligence causes the  company  to  do any thing  inconsistent  wi th  the Act 
or  a  l imitat ion,  restr ict ion or  quali f icat ion  in  the company’s Memorandum of  
Incorporat ion,  unless ra t if ied by a spec ia l  resolution.  In  accordance wi th  common law, 
a  director  may be he ld l iable for  a  breach of  a  f iduciary duty  for  any  loss,  damages or  
cos ts susta ined by the company as a  consequence of  the breach by a  direc tor  of  a  
direc tor .  Th is also appl ies to  al terna te d irec tors,  members of  the aud i t  commit tee as  
wel l  as  members of  ot her  board  commit tees ,  i r respect ive  of  whether  or  not  these 
members are d irectors or  not .  See fur ther  Cassim et  al .  Contemporary Company Law 
582 -  583.  
 
165 Cassim et  a l .  Contemporary Company Law 583.  However ,  whi le  the subsect ion  
applies  to  l iab il i ty  for  los s,  damages  or  cos ts sustained  by  a company,  i t  does no t  
provide fo r  the d isgorgement  of  prof i t s  made  by a d irec tor  in  breach  of  the  no -prof i t  
rule ,  which app lies even where the prof i t  i s  not  made a t  the expense of  the company:  
Regal  (Hastings)  Ltd v  Gul l i ver  (1942)  1  Al l  ER 378 (HL) ;  (1967)  2  AC 134  (United 
Kingdom) where  the di rectors were requ ired to  disgorge prof i t s  made by them even  
though the company had suffered no loss and may ac tua lly  have benefi ted  from their  
act ions .  
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Section 77(3) of the Companies Act of 2008 states that  
a director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or 
costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect 
consequence of the director having –  
(a) acted in the name of the company, signed anything 
on behalf of the company, or purported to bind the 
company or authorise the taking of any action by or 
on behalf of the company, despite knowing that the 
director lacked the authority to do so;  
(b)  Acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s 
business despite knowing that it was being 
conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1);  
(c)  been a party to an act or omission by the company 
despite knowing that the act or omission was 
calculated to defraud an accreditor, employee or 
shareholder of the company, or had another 
fraudulent purpose;  
(d)  signed, consented to, or authorised, the publication 
of (i) any financial statements that were false or 
misleading in a material respect; or (ii) a prospectus 
or a written statement that contained an untrue 
statement or a statement to the effect that a person 
had consented to be a director of the company, when 
no such consent had been given, despite knowing 
that he statement was false, misleading or untrue, as 
the case may;  
(e)   been present at a meeting, or participated in the 
making of a decision in terms of section 74 and failed 
to vote against (i) the issuing of any unauthorized 
shares, despite knowing that those shares had not 
been authorised in accordance with section 36; (ii) 
the issuing of any authorised securities, despite 
knowing that the issue of those securities was 
inconsistent with section 41; (iii) the granting of 
options to any person contemplated in section 42(4) 
despite knowing that any shares for which the 
options could be exercised, or into which any 
securities could be converted had not been 
authorised in terms of section 36; (iv) the provision 
of financial assistance to any person contemplated in 
section 44 for the acquisition of securities of the 
company, despite knowing that the provision of 
financial assistance was inconsistent with section 44 
or the company’s MoI; (v) the provisions of financial 
assistance to a director for a purpose contemplated 
in section 45, despite knowing that the provision of 
financial assistance was inconsistent with that 
section or the company’s MoI; (vi) a resolution 
approving a distribution, despite knowing that the 
distribution was contrary to section 46; (vii) the 
acquisition by the company of any of its shares, or 
the shares of its holding company, despite knowing 
that he acquisition was contrary to section 46 or 48; 
or (viii) an allotment by the company, despite 
knowing that the allotment was contrary to any 




In Blue Farm Fashion Limited v Rapitrade 6 (Pty) Ltd and Others166 the 
plaintiff company instituted action against the defendants after concluding a 
contract for the delivery of clothing. The first defendant failed to pay for the 
order. The plaintiff company instituted action against the defendant 
company and its directors based on the fact that the directors of the 
defendant company knew that the company had no money or assets to pay 
for the order of clothing. The action was based on sections 77(3)(b), 22(1) 
and 77(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. However, the defendants argued 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on these provisions,  as it was a 
third party creditor and should instead have relied on sections 22, 76 and 
218 of the Companies Act of 2008.167 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
argument and found that a third party creditor can indeed hold the directors 
of a company liable for loss, damages and/or costs it had suffered due to 
the director(s) continuing to carry on with the business of the company 
despite knowing that it was being conducted in a reckless manner, with 
gross negligence and the intent to defraud another person. 168 The Plaintiff 
was successful in proving its case based on sections 77(3(b), 22(1) and 
77(b). 
 
Section 77(5) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides as follows: 
If the board of a company has made a decision in a 
matter that contravened this Act, as contemplated in 
subsection (3)(e) - 
(a) the company, or any director who has been or may 
be held liable in terms of subsection (3)(e), may 
 
166 22288/2014)  [2016]  WCC ZAWC HC 35,  see also Chemfit  Fine  Chemicals (Pty)  Ltd 
t /a  SA Premix v  Maa ke and Others  (5772/2016) [2017] ZALMPPHC 27 at para 39 
where the court agreed with the finding in  Blue Farm Ltd v Rapitrade 6 (Pty) Ltd 
and Others .  
 
167 Blue Farm Fash ion Limited v  Rapitrad e 6  (Pty)  Ltd and  Others22288/2014)  [2016]  
WCC ZAWCHC  1 ,  3  -5 ,  10.  
 
168 See also Rabinowitz v  Van Graan  and Others  2013 (5)  SA 315 (GSJ)  were the  same 
argument  presen ted,  bu t  was re jec ted by  Du Plessis  AJ in  para 22 as  fol lows “I….find 
that  a  th ird  par ty  can  ho ld a  d irec tor  personal ly  l iab le in  terms of  the Act for  
acquiescing in  or  knowing about conduct  tha t  fa l l s  with in the ambi t  of  s  22(1)  thereof .”   
See  Myburg E  “Holding  delinquent d irectors personally  l iable” July 2017 De Rebus  30 




apply to a court for an order setting aside the 
decision of the board; and  
(b) the court may make – (i) an order setting aside the 
decisions in whole or in part, absolutely or 
conditionally; and (ii) any further order that is just 
and equitable in the circumstances, including an 
order to rectify the decision, reserve any transaction, 
or restore any consideration paid or benefit received 
by any person in terms of the decision of the board; 
and requiring the company to indemnity any director 
who has been or may be held liable in terms of this 
section, including indemnification for the costs of the 
proceedings under this subsection.  
 
Stevens, in the author’s view, correctly, indicates that the basis for liability 
may not necessarily be only delictual in nature, but may also be 
contractual.169 Section 77 imposes far-reaching liabilities for the 
contravention of the Companies Act by directors of a company, especially 
in light of the decision in Blue Farm Fashion Limited v Rapitrade 6 (Pty) Ltd 
and Others where it was found that a third party can hold directors liable.  
 
There is no known case law pertaining to a university Council or 
management being held accountable for a breach of common law fiduciary 
duties owed to the university. It was recently reported in the press that the 
University of Johannesburg issued a summons against, amongst others, a 
Council member and a former member of its executive management for 
breach of their fiduciary duties after allegations that they defrauded the 
university of approximately R30 million. The matter relates to allegations 
that these two senior members of the university used opportunities meant 
for the university for their personal benefit.170 The university has 
 
169 Stevens 2017 (20)  PELJ  1 .  See a lso ,  Van Warmelo P “Liab il i ty  in  Contrac t  and in  
De l ic t”  1985 (102)  SALJ 227 –  231.  In  Lil l icrap,  Wassenaar and Partners v  Pi lk ington 
Bro thers  SA (Pty)  Ltd  1985 1  SCA the cour t  he ld tha t  a  de lictua l  remedy  is  not  
avai lable to  a  pla int if f  w here  the  neg ligence rel ied upon a breach of  a  contrac tua l  term.  
For  more on this matter ,  see Hutch inson D and Visser  DP “ Li l l icrap Revis i ted:  Further  
thoughts on  Pure Economic  Loss  and  Concurrence of  Act ions” 1985  (102)  SALJ  587  -  
595.  Also,  see Pinshaw v Nexus  Securit ies  (Pty)  Ltd  2002  2 SA 510  (C)  where a  cla im 
for  economic  loss  caused by bad  investments was lodged  aga inst  one  of  the d irectors  of  
a  company based on  gross neg ligence ,  recklessness and f rau d.  The  company i t sel f  was  
also sued for  breach of  co ntract  based upon al legations of  d ishonesty and act ing in  bad  
fai th .   
 
170 See in  genera l ,  Tshwane T  “2 Sen ior  UJ Managers  Accused of  Defrauding Universi ty  
of  R25m”  2017-07-30 Eyewi tness News;  Seale L  “UJ Bosses  Suspended over  Graf t  
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subsequently obtained a summary judgment against these individuals 
through which they will be able to recover some of the monies. However, 
these two individuals have applied for a revision of the judgment , and the 
matter is currently sub judice.  
 
4.2.9 Removal of directors 
 
The authority or power to remove or discipline a member of Council is 
currently limited.  The only basis for disciplining a Council member is when 
he/she contravenes subsections 7(c),171 (d)172 or (e),173 (7A)174 or (7B) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997.175 In terms of section 27(7E)(a) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997, the Council must have a code of conduct that 
provides for the disciplining of Council members when these sub-sections 
are contravened. However, it does not specifically provide that a Council 
 
Allegations”  2017-0730  Weekend Argus ;  Nkos i  B “UJ Retr ieves Stolen R14m from 
Execs”  2018-08-08  The Star .  
 
171 This sub-sec tion provides as  fol lows:  “a  Council  member must before he or  she 
assumes of f ice,  and  annually  for  as long as he or  she cont inues to  hold such off ice ,  
declare any business,  commerc ial  or  f inancial  act ivi t ies under taken for  f inanc ial  ga in  
that  may raise a  confl ict  or  a  possib le conf l ict  of  interest  with  the public  h igher  
educat ion ins t i tut ion concerned.”  
 
172 This sub-sect ion provides as fo l lows: “A Council  member may not p lace hims elf  or  
herself  under  any  f inancia l  or  other  ob ligat i on  to  any  ind ividual  or  o rganisat ion  tha t  
might seek to  inf luence the performance of  any  function  of  the council .”  
 
173 This sub-sect ion provides as fo l lows: “ ( i)  A Council  member  may no t  h ave a conf l ict  
of  interes t  with  the public  h igher  educat i on ins t i tu t ion concerned;  ( i i )   may not  have a  
direc t  or  ind irec t  f inancial ,  personal ,  or  o ther  interest  in  any  matter  to  be d iscussed at  
a  meet ing,  or  in  regard to  which he or  she i s  to  make a dec is ion in  terms of  a  delega ted  
function ,  and which entai l s  or  may  entai l  a  conf l ic t  o r  possib le  conf l ic t  of  in teres t  wi th  
the public  h igher  education  inst i tu t ion  concerned;  ( i i i )    must ,  before  the meeting  of  
the council  or  the commit tee concerned and in  wri t ing,  inform the cha irperson of  that  
meet ing of  the existence  of  a  con f l ic t  or  poss ible confl ic t  of  inte rest .”  
 
174 This sec tion  provides as fo l lows: “ Any person may,  in  wri t ing ,  inform the  
chairperson  of  a  meeting of  the council  or  a  commit tee  of  the  council  concerned,  befor e  
that  meeting,  of  a  confl ict  or  possib le confl ic t  o f  interest  o f  a  member  o f  the counci l  or  
of  a  commit tee of  the council  wi th  the publ ic  h igher  educat ion ins t i tut ion concerned of  
which  such person  may be aware.”   I t  seems unclear  how thi s sec tion  can  be  
contravened.  
 
175 This sect ion prov ides as  fol lows:  “ A member  referred  to  in  subsect ions (7)  (e)  and  
(7A) is  obl iged  to  recuse himself  or  herself  f rom the  meet ing dur ing the discussion  of  




member may be removed, only that they are disciplined.  There is a clear 
lacuna in this provision as “disciplining” a Council member may not be 
enough: The Act should provide for the removal of a Council member. 
Although there are some Institutional Statutes or Council Code of 
Conducts176 that provide for suspension or removal of Council members, it 
is the author’s view that in the absence of a statutory provision for the 
removal of Council members, such actions might be perceived as being 
ultra vires the Higher Education Act of 1997. 
 
It is therefore essential to include similar provisions to those contained in 
section 71 of the Companies Act of 2008 in the Higher Education Act of 
1997, to provide a Council with the statutory power to suspend or remove a 
Council member. 
 
Section 71 of the Companies Act of 2008 provides for the removal of a 
director by either the shareholders or the board of directors. 177 In terms of 
section 71(3), a director can be removed if he/she becomes ineligible or 
disqualified in terms of the Companies Act of 2008, is incapacitated, or has 
neglected or been derelict in the performance of his/her duties.178 In 
 
176 For  ins tance,  the Codes  of  Conduct  of  the  Durban Universi ty  of  Technology ,  the 
Nelson Mandela Univers i ty ,  the Univers i ty  of  Stel lenbosch,  and  the  Univers i ty  of  
South Afr ica.   
177 For  the  purposes of  this  s tudy,  i t  i s  i r re levan t  to  discuss  the removal  of  direc tors by  
shareholders.  The remo val of  a  d irec tor  by a board wil l  be  discussed only br ief ly  to  
provide contex t  for  the inclusion of  a  s imilar  provis ion in  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  
1997.  On the topic of  removal of  d irec tors see  in  genera l ,  Cass im R  A Cri t ica l  
Analysis  o f  the  Removal of  Direc tors  by  the Board o f  Directors and  the Judic ia ry  
under  the Companies  Act  71  of  2008 (Published  LLD thes is  Univers i ty  o f  South Afr ica  
2018)  94 –  218;  Ncube CB “You’re Fired!   The Removal of  Directors under the  
Companies Act  71 of  2008”  2016 (128)  SALJ 37  –  44;  Delport(ed)  e t  a l .  Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act  of  2008 273 –  274;  Leseyane SL  Cri t ica l  Analys is of  sec t ion 71  
of  the Companies Act  71 of  2008 ( Publ ished LLM thesis  Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg  
2017)  10 –  12;  Stein and Everingha m  The New Compan ies Act  Unlocked 232 ;  Delpor t  
Henochsberg  on the Com panies  Act  o f  2008  273; Yeats  e t  a l .  Commentary on  the  
Companies Act  o f  2008  p2-1266 –  1267.  
 
178 For  more on  the removal of  di rec tors see Cassim A Crit ical  Analys is of  the Removal  
of  Directors by the Board  of  Directors and the  Judic iary under the Companies Act  o f  
2008  61 –  219 ;  Cassim et  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  444 ;  Davis (ed)  e t  al .  
Companies and other Business S tructures  in  South Afr ica  141 ;  Cassim 2016 SALJ  133 –  
135;  Ncube 2011 SALJ  33 –  51.  One of  the f ir st  cases that  deal t  with  a  removal of  a  
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Steenkamp and Another v Central Energy Soc and Others, 179 the applicants 
unsuccessfully approached the court on an urgent basis to set aside their 
removal as directors of PetroSA. According to the applicants, they had 
been unlawfully removed as directors in terms of the Companies Act of 
2008. They furthermore contended that their removal was unlawful in terms 




direc tor  in  terms of  sec t ion 71 was  Pretor ius v  PB Meat (Pty)  Ltd [2013]  ZAWCHC 89.  
This case deal t  wi th  the removal of  two d irectors who in  retu rn contested the ir  
removal .  The applicants had  resigned as  empl oyees  of  the company but  refused  to  
res ign as  directors as required by  the ir  employment contracts  s igned  with  the  company .  
Subsequently ,  a  meeting  of  the  board of  d irec tors was ca l led  to  consider  a  resolu tion  to  
remove the  appl icants as  di rectors  on the bas is  that  they  had  been  derel ic t  in  the  
performance o f  their  functions as d irectors.   The appl ican ts requ ired more informat ion,  
which the company provided.  However ,  the  applicants fe l t  tha t  the information  
provided was not  suff icien t .  The c our t  had to  rule  on whether  the  documents as  
requested by the appl ica nts had to  be produced  by the company in  order  to  sat isfy  the  
“suff ic ient  spec if ic i ty” requirement  contained  in  s  71(4)  of  the Companies Act ;  see in  
genera l  see Cass im 2016 SALJ  134,  139 -  142;  Delpor t  (ed)  e t  al .  Henochsberg on the  
Companies Act  o f  2008  274 (2) .  
 
179 Steenkamp and  Another  v  Centra l  Energy  Soc and Others  2018 (1)  SA 311 (WCC).  
 
180The Centra l  Energy Fund (CEF) ,  the on ly shareholder  of  PetroSA, had  suffered large  
losses re la t ing to  a  cer ta in  pr ojec t ,  and the company was in  urgent  need of  a  turna round  
strategy  for  the improvement of  the company.  The CEF was of  the opin ion tha t  par t  of  
the tu rnaround strategy  for  the company was  going to  be a  s treng thened with  the 
res truc tur ing of  the board.  As a consequence,  they planned on removing cer ta in  
direc tors f rom the board .  The  directors  were p rovided wi th  the  requi red notice to  make 
representat ions .  The applicants  were subsequently  removed  as d i rectors  of  the  
company.  The appl ica t ion was  based on two gro unds the one be ing that  the CEF d id no t  
comply  with  the relevan t  prov is ions of  the  Companies  Act.  I t  was a l leged that  the CEF 
should have re l ied on s  71(8)  rather  than s 71(1)  of  the Companies Act of  2008.  The  
applicants  therefore  argued t hat  the  CEF could  not  lawful ly  remove them as d irectors 
in  terms of  s  71(1)  and (2) ,  as the nature o f  the  al legat ions made aga inst  the d irec tors 
tr iggered the procedural  reg ime contempla ted in  sec tion 71(3) .  In  addit ion,  they 
contended  tha t  they were the o nly  two directors  lef t  a t  the t ime,  fol lowing the 
res ignat ion of  the other  direc tors tha t  had been identif ied by CEF.  The court  found tha t  
there was no bas is for  the appl ican ts’  argument  and tha t  i t  was based on a misreading  
of  s  71.  Furthermore,  the cour t  al so found that  the fac t  tha t  there  were on ly two 
direc tors lef t  was  ir relevant  because the  removal was done by  the only  shareholder  at  a  
shareholders’  meeting.  The court  therefore found that  any cha llenge by the app licants  
that  the ir  removal as d i rectors  based on non-compliance wi th  s  71 of  the Companies 
Act had fai led.  The second par t  of  their  app licat ion was based on the  adminis tra t ive  
law; they submit ted tha t  a  decis ion to  remove PetroSA’s en ti re  board ,  inc luding the 
applicants,  was unreasonable and d i sproport ionate,  a rbi trary and ir ra t ional .  As such,  
the appl ican ts  con tended tha t  the decis ion must  be  reviewed in  terms of  s  6  of  PAJA 
and set  as ide.  The  appl ican ts  also f ai led on  the second par t  of  their  applicat ion and  
their  app licat ion was therefore  dis missed.  For  more on this mat ter  see Saba  A “Minister  




4.2.10 Declaring a director delinquent 
 
The parties who have locus standi for actions are many and include a 
company, a shareholder, a director, a company secretary or prescribed 
officer of a company, a registered trade union that represents employees of 
a company, and the Companies Commission and the Takeover Regulation 
Panel.181  In terms of section 162(5) of the Companies Act 2008, 182 a court 
must declare a director delinquent when the director consented to be a 
director or acted as a director while being ineligible or disqualified in terms 
of section 69 of the Companies Act of 2008. Section 162(5) (c) furthermore 
confirms that a director must be declared delinquent when he/she have 
grossly abused his/her position as a director; taken advantage of 
information or an opportunity for personal gain; intentionally or by gross 
negligence, inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the 
company; or acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, wilful 
misconduct or breach of trust  concerning the performance of the director ’s 
functions within, and duties to the company.183 The first reported case 
where section 162 was invoked was Kukama v Lobelo and others.184  Legal 
 
181 See  s  162  (2)  and (3)  for  the specif ic  grounds  of  de linquency or  probation  which  are  
avai lable.  See in  genera l  Cass im A Crit ical  Analysis of  t he Removal o f  Direc tors by the  
Board o f  Direc tors and  the Judiciary u nder  the Companies Act  o f  2008  328 –  460;  
Cassim et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  436 –  438.  
 
182 Levenste in  E “The de linquent director :  No tolerance for  errant  directors?” 2013 
Legalbrie f  ht tp: / /www.werksmans.com/wp -conten t/up loads/2013/04/160_JN5493 -
Werksmans-Brief_The-Del inquent-Direc tor1.pdf  (Date  of  use :  30  August  2018);   
Levenste in  E “The Delinquent Direc tor” 2010 Without Pre judice 21 –  22;   Davis (ed)  et  
al .  Companies and other Business Struc tures in  South Africa  134 –  138 ;  Delport  e t  al .  
Henochsberg on the Companies Act  of  2008  563  –  566.  
 
183 Sect ion 162 i s  very  co mprehensive  and  not  al l  the  de tai l  wi l l  be d iscussed .  The  
essence of  the reasons  for  declar ing a direc tor  delinquent i s  impor tan t  to  mention here 
in  the con text  of  the  removal of  a  Counci l  member.  See in  general ,  Cass im R 
“Delinquent  Direc tors under  the Co mpanies  Act  71 of  2008”  2013 De Rebus  26;  Cass im 
et  al .  Contemporary Company Law  436 –  437.  
 
184 Kukama v  Lobelo and  others (38587/2011)  2012 ZAGP JHC (unreported)  60.  The  
matter  went on to  appeal  in  Lobelo and Another v  Kukama and Others  (38587/ /2011)  
2013 ZAGPJHC 137,  but  the appeal  was d ismissed .  See general ly ,  Davis (ed)  e t  al .  
Companies and Other Business Struc tures in  South Africa  138;  Pa te l  M “I l l ic i t  outf low 
of  cap ita l  f rom South  Afr ica  e l iminated by  s ta tutory du ties  placed on  direc tors” 2015  
De Rebus  48-  49 ;  Cassim 2016 PELJ  2  –  3 ;  Du Pless is  and  Delpor t  2017 SALJ  285;  
Also see Msimang No and Another v  Katu li iba and Others (11/23050)  2012 ZAGPJHC 
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action was instituted by the applicant (K) against his business partner (L) 
for the misappropriation of more than R60 million. K and L were equal 
shareholders of two companies. Both were directors of company A, but only 
L was a director of company B. The South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) paid certain tax refunds to company B on the instruction of L. 
However, one of these refunds was fraudulently obtained. L then utilised 
the monies for other purposes other than for the benefit of company B. K 
then brought an action to declare L a delinquent director and to have him 
removed as a director of the other companies on whose boards he sat. 185 By 
utilising the funds received from SARS for the benefit of other companies 
which were not subsidiaries of company B, L acted in breach of the 
fiduciary duties he owed to company B. Furthermore, the failure to inform 
SARS of the fraud and pay the money back amounted to gross negligence 
and wilful misconduct on the part of L.186 The court granted the application 
as L’s conduct fell short of the standard expected of a director and his 
actions amounted to wilful misconduct, breach of trust and a gross abuse 
of his position as director.187   
 
 
240; 2013 1 All  SA 580 (GSJ) ;  See fur ther  Davis (ed)  et  a l .  Companies and Other 
Business S tructures in  So uth Afr ica  140;  Delport  (ed)  et  al .  Henochsberg on the  
Companies Act  o f  2008  565.  
 
185 The appl ica t ion was brought in  terms of  ss 22,  76(2)  and (3) ,  s  77(3)(a) (b)  and (c)  as  
wel l  as  s  162(5)(c)( i)  –  ( iv)  of  the  Companies Act  of  2008.  K al leged  that  s  76(2)(b )  
crea tes a  duty on the par t  of  a  d irec tor  to  communica te at  the ear l iest  pract icab le  
opportuni ty  any  information tha t  comes to  their  at tent ion to  the board.  In  this  instance,  
L should have d isclosed  that  there was a  f raudulent  cla im to  SARS. The effec t  of  th is  
f raudulen t  SARS c la im caused  ir reparable harm to  company B.  See  in  genera l ,  Du 
Pless is  J  and Delport  P “‘Del inquent  Director’s  and  ‘Direc tors under  Probat ion’:  A 
Unique South Afr ican Approach Regarding Disqualif ica t ion of  Company Directors”  
2017  SALJ  285 –  286.  
 
186 Sect ion  76(2)(b)  o f  the Companies  Act o f  2008 impose s  a  duty  on a di rec tor  to  
notify  his/her  board of  direc tors a t  the  ear l iest  poss ible  t ime of  any informat ion that  
comes to  his /her  a t tent ion.  I t  was c lear  that  the  f ir st  respondent  had fai l ed in  th is duty.  
The effec t  o f  this  fai lure not  on ly caused  ir reparab le  harm to  the  second respondent as  
envisioned  in  s  162(5)(c)( i i i )  of  the Companies Act o f  2008,  but   a lso led to  add it iona l  
cr iminal  l iab il i ty  in  terms of  s  332(1)  and  (2)  of  the Crimina ls  Procedure Act  51 of  
1977 as amended.  See in  genera l ,  Du Plessis  an d  Delport  2017  SALJ  285.  
 
187 For  a  succ inc t  discussion of  the case see Cass im 2013 De Rebus  26;  Du Plessis  and  




In the second reported decision, Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited,188 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously approved the declaration of 
delinquency made in the court a quo against the first and second 
appellants.189   
 
The inclusion of delinquency proceedings are recommended first to ensure 
that individuals who have been declared delinquent in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008 should not be eligible for election as Council 
members;190 and secondly, the Higher Education Act of 1997 should include 
 
188 Gihwala  v  Grancy Property  Limited  2016  ZASCA 35.  See  Cassim 201 6 PELJ 3 –  7 ;  
Van Zyl  G and  Smit  M “Del inquent Direc tors”  2016 Without  Pre judice  19 –  22 ;  Du 
Pless is  and Delport  2017 SALJ 286 –  292;  Pansegrouw L The Del inquent Director –  No  
Room for  Errant Directors  in  the New Companies Act  (Unpubl ished  LLM thesis  
Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg 2017)  6  –  7 :  Delpor t  et  a l .  Henochsberg on  the Companies  
Act  o f  2008  568.  
 
189 In  this mat ter  the Supreme Court  of  Appeal  f ir st  had to  confirm whether  s  162(5)(c)  
of  the Companies  Act of  2008 had retrospect ive effec t ,  a nd whether  i t  was  
unconsti tut ional .  The facts were as  fol lows:  the f i r st  and second appellants were 
direc tors of  Seena Marena Investments (Pty)  Ltd (here inaf ter  referred to  as  SMI) .  In  
2005,  the  f ir s t  and second appel lan ts en tered  into  a  verbal  agreement w ith  Grancy  
Proper ty  Limi ted (hereinaf ter  referred to  as GPL) for  the company to  acquire a  one -
third  shareholder  in  SMI.  However ,  the second appel lant  lacked  the f inancia l  resources  
to  pay for  h is shares and consequent ly ,  the f ir s t  appellan t  and GPL had to  loan money  
to  the  second appel lan t  to  enab le h im to  pay for  his share s.  However ,  the business  
rela t ionship  of  the par t ies soured for  var ious reasons,  and bo th the  f irs t  and second 
appel lant  fa i led to  reg is ter  GPL as  a  shareholder  of  SMI.   I t  came to  the a t tent ion of  
GPL tha t  the f ir st  and second appellants had made var ious payments to  themselves,  and 
had received d ividend payments  as well ,  without shar ing any of  the funds wi th  GPL.  
Subsequently ,  GPL sought an  order  in ter  al ia ,  declar ing  the  f ir st  and  second  appel lants 
delinquent d irectors in  terms of  s  162(5)(c)  of  the Compa nies Act  of  2008.  The court  a 
quo  granted the order .  The f ir st  and second  appel lants argued tha t  s  162(5)  was  
unconsti tut ional  on the  grounds  that  i t  was re trospect ive  in  i ts  app licat ion,  and that  
there  was  no d iscre t ion  ves ted in  the  court  by s  162(5)(c)  and (6)  to  re fuse  to  make  a  
delinquency order  or  to  moderate the per iod of  such order  to  less than seven years.  The  
court  found that  the  court  a quo had correct ly  re jec ted the at tacks on the  
consti tut iona l i ty  o f  s  162(5)(c)  of  the Companies Act of  2008,  an d the appeal  against  
the del inquency  orders granted  by the court  a quo  fa i led.  See  in  general ,  Cass im 2016  
PELJ 2 –  25 ;  Du Pless is  and Delpor t  2017 SALJ 286.  
 
190 The ine lig ibi l i ty  of  a  Cou ncil  member and chair  of  Council  was high lighted in  the  
matter  of  Wil l iams and Another  v  Univers i ty  of  the  Western  Cape and  Others  
(24537/2015)  [2016]  ZAWCHC 198.  Although  del inquency  proceedings were  not  the  
subject  matter  of  the case,  the information rel a t ing to  the chai r  of  Council  being  
declared de linquent  in  terms of  t he Companies Act  of  2008 came to  the  at tent ion of  the  
court  dur ing the proceedings.  In  shor t ,  the de tai l s  of  the case are  as fol lows:  Two 
Council  members were suspended fo llowing a compl ain t  f rom the SRC to  Counci l  based  
on these  two Council  members at ten ding  a “prayers for  peace”  meeting.  The  two 
members ind ica ted tha t  they were a t tending in  their  personal  capac it ies and not  in  the ir  
capac it ies as  Counci l  members.  These two Council  membe rs  were suspended  with  
206 
 
similar provisions to those contained in section 162 to provide for a Council 
member who abused his/her position as a Council member; took personal 
advantage or information or an opportunity meant for the institution for 
personal gain; intentionally or by gross negligence inflicted harm upon the 
Council;  acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, inflicted 
harm upon the institution; or acted in a way that amounted to gross 
negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the 
performance of the duties of the Council member to be declared delinquent 
and prevent him/her to serve on a different university’s Council. 
 
Section 162 must be read in conjunction with section 76(2)(a).191 It provides 
that where a director has contravened section 76(2)(a) by taking advantage 
of information or an opportunity or acting in a grossly negligent fashion that 
caused harm to the company, the director must be declared delinquent. In 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam,192 the court held that a shareholder could 
not institute delinquency proceedings against directors using a derivative 
action in terms of section 165, but that such proceedings should be brought 
under section 162.193 
 
immediate effect .  They were no t  provided with  notice tha t  their  suspension would be  
discussed  at  a  Counci l  meeting .  The  appl icants brought  the ir  act ion agains t  the 
ins t i tut ion,  requesting  the court  to  declare thei r  suspension un lawfu l  and to  re ins ta t e  
them as Council  members.  The appl icants a l leged th a t  they were suspended as an ac t  of  
revenge because  of  the ir  cr i t ic i sm of  the chai r  of  Counci l .  Th is cr i t ic i sm re la ted to  
information tha t  came to  the a t tent ion of  the  appl ican ts per ta ini ng to  the chair  o f  
Council  being  declared a de linquent person  in  term s of  the Companies  Act  of  2008  and  
which informat ion he had fai led to  disc lose to  Council  when he was nominated.  The  
applicants  were successful  in  their  appl ica t ion  and were re insta ted  as  Council  members .  
However ,  the author  i s  of  the opin ion tha t  someone who has been dec lared del inquent 
by a court  of  law should not  be el igib le  for  e lect ion as  a  Counci l  member and  should  
spec if ica l ly  no t  act  as  chairperson of  the  Council .   
 
191 Sect ion 76(2) (a)  prov ides  tha t  a  d irec tor  o f  a  company must  (a)  not  use the posi t ion  
of  direc tor  or  any information  obta ined whi le  act ing in  the capac ity  of  a  director  –  ( i )  
to  gain an advantage for  the director  or  fo r  another  person other  than the company or  a  
whol ly-owned subsid iary  of  the company; or  ( i i )  to  cause harm to  the compan y or  a  
subsid iary of  the  company knowingly.  Sect ion  76(2)  i s  d iscussed above in  sect ion  
4.2 .5 .   
 
192 Lewis  Group Limi ted v  Wool lam  2017  (2)  SA 547 (WCC).  
 
193 Cassim R “The launching of  delin quency proceeding s under  the Companies Act 71 of  
2008 by means of  the  der iva tive ac t ion :   Lewis  Group Limi ted v  Woollam  2017 (2)  SA 
547 (WCC)” 2017 Obiter 673  –  688.  For  more on der iva tive act ions  in  genera l ,  see  
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The examples of universities which were placed under administration 
indicate that Council members, as well as members of the Executive 
Management, had acted with gross negligence and that their conduct had 
not been in the best interests of their institutions.194 In the author’s view, the 
inclusion of delinquency provisions similar to those found in the Companies 
Act of 2008 in the Higher Education Act of 1997 would serve as a deterrent 
and prevent Council members who have been declared delinquent at one 
institution, to move on to another institution and take up a position as either 
a Council member or a member of the executive management.  
 
4.3 THE BANKS ACT OF 1990 
 
Banks differ from other companies due to the vitally important position they 
hold in their financial system. Banks are the custodians of the public’s 
money and play an essential role in the South African economy.195 The 
Banks Act of 1990 is the primary statute regulating banks. 196 The main 
purpose of this Act is to protect the public against any losses they may 
suffer from possible malpractice or negligence on the part of the banks and 
 
Cassim FM The Sta tutory  Derivat ive Act ion  u nder the Companies  Act  of  2008:  
Guide lines for the Exerc ise of  the Ju dic ial  Discretion  (Publ ished PhD thes is  Univers i ty  
of  Cape Town 2014)  8  –  190; Cassim FM “Judicial  Discret ion in  Der ivative Act ions  
under  the Companies  Act  of  2008” 2013  (130)  SALJ 778  –  809;  Cassim FM “The 
Sta tutory Der iva tive act ion under  the Companies A c t:  The Role of  Good Fai th” 2013  
(130)  SALJ  496 –  526; Stoop H “The Deriva tive Act ion Prov isions in  the Companies 
Act  71 of  2008” 2012  (129)  SALJ  527 –  553.  
 
194 The universi t ies tha t  were placed  under  admin istrat ion are discussed above in  
Chapter  3 ,  para  3 .3 .2(b)  above.  
  
195 For  a  background  on  the Banks Act of  1990,  see in  general  Schoeman HC (ed)  e t  a l .  
An Introduct ion to  South Afr ican Banking and Cred it  Law  2 n d  ed (LexisNexis South  
Afr ica  2013)  11 –  2 .  Fo r  a  discuss ion of  the board of  direc tors of  a  bank,  see De Jager  
The Management o f  Banks  in  South Africa:   Legal and  Governance  Princip les  433  –  
453.  
 
196 Here inaf ter  referred to  as the Banks Act of  1990.  The purpose of  the Banks Act  of  
1990 is  to  prov ide fo r  the “regulat ion and supervision of  the business of  pub lic  
companies  taking  deposit s  f rom the  publ ic”.  This  study  includes  only  a  short  summary  
of  i t s  prov isions for  comparat ive purposes .  See  Schoeman (ed)  e t  al .  An Introduct ion to  
South African Banking and Credi t  Law  11 –  14  for  the purpose and applicat io n of  the  
Banks Act and De Jager  The Management  of  Banks in  South Afr ica:  Legal and 




to ensure that the public is protected against any unfair competition by 
institutions similar to banks.197 Apart from the Banks Act of 1990, the 
Companies Act of 2008 and other legislative instruments regulating the 
banking industry, banks must comply with the King Code on Corporate 
Governance.198 The board of directors of a bank is responsible for 
supervising the risk management process of a bank and must , therefore, 
accept responsibility for protecting the interests of depositors. 199 The 
Companies Act of 2008 is not the only statute providing for fiduciary duties 
of directors as well as their duties of care and skill. 200  Section 60 of the 
Banks Act of 1990 provides for both these duties in respect of directors of 
banks.201  
 
According to section 60(1) of the Banks Act 1990, 202 “each director, chief 
executive officer and executive officer of a bank owes a fiduciary duty, and 
a duty of care and skill to the bank of which such a person is a director, 
chief executive officer or executive officer.”  Section 60(1A) lists the various 
duties owed to the bank, namely,  to act bona fide for the benefit of the 
bank;  avoid any conflict between the bank’s interests and the interests of 
such a director, chief executive officer or executive officer, as the case may 
 
197Sharrock R (ed)  The Law of  Banking and Payment in  South Africa  ( Ju ta  Cape Town 
2016)  67.  
 
198 Shar rock (ed)  The Law o f  Banking and  Payment  i n  South Africa  105.  Corporate  
governance  i s  discussed  in  sec tion 4.4  below.  
 
199 De Jager  J  “Comments on the Effects of  sect ion 40 of  the Banks Amendment Act 19  
of  2003 on sec tion 60 of  th e Banks Act 94 of  1990” 2005 (17)  SA Merc LJ  170.  
 
200 Schoeman et  al .  An In troduction  to  South African Banking  and Cred it  Law  116  –  118 
for  the du ties  owed  by d irec tors of  banks.  
 
201 Sec tion  60 of  the Banks  Act  of  1990 formed par t  of  the Act when i t  was  prom ulgated  
and was subsequently  fu r ther  amended.  
 
202 As amended  by  s  40(a)  of  the  Banks Amendment Act 19  of  2003 .  Hereinaf ter  
referred to  as the Banks  Amendment Act.  See Deloi t te  “Direc tor  Duties”  2013 76 –  77. 
Regal  Treasury  Bank  Holdings was p laced in  curato rship.  The  bank  fa i led for  numerous  
reasons  i . e .  the  CEO was no t  a  f i t  and proper  person  to  hold  off ice;  the  board  of  
direc tors was act ing in  breach of  both the Banks Act of  1990 and the Companies Act of  
1973 as wel l  as corporate governance pr inc iples ;  and  the d irec tors were knowingly  




be;  possess and maintain the knowledge and skill that may reasonably be 
expected of a person holding a similar appointment and carrying out similar 
functions as carried out by the director, chief executive officer or executive 
officer of that bank; and exercise such care in the carry ing out of their 
duties in relation to that bank as may reasonably be expected of a diligent 
person who holds the same appointment under similar circumstances and 
who possesses both the knowledge and skill mentioned in paragraph (c) 203 
and any such additional knowledge and skill as the director, chief executive 
officer or executive officer in question may have.  
 
Section 77 of the Companies Act of 2008 applies should a banking director 
or officer fall short of the standard of care, knowledge and skill required of 
him/her by both the Companies Act of 2008 and the Banks Act of 1990.204  
 
Section 60 of the Banks Act applies to directors and other officers of banks. 
De Jager indicates that this is in accordance with established principles of 
our common law.205 This is also the approach followed by the Companies 
Act of 2008 as sections 76(1), and 77(1) provide for their application to 
prescribed officers or a person who is a member of a committee of a board 
of a company or of the audit committee of a board, irrespective of whether 
or not the person is also a member of the company’s board. 206 
 
The common law used to favour a subjective test in company law, the 
approach towards this test has changed to where an objective test is being 
 
203Section 60(A)(1A)(c)  requires the d irector  to  “ possess and mainta in  the knowledge  
and sk il l  tha t  may reasonably be expected of  a  person ho lding a s im i lar  appointment 
and car rying ou t  s imi lar  funct ions as are  carr ied out  by the d irec tor ,  chief  execut ive 
off icer  or  execut ive off icer  of  that  bank”.  
 
204 Dodman D and  Graham A “Cr iminal  l iab il i ty  for  bank directors? A look at  the 
United Kingdom and South Afr i ca” Hogan Lovel ls  Africa  Newslet ter  (April  2013)  
ht tp: / /www.hoganlovell s .com/cr iminal - l iabi l i ty -for-bank-directors-a- look -at- the-
united-k ingdom-and-sou th-afr ica-04-09-2015/  (Date of  use :  30 August  2018) .  Sect ion 
77 of  the Companies  Act i s  d iscussed above  in  para 4 .2 .8  above.  
 
205 De Jager  2005 SA Merc  LJ  172 .  
 




preferred.207 Section 60(1A)(c) and (d) of the Banks Act of 1990 introduces 
an objective test for both the duty of skill and the duty of care that rests on 
the managers of a bank.208 It is also noteworthy that section 60(B) of the 
Banks Act of 1990 is very clear about the corporate governance processes 
to be followed by a bank. Section 60B(1) of the Banks Act  states that: 
 ….notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, 
the board of directors and executive officers of a bank 
shall establish and maintain an adequate and effective 
process of corporate governance, which shall be 
consistent with the nature, complexity and risks inherent 
in the activities and the business of the bank concerned.  
 
Section 60(B)(2) of the Banks Act of 1990 further provides that the process 
of corporate governance shall be established with the objective of 
achieving the bank’s strategic and business objectives efficiently, 
effectively, ethically and equitably within acceptable risk parameters, to 
ensure compliance with the strategic framework and guidelines established 
for the bank or controlling company. It also provides for a commitment by 
the executive officers of the bank to adhere to corporate behaviour that is 
universally recognised and accepted as correct and proper. There must be 
a balance of interests of the shareholders and other interested persons 
who may be affected by the conduct of directors or executive officers of the 
bank within a framework of effective accountability and proper corporate 
governance practices. Mechanisms and procedures must be established 
and maintained to minimise or avoid potential conflicts of interests between 
the business interests of the bank and the personal interests of directors or 
executive officers of the bank, and there must be responsible conduct by 
the directors and executive officers of the bank adversarial. Moreover, this 
section also provides for the achievement of the maximum level of 
efficiency and profitability of the bank within an acceptable risk profile for 
 
207  See para 4 .2 .6  above for  a  discussion  on the  subjec tive  as wel l  as the objec tive  tes ts  
used to  de termine negl igence.  
 
208 De Jager  2005 SA Merc LJ  174.  S 60(1A) of  the Banks  Act of  1990 c lear ly  def ines  
the dimensions of  these  duties and i t  fur thermore cla r if ies the ambiguous common l aw 
posi t ion relat ing to  the  relevant  appl icab le tes t  to  determine whet her  or  not  the duty  
has been d ischarged .   
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the bank; the timely, accurate and meaningful disclosure of matters that are 
material to the business of the bank or controlling company or the interests 
of the shareholders of or other persons having an interest in the bank;  that 
the board of directors retains control over the strategic and business 
direction of the bank, while enabling its executives to manage the bank’s 
operations effectively in achieving the agreed strategic and business 
objectives; and compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
Unfortunately, the banking environment is also not without corporate 
failures, despite these measures. If one considers the high level of 
corporate governance practices that the financial sector is expected to 
comply with, it concerns that there are still failures in this environment. A 
recent example is the failure of VBS bank where various allegations of 
mismanagement, fraud and corruption have been made. 209 The high 
standard of corporate governance required of banks is justified by their role 
in the economy. It does, however, confirm the point that overall better 
governance and accountability must be practised by financial institutions. 
In the event of a breach of their duties toward the bank, appropriate action 
must be instituted against the individuals concerned, and they must be held 
accountable for their actions. 
 
Corporate governance should involve a strong leadership structure, which 
finds its foundation in integrity, competence, responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency.210 This structure should then set the direction for 
good governance practices at a public higher education institution. The 
higher education environment, like the banking environment, is unique. 
Although the banking environment stil l has failures as indicated above, the 
failures have been far less than those occurring in companies. The Banks 
Act of 1990 also goes further than the Companies Act of 2008 and includes 
 
209 Omarjee L  “VBS Mutual  Bank “Several ly  Mismanaged”  –  SARB Affidavit”  Mail  & 
Guardian  (da te  publ ished:  11 Apri l  2018) ;  Thomspon W “VBS Executive s may have  
Sto len 75% of  i t s  Assets”  2018-07-10 Business Day .  
 
210 King IV  pr inc iple  1 ,  see  in  general  Wix ley T,  Everingham G and Louw K Corpora te 




a compliance function in section 60A and the provisions relating to 
corporate governance. The author suggests that the Higher Education Act 
of 1997 should similarly be amended to include statutory provisions to 
provide for accountability for breaches of fiduciary duties and the duty of 
care and skill as well as to provide for clear compliance functions and 
corporate governance. However, it is important, that if these 
recommendations (as indicated in Chapter 6 below) are indeed included in 
the Higher Education Act of 1997, institutions must then use them to 
ensure accountability and proper corporate governance practices. 
 




There is no universal definition of corporate governance. 211 The South 
African corporate governance regime has its origin in English law. The 
company law regime of South Africa played a significant role in the 
development of principles of corporate governance.212 According to the 
Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance  in the United Kingdom, 
corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.213 Corporate governance relates to the structures and processes 
associated with the management, decision-making and control in an 
organisation.214  Cassim et al. suggest that good corporate governance is all 
 
211 See the discussion in  Chapter  1 ,  para 1 .1 .1  above.  See also Botha 2009 (30)  Obiter  
703;  Esser  IM and Havenga M K “Shareholder  Par t ic ipa tion  in  Corporate  Governance” 
2008 (1)  Speculum Juris  74.   
 
212 Corporate governance addresses the ent ire  span  of  responsib il i t ies owed by directors  
of  the company to  var ious stakeholde rs l ike the shareholders,  c l ients etc .  Botha 2009  
(30)  Obi ter  704.  
 
213 The Cadbury  Report ,  para 2 .5 .  For  more on this  report ,  see  
ht tps: / /www.icaew.com/en/l ibrary /subject -gateways/corpora te -governance/codes -and-
reports/cadbury-report  (Date of  use :  30  August  2018) .  See  Du Pless is  JJ “Corporate  
Governance and  the  Cadbury Report”  1994(1)  SA Merc Law  81 –  90.  
 
214 See Aka PC “Co rporate  Governance  in  South  Afr ica:  Analyz ing the  Dynamics of  
Corpora te Governance Reforms in  the Rainbow Nat ion” 2007 North  Carol ina Journal  
of  Interna tional Law and Commercia l  Regulation 238 .  On corporate governance 
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about effective and responsible leadership and describe responsible 
leadership as “having ethical values of responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency”.  Furthermore, Du Plessis defines corporate 
governance as: 
….the system of regulating and overseeing corporate 
conduct and of balancing the interests of all internal 
stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by 
the corporation’s conduct, in order to ensure responsible 
behaviour by corporations and to create long term 
sustainable growth for the corporation. 215 
 
The most important elements of this definition according to Du Plessis are 
that corporate governance is the system of regulating and overseeing 
corporate conduct; takes into consideration the interest of internal 
stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the corporation’s 
conduct; aims at ensuring responsible behaviour by corporations; and aims 
at creating long-term, sustainable growth for the corporation. 216 The 
definition of corporate governance differs from code to code. 217 King IV218 
states that “….corporate governance, for the purposes of King IV, is about 
the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the governing body 
towards the achievement of the following governance outcomes: ethical 
culture, good performance, effective control and legitimacy”. 219  
 
To date, there have been four iterations of the King Code on Corporate 
Governance. The King Code on Corporate Governance (King I) was 
published in 1994. This code aimed to create the highest standard of 
corporate governance in South Africa and resulted in the Code of 
 
genera lly ,  see  a lso  Botha 2009(30)  Obi ter  704;  Du Plessi s  (ed)  Princ iples o f  
Contemporary Corporate Governan ce  4  –  13;  Fombrun CJ “Corpora te Governance” 
2006 (8)  Corporate Reputation  Review  267  –  269.  
 
215Du Plessis  (ed)  Princip les o f  Contemporary Corporate Governance  13.  
 
216Du Plessis  (ed)  Princip les o f  Contempo rary Corporate Governance  13.  
 
217Esser  et  a l .  Corporate  Governance Annual Review 2012  1 .  
 
218 King IV i s  discussed in  more de tai l  in  para  4 .4 .3  below.  
 




Corporate Practices and Conduct, which was a recommended set of 
principles for good governance practices.220 King I was revised and 
replaced by the second King Report on Corporate Governance (King II)  in 
2002. The third iteration of the King Report on Corporate Governance (King 
III) followed in 2009221 while the current King Report on Corporate 
Governance (King IV) came into effect on 1 April 2017. The King Reports 
have no statutory effect but offer guidelines for good corporate 
governance. Internationally, corporate governance is implemented either 
on a statutory basis or as a result of a code of principles or by a 
combination of the two. In South Africa, corporate governance is regulated 
primarily by a code of principles on the one hand, and through 
incorporating some of the King principles into statutes and stock exchange 
listing requirements on the other.222  According to Brink: 
…it can be convincingly argued that self-regulation, in 
which an organisation voluntarily monitors its own 
adherence to legal and ethical standards, is far preferable 
to having an outside agency such as government monitor 
and enforce those standards. This approach allows 
organisations to maintain control over the standards to 
which they are held by successful self-policing themselves. 
Apart from the bureaucratic burden that would be imposed 
by external enforcement, the cost of setting up such a 
mechanism is also avoided. 223   
 
 
220 See foreword of  King I .  King I  a l so included a Code of  Eth ics for  en te rpr ises and a l l  
who deal  wi th  enterpr ises,  see King I  58 –  65.  The inten t ion of  the code was to  ra ise 
ethical  awareness.  See in  general ,  Esser  and Delport  2011 (74)  THRHR  449 –  450;  Du 
Pless is  JJ and Low CK (eds)  Corporate Governance Codes for the 21 s t  Cen tury  
(Springer  In te rna tional  Publ ish ing Switzer land 2017)  245.   
 
221 See para  4 .4 .2  for  a  br ief  history  of  the f ir s t  th ree King Reports on Corporate 
Governance .  The focus of  this study  i s  on King IV ,  d iscussed in  para 4 .4 .3  below.  
 
222 Compliance with  the King Reports on Corpora te Governance  i s  mandatory for  any  
company wishing  to  l i st  on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange ( JSE).  For  the JSE l i st ing  
requirements,  
h t tps: / /www.jse.co.za/content / JSERulesPol iciesandRegula t ionI tems/JSE%20Lis t ings%2
0Requirements.pdf  (Date of  use:  28 October  2018) .   
 




The King Reports point out that there is a link between governance and 
compliance with law as governance in isolation would be impossible.224 
Good governance is not something that exists separately from the law, and 
it is entirely inappropriate to divorce governance from law. Corporate 
governance chiefly involves the establishment of structures and processes 
with appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge 
their legal responsibilities and oversee compliance with the law. King IV 
states that those charged with governance should ensure that compliance 
is understood, not only for the obligations that i t creates but also for the 
rights and protections that it affords. A holistic view is needed of how 
applicable laws, non-binding rules, codes and standards related to one 
another. This includes how corporate governance principles relate to 
relevant legislation.225 
 
Over the years, South Africa has experienced several corporate failures 
which were mainly caused by ineffective corporate governance. Some of 
these corporate failures occurred before the publication of King I226 while 
others occurred after its publication.227 Both the LeisureNet and Fidentia 
corporate collapses were indicative of the fact that corporate governance in 
South Africa still needed improvement.228 The recent Steinhoff International 
 
224 King I  do not  make th is l ink.  However ,  in  King II  9 ,  var ious important  legislat ion  
that  was enac ted  af ter  King  I  is  d iscussed.  King III  7 -  8  conf irms the l ink be tween  
good governance and compliance.  King IV  30.  
 
225 King IV 13.   
 
226 One of  these  corpora te fai lures was  Masterbond  (19 91) .  
 
227 A few of  these corporate fa i lures were Regal  Treasury Pr ivate Bank  Ltd (2001) ,  
Macmed Health  Care Ltd (1999) ,  LeisureNet (2000) ,  Saambou Bank (2002)  and  
Fidentia  (2007) ,  Naspers (2017) ,  KPMG (2018) .  See in  genera l ,  Otty  R “King III  and 
the Companies  Act :  Director’ s  and  Off icer’ s  Liab il i ty”  2009 (8)  Enterprise  Risk  8 ;  
Rossouw J “Ste inhoff  Scandal  Poin ts to  Major  Gaps in  Stopping Uneth ica l  Corporate  
Behaviour”  2017-12-17  The Conversa tion ;  Donnelly  L  “KPMG Woes Deepens af ter  
VBS Bank  scandal”2018-04-15 Mail  & Guardian ) ;   Macharia  J  “KPMG welcomes 
Review and Owns up to  Fai l in gs”  2018-05-07  Sunday  Times ;  Cotter i l l  J  “McKinsey,  
KPMG Accused  of  Cr iminal  Breaches  over  South Afr ica  Gupta  Scandal”  2018-01-17 
Financial  Times .  
 
228 See in  genera l ,  Mlambo C The In fluence  of  Corporate  Failures and  Fore ign Law on  
South African Corpora te Go vernance  (Publ ished LLM thesis  Univers i ty  of  Pretor ia  
2016)  41;  Van der  Wal t  AWAJ et  a l .  “An Analysis of  the Prominence of  Corpora te 
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N.V.229 corporate governance collapse is one of the biggest corporate 
failures to date in South Africa and has been compared to the Enron failure 
in the USA.230  
 
The Steinhoff scandal reiterates the need for the accountability of directors 
and auditors as well as the improvement of corporate governance and the 
audit function in South Africa. Despite what is internationally regarded as a 
high-quality governance code, the large number of corporate scandals, , is 
concerning and begs the question whether or not South Africa should still 
 
Governance in  South Afr ican Media for  the Period 1 990 –  2012” 2015 (59 )  The Journal  
of  Corpora te Cit i zensh ip 177.  
 
229 Registered in  the Nether lands,  S teinhof f  i s  a  l imi ted l iab il i ty  company in  terms of  
the Nether lands Civ il  Code.  Accord ingly ,  the  company has a  two - t ier  board.  This  
means that  one  board  i s  t he  superv is ing board  and the o ther  i s  the  managing board.  I t  
seems tha t  S te inhoff  was the only company in  South Afr ica that  had this un ique board 
structure.  See Styan JB Steinhoff  en die Ste l lenbosse Boys  (Lapa Uitgewers South 
Afr ica 2018)  for  an invest iga tive  perspec tive on the Ste inhoff  scandal .  
 
230 Steinhoff  i s  l i sted on  the JSE and therefore  had to  comply with  the JSE l is t ing  
requirements.  I t  i s  a l so  regis tered  as an  ex ternal  company in  terms of  s  23 of  the  
Companies Act of  2008.  Therefore ,  unless a  sec t ion of  the Companies  Act specif ica l ly  
states that  i t  i s  app licable to  ex t erna l  companies,  i t  wil l  not  be.  The company would 
therefore be sub jec t  to  Book 2 of  the Dutch Civil  Code .  This accounting scandal  has  
raised  major  concerns  with  regards  to  corporate  governance  in  South Afr ica and  
internat ionally .  The company was  accused o f  overs tat ing i t s  earn ings ,  amongst  other  
account ing ir regular i t ies.  German prosecu tors confirmed tha t  they were invest iga ting  
Markus Jooste (CEO) and other  sen ior  off icials  for  accou nting fraud.  Many qu est ions  
were  ra ised as  to  how the JSE,  investors ,  ass et  managers,  fund managers and  even  
direc tors could have missed the impending co llapse when there were so many warn ing  
signs.  Another  importan t  quest ion i s  why ne ither  the audi t  commi ttee nor  the externa l  
auditors  picked  up any  dubious  account ing pract ices ?  I t  became apparent  that  the 
chairperson  of  the audit  committee of  Ste inhoff  was also par t  o f  i t s  execu tive 
management.  King  IV clear ly  s ta tes that  th is  should no t  be  the case  as i t  i s  a  
requirement tha t  the chairperson of  an aud it  commit tee  be independen t.  Delo it te  was  
Ste inhoff’ s audi tors for  more than  20 years and  provided  Ste inhoff  wi th  a  “clean”  and  
unqualif ied aud it  for  the 2015/2016 f inancia l  year .  However ,  Deloi t te ,  decl ined t o  sign  
off  the 2017 f inancia l  statements af te r  the  scandal  broke .  See in  general ,  Rossouw J  
“Steinhoff  Scandal  Po in ts to  Major  Gaps in  stopping Unethical  Corporate Behaviour” 
The Conversat ion  (date  published:  17  December 2017)  
https: / / theconversat ion.com/steinhoff - scandal-points- to-major -gaps- in-s topping-
unethical -corpora te-behaviour -88905.  See  Chapter  5 ,  para  5 .2 .4  below for  a  discussion  
of  Enron.  See Rossouw J “Steinhoff ’s Board Behaved Badly.  Why i t  needs to  be held  
Accountable.”  2018-04-08 The Conversa tion https: / / theconversat ion.com /steinhoffs-
board-behaved -badly-why-i t-needs- to-be-held - to -account-94129; accord ing to  Styan,  
Ste inhoff  declared in  i t s  2015 prospec tus tha t  their  col lec t ive tax rate  for  2012 was 
only 11%, in  2013 i t  was 12,3% and 2014 i t  was  15,7%.  T his i s  in  sharp  cont ras t  to  the  
South  Afr ican corporate tax rate  of  28%. Reuters “German Prosecu tors  invest igate 




follow the “soft approach” in the form of voluntary corporate governance 
codes or should rather have legally enforceable statutory regulation.  
 
4.4.2 Overview of the South African King Reports on Corporate 
Governance 
 
As mentioned above, King I231 was published in 1994 by the Institute of 
Directors (IoDSA) as a result of the increase of failing entities 
internationally232 and locally,233 increased corruption and the dire need of 
regulation of corporate governance. King I was the first corporate 
governance code published in South Africa. Compliance with the Code was 
voluntary, and there were no severe consequences for non-compliance. 
King I was revised and replaced in 2002 with King II.234 Neither King I nor 
 
231 Compl iance with  King I  was volun tary and i t s  pr incip les app lied to  l i s ted companies 
on the  Johannesburg  Stock Exchan ge  ( JSE),  large public  ent i t ies as  def ined  in  the  
Publ ic  Ent i t ies Act  93 of  1992,  banks,  f inancial  and insurance  ent i t ies as def ined  in  the 
Financial  Services Act as wel l  as large unl i sted public  companies,  see  King I  5 .  The 
King Commi ttee was headed by fo rmer  High Court  judge,  Mervyn  King S.C.  King I  was  
draf ted  to  ass ist  companies and  the ir  d irectors  by provid ing a set  of  pr inc iples  and  
guidel ines to  cla r ify  the ex is t ing common law pr inc iples regarding corporate 
governance .  See in  gen eral ,  Mlambo The In fluence of  Corpora te Failures and  Foreign  
Law on South African Corpora te  Governance  42 –  44;  Van der  Walt  et  a l .  2015  The 
Journal of  Corporate Cit i zensh ip 177;  West  A “Theor izing  South Afr ica’s Corporate 
Governance” 2006 Journal of  Business  Eth ics  455;  Carc iumaru LM An Assessment o f  
the Impact o f  Corporate  Gov ernance Codes and Legis lat ion on Direc tor’s and Off icer’s  
Liabil i ty  Insurance in  South Afr ica  (Publ ished Master  o f  Commerce thes is  Universi ty  
of  the Witwatersrand 2009)  115 –  117.  
 
232 Austra l ia  and the Un i ted States of  Amer ica experienced major  corporate co llapses 
through mismanagement  during the 1980s,  for  example  the  Bond Corporation  Group  of  
Companies and  Enron.  For  these and other  examples ,  see Cass idy  J “Models  for  
Reform:  The  Director’ s  Duty of  Care in  a  Modern Commercial  Wor ld” 2009  (20)  
Stel lenbosch  Law Review  373.   
 
233These corporate  fa i lures  are br ief ly  mentioned above in  para 3 .3 .2 (b) .  
 
234 King  II  was appl icab le to  JSE -l is ted  companies,  banks ,  f inancia l  inst i tu t ions  and 
public  sec tor  enterpr ises.  I t  d id ,  however ,  state  that  other  ent i t ies  should “g iv e  due  
considera t ion  to  comply ing wi th  King II ,”  see  King  II  21.  See  in  general  Rossouw GJ 
“The Philosophica l  Premises of  the Second King Report  on Corpora te Governance” 
2005 (70)  Koers  745 –  748;  Rossouw GJ “Business Ethics  and  Corpora te  Governance in  
the Second King Repor t :  Farsigh ted or  fut i le?” 2002 (67)  Koers  405  –  419;  Bekink 
2008 (20)  SA Merc  LJ  107 –  110 ;  Mlambo The Inf luence of  Corpora te Failures  and 
Fore ign Law on South Afr ic an Corporate  Governan ce 44; Carc iumaru An Assessment o f  
the Impact o f  Corporate  Governance Codes and Legis lat ion on Direc tor’s and Off icers’  




King II dealt with the codification of directors’ duties in any detail. 235 Non-
compliance with the recommendations of King II could result in secondary 
liability, such as sanctions by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in 
respect of aspects that had been included in the JSE Listings 
Requirements,236 but not necessarily in direct liability. 237  
 
King III followed in 2009 and was aligned with the Companies Act 71 of 
2008.  238 This version of the Code was prompted not only by the significant 
changes in South African company law introduced by the Companies Act of 
2008 but also by changes in international governance trends.239 The 
Companies Act of 2008 had incorporated into statute several crucial 
corporate governance matters. The 2008 Act specifically encourages  
transparency and high standards of corporate governance 240 while its 
 
235Esser  Recognit ion of  Various S takeholder In terests in  Company Mana gement 295 –  
296.  For  more on the h istory of  the King Repor ts,  see in  gene ra l ,  Direc tor’s S tandard  
of  Care ,  Ski l l  and Di l igence and the Business Judgment Rule in  v iew of  South Africa’s  
Companies Act  71  of  2008:  Future Impl ica tions for Corporate Governance  30 –  36.  
 
236 Kemp-Mans  N, Erasmus P and  Viviers  S  “Advances in  the  Corpora t e Governance  
Prac tices of  Johannesburg Stock Exchange  Companies”  2016 (20)  Southern Afr ican 
Business  Review  71  –  89;  Du Plessis  e t  a l .  Princip les o f  Contemporary Corporate  
Governance  393.  The JSE is  a  se lf - regulat ing organisat ion,  and i t s  powers are der ive d  
from the  Financia l  Markets Act 19  of  2012.  However ,  the powers of  the  JSE are l imited 
to  matters included in  the  l i st ing requirements.  See JSE “Unders tanding  JSE 
Investiga tions  and  Imposi t ion  of  Censur es”  
https: / /www.jse.co.za/content / JSEEducationI tems/CensuresBrochure.pdf  (Date of  use :  
15 February 2018)  for  the JSE l i s t ing requirements,  p  see  
ht tps: / /www.jse.co.za/content / JSEEducationI tems/Serv ice%20Issue%2017.pdf  (Date of  
use :  13 September  2016) .  
 
237 Esser  and Delpor t  2011(74)  THRHR  449.  
 
238 For  a  compar ison be tw een King III  and King II ,  see Muwandi T Comparison of  King  
III  and King  II  and  the  implicat ions  of  King II I  (Published  MBA thes is  Univers i ty  of  
Ste l lenbosch 2010)  1  –  107.  See  also Mall in  CA (ed)  Handbook on Interna tional  
Corpora te  Governance:  Country Anal yses  (Edward Elgar  Publishing  Limited  2006)  396 
–  399;  Du Plessis  e t  al .  Princip les o f  Contemporary Corporate Governance 394 –  396.   
 
239King III  5 ;  Wiese Corporate Governance in  South Afr ica:  Wi th Internat ional  
Comparisons  19 ;  Cassim et  a l .  Contemporary Com pany Law  474.  
 




predecessor, the Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not expressly deal with 
corporate governance issues in detail. 241 
 
King III applied to all entities,242 regardless of the manner and form of 
incorporation or establishment, whether in the private, public or non-profit 
sectors, thereby also making it applicable to higher education institutions. 243 
King IV provides some sector-specific supplements.  It is recommended 
that a sector supplement be developed for the higher education sector. 244 
As indicated above, the various independent assessor reports of the 
troubled higher education institutions indicate that there has been a lack of 
proper governance.245  
 
King III moved away from the “comply and explain” method used in King II 
and introduced the “apply or explain” 246 method in its place.247 
 
241 See in  gener al ,  Cassim e t  al .  Contemporary Company Law  474.  Muwandi  
Comparison o f  King III  and King II ,  and the impl icat ions of  King III  1; King M “The 
Synerg ies and  Interac tion between  King  III  and the  Companies Ac t  61 of  2008”  2010 
Acta Juridica  446.  
 
242 King III17.  
 
243The main aspects of  King III  were effect ive leadership,  sus ta inab il i ty  and corporate 
ci t izensh ip.  King III  deal t  wi th  var ious  matters  includ ing sustainab il i ty ,  inclusive  
stakeholder  approach,  integra t ed repor t ing ,  al ternat ive dispu te reso lut ion,  r i sk -based  
internal  aud it ,  shareholders and remunera tion as wel l  as the evaluat ion of  board and 
direc tor  performance.  King III  a l so in troduced informat ion technology governance and 
business  rescue proceed ings .  See King III11,  16;  Chapter  5  and 104 –  105;  King III  
consis ted of  two documents,  one be ing the code of  governance ( the Code)  which 
conta ins the pr inc iples of  King I II ,  and the report ,  which prov ides recommendat ions on  
bes t  prac tice ;  Muwandi  Comparison of  King II I  and King II ,  and the implica tions o f  
King  II I  1.  
 
244 King IV i s  discussed in  deta i l  sect ion 4.4 .3  below.  
 
245 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2(b)  for  a  d iscuss ion of  higher  education inst i tu t ions placed  
under  administrat ion.  
 
246 The “app ly or  exp la in”  method  is  a  ref inement  of  the  “comply or  exp lain”  method .  
See  Esser  and Delpor t  2011 THRHR  450.  The “comply or  explain”  method used  in  King  
II  was  app lied  mainly  by l is ted  companies  in  compliance  with  the  l i st ing requi rements.  
This resu lted  in  companies report in g on  cer ta in  pr incip les,  e i ther  wi th  which  they 
agreed  with  or  could  af ford,  but  no t  wi th  al l  the  pr incip les.  These  companies  then  have 
to  explain  why they d id not  comply with  cer ta in  pr incip les.   
 
247 This i s  discussed in  de tai l  in  para  4 .4 .3  below. See in  genera l  Du Plessis  and Low 
(eds)  Corporate Governance  Codes for the 21 s t  Century 252 –  254 .  
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4.4.3 King IV 
 
Various developments in corporate governance since the implementation of 
King III necessitated its revision. Fundamental changes had occurred in 
both business and society, which influenced King IV. Numerous requests 
were also received by the King Commission to draft King IV in such a way 
that it would be more applicable to all organisations and not only 
companies.248 The previous King Reports all had their foundation in ethical 
and effective leadership, and King IV confirms this. King IV has several 
objectives.249  Although it refines several of the concepts used in King III, it 
does not depart significantly from the philosophical underpinnings of King 
III.250 However, the emphasis in King III was on input, whereas King IV is on 
output. Output refers to the products, services, by-products and waste that 
are produced by an organisation.251 The legal status of King IV, as with its 
predecessors, is that of a set of voluntary principles and leading 
practices.252  However, according to Delport, non-compliance with the King 
Code might have an impact on the liability of directors.253 King IV confirms 
 
 
248 King IV  3 ;  6 .  
 
249 King IV  22.  They  inc lude:   promot ing good  corpora te  governance  as  in tegra l  to  
running a business or  enterpr ise and del iver i ng benefi t s  such as an  ethical  cul ture ;  
enhancing  per formance and va lue -crea tion  by the organ isat ion;  enabl ing the  govern ing 
body to  exerc ise adequate and effec tive  con trol  and bui lding  and pro tec t ing trus t  in  the  
organisat ion,  and i ts  reputa t ion and leg it imacy; broaden the  ac cep tance  of  good  
corporate governance by making i t  ac cess ible  and f i t  for  app licat ion by organisa t ions  
of  a  var ie ty  of  s izes,  resources  and complex ity  of  s tra teg ic ob jec tives  and opera t ions;  
reinforce good  corporate governance  as a  ho l i s t ic  an  in ter -rela ted  set  of  arrangements 
to  be  unders tood and implemente d  in  an  in tegra ted manner;  and  presen t  good corpora te  
governance  as concerned with  no t  on ly struc ture and  process,  bu t  also an eth ica l  
consc iousness and behavior  
 
250 King IV 6.  These ph ilosophica l  underp i nnings a re eth ical  and effect ive leadership.   
 
251 King IV 15.  
 
252 Van Tonder  Obiter 2018 307.  
 
253 See in  genera l ,  Delport  The New Companies Act  Manual  93;  Van Tonder  Obiter  2018 
307.   In  Brehm v Eisner  746 A.2d 244 (Del 2000)  256 (United  Sta tes)  sta tes the 
fo l lowing: “(a)  aspirat ional  idea ls  of  good corporate g overnance pract ices of  d irec tors 
that  go  beyond the minimal lega l  requ irements of  the corpora tion law are high ly 
des irable,  of ten tend to  benefi t  s tockholders,  sometimes reduce l i t ig a t ion and can 
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that the governing body is the focal point of corporate governance in an 
organisation and therefore, the primary audience of King IV.254 Specific 
features that distinguish it from its predecessors are the outcomes-based 
approach; clear differentiation between principles and practices; its design 
and drafting to enhance user accessibility: and the reinforcement of 
governance as a holistic and integrated set of arrangements. Broader 
terms are used in King IV, namely “organisations”, “governing body”, and 
“those charged with governance duties” rather than more specific company 
law terminology, confirming its general application. 255 The broader reach of 
the report is demonstrated by the inclusion of the sectorial supplements in 
King IV that assist organisations across a variety of sectors and 
organisational types to interpret and implement its provisions. It provides 
guidance on how to apply the recommended practices proportionally in line 
with the organisation’s size and resources and the extent and complexity of 
its activities. In order to balance its less prescriptive approach, there is a 
greater emphasis on transparency concerning how judgment is exercised 
when considering the practice recommendations contained in King IV.256 
 
An “apply and explain” approach is advocated to reinforce this qualitative 
interpretation of the principles and practices of King IV, in contrast to the 
“apply or explain” approach of King III. The “apply and explain” applicat ion 
regime refers to applying the principles and explaining how they are being 
affected.257 All principles are phrased as aspirations and ideals that 
 
usually  help d irec tors avoid l iabi l i ty .   But they are not  re qui red by the corporation  law 
and do not  def ine standards of  l iabi l i ty .”  
 
254 King IV  35.  
 
255 King IV  6 .  
 
256 King IV  27; Accounting  Weekly “King IV :  Fr iend or  Foe  to  the Non -Profi t  Secto r  in  
South Afr ica” Ap r i l  2017 https: / /accountingweekly.com/KING -IV-FRIEND-FOE-NON-
PROFIT-SECTOR-SOUTH-AFRICA/ (Date of  use :  1  November  2018.  
 
257 King IV 27; 37.  These aspirat ions and  idea ls are basic  to  good governance  and 
applicat ion of  p r inc iples i s  therefore assumed.  The exp lanation  tha t  i s  requ ired i s  a  
high-level  d isclosure o f  the practices that  have been implemented and the progress  
made on  the journey  towar ds g iving  effect  to  e ach pr inc iple .  Maharaj  A & Combrink  J 
“King  IV –  The  why,  the what  and the  what  now? Mazars  
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organisations should strive towards on their journey to achieve good 
governance outcomes.258 King IV, as does King III, confirms that there is an 
argument against the mandatory “comply or else” framework and that a 
“one size fits all” approach is not suitable, as the types of business and 
enterprises carried out by organisations, and the sizes of the enterprises 
themselves, are so varied. There is also a danger that the governing body 
may become focused on compliance instead of applying its mind to the 
best governance practice for the particular issue before it. 259   
 
King IV follows the same tradition as the previous King Reports in 
preferring a stakeholder-inclusive model260 that requires the governing body 
 
https: / /www.mazars.co .za/Home/News/Art icle s /KING-IV-THE-WHY-THE-WHAT-
AND-THE-WHAT-NOW (Date  of  use :  1  November 2018);  Wiese Corporate Governance 
in  South Africa wi th  Interna tional Comparisons  22.  
 
258 In  fol lowing the “apply or  expla in” method,  the board of  direc tors ,  in  i t s  co llect ive  
decision making,  cou ld  conclude t hat  to  fo l low a recommendat ion would not ,  in  the  
par t icular  c ircumstances,  be  in  the bes t  in te res t  of  the company.  The board cou ld  
decide  to  app ly the recommendation  differen t ly  or  apply  ano ther  pract ice  and  s t i l l  
achieve the object ive  o f  the overarching corporate governance pr inc ip les of  fai rness ,  
accountab i l i ty ,  responsibil i ty  and transparency .  Explain ing how the pr incip les and 
recommendat ions  were  applied,  or  i f  not  app lied  the  reasons,  resu lt s  in  compliance.  See  
in  general ,  Walker  D  and Meir ing I  “King Code and developments in  corpora te 
governance” 2010 Without Pre judice  36 –  38;  Du Pless is  and Low (eds)  Corporate  
Governance Codes for  the 21 s t  Century:  In ternat ional Perspect ives and Crit ical  
Analyses  252  –  254 ;  The focus then sh if ted  f rom compliance wi th  the King code of  
pract ice  for  large JSE l i sted compa nies  to  a lso  include  compliance by  small  companies  
and other  en terpr ises  l ike higher  educat ion ins t i tu t ions.  See King III  7 ;  Du  Plessis  e t  
al .  Princip les of  Contemporary Corporate Go vernance 397.  
 
259 King IV 7; 37.  Prac tices are meant to  be proport iona lly  a ppl ied tak ing the fo l lowing  
into  account  in  re la t ion  to  the  organ isat ion:  size  of  turnover  and  workforce;  resources;  
and complex ity  of  strategic ob jec tives  and  opera t ions.  The smalle r  and less complex an  
organisat ion,  the more  i t  should consider  recommende d prac tices  proport iona lly  
accord ing to  the  sca le o f  i t s  opera t ions.   Organisa t ions that  are  by na ture and in  terms 
of  object ives of  publ ic  interes t ,  should asp ire  to  a  h igher  level  of  appl ica t ion  of  goo d  
governance  pract ices as  recommended  in  King IV .  App lica t ion  on a  proport iona l  bas is 
is  sub jec t  to  legis lat ive  requirements .  See in  genera l  Wix ley,  Ever ingham and Louw 
Corpora te Governance  16.  
 
260 In  the stakeholder - inclusive model ,  th e bes t  in teres ts  o f  t he  company are no t  
necessar i ly  equated to  the inte res ts  of  shareholders,  and shareholders do no t  have  
predetermined precedence over  other  s takeholders.  The interests  of  shareholders or  any  
other  stakeholder  grouping may be afforded pre cedence,  based on wha t i s  bel ieved to  
serve the interests  of  the organ isat ion at  a  point  in  t ime and depending on the  
circumstances .  See  in  genera l ,  Esser  IM “ A Global  Perspect ive on  Afr ican  Corporate  
Governance:  The Pro tec tion of  Stakeholders’  In terests” 2007 South African Yearbook o f  
Internat ional  Law   406  –  429;  Esser  IM and  Delport  P “The  Pro tec tion  of  Stakeholders :  
The South  Afr ican  Social  and Eth ics Committee  and  the  Uni ted  Kingdom’s  Enl ightened 
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to consider, weigh and balance the legitimate needs, interests and 
expectations of all material stakeholders in making decisions in the best 
interests of the organisation.261 King IV contains 17 principles instead of the 
75 principles of King III, making it a more practical and concise 
document.262 The reason for this much shorter document can be explained 
in part by the fact that many of the King III principles are now contained in 
the legislation. There is no need to duplicate them in King IV, as corporate 
governance and legislation are integrated, and do not operate in isolation. 263 
However, certain principles contained in King III are not included in King 
IV, nor are they dealt with in legislation.264  
 
The main difference between the application regime of King III and King IV 
is that the application or adoption of the principles is assumed in King IV.265  
The main objective of King IV is to broaden acceptance of corporate 
governance by making it accessible and fit for application across sectors, 
organisations and entities of varying sizes, resources and complexity of 
strategic objectives and operations.266 King IV also supports integrated 
reporting instead of silo reporting. 267 Integrated reporting promotes a more 
cohesive and efficient approach to corporate reporting. 268 According to King: 
 
Shareholder  Value  Approach:  Par t  1”  2017 (50)  De Jure  104 –  110;  Esser  IM and  
Delpor t  P  “Shareholder  Pro tec tion  Phi losophy  in  term s  of  the  Companies Act 71  of  
2008” 2016 THRHR  4  –  18;  Du Plessis  JJ  “Corpora te Socia l  Responsib il i ty  and 
“Contemporary Community  Expecta t ions”  2017 (35)  Company & Securit ies  Law 
Journal  30 –  46.   
 
261 King IV 25.   
 
262 King IV 7.  
 
263For example,  business rescue  i s  now prov ided for  in  the Companies Act  of  2008.  
 
264 For  ins tance,  pr inc iple  2 .20 of  King III  s ta tes that  the induct ion and ongoing train ing  
and development of  directors should be  c onducted  through form al processes.  In  the  
author’s view,  th is  important  pr ovision  should have been  re tained in  King IV .  
 
265King  IV 27.  
 
266 King IV 22.  
 
267 Accord ing to  King IV ,  the tradi t ional  f inancia l  report ing sys tem was a  good 
development at  the  t ime.  How ever ,  since then i t  h as had to  respond to  market  
regula tors,  standard boar ds and complex leg islat ion.  The  view is  now that  whi le  
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…an integrated report provides insight into the 
organisation’s strategic objectives and how those 
objectives relate to its ability to create and sustain value 
over time and with the resources and relationships on 
which the organisation depends……an integrated report 
also includes the board’s expectation about the future, as 
well as other information to assist readers of the report to 
understand and make informed assessments about the 
company’s prospects and whether it will sustain value 
creation.269  
 
The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) 270 published its 
International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) in 2013. 271 King IV was 
endorsed by the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) of South Africa. 272 In 
terms of King IV, an organisation’s integrated report is one of many reports 
that an organisation may issue to indicate its compliance with legal 
requirements. The integrated report issued by the organisation must enable 




audited f inancia l  s ta tements are crucia l ,  they are insuff ic ien t  to  discharge the duty of  
accountabi l i ty .  See  King  IV  5 .  
 
268 Internat ional  In tegra ted Report ing Counci l  ( I IRC)  In ternat ional In tegrated 
Reporting Framework  4 .  This f ramework serves as a  gu idance to  organ isa t ions on how 
to prepare their  in tegra ted report .   
 
269 Esser  and Havenga (eds)  Corporate  Governance Annual Review 201 2  13.  See in  
genera l  on  integra ted  report ing,  Cassim et  al .  Contemporary  Company Law  503  –  504 ;  
Hendrikse and Hefer -Hendrikse Corporate Governance Handbook:   Princip les and  
Practice  451  –  464;  Naidoo Corporate Governance:  An Essen tia l  Guide for South 
Afr ican Companies  275  –  285;  Wiese Corporate Governance in  South Africa with  
Internat ional Comparisons  171 –  175:  Du Pless is  and Low (eds)  Corporate Governance  
Codes for  the  21 s t  Century  256.   
 
270 See ht tp: / / in tegra tedreport i ng.org /the- i irc-2 /  for  more on the IIRC (Date of  use :  22  
March 2018) ;  Wiese Corpora te Governance  in  South Africa  with  Internat ional  
Comparisons 173  -  174.  
 
271 For  more on this f ramework,  see ht tp : / / in tegra tedreport ing.org /wp -
conten t/up loads/2015/03 /13 -12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf  
(Date of  use :  22 March 2018) .  
 
272 King IV 28; ht tp: / / in tegratedreport ingsa.org /  (Date of  use:  22 March  2018) .  See IRC 
“Disc losure of  Governance Informat ion in  the Integrated Report :   An Information 
Paper” 2017.   
 




As was mentioned above, King IV274 includes sectoral supplements275 that 
provide specific guidance to specific categories of organisations and 
sectors, in addition to the traditional audience of listed, public and large 
private companies. The current supplements cater for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs),276 non-profit organisations,277 state-owned entities,278 
municipalities279 and retirement funds.280 These sectoral supplements should 
not be used on their own but should be read in conjunction with the rest of 
King IV.281  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations applicable to public higher education 
institutions support good governance practices. These regulations are 
outdated as they are based on King III, but it is envisaged that this will be 
addressed by the DHET in the near future.    
 
 
274 King IV  is  the f ir st  of  the South Afr ican corporat e governance codes to  use sectoral  
supplements .  
 
275 King IV 75 -  117.  The  sec tor  supplements provide the appl icab le terminology and  
address  the governance chal lenges  and considerat ions  of  that  sec tor .  In  respec t  of  a l l  
categories o f  organ isat ions and  sec tor s,  the essence of  the  King  IV Code ,  namely the  
governance  outcomes and pr i nc iples ,  hold  true.  The  pr incip les and  outcomes are 
therefore carr ied forward to  each of  the supplements with  the necessary changes in  
terminology.  I t  i s  on ly at  the leve l  of  practic e tha t  the d iffe ren t  categor ies  of  
organisat ions are d is t inguished.  Small  and medium sized companies  a lso genera l ly  s t i l l  
share the view tha t  corporate  governance i s  not  applicable to  them. Despite  King III’ s  
holist ic  p r inc iple -based approach,  some non -profi t  organ isat ions deemed i t  
unachievable due to  a  lack of  resources to  mee t  requirements tha t  are in  fac t  in tended  
for  a  large and compl icated structures .  King IV  aims to  change tha t  by  includ ing the  
sec tora l  sec tors to  ass ist  specif ic  sectors in  ach ieving  good governance.   
 
276 King IV 103 –  110.  A Small  Medium Enterpr ise  (SME) i s  formal ly  recognised in  the  
Nat ional  Smal l  Business  Act 102 of  1996.  
 
277 King IV 87  –  94.  This  can be  a  char i ty ,  c lub,  char i tab le trust ,  associa t ion or  a  non -
profi t  organisa t ion in  t e rms of  the Non-prof i t  Organisat ions Act o f  1997 .  
 
278King  IV  111  –  117.  Thi s appl ies to  al l  ent i t ies  as l i s ted  in  schedule  2  and  3 of  the 
Publ ic  Finance Management Act  of  1999.  
 
279 King IV 79 –  86.  
 
280 King IV 95 –  102.  
 
281 King IV 75 .  USAf has confirmed  that  i t  was approached by  the  King Commiss ion to  
assis t  in  draf t ing a  sec tor ial  supplement  for  higher  educat ions.  USAf  agreed  to  ass ist  




The discussion below focuses on some important principles of King IV that 
are, in the author’s view, relevant and important in the higher education 
sector. 
 
(a) Leadership, ethics and corporate citizenship 
 
The principles of leadership, ethics and corporate citizenship are dealt with 
in part 5.1 of King IV.282 Principle 1 provides that the governing body should 
lead ethically and effectively.283 The principle requires members of the 
governing body to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
organisation.284  This is especially important when it comes to the higher 
education environment. Public higher education inst itutions receive public 
money, and therefore public accountability is essential. One of the 
characteristics of this principle is transparency. 285  
 
Principle 2 provides that the governing body should govern the ethics of 
the organisation in a way that supports the establishment of an ethical 
culture.286 This principle, amongst other things, recommends that all 
 
282 King IV 43 –  46.   
 
283 Members of  the governing body should in  their  dec ision -making and exercise of  
duties demonstrate  the  fol lowing  ind ividual  and co llect ive eth ic a l  charac ter i st ics:  
independence,  inclus ivi ty ,  competence,  d i l igence,  being informed and courage.  King IV  
43.  
 
284 King IV 43; recommended prac tice 1  –  3 .  
 
285 King IV 44; recommended pr ac tice 1 .  
 
286 King IV 44; recommended prac tices 4  –  10 .  This i s  an impor tan t  pr inc ip le,  especial ly  
for  higher  educat ion ins t i tu t ions.  I t  prescr ibes that  a  govern ing body  should ensure  that  
the necessary  struc tures  are  in  place  to  give effect  to  the organ isa t ion’s eth ics,  values  
and norms,  which must  include repor t ing mechanisms a nd appropr ia te  oversigh t  and  
resources of  eth ics management.  The govern ing body should oversee that  there are  
processes in  place to  ensure tha t  employees,  business assoc iates,  contra c tors and  
suppl iers a re  famil iar  with  the organ isat ion’s ethics as s t ipu la ted in  a  code of  e thics.  
Compliance wi th  this code must  be monitored  and there  should be d isclosure  of  the 
structures  and  processes  tha t  have been pu t  in  p lace  for  eth ics management;  key focus 
areas dur ing the repor t ing per iod ;  and  mechanisms for  monito r in g  and assessing  
effec tiveness,  King IV  34.  The govern ing body should prov ide clear  strateg ic d irec t ion  
on the management of  the organ isat ion’s  e thics.  The governing body  should ensur e  tha t  
an eth ics po li cy encompasses the relat ionsh ip with  both interna l  an d ex terna l  
stakeholders,  includ ing  the conduct  of  organ isat ions wi thin the supply cha in and 
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organisations approve codes of conduct and ethics policies and procedures 
for their specific organisations.287 The independent assessors’ reports of the 
various institutions that were investigated, as discussed above, are 
indicative of the fact that some higher education institutions do not yet 
reach the required standard.288 Improving the ethical conduct of higher 
education institutions should be of the utmost importance, and proper 
measures should be implemented in the event of the contravention of the 
ethical policies and procedures.289  Therefore, it is a recommendation that 
all public higher education institutions have approved codes of conduct and 
ethics policies and procedures that are implemented and enforced 
throughout the institution.290 These codes and policies should also be 
available to the public to ensure transparency. 
 
(b) Governing structures and delegation 
 
King IV contains five important principles with regard to governing 
structures.291 Principle 6 holds that the governing body should serve as the 
focal point and custodian of corporate governance in the organisation. The 
governing body should exercise its leadership role by steering the 
organisation and determining its strategic direction; approving policies and 
planning that give effect to the direction provided; overseeing and 
 
addresses  the par t icular  eth ica l  r isk  prof i le  of  the o rganisa t ion .  The governing body  
should oversee that  there  are processes in  place to  ensure tha t  employees ,  bus iness 
assoc iates,  cont rac tors and suppl iers are fami lia r  with  the organ isat ion’s eth ical  norms 
as deta i led in  a  code of  ethics and conduct  –  for  example incorporating them into  
employment  and  supply  cont rac ts .  King IV fur thermore  recommends d isc losure of  t he 
structures  and  processes  tha t  have  been  pu t  in  p lace  for  e thics  management,  key  focus  
areas dur ing the  repor t ing per iod  and  mechanisms for  moni tor ing  and assessing  
effec tiveness.   
 
287 King IV 44; recommended prac tice 5 .  
 
288 These independent assessors’  re por ts  are d iscussed above in  Chapter  3 ,  para 
3 .3 .2(b) .  See the suggested recommendat ions  in  Chapter  6 ,  para  6 .3  and 6.4  below.  
 
289See  the suggested recommendat ions in  Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3  and 6.4  below.  
 
290 These e thics  pol icies  must  inc lude an effect ive rese arch eth ics pol icy.   
 




monitoring of implementation and execution by management; and ensuring 
accountability for organisational performance by means of, among others, 
reporting and disclosure. This principle reflects the fact that ethical 
leadership is key to the implementation of good governance in public 
higher education institutions.292 In the author’s opinion, effective corporate 
governance practices should be implemented at all public higher education 
institutions. It is not suggested that these institutions should focus on 
mindless compliance; instead, they should develop and implement a 
corporate governance strategy suitable for their specific insti tution. Each 
institution must have strong and ethical leadership that sets the direction of 
good corporate governance practices. 
 
According to principle 7, the governing body should strike a balance 
between knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and independence for it to 
discharge its governance role and responsibilities objectively and 
effectively.293 Each higher education institution must, therefore, assess its 
knowledge pool and, in the event of an opening in its Council, the 
institution must require a minimum skill-set to ensure that it is able to rely 
on a good range of expertise. It is a recommended practice that the 
governing body should have a majority of non-executive members, most of 
whom should be independent.294 The independence of non-executive 
members increases the likelihood that decisions will be made in the best 
interests of the organisation instead of favouring personal or other 
interests.295 This principle is enforced in section 27(6) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1997.296 
 
292 King IV ;  recommended  pract ice  1  –  5 .  
 
293 King IV 50 –  53;  recommended pract ices 6  –  38 .  
 
294 King IV 50; recommended prac tice 8 .  
 
295 King IV 50.  
 
296 Sec tion 27(6)  confirms that  a t  least  60% of  the members of  a  Counci l  must  be 
persons  who are no t  employed  by,  or  s tudents of ,  the  publ ic  higher  education  




Principle 8 confirms that the governing body should ensure that its 
arrangements for delegation within its own structures promote independent 
judgment and assist with the balance of power and the effective discharge 
of duties.297 Each institution must ensure that its delegation of authority is 
revised annually and made publicly available.298 Although King IV 
recommends specific committees which must be provided for, it is at the 
discretion of the board to appoint other committees. The committees 
included in King IV are the audit, risk governance, remuneration, 
nomination and social and ethical committees. 299 The role of committees is 
vital in any organisation, especially in public higher education. The 2014 
Reporting Regulations provide for certain committees to be constituted, 
and it is at the discretion of each institution to constitute others. 300 The 
structure, composition and mandate of each committee are essential and 
must be considered carefully. Committees should not merely be constituted 
for the sake of having committees. Their function and mandate need to be 
clear. Therefore, in the view of the author, each public higher education 
institution should provide for its committees, their composition and mandate 
in its institutional statute.301 The delegation of authority of each institution 
 
297 King IV 54 –  57;  recommended prac tices 39 –  70.  The te rms of  referen ce should,  at  a  
minimum, dea l  wi th  the fol lowing: the composit ion of  the  c ommit tee and ,  i f  app licab le,  
the process  and cr i ter ia  for  the appointment  of  any committee members who are no t  
members of  the governing body; the commit tee’s overal l  role  and assoc ia ted  
responsib il i t ies and functions;  delegated author i ty  with  respect  to  de c is ion-making;  the  
tenure  of  the  committee ;   when and how the  commit tee  should  report  to  the  governing  
body and others;  the commit tee’s  access  to  resources and informat ion;  the meet i ng 
procedure ;  and the  arrangements for  eva lua ting the commit tee’s performa nce.  
 
298 I t  is  up to  each ins t i tut ion to  have a delega tion of  authori ty  approved by i t s  Counci l ,  
as Counci l  has the power to  delegate i t s  functions.  I t  i s  impor tant  that  a  de lega tion of  
authori ty  dea l  with  al l  relevant  mat ters l ike  tenders,  any mat ters  with  f inancia l  
impl ica t ions,  lease  agreements  and  any o ther  contrac ts  wi th  or  without monetary  va lue .  
I t  is  a lso  important  to  deal  with  other  mat ters  l ike dec is ion -making in  the  academic  
environment and  the  commerc ial  domain of  the ins t i tut ion.  
 
299 King IV 54 –  57;  recommended pract ices 51 –  70.  
 
300 See para  4 .4 .4  be low for  a  discussion  of  the commit tees as  contained in  the 2014 
Reporting Regulat ions .   
 
301 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .3 .2  below for  the recommendat ions  in  this regard.  Section  29 
of  the Higher  Educat ion  Ac t of  1997 confirms that  each ins t i tut ion may  (not  must)  
es tabl i sh commit tees  to  perform any of  the ir  functions and may appoin t  persons,  who 
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should provide for the accountability of individuals who do not follow the 
policies and processes in order to fulfil the mandate of each committee.302 
For some companies, an audit committee is a statutory requirement. 303 King 
IV recommends that any governing body of any organisation which issues 
audited financial statements should establish an audit committee.304 King IV 
further states that the role of the audit committee 305 should be to provide 
independent oversight of, amongst others, the effectiveness of the 
organisation’s assurance functions and services, with a particular focus on 
combined assurance306 arrangements, including external assurance service 
providers, internal audits and the finance function.  Also included is the 
integrity of the annual financial statements and, insofar as they are 
delegated by the governing body, other external reports issued by the 
organisation.307 The audit committee holds decision-making power and 
 
are not  members  of  the Council  or  the  Sena te,  as the case may b e,  as members  of  such 
committees.   
 
302Commit tees are a lso included in  the Companies Act of  2008.  Sect ion 72 sta tes tha t  
except  where the Memorandum of  Incorporat ion provides otherwise,  the board may 
appoint  any number of  committees and may provide these com mittees  wi th  a  re levan t  
mandate.  
 
303 These companies include banks  in  accordance with  s  64 of  the Banks Act of  1990,  a  
public  company ,  a  s ta te-owned  ent i ty  and any  company,  which  has indica ted in  i t s  
Memorandum of  Incorporation  that  the  company must  have an  aud it  commit tee.  Sec tion  
94 of  the Companies  Act of  2008.   
 
304 King IV 55,  recommended prac tice 51.  
 
305 Sect ion 94  (7)  of  the  Companies  Act  of  2008  l i st s  the  dut ies  of  audi tors;  King  IV  55; 
recommended pract ices 52 –  59.  See Braio tta  L,  Gazzaway RT and Cols on R The Audi t  
Committee Handbook 5 t h  ed  (Wiley New Jersey  2010)  1  –  403 for  more on the aud it  
committee,  i t s  structure,  funct ions  and responsib il i t ies.   
 
306 King IV 55; recommended practice  51.  See in  general ,  Schreurs HC and Marais  M 
“Perspect ives  of  Chie f  Audit  Execut ives  on the  Implementa t ion  of  Combined  
Assurance” 2015 (17)  SAJAAR  73-86.  In  a  combined assurance model,  some of  the l ines  
of  assurance,  such as interna l  audi t  and  r i sk and compl iance operate  across a  broad 
spec trum of  the business.  An intern al  aud it ,  as  par t  of  the  th ird  l ine of  assurance,  
remains  pivo tal  to  corporate  governance.  See  King IV 55  and  s  94 of  the  Companies  Act  
of  2008 ,  which makes provis ion for  the estab li shment and management of  an aud it  
committee.  See Ferr eira  2008 Medi tari  Accountancy Research  89  –  106;  Marx B and  
Lubbe D “The  Role of  the  Audi t  Commit tee in  Support ing the  External  Auditor’ s  
Independence and  Effect iveness” 2010  (8)  JNGS 86 –  106;  Marx  and Van  der  Watt  2011  
JNGS  56 –  71 in  this regard.   
 
307 King IV  55,  recommended pract ice 51.  See in  genera l ,  Ferrei ra  I  “The  Effect  of  the  
Audi t  Commit tee’s  Composi t ion  and  Struc ture  on the  Performance  of  Audi t  
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accountability for statutory duties.308 King IV recommends that the audit 
committee disclose the date of the first appointment of the auditing firm. In 
the interests of the quality of the audit, King IV furthermore recommends 
that the audit committee disclose significant audit matters that arose from 
the audit and how these matters are addressed by the audit committee.309 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations require that each public higher education 
institution should have an audit committee. 310 The general functions of an 
audit committee within the higher education environment include inter alia 
the following: To ensure that internal control systems, information systems, 
accounting practice, internal and external financial reporting, enterprise 
risk management and corporate governance of the institution are 
continuously adequate and effective; assessing the effectiveness of 
accounting and internal control systems; to establish an independent 
internal audit function, with  formal terms of reference, purpose and 
delegation of authority; and to establish an effective external audit function 
with clear terms of reference and mandate.311 
 
King IV also recommends the establishment of a committee responsible for 
nominations of members of governing bodies. This committee shall be 
responsible for making recommendations on the appropriate composition, 
 
Commit tees”  2008(20)  Meditari  Accountancy  Research  89  –  106;  Marx and  Lubbe 
2010(8)  JNGS 86  –  106.  Also see Marx B and Van der  Watt  B “Sustainab il i ty  and  
Integra ted report ing:  An Analysis of  the Audi t  Committee’s oversigh t  role” 2011(9)  
JNGS  56 –  71;  Adelopo I ,  Aras G and Crowther  D Corpora te Socia l  Responsibi l i ty:  
Auditor Independence:  Audi t ing,  Corporate  Governance and  Marke t  Confidence  
(Routledge United Kingdom 2012)  76 –  88 ;  91 –  94 and 105 –  125 for  more on audi t  
committees and the ir  independence.  
 
308 King IV 33; 55,  recommended pract ice 54 .  
 
309 King IV  55 –  56,  recommended pract ice  59.  This recommendat i on is  in  l ine  with  th e  
rule  by the Independent Regulatory Board for  Audi to rs ,  which was published on 4  
December 2015.  See h ttps: / /www.bdo.co .za /ge tat tac hment /7309a39b-d00e-40f7-96c9-
6cbacec695d4/a t tachment.aspx  (Date of  use :  30 August  2018) .  
 
310 2014 Report ing Regulations  24 –  26.  For  a  discuss ion of  the 2014 Reporting  
Regula tions  and the aud it  committee,  see sec tion 4.4 .5  be low.  
 
311 Information compi led b y reviewing the chart ers of  three publ ic  higher  education  
ins t i tut ions .  See  in  general ,  Committee of  Universi ty  Chairperson (CUC)  Handbook for 




succession, performance and effective function of the institution and its 
various committees.312  This type of committee is essential for public higher 
education institutions, as many nominations take place within a public 
higher education institution, i.e. Council  and Senate. The 2014 Reporting 
Regulations do provide for a Council Membership Committee, which must 
consider nominations for vacancies on the Council.313 The Council and 
Senate committees play a significant role in institutions, as they assist and 
advise the Council and Senate on various matters. A committee 
responsible for nominations and elections considers nominations and 
elections of various positions on these committees. It is this committee’s 
responsibility to ensure that persons with the required skills are elected for 
these positions to ensure optimal functioning of these committees.  The 
committee is also able to consider diversity in its committee compositions 
in a holistic manner. 
 
In addition, the governing body should also consider establishing a 
committee to assist it with the governance of risk. 314 The 2014 Reporting 
Regulations require that such a committee be established, whether as a 
standalone committee or as part of a combined audit and risk committee. If 
it is part of a combined committee, the agenda of the meetings addressing 
risk, audit and opportunity should be kept separate. 315 The risk committee 
must consider all issues of risks, not only financial risks of the institution 
 
312 King IV 56 –  57,  recommended prac ti ce 60 –  61.  All  members of  the committee for  
nominat ions should  be  non -execu tive  members of  the  govern ing body  and the  majori ty  
should be independent.  
 
313 At th is juncture i t  should be noted that  in  terms of  s  27(4)(c)  of  the Higher  
Educat ion Act of  1997 th e Minister  can  appoin t  (not  nominate)  f ive  members.  However ,  
in  terms of  s  5A these  members must  comply  with  the el igib il i ty  cr i te r ia  as de termined  
by the ins t i tut iona l  sta tu te .  
 
314 King IV 57 ,  recommended prac tices 63 –  64.  
 
315 King IV 57,  recommended prac t ices 62 –  64.  For  th i s commit tee’s  ro le  in  general ,  
see  Deloi t te  “King IV on Corporate  Governance:  What  i s  new and what  has changed?”  
http: / /www2.delo i t te .com/na/en/pages/r i sk/ar t ic les/k ing -iv-report-on-corporate -




and report to Council on these risks. This committee must also establish 
risk mitigation processes and have a risk management system in place. 316   
 
The establishment of a committee responsible for remuneration is also 
recommended by King IV.317 This committee must recommend a policy that 
will result in fair, responsible and transparent remuneration.318 King IV aims 
to foster enhanced transparency with regards to reporting on remuneration. 
An important introduction into King IV is that the remuneration committee 
should consider and disclose the measures put in place to attain fair and 
responsible executive remuneration in the context of overall employee 
remuneration.319 A remuneration committee is also required by the 2014 
Reporting Regulations.320 In terms of these regulations, the remuneration 
committee must disclose its remuneration policy. Executive remuneration 
and bonuses, as well as any fees paid to the Council members, must be 
disclosed amongst others. The Companies Amendment Bill of 2018 
suggests an amendment to section 30 of the Companies Act of 2008.  It 
also requires an implementation report containing each individual director’s 
remuneration and benefits.321 It is recommended that the 2014 Reporting 
 
316 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  26  –  28.  
 
317 King IV  57;  recommended prac tice 65 .  For  more about remunera tion  commit tees  in  
genera l ,  see Bussin M “Factors Dr iving Changes to  Remunera t ion Pol icies in  South  
Africa”  2015 (2)  SAJLR  43 –  63.  Disclosure on  remunerat ion should  be as fo l lows: a  
statement  that  p rovides  the  context  for  remunerat ion po licy  and  decisions;  ( i i )  an 
overview of  the  main  provis ions of  the remunerat ion pol icy and  ( i i i )  the ac tua l  
remunera tion  awarded to  each  execu tive and  prescr ibed  off icer .  The level  of  d isclosure 
is  s treng thened  by recommending tha t  shareholders be g iven the opportuni ty  to  pass  
separate ,  non-bind ing  advisory vo tes on the po l icy and i t s  implementa t ion,  but  wi th  the 
consequence  that  compulsory  shareholder  engagement i s  t r iggered  in  the  event  that  
ei ther  the  pol icy  or  i t s  implementa t ion  i s  not  supported  by a  vo te  of  at  leas t  75% of  the  
voting shares .  
 
318 King IV 31; 64 recommended pract ice 27 .  
 
319 King IV 31.  The 2014  Reporting Regula tions 23  are a lso discussed in  para 4 .4 .4  
below. See s 30(6)  o f  the Companies  Act of  2008,  which def ines remuneration  for  the 
purposes of  annual  f inancia l  sta tements.  Also,  se e regulat ion 43 of  the Companies Act 
of  2008.  See in  general ,  Madlela  V and Lehloenya PM “The Regulat ion of  Executive  
Remunera tion in  South Afr ica” 2016  (37)  Obiter  1  –  19.  
 
320 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  23  –  24.  
 
321 B-2018 Government Ga ze tte  Nr.  41913 (GN. 969)  21 Sep tember  2018 clause  5 .  
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Regulations be amended so that the remuneration and all benefits (not only 
bonuses) of all executives above a certain peromnes level322 be reported on 
an annual basis.323 The reason for this recommendation is that enhanced 
reporting relating to remuneration practices of higher education institutions 
will ensure public accountability. 
 
Social and Ethics Committees was introduced as a requirement for some 
companies in the Companies Act of 2008, and these committees  are 
unique to South Africa.324 King IV urges all organisations to establish such a 
committee and recommends a higher standard for the composition of this 
committee than the one provided for in the Companies Act of 2008. 
Regulation 43 of the Companies Act of 2008 confirms that a board must 
give attention to the matters handled by the Social and Ethics Committee. 
These duties include social and economic development; good corporate 
citizenship; the environment, health and safety; consumer relationships; as 
well as labour and employment. According to Wixley, by creating a specific 
duty for this committee to monitor and report on each of these duties, the 
Companies Act of 2008 imposes a higher duty on the board to consider 
them. It is curious that despite the name of this committee, there is no 
mention of codes of conduct or ethics. 325 King IV recommends that the role 
of the social and ethics committee should go further than prescribed in the 
 
 
322 Peromnes level  i s  the g rading leve l  used for  s ta ff  in  public  un ivers i t ies.  
 
323 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below for  recommendations in  th is regard.  
 
324 Sec tion 72(4)  –  (10)  of  the Companies Act of  2008,  read together  with  r egula t ion 43 .  
I t  i s  no t  the in ten tion of  this researc h  to  inc lude an ex tensive discuss ion on the Socia l  
and Ethics  Commit tee.  see  in  general ,  Havenga  MK “The Social  and  Ethics Commit tee 
in  South Afr ican Company Law” 2015  (78)  THRHR  286 –  288 ;  Stoop  HH “Towards  
Greener  Companies -  Sustainab il i ty  and the Socia l  and Ethics Commit tee” 2013 Ste l l  
Law Review  574 –  580;  Kloppers HJ “Driving Corpora te Social  Responsib il i ty  (CSR) 
through the Companies  Act :  An Overv iew of  the Role of  the Social  a nd Eth ics  
Commit tee” 2013 (16)  PELJ 166 -  188.  The Companies Bil l  of  2018 now amends s 72  
rela t ing  to  soc ial  and  e thics committees.  King  IV expands  on  the  ro le  o f  the soc ia l  and 
ethics  commit tee ;  for  instance,  the commit tee’s direc t ion and oversigh t  of  man agement  
ethics  i s  addressed as well  as the social ly  responsib le aspects o f  a  remunerat ion pol icy.   
 




Companies Act of 2008, and should include matters about ethical 
behaviour and risk management.326  The social and ethics committee’s 
mandate is to monitor and report on the company’s social performance in 
five areas, namely, social and economic development; good corporate 
citizenship; the environment, health and public safety; consumer 
relationships; and labour and employment.327 The committee’s monitoring 
function should include an assessment of the company’s performance in 
relation to applicable legislation, legal requirements and codes. It should 
also conduct regular reviews of the performance of the company.328 
 
King IV recommends that the majority of the governing body members be 
non-executive, to ensure that independent judgment prevails. 329 The 
Companies Amendment Bill of 2018 proposes that the Minister may 
 
326 Delo it te  “King IV on Corpora te Governance:  What i s  new and what has changed?” 
http: / /www2.deloi t te .com/na/en/pages/r i sk/ar t ic les/k ing -iv-report-on-corporate -
governance-bo lder- than-ever .html  (Date of  use :  30 August  2018) .   
 
327 Sec tion  72(8)  of  the Companies Act  of  2008,  read together  with  Regula t ion 43 ;  
Havenga 2015 THRHR  288 –  291.  The mandate in  terms of  the Companies Act  of  2008 
is  to  moni tor  the company’s act ivi t ies,  having regard for  any relevant  legisla t ion ,  other  
lega l  requ irements or  prevai l ing codes of  best  prac tice in  relat ion  to  social   and  
economic development,  good corporate c i t izenship,  the env ironment,  heal th  and public  
safety;  consumer rela t ionships ;  and labor  and employment;  to  draw matters wi thin i t s  
mandate to  the a t tent ion  of  the Board  as occasion requires ;  and report ,  through one o f  
i t s  members to  the shareholders at  the company’s annual  genera l  meet ing on the  
matters wi thin i t s  mandate.  See in  genera l ,  Rossouw The Socia l  & Ethics Commit tee  
Handbook  23  -  25;  Esser  IM and Delpor t  P  “The Pro tect ion of  Stakeholders :  The South 
African Social  and Ethics Commit tee and  the Uni ted Kingdom’s Enligh tened  
Shareholder  Value Approach:  Par t  2” 2017 (50)  De Jure  221 –  232.  The Companies Bi l l  
of  2018,  if  promulgated ,  wil l  amend s 72 rela t ing to  social  and e thics committees.  The  
amended sec tion st i l l  only requires Social  and Ethics Committees for  a  public  or  sta te-
owned company.   I t  does,  however ,  st ipula te  the composi t ion  of  the  commit tee ,  of  
which  at  least  one di rec tor  must  be  independent .  Fur ther more,  the amendment wi l l  a l so  
provide for  exemption p rovis ions.   
 
328 Wixley ,  Ever ingham and Louw Corporate  Governance  139.  
 
329 King IV 29 –  30;  57,  recommended prac tice  68 –  70.  See in  general ,  Kloppers  
2013(16)  PELJ  165 –  199.  South Afr ica is  the f irs t  coun try to  have a socia l  and e thics  
committee as  a  s ta tutory  commit tee.   Deloi t te  “The Companies Act ,  the Socia l  & Eth ics  
Commit tee  and  the management of  the eth ics  performance  of  the  company” 2014  
http: / /www2.deloi t te .com/content /dam/Delo it te/za/Documents/governance -r i sk-
compliance /ZA_SocialAndEthicsCommitteeAndT heManagementOfTheEthicsPerformanc
e_24032014.pdf  (Date o f  use:  30 August  2018) .  See also Rossouw D The Socia l  and  
Ethics Committee Handbook 2 n d  ed (The Ethics  Committee 2018)  21 -22;  Schoeman C 




prescribe minimum qualification requirements for members of this 
committee to ensure that members have adequate, relevant knowledge and 
experience to ensure that the members can perform their functions. 330 The 
Companies Amendment Bill, if promulgated in its current form, also 
provides that the Minister may prescribe the functions of this committee. 331 
The committee should report any risks associated with the social and 
ethics committee’s mandate to the board. 332 The broad mandate of this 
committee may create an administrative burden for companies. However, 
these matters affect all companies and must be attended to. It must be 
noted that failure to comply with these duties might expose the committee 
members as well as the board to potential action in terms of section 218 of 
the Companies Act of 2008.333 It is suggested that in the higher education 
sector there should be such a committee with representatives from related 
committees such as the risk management committee. 
 
Section 29 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 prescribes committees of 
Council and Senate and states that the Council and Senate of a public 
higher education institution may each establish committees to perform any 
of their functions and may appoint persons, who are not members of the 
Council or the Senate, as the case may be, as member of such 
committees. Neither the Council nor the Senate will be divested of 
responsibility for the performance of any of their functions delegated to any 
of these committees.334  There are no specific committees mentioned in the 
 
330 Section  5A(b)  of  the Companies Amendment Bil l  of  2018.   
 
331 Section  5A(e)  of  the Companies Amendment Bil l  of  2018.  
 
332 Sect ion 5A(f)  and  (g)  of  the  Companies  Bil l  of  2018 proposes  that  the social  and  
ethics commit tee prepare a  repor t  in  the p rescr ibe d manner  and form, wh ich must  be  
external ly  assured.  The report  must  then be presented to  the shareholders.  
 
333 Wixley ,  Ever inham and  Louw Corporate  Governance  141 –  142.  
334 Sec tion 29(1)  and (2)  o f  the Higher  Education  Act o f  1997.  Sec tion 29(4)  s tates  tha t  
“the composi t ion,  manner  of  e lec t ion ,  functions ,  procedure a t  meet ings  an d dissolu tion 
of  a  commit tee  and  a  jo int  commit tee  are determined  by the  inst i tu t ional  s tatutes  and  
ins t i tut iona l  rules  or  an  Act of  Par l iament .”   However ,  the  Regulat ions  for  Report ing  
by Public  Higher Education Inst i tu t ions  that  became effec tive on  1  January 2015,  
prescr ibe  cer ta in  commit tees i .e .  a  remuneration  commit tee,  f inance committee,  
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section, and it is left to universities to provide for the particular committees 
in their institutional statutes in accordance with the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations. In accordance with these regulations, universities should 
constitute at least a remuneration committee, finance committee, planning 
and resources committee, Council membership committee, audit 
committee, risk committee and IT governance committee. 335  
 
Principle 9 of King IV recommends that the governing body should ensure 
that the evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees, their 
chairs and individual members support continued improvement in the 
performance and effectiveness of the university .336 This principle also 
recommends that a governing body should have a formal process in place 
to evaluate the performance of the governing body, its committees, the 
chairpersons and members.337 However, in the author’s view, in the context 
of a higher education institution, it would be more effective if an external 
body like the CHE were responsible for the assessment of Council 
members at least every two years. It is suggested that, in alignment with 
King IV, the following be disclosed in relation to the evaluation of the 
performance of the governing body: a description of all other performance 
evaluations undertaken during the reporting period, including their scope, 
whether they were formal or informal, and whether or not they were 
eternally facilitated; an overview of the evaluation results and remedial 
actions taken; and whether the governing body is satisfied that the 
evaluation process is improving its performance and effectiveness. 338 In the 
author’s view, each public university should have a formal process to 
 
planning  and  resource  commit tee ,  audi t  commit tee,  r isk  committee and  IT  governance 
committee .  
 
335 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  23  –  27.  See  para  4 .4 .4  below for  a  more  d e tai led 
discuss ion of  the committees  of  higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions and the compliance to  the 
2014 Report ing Regulat ions .  
 
336 King IV 58; recommended prac tices 71 –  75.  
 
337 King IV 58; recommended prac ti ce 73.  
 
338 King IV 58; recommended prac tice 75.  
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evaluate committees, their chairpersons and their members. This should 
preferably be an independent evaluation carried out by CHE or USAf, and a 
report with recommendations should be submitted to the Council every two 
years. This report should contain information regarding the effectiveness of 
the Council after concluding questionnaires and conducting interviews with 
Council members; comments on how the Council complied with its code of 
conduct; statements on any reported conflict of interest; what value was 
contributed by the Council during the reporting period; whether the Council 
was adhering to the values and strategic objectives of the institution; 
statements on the effectiveness of the Council and Senate committees, 
whether they add value and the members have the proper knowledge and 
skills for a specific committee; and statements on how effectively the 
Council is handling the financial decisions of the institution. The report 
should also contain any remedial action that needs to be undertaken by the 
Council. 
 
According to principle 10, the governing body should ensure that the 
appointment of, and delegation to management  contribute to role clarity 
and the effective exercise of authority and responsibility .339 Section 26 of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for the governing structures and 
offices of higher education institutions. Some of these offices include the 
office of the Principal, Vice-principals and the SRC. The institutional statute 
of an institution plays an important role in clarifying the responsibilities of 
these offices. Although each university’s institutional statutes differ, they 
usually all provide for at least the following: the constitution of the Council 
and Senate and the term of office of members; the conduct of the Council 
and Senate meetings; and the role and responsibilities of the office of the 
Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Deputy-Vice Chancellors, Registrar, 
Executive Deans and Executive Directors. It is of utmost importance that 
each public institution ensures that it has a proper delegation of authority in 
place for management to make financial decisions and the signature of 
 




contracts. The same recommendation is also made with regards to Council 
and Senate committees to ensure that their roles, mandates and decision-
making powers are clear.340   
 
An essential addition to King IV was the recommendation of the 
appointment of professional corporate governance services to assist the 
governing body.341 It is advised that the governing body ensure it has 
access to professional and independent guidance on corporate governance 
and its legal duties and that it has support to coordinate its functioning as 
well as that of its committees. King IV further recommends that all 
organisations should, as a matter of good practice, consider appointing a 
corporate governance professional to fulfil the role that is ascribed to a 
company secretary in terms of the Companies Act of 2008.342 It is, 
therefore, a recommendation that higher education institutions obtain the 
services of a corporate governance specialist as required by King IV to 






340 King IV 59; recommended prac tice 85.  
 
341 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below for  recommendations in  th is regard.  
 
342 King IV 59  –  60;  recommended pract ice 90  –  99.   Swart  M “The Company Secretary  
defined :  business in s ight” 2007 (1)  Enterprise Risk  12  –  15; Wolpert  J  “RM 
Responsib il i t ies:  The Role of  the Company Secretary :  Corpora te Governance” 2010  (4)  
Enterprise  Risk  36  –  37 .  The  dut ies o f  a  co mpany secre tary  are se t  ou t  in  s  88 of  the 
Companies Act of  2008 and inc lu de the fol lowing: provid ing the d irec tors of  the  
company col lec t ively and indiv idually  with  guidance as to  their  dut ies,  responsib il i t ies  
and powers;  making the direc tors  aware  of  an y law relevant  to  or  affect ing the 
company;  repor t ing to  the company’s bo ard any  fai lure on the par t  of  the company or  a  
direc tor  to  comply  with  the  Memorandum of  Incorpora tion  (MoI)  or  rules  of  the  
company or  this Act ;  ensur ing that  minutes  of  al l  shareh olders meet ings,  boar d  
meet ings and the meetings of  any committees  of  the direc tors ,  or  of  the company’s  
audit  committee,  are properly  recorded in  accordance with  the Companies Act of  2008;  
cer t ifying in  the company’s annual  f inancia l  s tatements whether  th e company has f i led 
the required  re turns and notices  in  terms of  the Compa nies Act of  2008 ,  and whether  a l l  
such re turns and notices  appear  to  be true,  correct  and up to  date;  ensur ing that  a  copy 
of  the  company’s  annual  f inancial  sta tements i s  sen t ,  in  ac cordance  with  this  Ac t,  to  
every person who is  en ti t led  to  i t ;  and  carryin g  out  the funct ions of  a  person des ignated  
in  te rms of  s  33(3)  of  the Companies  Act of  2008.  
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(c) Governance functional areas 
 
This chapter in King IV consists of five principles relating to the functional 
areas of governance, namely the governance of risk, technology and 
information, compliance governance, remuneration governance and 
assurance.343 These functional areas are all critical to good governance in 
public higher education institutions and are discussed separately below.  
 
Risk governance is addressed in principle 11 of King IV.344 It relates to the 
management of risk by the governing body in such a way that it achieves 
its objects.345 The governing body should evaluate and agree on the nature 
and extent of the risks that the organisation should be willing to take in 
pursuit of its strategic objectives. In particular, it should approve the 
organisation’s risk appetite346 and limit the potential loss that the 
organisation could feasibly tolerate.347 The 2014 Reporting Regulations 
require that each public higher education institution have a risk committee, 
be it a standalone committee or a combined audit and risk committee. The 
responsibility of this committee is to consider all issues of risk, which may 
result in some form of exposure for the institution. 348 King IV suggests that 
the following aspects should be disclosed in relation to the governance of 
risk: key areas of focus during the reporting period, the key risks that the 
organisation faces as well as undue, unexpected or unusual risks or risks 
taken outside of risk tolerance levels; actions taken to monitor the 
 
343 Par t  5 .4  of  King IV  61 –  70.  
 
344 King IV 61 –  62;  recommended pract ices 1  –  9 .  
 
345 King IV 61; recommended prac tice 1 .  
 
346 This i s  the p ropensi ty  to  take appropriat e  levels of  r isk .  See in  general ,  Wiese  
Corpora te  Governance  in  South Africa  wi th  Internat ional  Comparisons 110  –  117 ;  
Naidoo Corporate Governance:  An Essen tia l  Guide for South Afr ica n Companies  287 –  
302;  Esser  and  Havenga (eds)  Corporate Governance Annua l Review  2012 50 –  52.  
 
347 King IV  r ecommended pract ice  4 .  
 
348 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  26 .  See para 4 .4 .4  below for  a  d iscuss ion of  the 2014 




effectiveness of risk management and how the outcomes were addressed; 
and planned areas of future focus.349 Risk evaluation should ultimately be 
the responsibility of the risk committee of each public higher education 
institution. 
 
Principle 12 states that the governing body should govern technology and 
information in a way that supports the organisation setting and achieving its 
strategic objectives.350 Over the last decades, technology has improved 
tremendously, and it has become critical for institutions to use technology 
to improve governance at institutions.351 Information and technology 
overlap, but each can function on its own. 352 King IV recognises information 
as a corporate asset separate from technology. 353 Each governing body 
should provide strategic direction for the management of technology and 
information, and this should ultimately be done through an Information 
Technology governance committee.354 In respect of higher education 
 
349 King IV 61; recommended prac tice 9 .  
 
350 King IV 62 –  63 ;  recommended pract ices 10 –  17.  Accord ing to  the  recommended 
pract ices under  th is pr inciple,  the govern ing body should oversee the  adequacy and 
effec tiveness  of  technology and  informat ion management,  inc luding :  explo itat ion  of  
opportuni t ies of fered by  technology and  dig ita l  developments;  e th ical  and responsible  
use  of  technology and informat ion;  informat ion  management that  creates and enhances 
inte l lectual  cap ital  in  the organ isat ion;  in tegra t ion of  people,  technolog i es,  informat ion  
and processes  in  the  dig ita l  business  va lue cha in;  assess ing  re turn on  investment;   r isk  
overs ight  of  outsourced  services and the supply  chain for  the acquis i t ion of  goods and 
serv ices ;  and  compliance with  re levan t  laws.  See in  general  on  the  top ic of  technolo gy  
and Information Wiese  Corpora te Governance in  Sout h Africa wi th  Internat ional 
Comparisons  117 and for  more on cyber  securi ty  see p  118; Naidoo Corporate 
Governance:  An Essen tial  Guide for  South African Companies 306 –  309.  Joh l  C,  Van  
Solms R and  Flowerday S “Informat ion Technology Governance in  the Conte xt  of  
Higher  Education Governance in  South Afr ica” 2014 (28)  SAJHE  128 –  148 wi th  
regards to  IT governance in  h igher  education.  
 
351 Johl ,  Van Solms and  Flowerday 2014  (28)  SAJHE 635.  
 
352 Giles J  “King IV Code  and IT Governance”  November  2016  Michalsons  
https: / /www.michalsons.com/blog /king -iv-code-and-i t-governance/18691  (Date of  use :  
30 August  2018) .   
 
353 See  Deloi t te  “King IV on  Corpora te  Governance:  What  i s  new and what  has  
changed?”ht tp: / /www2.deloi t te .com/na/en/pages/ r isk /ar t ic les /king- iv-report -on-
corporate-governance-bolder- than-ever .html  (Date of  use:  30 August  2018) .  
 




institutions, the 2014 Reporting Regulations also require the establishment 
of an Information Technology governance committee. 355  Each public higher 
education institution should, therefore, approve a policy that pertains to the 
use of technology and information.356 This policy should set out the 
information technology governance framework for each institution as well 
as how the information technology risk management will be addressed. It 
should also include a cybersecurity plan to safeguard the institution’s 
information, data, programmes and devices against cyber breaches. Due to 
the nature of higher education institutions, such institut ions will, for 
instance, store high volumes of personal data and will use appropriate 
software programmes to capture and store this information.357 
 
According to King IV, each governing body should exercise ongoing 
oversight of technology and information management. The following 
objectives should be achieved: integration of people, technologies, 
information and processes across the institution; integration of technology 
and information risks into the institutions’ risk management strategy; 
proactive monitoring of intelligence to identify and respond to security 
breaches, including cyber-attacks and harmful social use; management of 
the performance of, and the risks relating to any third-party and outsourced 
service providers of the institution; the assessment of value delivered to 
the institution through significant investments in technology and 
information; the responsible disposal of obsolete technology and 
information in a way that has regard for the environment and information 
security; ethical and responsible use of technology and information; and 
compliance with relevant laws.358  Each institution should have a policy in 
 
355 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  27 .  See para 4 .4 .4  below for  a  d iscuss ion of  the 2014 
Reporting Regulat ions .  
 
356 Similar  to  the genera l  recomm endation for  organisat ions contained in  King IV 62; 
recommended pract ice 11.  
 
357 McFar lane D “Unders tanding the Relat ionship between Informat ion Governance  and  
Cyber  Securi ty” June 2017 https: / /www.hanzo.co/blog /understanding - the-relat ionsh ip-
between- information-governance-and-cyber-securi ty  (Date of  use:  3  November 2018) .  
 
358 King IV 62; recommended prac tice 13.  
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place to provide for these matters. It is critically important that the 
information technology department of each institution ensure that they 
educate staff on the safe use of technology and especially cybersecurity. 359  
Each public higher education institution should have a technology and 
information governance committee that feeds into the institution’s audit and 
risk committee to ensure that any risks identified are dealt with on a high 
level. 
 
King IV also advocates compliance governance.360 Accordingly, each 
institution should ensure compliance with applicable laws as well as non-
binding rules, codes361 and standards362 in a way that will ensure that the 
institution is being ethical and a good corporate citizen. This also includes 
proper accountability for those who act in an unethical way and cause harm 
to the institution, especially since these are public institutions receiving and 
spending public funds.363 Therefore, compliance governance must receive 
the necessary attention from the Council, which must lead by example. 
Each governing body should approve policies that articulate and give effect 
to its direction on compliance and identify which ru les, codes and 




359 See  in  genera l ,  Kort jan  N and Van Solms R “A Conceptua l  Framework for  Cyber  
Secur i ty-awareness and  Educat ion in  South Afr ica” 2014 South African Computer  
Journal  29 –  41.  
 
360 King IV,  princ iple 13.  
 
361 Like the King IV code.  
 
362 Like the s tandards issued by the Internat ional  Organi sa t ion for  Standard iza tion  
(hereinaf ter  referred to  as the ISO s tandards) .  
 
363 King IV 63; recommended prac tice 18.  
 
364 King IV 63; recommended prac tice 19.  For  example,  each ins t i tut ion should commit  
to  accept  and comply with  King IV .  Fur ther  to  this,  where  an inst i tu t ion has chosen to  
comply wi th  standards  l ike the ISO s tandards,  the po licies of  the ins t i tut ion must  
indicate  th is  and ensure  tha t  the pr incip les of  these  s tandards  are  incorporated i nto  the  





The Council of each institution is the highest decision-making body of a 
university; the oversight of compliance will, therefore, lie with it. However, 
the Council of each institution should delegate the responsibility for the 
implementation, execution and management of effective compliance 
management to the executive management of the institution under the 
leadership of the vice-chancellor.365 The following should be disclosed in 
relation to compliance: an overview of the arrangements for governing and 
managing compliance; key areas of focus during the reporting period; 
actions taken to monitor the effectiveness of compliance management and 
how the outcomes were addressed; and planned areas of focus. The author 
recommends that these aspects be reported on in the annual report of each 
public higher education institution.366 
 
It is a recommendation of King IV that each organisation, including higher 
education institutions, should implement fair remuneration practices.367 
Executive remuneration for directors of companies are regulated by the 
Companies Act of 2008, the common law, the JSE listing requirements 
(where applicable) and other regulatory standards, which include the King 
Code.368 Although the Higher Education Act of 1997 does not contain similar 
provisions to those of section 30(6) of the Companies Act of 2008, 369 the 
 
365 King IV 64: recommended pract ice 20.  Sect ion 27 confirms tha t  the Council  i s  
responsib le  for  governing the  ins t i tu t ion ,  whi le  s  30 s ta tes that  the v ice -chancellor  i s  
responsib le  for  the management  and  administrat ion  of  the un iversi ty .  The governing  
body should exerc is e ongoing overs ight  o f  compliance  and,  in  par t icular ,  oversee  that  
i t  resul t s  in  the fol lowing: compl iance being unders tood not  only for  the obliga tions i t  
crea tes,  but  also for  the r i ghts and protect ions  if  affords;  compl iance management ,  
taking a hol i st i c  view of  how applicable laws and non -bind ing ru les,  codes and  
standards rela te  to  one ano ther ;  and  cont inuous monitor ing of  the regula tory 
environment and appropriate  responses to  cha nges and development s.   See PWC 
“Corporate Governance is  a  performance i ssue” http : / /www.pwc.com/la/en/r i sk -
assurance/corpora te -governance .html  (Date of  use :  30 August  2018) .  King  III  made 
provis ion for  the compl iance wi th  laws,  ru les,  codes and standards in  Chapter  6 .  
 
366 The recommendat ions  regarding this are conta ined in  Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .  
 
367 Pr incip le 14 ;  King IV 64 –  65.  
 
368 Lehloenya 2016 Obiter 4.  
 
369 Sec tion 30(4)  of  th e Companies Act of  2008 def ines remunera tion to  include in ter 
al ia :  sa lar ies,  bonuses  and performance -re lated payments ;  expenses ;  pension fund 
contr ibu tions;  the va lue of  any opt ion or  r igh t  given direct ly  or  indirec tly  to  a  director ;  
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2014 Reporting Regulations do require a remuneration committee and 
provide terms of reference.370  
 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, executive remuneration has come 
under the spotlight given the growing number of excessive remuneration 
packages of directors. There is increasing concern over the lack of 
transparency and accountability in determining executive remuneration. 
Further problems identified in determining these remuneration packages 
include among other things conflict of interest among those determining the 
packages; misalignment of management and shareholder interests; 
inadequate protection of shareholder governance rights, excessive levels 
of remuneration which conflict with the corporate governance principles of 
fair and responsible remuneration and excessive remuneration conflicting 
with the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the company. Excessive 
remuneration can have a negative effect on the stock markets, as investors 
may be hesitant to invest in a company where directors are paid exorbitant 
packages. There is also a growing concern that the gap between the 
remuneration of executives and other workers is too big. 371 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 provides for various mechanisms in place to 
ensure fair and transparent remuneration. For instance, in terms of section 
 
any f inancial  assis tance;  and any loans  p rovided to  a  director .  The  Companies Act  
Amendment Bil l  of  2018.  Requires tha t  th is  is  al so made applicable to  prescr ibed  
off icers and each ind ividual  must  be ment ioned by name.  The Companies Act  
Amendment Bi l l  a l so now requires tha t  a  director’s remunera t ion repor t  be inc luded in  
the annual  report ing of  ea ch company ( s 30A).  See in  genera l ,  Luiz  S “Executive 
Remunera tion and Shareholder  Vot ing” 2013 SA Merc LJ  291 –  292.  
 
370 See 2014 Reporting Regulations  23  –  24.  
 
371 Madlela and Lehloeny a  2016 Obiter 1; Akua Asafo-Adjei  M Regulat ion of  Execut ive  
Direc tors  Remunerat ion in  South Africa:   The Road to  Achieve Good Corporate 
Governance  (Publ ished  LLM thesis  Univers i ty  of  Cape  Town 2015)  2 ,  6;  Kneale  C 
Corpora te Governance in  Southern Africa (Char tered Secretar ie s Southern Afr ica 2012)  
176-195; Wiese Corporate Governance in  South Africa  wi th  Interna tional Comparisons  
56 –  63. ;  Naidoo  Corporate Governance:  An Essent ial  Guide  for  South  Afr ican  




165,372 shareholders, as well as other stakeholders, may challenge board 
decisions where excessive remuneration was approved. This statutory 
provision should deter directors from making decisions to overpay the 
directors. Further to this, the shareholders may also invoke section 163 
relating to relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or abuse of the 
separate juristic personality of the company. A court has extensive powers 
to grant interim or final relief, which may include some of the following: 
restraining the company’s conduct that was complained about; regulating 
the company’s affairs; directing the company to change its Memorandum of 
Incorporation; directing the company to amend a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.373 
 
King IV, in the view of the author correctly emphasises the need for 
disclosure of executive remuneration. Section 30(4) of the Companies Act 
of 2008 stipulates that the financial statements of each company that are 
required in terms of the Companies Act, must be audited on an annual 
basis and must disclose the remuneration and benefits of each director.  
 
Fair and transparent remuneration is very important in the higher education 
environment as institutions have a vast number of employees, ranging from 
top management to entry-level staff across various sectors. In a recent 
media report, it became apparent that universities were paying excessive 
 
372 This sect ion prov ides for  der ivat ive ac t ions.  In  terms of  s  165(2) ,  “a person may 
serve a  demand upon  a  company to  commence  or  continue legal  proceedings,  or  take 
rela ted steps  to  pro tec t  the legal  inte rests  of  the company if  the person (a)  i s  a  
shareholder  or  a  person  enti t led to  be  reg istered  as a  shareholder  of  the  company  or  of  
a  re lated company;  (b)  i s  a  director  or  prescr ibed off icer  of  the  company or  of  a  re lated 
company;  (c)  is  a  registered t rade un ion that  represents employees  of  the company  or  
another  representa t ive o f  employ ees of  the company; or  (d)  has been granted  leave  of  
the cour t  to  do so,  which may  be gran ted on ly if  the court  i s  sat i s f ied that  i t  i s  
necessary or  expedient  to  do so to  pro tec t  a  lega l  r igh t  of  that  other  person.”  
 
373 Madlela  and Lehloenya 2016 Obi ter  5 .  On the oppression  remedy in  general  see 
Cassim MF “The Appraisa l  Remedy and the Oppression  Remedy under  the Companies  
At of  2008 ,  and the Overlap be tween them” 2017 (29)  SA Merc LJ  305  –  324;  
Lehloenya M and Kgarabjang T “Defin ing the Limi ts  of  the ‘Oppres s ion  Remedy’ in  the 
wake of  sec tion 163 of  the Companies  Act 71 of  2008 –  Grancy Propert ies Limi ted v  
Manala  (2013)  3  All  SA 111 (SCA)” 2015 (36)  Obiter  511 –  518.   For  more on 
der iva tive ac t ions in  terms of  s  165,  see in  general  Cassim 2017 (38)  Obiter  673 –  688;  




packages to vice-chancellors and other executives.374 Considering that 
universities receive public money and this money should be spent for the 
public good, it is concerning that such exorbitant salaries are paid to these 
executives. It seems that public higher education institutions are competing 
with large corporations. The Department of Higher Education and Training 
should investigate this matter to ensure that the remuneration practices at 
public universities are fair and transparent.  
 
In accordance with the principles of fair remuneration practices, each 
institution should ensure that it remunerates fairly, responsibly and 
transparently so as to promote strategic objectives and positive outcomes 
in the short, medium and long term.375 King IV recommends practices with 
regards to remuneration policy and reporting, as the governing body should 
provide strategic direction for fair, responsible and transparent 
remuneration on an enterprise-wide basis.376 The Companies Amendment 
Bill of 2018 proposes that each company should ensure that remuneration 
is reported on in three parts, namely, a background statement, an overview 
of the main provisions of the organisation-wide policy on remuneration and 
an implementation report which contains details of all remuneration and 
 
374 Govender  P “SA’s Cash -strapped Univers i t ies pay Bosses Mul t imil l ion -Rand 
Salar ies”  2018-11-11 Sunday Times .  The packages rece ived by some of  the Vice -
Chancel lors range from R2.5 mil l ion  to  R4.5 mi l l ion rand.   The former Vice -Chancellor  
of  the Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg received a s hocking R17.6 mil l ion  for  2017 tha t  
included bonuses and incent ives.  
 
375 King IV 64 –  65;  recommended prac tices 26 –  30.  The  remunera tion  po l icy should be 
des igned to  ach ieve  the  fol l owing ob jectives:  to  a t t rac t ,  motiva te,  reward and re ta in  
human cap ita l ;  to  promote the achievement of  s tra teg ic objec tives wi thin the  
organisat ion’s r i sk  appeti te;  to  promote posit ive outcomes;  and to  promote an e thica l  
culture and responsible corporate c i t izensh ip.  
 
376 See the  new proposed s 30A(2)  and King IV  54 –  65;  recommended pract ices 26 –  
31.   
See  Delo it te  “Remunerat ion  Governance”  
https: / /www2.deloi t te .com/content / dam/Delo it te/za /Documents/governance -r i sk-
compliance /za_Deloi t te_KingIV_Remunerat ion_Governance_01032017.pdf  (Date  of  




benefits awarded to individual members of the institution during the 
reporting period. This is also in line with King IV.377  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations provide for a remuneration committee, 
which needs to report to the Council on remuneration matters.  Since the 
2014 Reporting Regulations are not yet aligned with King IV, it is 
recommended that they should be revised and updated accordingly. 378 It is 
further suggested that reporting on remuneration should include 
transparency about all benefits of Council members and members of the 
executive management. This must include any fees paid to a Council 
member for services rendered; salaries, bonuses and performance-related 
payments; expense allowances; contributions to any pension fund; any 
financial assistance that has been provided to a Council member or a 
member of the executive management; any loan that was provided to a 
Council member or member of the executive management; and housing 
and travel benefits. These disclosures should be made in respect of each 
individual, who should be named in the annual report. Section 30 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 and its proposed amendment under clause 6 of 
Companies Amendment Bill of 2018 provide guidance in this regard. 
 
Principle 15 states that the governing body should ensure that assurance 
services and functions enable an effective control environment and support 
the integrity of information for internal decision-making and the 
organisation’s external reports.379 The King IV principle contains 
recommended practices for a combined assurance model380 and states that 
 
377 King IV 65; recommended pract ice 32 –  35.  For  a  ful l  d iscussion of  the background  
statement ,  overv iew of  remune ra tion  pol icy and  implementa t ion report ,  see  King  IV 66  
–  67;  recommended prac tices  33 –  35.  
 
378 2014 Report ing Regula tions  23  –  24.  See sect ion 4.4 .4  below for  a  d iscussion  of  the 
2014 Report ing Regulat ions .   
 
379 King IV 68 –  70 recommended pract ices 40 –  61.  
 
380 In  terms of  King  IV ,  a  combined assurance  model i s  def ined as fol lows: “I t  
incorpora tes and op timises al l  assurance serv ices and funct ions so  that  taken as a  
whole ,  these enable an effect ive con tro l  e nvironment;  support  the integri ty  of 
information  used for  in ternal  dec ision -making by management,  the governing body and 
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the governing body should delegate to the audit committee the mandate to 
provide direction for the use of a combined assurance model to achieve 
certain objectives.381 This principle also contains recommended practices 
for internal auditing functions.382 The International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Audit recommends that the internal audit 
function must report directly to senior management and the board. 383 In the 
context of higher education institutions, the internal audit should report 
directly to the Vice-Chancellor and Council. The internal audit office must 
have unfettered access to the chair of the audit committee as well as the 
chair of Council. The Council should assume responsibility for internal 
auditing by determining the direction for the internal audit arrangements to 
provide objective and relevant assurance that contributes to effective 
governance, risk management and control processes. The governing body 
should delegate this function to the audit committee.384     
 
 
i t s  commit tees ;  and support  the  integri ty  of  the organisat ion’s ex terna l  report .”  King IV  
10.   See in  general  King IV  68,  recommended p ract ices 40 -  43 ;  Barac K and Forte  J  
“Combined As surance :  A Systematic  Process 2015 (17)  SAJAAR  71 –  83;  Masi te  SJ  
“Combined  Assurance as an Element  of  Effec t ive Corporate Governance”  2017 (18)  
Chartered Inst i tu te  o f  Government  Finan ce Audit  and  Risk  Off i cers Journal  16 –  18 ;  
Masegare P “Implement ing Val ue-Added Combined Assurance In tervent ions for  South  
African Organisat ions” 2018 (1)  Journal o f  Management and Admin istra tion  129 –  149.  
 
381 King  IV  68;  recommended pract ice  40.  These ob jec tives  include  adequ acy  and  
effec tiveness  of  the  inte rnal  contro l  envi ronment and  the integri ty  o f  in format ion used  
for  report ing and decision -making.  For  more on the assurance of  external  reports,  see 
King  IV 69.  
 
382 King IV  69  –  70 ;  recommended  pract ice s  48 –  61.  Barac K and  Vil joen PC 
“Managing r i sk:  What  Should Interna l  A udi t  do?” 2015 (17)  SAJAAR  5  –  17;  Coetzee P  
and Lubbe D “The use of  Risk Management Pr incip les in  Planning an  Interna l  Audi t  
Engagement” 2013  (17)  South Afr ica Business Review  113 –  139; De Jager  H “Prac tic es  
of  Internal  Audi t ing in  South Afr ica” 2015 (17)  SAJAAR  1  –  4 .  
 
383 Internat ional S tandards  for  the  Professional Practice o f  Interna l  Audit  11.  
 
384 I t  i s  important  tha t  the governing body approve  an in terna l  aud it  char te r  tha t  def ines 
the role  and associa te d responsib il i t ies and authori ty  of  in terna l  audit ,  includ ing 
address ing i t s  ro le  with in combined  assurance  and the in ternal  audi t  s tandards to  be 
adopted.   Furthermore ,  the governing body should moni tor  on an ongoing basis that  an 
internal  aud it  fol lows a n approved,  r i sk -based,  in ternal  aud it  p lans  reviews the  
organisat iona l  r i sk  prof i le  regular ly ,  and  proposes  adap ta t ions  to  the  internal  aud it  p lan 




4.4.4 The regulations for reporting by public higher education 
institutions 
 
In 2014, the Regulations for reporting by public higher education 
institutions were published.385 These regulations repealed the Regulations 
for annual reporting by public higher education institutions of 2007.386  They 
provide guidance on the annual report which must be submitted by a public 
higher education institution and confirm the need to comply with King III.387 
The Regulations were issued in two parts, namely, regulations and an 
implementation manual. The 2014 Reporting Regulations confirm that the 
regulations apply to all public higher education institutions and that each 
institution must produce and submit an annual report to the Department of 
Higher Education and Training.388 The annual reporting requirements 
pertaining to the specific reports that must be included in the annual report 
are contained in clause 7 of the regulations.389 These regulations contain 
some contradictory statements as it seems that the regulations contained 
in part 1 and 2 must be complied with, while the implementation manual 
appears to act as a guideline only.390 The 2014 Reporting Regulations were 
based on King III, and there is a need for these regulations to be updated 
in line with King IV.391 The Regulations “encourage” compliance with King 
 
385 Government Gaze tte  Nr.  37726 (GN. 464)  9  June 201 4.  They became effect ive on 1 
January 2015.  
 
386 Government  Gaze tte  Nr .  30132 (GN. 691)  1  August  2007 .   
 
387 See 2014 Reporting Regulations  15  –  17 regard ing compliance wi th  King III .  
 
388 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  6 .  
 
389 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  9  –  10.    
 
390 Par t  1  and  2 is  con ta ined on  pages 4  –  10 whi le  the  implementat ion manua l  i s  
conta ined on pages 11 –  35 of  the  2014 Reporting Regula tions.  
 
391 The DHET has indicated tha t  the update of  the  2014 Report ing Regula tions,  in  l ine  
with  King  IV  was p lanned for  the  fu ture bu t  there was  no t imeline for  the publ ica t ion  of  




III.392 The author recommends that when the 2014 Reporting Regulations 
are amended by the DHET to comply with King IV, it should be stated 
clearly that public higher educations must comply with the King IV 
provisions. They must also outline the consequences of non-compliance. 
 
The implementation manual contained in the 2014 Reporting Regulations 
provides a guideline to higher education institutions rather than imposing a 
statutory framework. However, the 2014 Reporting Regulations do not 
always make it clear what are actual requirements and what are merely 
guidelines. This could result in confusion and non-compliance. Scrutiny of 
the annual reports of six public higher education institutions for 2015, 2016 
and 2017 indicate that institutions do not consistently report on the same 
matters. The reports were selected from the publicly available annual 
reports and provide a sample of reports from traditional (academic) and 
comprehensive university as well as one from the newly established 
universities. It is not the intention of this thesis to deal with these annual 
reports in detail, but rather to make certain observations as to the different 
ways in which universities report and on their compliance with the 2014 
Reporting Regulations. One of the six annual reports considered was more 
than double the volume of the other institution's reports. The Council report 
of one of them was only two pages long and provided an overview; while 
the other institution’s Counc il report, amongst other things, highlighted 
matters that were discussed and approved, the attendance of meetings and 
performance reviews.  The report of the chairperson of Council should be 
an integrated report that provides adequate and relevant information 
relating to the operations of the institution.393 Generally, the Council reports 
of all the institutions reviewed did not, in the author’s view, provide 
adequate information.  Amongst other things, this report should include 
information about the Council ’s sub-committees, and confirmation that 
 
392 See 2014 Reporting Regulations  17 .  Unfortunately ,  they  incorrec tly  re fer  to  the King  
III  princip les as only being appl icab le to  l i sted companies whereas King III  clear ly  
states tha t  they app ly to  al l  ent i t ies.  King III  17 .  
 




these committees are chaired by external individuals with appropriate skills 
and experience. In addition, reference should be made to significant 
matters on the agendas of these committees that remain unresolved as 
well as include a summary of the attendance of the members of these 
meetings. All the reports showed only partial compliance. Although they 
mentioned their committees, only two included their members so that 
independence could be established. There was no mention of agenda items 
that remained unresolved. It is highly unlikely that there would be no such 
matters in all of the institutions given the nature of a higher education 
institution.394 Moreover, the Council must give due consideration to and 
report on several other important matters.395  Where the audit report has 
been qualified, a statement to this effect, the reason for the qualification 
and the steps being taken to remedy the situation should be disclosed. 
Three of the universities provided statements, but they did not provide any 
reasons, nor the steps taken by the Council to remedy the situation. In 
addition, any large tenders that were awarded during the reporting year 
must be reported on, including the process followed and the composition of 
the tender committee. Only one university had a statement on the tenders 
awarded for two of its reporting years. However, it did not include the 
composition of the tender committee nor the process that was followed. 
Furthermore, a statement is required regarding how contracts are 
managed, the process of managing service level agreements and the 
monitoring of suppliers’ performance and workplace e thics.396 Three 
universities included one brief paragraph to confirm that they have a 
contract management process in place, but none of the universities 
reported on the process of managing service level agreements or the 
monitoring of suppliers’ performance and workplace ethics. Council should 
also indicate in its report the reasons for refusals of relevant requests for 
information that were lodged with an institution in terms of the Promotion of 
 
394 As  requ ired in  2014 Report ing Regulat ions  21.  
 
395 As  requ ired in  2014 Report ing Regulat ions  19 –  21.  
 




Access to Information Act 2002.397 Only one university made a statement 
relating to requests for access to information, but it did not include any 
information on the refusal of requests. Lastly, the Council should disclose 
any material or immaterial but often repeated regulatory penalties, 
sanctions, fines for contraventions or non-compliance with statutory 
obligations.398 Only one of the institutions referred to this information for all 
three years.399 Furthermore, only two of the six institutions contained a 
statement by the audit committee on how it had fulfilled its duties, while 
another institution did not include a report by the independent auditor in the 
annual report for one of the reporting years.400   
 
It was found that the Vice-Chancellor of one of these institutions was also a 
member of its audit committee in 2015, which contravenes the 2014 
Reporting Regulations. In 2016 and 2017, the same institution did not 
provide the names of the members of the audit committee, and thus its 
independence could not be verified. This may be due to the somewhat 
confusing way that the 2014 Reporting Regulations were drafted insofar as 
it is not clear what information is mandatory to include in the reports and 
what serves merely as a guideline. Some of the information contained in 
the annual reports complied with the 2014 Reporting Regulations, while 
other information was irrelevant or inadequate in many respects.  One of 
the institutions, for instance, included a report on its human resource 
division and went into excessive detail about its operating context, its sub-
committees, mentorship programme and induction. Not all of this 
information could be considered necessary for annual reporting purposes 
nor could some of these annual reports be construed as integrated 
reporting in line with the International Integrated Reporting Framework 
 
397 As  requ ired in  2014 Report ing Regulat ions  21.  
 
398 As  requ ired in  2014 Report ing Regulat i ons  21.   
 
399 As  requ ired in  2014 Report ing Regulat ions  21.  
 




(IIRF), which advocates a concise report as well as transparency.401 
Compliance with some aspects could not be verified in the reports reviewed 
due to insufficient information provided in the annual reports.  
 
None of the institutions was particularly transparent with regards to their 
involvement in commercial entities in which they hold shares. Although the 
2014 Reporting Regulations currently place no duty on higher education 
institutions to declare loans to commercial entities, it is recommended that 
they are changed to include reporting on any loans provided by institutions 
to commercial entities. Section 40(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 
allows a public higher education institution to enter into a loan or an 
overdraft agreement only with Council approval. It is not clear  whether this 
section was aimed only at instances where a higher education institution 
intends to obtain a loan or whether it also applies when the institution 
intends to provide a loan. In the author’s view, the wording of the section 
allows for a broader interpretation, namely, that it will apply to all instances 
where a public higher education institution enters into a loan agreement. 
Since public higher education institutions receive public funding, they are 
subject to public accountability. Therefore, all institutions should declare 
any loans they provide to commercial entities as well as any remuneration 
paid to directors of these commercial entities. In the second report 
considered, the institution declared its interest in several commercial 
entities and confirmed loans it had provided to those entities. 402  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations are silent on how compliance is checked 
or verified by the DHET. It is also silent on the consequences of non-
compliance by institutions. The DHET’s approach regarding compliance is 
 
401 See the IIRF ht tp: / / in tegra tedreport ing.org/wp -content /uploads/2015/03/13 -12-08-
THE-INTERNATIONAL -IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf  (Date of  use:  30 August  2018) .  
 
402 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below with  regards to  recommendat ions per ta i ning to  the 
2014 Report ing Regulat ions.  Some of  the recommendat ions include  clar i f ica t ion of  
confusing language;  making i t  c lear  tha t  there must  be compl iance to  the 2014 
Reporting Regulat ions ;  updating i t  to  comply wi th  King IV;  as wel l  as the inc lusion o f  




to have its University Branch analyse the annual reports received from 
public higher institutions to check for compliance.  In the event of non-
compliance, they write to the institution concerned and request them to 
address the areas of non-compliance. However, no information could be 
obtained regarding the mechanisms used to check and/or verify 
compliance. Furthermore, the DHET confirmed by way of an email that 
universities must comply with all of the provisions as contained in the 2014 
Reporting Regulations, despite this not being clearly stated in the 2014 
Reporting Regulations.403 Regulatory checks by the DHET to ensure 
compliance with legislation would, in the author’s, promote good 
governance in higher education institutions.  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations confirm that the Council of a public 
university is responsible for its governance while the executive 
management is responsible for effective management and administration of 
the institution.404 The integrated annual report should reflect how these 
duties are discharged and should be perceived as confirmation of sound 
governance. This makes accurate reporting and monitoring of the annual 
report so important.405   
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations require public higher education institutions 
to establish certain committees.406 Some of these committees are in line 
with the recommendations of King IV discussed above.407 King IV also 
recommends that committees be established to suit the specific needs of 
the particular organisation.408   
 
403 By way of  email  f rom Ms Rekha Bennideen da ted 20 October  2016.  
 
404 Section  27 and 30  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  of  1997.  
 
405 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  17 .  
 
406 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  23  -27.  
 
407 See para  4 .4 .3  above for  a  discussion  of  King IV .  
 




The 2014 Reporting Regulations also provide for a remuneration committee 
that must issue a remuneration report to explain the institution’s 
remuneration philosophy and how it has been implemented. 409 Higher 
education institutions should, in view of King IV, review not only their 
remuneration policies but also the way in which their remuneration 
committee functions.410 Each university is responsible for developing and 
implementing the specific terms of reference of the remuneration 
committee. Amongst other things, the institution will be responsible for 
considering and reporting to Council on matters relating to staff polic ies, 
remuneration and prerequisites, bonuses, executive remuneration, 
remuneration of Council members, retirement funds and medical aid. 
Moreover, any ex gratia payments must be fully explained and justified. 411 It 
was also apparent from the executive remuneration reports of these 
institutions that there were substantive differences between the 
remuneration of executives, which could, in my view, be interpreted as 
unfair remuneration practices. It was apparent that some public universities 
allow their executives to travel first or business class, yet this is not fully 
disclosed in their annual reports. This may have reflected in the financial 
statements, but it will only be apparent to someone with the relevant 
knowledge and experience relating to financial statements. There is a need 
for more transparency concerning remuneration practices. According to the 
2014 Reporting Regulations, the remuneration committee should issue a 
remuneration report to explain the institutions’ remuneration philosophy 
and how it has been implemented. Furthermore, the remuneration 
committee should explain its remuneration policy on base pay, including 
the use of appropriate benchmarks. In addition, policies regarding 
executive service contracts should be disclosed in the annual remuneration 
report, including the period of the contract and notice conditions. 412 One of 
 
409 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  23  –  24.  
 
410 See para  4 .4 .3  above for  a  discussion  of  King IV and the remunera tion  committee.  
 
411 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  23  –  24.  
 
412 2014 Report ing Reg ulat ing  21 –  22.  
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the institutions reported in two consecutive reporting years that it is not yet 
complying with the provisions of King III relating to remuneration. Only two 
of the institutions adequately reported on their remuneration practices and 
provided an explanation of their remuneration policies. King IV sets a 
higher standard with regards to fair and transparent remuneration 
practices, and it is a recommendation that the 2014 Reporting Regulations 
are brought in line with this code. Although it is not a requirement, it is a 
recommendation that for the sake of transparency, each institution should 
put a policy in place to confirm its commitment to follow fair and 
transparent remuneration practices as advocated in King IV.413 
 
The second committee that is prescribed by the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations is a finance committee, whose duty, amongst others, is to 
oversee the financial health of the higher education institution as a going 
concern as well as the operating and running costs and capital budgets. 414 It 
is also this committee’s responsibility to ensure that there are adequate 
accounting systems in place as well as adequate and suitably qualified 
staff to assist the committee in executing its mandate.415 It would appear 
from the annual reports of the two institutions that were considered for this 
research that only one had a finance committee. 
 
The third prescribed committee is a planning and resources committee, 416 
which is specific to higher education institutions. This committee works 
 
  
413 See discussion of  remunerat ion above in  para 4 .4 .3  above.  Chapter  6  be low makes 
recommendat ions  concerning remunerat ion commit tees of  public  higher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ion.  Amongst  o thers ,  i t  wil l  be a  recommendat ion that  al l  benef i t s  of  execu tive  
management and Counci l  members  should be  inc luded in  the  annual  reports  of  
ins t i tut ions ,  which inc lude interna tional  t rave l  benefi ts .  See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  
below for  recommendat ions in  th is  r egard .  
 
414 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  24 .  
 
415 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  24 .  Recommendations in  th is  regard  are made in  Chapter  
6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  be low; a lso see discussion  above in  para 4 .4 .3  on King IV and 
recommended committees.  
 




closely with the finance committee and is responsible for ensuring that the 
institution’s medium- and long-term strategic plans are in place. 
Furthermore, it assists the finance committee with the preparation o f the 
annual budget.417  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations also prescribe the Council membership 
committee, which is specific to higher education institutions and which 
considers nominations for vacancies on Council in terms of the relevant 
institutional statute.418 This important committee is responsible for checking 
and verifying nominations of candidates and ensuring that Council 
members are elected from the correct constituencies. Both of the 
institutions reviewed had a similar committee according to their annual 
reports.  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations also require that each higher education 
institution have an audit committee that provides oversight of the reporting 
process of the institution and is customised to that specific institution. 419 In 
terms of the Regulations, this committee must report on compliance with 
Chapter 3 of King III. This will have to be updated in line with King IV.420 
The annual report of the institution must indicate when the audit committee 
was established and how many members it has. All members of the audit 
committee must be independent of the public higher education institution 
and must not be employed by this institution. Furthermore, they must be 
specialists in their field. The audit committee operates in accordance with 
written terms of reference, confirmed by the Council. In accordance with 
 
417 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  24 .  
 
418 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  24 .  
 
419 2014 Reporting  Regula tions  24  –  26 .  See  a lso Van der  Nest  DP,  Thornhil l  C and de  
Jager  J  “Audit  Commit tees and Accountab il i ty  in  the  South  Afr ican Publ ic  Sector ”  
2008 (43)  JPA  545 –  558; Marx  B and Els G “The Role of  the Audit  Comm i t tee  in  
Strengthen ing Business Ethics  and  Protect ing Stakeholders’  In teres ts” 2009 (4)  African  
Journals  of  Business Ethics  5  –  15.   
 
420 See para  4 .4 .3  above for  the d iscuss ion of  the a udit  committee as recommended by 




the 2014 Reporting Regulations, the internal auditors monitor the operation 
of internal control systems and report findings and recommendations to 
management, the audit committee and the Council .421 The Council, 
operating through its audit committee, provides oversight of the financial 
reporting process. All higher education institutions must therefore  ensure 
that their audit committees and their policies and practices are reviewed to 
ensure compliance with King IV.  All six institutions that were scrutinised 
for this research had a combined audit and risk committee. 422 
 
The Regulations also prescribe a risk committee.423 Many universities have 
a combined audit and risk committee. This is accepted pract ice if, as 
suggested by King IV, the committee ensures that enough time is dedicated 
to risk management or the responsibilities associated with risk. 424 If an 
institution elects to have two separate audit and risk committees, at least 
one of the risk committee members should hold joint membership of the 
audit committee to ensure effective functioning. 425 It is the mandate of the 
risk committee to consider all issues of risk which may result in some form 
of exposure to the institution, like financial or legal exposure. The Council’s 
integrated report must indicate how this committee is constituted and what 
the reporting line is. The risk committee must maintain a reporting system 
that enables it to monitor changes in a public higher education’s 
institution’s risk profile and to gain assurance that risk management is 
effective. Furthermore, the committee establishes risk maturity levels and 
determines the institution’s risk appetite. It then considers all possible 
risks, the likelihood of their occurrence and, where applicable, establishes 
 
421 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  24  –  26.  
 
422 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below for  recommendations in  l ine wi th  King  IV .  
 
423 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  26  –  27.  
 
424 King IV 55; recommended prac tice 53.  
 




risk mitigation procedures. It also ensures that there are a risk 
management system and a risk mitigation procedure. 426   
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations also prescribe an Information Technology 
governance committee.427 Upon enquiry, it was established that not all 
universities have such a committee. Neither of the institutions whose 
annual reports were scrutinised seemed to have any form of IT committee. 
According to the guidelines provided in the 2014 Reporting Regulations, 
this committee should report to Council on the following matters: a 
statement that the Council is responsible for IT governance and how the 
Council has fulfilled this role; a statement that management is responsible 
for the implementation of an IT governance framework; comments on the 
alignment of IT with the performance and sustainability objectives of the 
public higher education institution; comments that Council moni tors and 
evaluates significant IT investment and expenditure; discusses how IT is an 
integral part of the public higher education institution’s risk management; 
monitoring that IT assets are managed effectively; and commenting on how 
the risk and audit committees assist the Council in carrying out its IT 




This chapter reviewed South African company law and corporate 
governance principles and developments, which may provide guidance on 
the governance of higher education institutions. The overview in this 
chapter serves as the basis for specific recommendations on governance in 
higher education institutions, outlined in Chapter 6 below. Various 
provisions of the Companies Act of 2008 were reviewed, and it was 
considered whether the Higher Education Act of 1997 would benefit from 
 
426 See Chapter  6 ,  para 6 .4 .2  below for  these recom mendat ions.   
 
427 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  27 .  
 




adding similar provisions, for example in respect of the duties and liabilities 
of directors; the fiduciary duties and duties of care and skill; 429 liability of 
directors;430 declaring a director delinquent,431 and the removal of directors. 432 
Common law fiduciary duties apply to Council members as well as the 
executive management of public higher education institutions. Although 
there is general recognition of their fiduciary duties and duties of care and 
skill, this author was not able to trace any case law relating to personal 
liability of Council members nor members of the executive management of 
higher education institutions for breaches of their fiduciary duties or their 
duty of care and skill.433  
 
In the author’s view, the Higher Education Act of 1997 will benefit from 
including similar provisions as part of the codification in the Higher 
Education Act of 1997. The business judgment rule in South Africa was 
also considered in this chapter, and it is recommended in chapter 6 below 
that a similar provision be included in the Higher Education Act of 1997 to 
provide that Council members and members of executive management who 
act with the required care and skill in their decision making, will be 
protected against personal liability.434   
 
 
429 See para  4 .2 .5  and  4.2 .6  above for  a  discussion  of  f iduc iary du ties  and the duty  o f  
care and sk il l .  
 
430 See para  4 .2 .8  above for  a  di scussion  of  the l iabil i t ies in  terms of  s  77.  
 
431 See para  4 .10 above for  a  discussion of  dec lar ing a director  del inquent.  
 
432 See para 4.9 for a discussion of removal of a director. 
 
433 Recen tly ,  the Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg  sued i t s  former cha ir  of  Counci l  as well  as  
a  member of  the execu tive management for  defrauding the Univers i ty  o f  mil l ions.  The  
universi ty  stated that  these  two members  owed f iduciary du ties  to  the un iversi ty  and by  
defrauding  the  Univer si ty  of  money,  they had breached the ir  du ties.  The  universi ty  was 
successfu l  in  ob tain ing  a summary judgment against  them, bu t  i t  i s  current ly  under  
appeal .  See  in  genera l  The Ci t i zen  “R14m stolen by Former UJ Execut ives to  be  
Recovered”  2018-08-08;  Nkosi  B “UJ Retr ieves  Sto len R14m from Execs”  2018-08-08 
The S tar .  
 




The regulation of the duties of bank directors in accordance with the Banks 
Act of 1990 was also considered.435 The Banks Act of 1990 must be read in 
conjunction with the Companies Act of 2008. Directors of banks are held to 
a higher standard than directors of other types of companies. The Banks 
Act of 1990 also provides for some corporate governance matters in 
addition to its provisions on the duties and liabilities of bank directors. This 
shows that aspects of governance can successfully be provided for in 
legislation, and it is submitted that the Higher Education Act of 1997 will 
benefit from the inclusion of similar provisions. The common law provisions 
still apply to banks and companies and the common law should be applied 
in conjunction with the statutory provisions. 436 This will also be the case in 
respect of higher education legislation. 
 
All public higher education institutions should be transparent with regards 
to the expenditure of public funding. However, the Higher Education Act of 
1997 does not specifically focus on accountability and fiduciary duties of 
the Council and executive management members, and this needs to be 
addressed. It is suggested that the Higher Education Act of 1997 include 
similar provisions to those contained in section 71, 75 – 77 of the 
Companies Act of 2008.437 
 
South African corporate governance, and specifically King IV, was then 
considered in order to examine its application to the higher education 
sector.438 Corporate failures in South Africa and especially the recent 
Steinhoff matter indicate that ineffective corporate governance still occurs.  
The “soft law” approach in may not be the correct approach since there is 
very little or no evidence of accountability.439 In Steinhoff specifically, it 
 
435 The comparison wi th  the Banks Act of  1990  i s  discussed  in  para 4 .3  above.  
 
436 See para  4 .3  above for  a  compar ison with  th e Banks Act of  1990.  
 
437 See para  4 .2 .5  above for  a  discussion  of  these p rovis ions.  
 
438 King IV i s  discussed in  para 4 .4 .3  above.  
 
439 See para  3 .3 .2(b) .  
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seems clear that the board and the board committees contributed to the 
accounting scandal and the subsequent losses suffered by many people. 
However, so far, there has been no indication that any of these executives 
will be held accountable for the role that they played in the company’s 
collapse. Legislation providing for both civil and criminal actions against 
these individuals exists to ensure accountability, yet so far, no action has 
been instituted against any of these individuals. Although legislation will 
not be able to prevent criminal conduct, the author is of the opinion that it 
should augment the soft law approach. 
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations for public higher education institutions still 
provides for compliance with King III. It is clear that the Regulations should 
be revised to align with King IV. It was shown that the Regulations demand 
more transparency with regards to reporting, as well as compliance with 
corporate governance principles. 440 However, it is, not clear from the 2014 
Reporting Regulations, which provisions are requirements, and which are 
merely recommendations. It is specifically suggested that there should be 
more transparency concerning remuneration and what benefits are 
received by Council members as well as members of the executive 
management. The inclusion of a requirement that all public institutions 
must declare any shareholding or other interests they have in commercial 
entities, including any loans that were provided to these entities, is also 
proposed.  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations do not address the consequences of non-
compliance by higher education institutions. The DHET processes to 
evaluate annual reports and verify compliance with the provisions of the 
2014 Reporting Regulations may need to be strengthened. In the author’s 
opinion, the Regulations should be revised to ensure clear reporting 
requirements as well as consequences of non-compliance by these 
institutions. Private universities in South Africa, which have the same focus 
 
 
440 See para  4 .4 .4  above for  a  discussion  of  the 2014 Reporting  Regulat ions .  
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and objectives as public universities, are governed by the Companies Act 
of 2008, and their directors and management are treated like the di rectors 
and management of any other company.441 It could be argued that they are 
subject to a better corporate governance regime as the Companies Act of 
2008 provide provisions to which these private higher education institutions 
must comply with.442 In addition, it could be argued that in light of this, that 
private higher education institutions are subject to the Companies Act of 
2008 while public universities are not. Their standards are not measured in 
the same way.  Private higher education institutions are measured against 
both common law as well as statutory provisions contained in the 
Companies Act of 2008 while the public higher education institutions are 
measured against the common law and the Higher Education Act of 1997.  
It is not recommended in the research that public higher education 
institutions be registered as companies. Instead, this research has 
revealed that the higher education environment may benefit from amending 
the Higher Education Act of 1997 to include similar provisions as those 
contained in the Companies Act of 2008 to ensure high levels of 
transparency, accountability and corporate governance practices. 
 
441 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(a)  above  for  a  discuss ion of  pr ivate higher  educat io n.  
 
442 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  above for  a  discussion  these  provisions.  
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The two jurisdictions chosen for the comparative analysis of corporate 
governance in the higher education sector are the State of Georgia in the 
United States of America (USA) and the province of Ontario, Canada. The 
regulation relating to each jurisdiction’s corporate law, 1 corporate 
governance and higher education is compared to that of South Africa.  
 
The USA has been selected because of its interesting dual legal system, 
which comprises both federal and state law.2 Further to this, the USA also 
has a history of segregation in higher education, which can be compared to 
the pre-1994 era in South Africa. More specifically, the research focuses on 
the State of Georgia, which has its own state Consti tution3 and the Official 
Code of Georgia 2017.4  The Georgia Code of 2017 regulates corporate law 
in this state, including public higher education institutions, which are either 
for-profit or not-for-profit corporations.5 This comparison has been included 
to provide an example of a jurisdiction where public higher education 
institutions are successfully run as either for-profit or not-for-profit 
corporations. The inclusion of this comparison is not to suggest that public 
higher education institutions in South Africa should be corporatised, but 
 
1 Corpora te law wil l  be d iscussed  in  para 5 .2 .3  be low.  
 
2 As of  Sep tember  2014 ,  the USA consists  of  50 states  (one  of  which is  Georgia) .  
Forty-eigh t  of  these  s ta tes are  s i tuated  in  cont inental  USA, wi th  Alaska and  Hawai i  
being the other  two s ta tes.  For  a  background on the s tates ,  see  
ht tps: / /www.reference.com/geography/52 -states-america-4f1e3bb76186b443  (Date of  
use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
3 See the Georg ia Const i tut ion on h ttp : / / law. just ia .com/consti tut ion/georgia  (Date of  
use :  28 August  2018) .  Hereinaf ter  referred to  as  the Georgia Consti tu t ion ,  wh ich 
became effect ive on 1  July 1983.  
 
4Hereinaf ter  referred  to  as the  Georgia Code of  2017 on  
https: / / law.just ia .com/codes/geor gia/2017/  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  This Code i s  
updated annual ly  and  for  the purposes of  th is  research,  the 2017 Code was used .  
 
5 See para  5 .2 .3(c)  below for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Georgia Code of  2017.  
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rather to provide an example of how effectively public higher educations 
can operate when legislation and processes are in place to ensure proper 
governance and efficient management of institutions. Furthermore, there is 
little government intervention in the affairs of these public institutions, and 
many of the governing boards, which are responsible for the governance 
and functioning of these institutions, have ensured that essential policies, 
procedures and programmes have been implemented to ensure the smooth 
operation of the institution. 
 
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) plays an important role in 
governing corporate affairs in the USA.6  It is the leading corporate statute 
upon which various states rely with regards to corporate law. However, the 
MBCA has no legal force unless it is enacted by state legislature.7 A 
mandatory regime of corporate governance is followed in the USA, whereas 
Canada and South Africa have a partially enabling regime. 8  Each state in 
the USA is responsible for its own corporate law. The place of incorporation 
of a company may be elected and does not have to coincide with the state 
where the company is situated.9 Various statutory instruments influence 
corporate governance and securities laws in the USA, and they are also 
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 10 This 
chapter considers selected statutes, which introduced major changes to the 
regulation of financial practice and corporate governance. It should be 
 
6 The  MBCA is annota ted from t ime to  t ime.   The most  recen t  vers ion  was updated  in  
2016.  Georgia  i s  one  of  the  sta tes  t ha t  model led i ts  business code  on the MBCA. The 
MBCA is d iscussed more ful ly  in  para 5 .2 .3(b)  below.  
7 This i s  d iscussed more  fully  in  para 5 .2 .3(b)  be low.  
 
8 The corporate governance r eg ime in  Canada is  d i scussed more fu lly  in  para 5 .3 .4  
below. See Anand AI “An Analys is of  Enabl ing v Mandatory Corpora te Governance  
structures  post  Sarbanes -Oxley” 2006 (13)  Delaware Journal of  Corporate Law  234.  
 
9 Backer  LC Comparat ive Corporate Law: Uni ted States,  European Union,  China and  
Japan (Caro lina Academic Press 20 02)  64.  
 
10 For  ins tance,  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2010,  discussed  below in  para  5 .2 .4  below;  




noted that these statutes also had an impact on developments in Canada in 
these areas.  
 
In the USA, higher education is regulated by both federal and state law. 
Public higher education institutions in the USA are autonomous, and the 
external governing bodies of these institutions operate at arms-length from 
them.11 The institutional governance structures of higher education 
institutions are similar to those of South African public higher education 
institutions.  
 
Canada is divided into ten provinces and three territories.12 The Canadian 
Constitution is the supreme law of that country and comprises both the 
Constitution Act of 1867 and the Constitution Act of 1982. Canada has a 
democratic government consisting of three branches − the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary.13  Further to this, Canada follows a federal 
system of governance, which means that both the provincial and territorial 
legislatures have their own authority to make laws. 14 Canada was chosen 
for this comparison because the research undertaken for this study, 
including discussion with the Ontario Minister of Training and Colleges  has 
indicated that it has the lowest level of governance interference into the 
affairs of its universities. The reason for the selection of Ontario is that 
public universities in this province are incorporated, not-for-profit 
corporations and must, therefore, adhere to corporate laws such as the 
 
11 See para  5 .5 .1  be low for  more o n the h igher  educat ion in  the USA.  
 
12 Shanahan T and Jones GA “Shif t ing Roles and Approaches:  Government Coord ina ting  
of  Post-Secondary  Educat ion in  Canada,  1995  –  2006” 2007  (26)  Higher Education  
Research and Development  31 –  32 .  
 
13 Hereinaf ter  referred t o  as the Canadian Const i tu t ion .  See Gal l  GL The Canadian  
Legal Sys tem  (Carswel l  1995)  38;  for  more  on the Canadian Const i tu t ion  see,  
ht tp: / /www.jus t ice.gc.ca /eng/cs j - sjc/ jus t /05.h tm l  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
14 For  more on the Canadian Const i tu t ion,  see h t tp : / /www.just ice.gc.ca /eng/csj -
sjc/ jus t /05.h tml  (Date o f  use :  28 August  2018);  Clement WHP The Law of  the Canadian 
Const i tu t ion  (Carswel l  Company  1904)  1  –  32 ;  Oliver  P ,  Macklem P and Des Rosiers  N  
The  Oxford Handbook  of  the  Canadian  Consti tut ion  (Oxford  2017)  1  –  8 ;  Beat ty  D 
“Canadian Const i tu t iona l  Law in  a  Nutshe ll”  1998 (36)  Alberta Law Review  605  –  629.   
268 
 
Ontario Corporations Act of 199015 as well as the Charities Accounting Act 
of 199016 in addition to their own incorporating legislation. These public 
universities are managed like corporations, apparently very successfully, 
with very little involvement of the Minister of Training, Colleges and 
Universities.17 At this juncture, it should be mentioned that these 
corporations are not managed as commercial companies, but as well-
functioning public universities funded by the state where they are 
incorporated. The way in which these institutions are managed provides an 
example of effective institutional autonomy where the public universit ies 
operate at arm’s length from the government.  
  
As in the USA, Canada also has federal and provincial legislation, and 
corporations can choose where to incorporate. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the most critical legislation considered is the Canada Business 
Corporation Act of 1985 (CBCA),18 which is applicable to all federally 
incorporated corporations; the Ontario Business Corporation Act  of 1990 
(OCBA),19 which is applicable to all corporations with share capital; and the 
Ontario Corporations Act,20 for all other corporations where the OBCA is not 
 
15 Ontar io  Corpora tions Act of  R.S.O.  c  .38 1990.  Here inaf ter  r eferred to  as the Ontar io  
Corpora tions  Act.  For  the  sake  of  clar if ica t ion,  the incorpora ting  ac ts  of  these 
universi t ies  make reference  to  the Ontar io  Corporations  Act  R.S.O.  1970 c.89.  T he  
Corpora tions Act of  1990 did not  repea l  and rep lace the Corporat ion s Act of  1970.  The 
Corpora tions Act of  1990 is  a  cont inuation of  the 1970 and 1980 (R.S.O.  1980 c95)  
vers ions .  I t  has  therefore been  amended  throughout the years.  The Ontar io  Corpora tion s  
Act  i s  discussed  in  para 5 .3 .2  below.  
 
16 Char i t ies Account ing Act of  R.S.O.  c .C10 1990.  Here inaf ter  referred to  as the  
Char i t ies Accounting Act.  
 
17 See the Min ister  of  Tra ining,  Colleges and Univers i t ies websi te  for  more informat ion  
https: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/minis try - train ing-colleges-un ivers i t ies  (Date of  use:  28  
August  2018) .  
 
18 Canada Business Corporation  Act of  R.S.C 1985,  c  C -44.  Here inaf ter  referred  to  as  
the CBCA.  
 
19 Ontar io  Business  Corporation Act of  R.S.O.  c .  B.16 1990.  Hereinaf t e r  referred to  as  
the OBCA.  
 




applicable.21 The Ontario Not-For-Profit-Corporations Act of 2010 (ONCA),22 
which will be relevant to corporations without share capital, including 
higher education institutions, is yet to be enacted.23 The ONCA will have a 
significant impact on not-for-profit companies, including public higher 
education institutions in Ontario. Amongst other things, the ONCA sets out 
the fiduciary duties and the duties of care and skill for not -for-profit 
organisations in Ontario, which will include higher education institutions. 24 
 
The corporate governance framework in Canada25 is similar to that in South 
Africa and is principles-based, which differs from the mandatory regime in 
the USA.26 All for-profit-companies and especially listed companies in 
Canada are subject to various other corporate law statutes that also affect 
their corporate governance.27  Corporate governance regulation in Canada 
is partially enabling28 and fragmented29 and consists of statutes like the 
CBCA and the OBCA and securities legislation. The regulation of directors 
is contained in the CBCA, OBCA as well as the ONCA. A similarity between 
the USA, Canada and South Africa is the inclusion of a business judgment 
rule in legislation, although it differs between jurisdictions. An important 
 
21 This wi l l  include higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions.  See para 5 .5 .1  be low for  a  discuss ion  
of  higher  education in  the USA.  
 
22 Ontar io  Not-For-Prof i t -Corporations Act S.O 2010.  Here ina f ter  refer red to  as the  
ONCA. Once  in  force ,  i t  wil l  prov ide  a  modern legal  f ramework  for  not -for-prof i t  
corporat ions,  includ ing chari tab le corporat ions .  I t  i s  discussed more fu lly  in  cl ause 5 .4  
below.  
 
23 The ONCA was passed in  2010 but  has not  yet  come in to operat ion.  
 
24 The ONCA is discussed  more ful ly  in  para 5 .2 .3  below.  
 
25 See  para  5 .3 .2  be low for  a  discussion  of  the  corpora te  governance  framework in  
Canada.  
 
26 See  para 5 .2 .4  be low f or  a  discussion of  the corporate governance framework in  the  
USA.  
 
27 Beside the OBCA and  the CBCA,  the  Insurance Act R.S.O.  1990 C I .8;  Income Tax  
Act  R.S.O.  C I .2;  Chari t ies Account ing Act  R.S.O.  1990 c .C10  to  name a  few.   
 
28 Anand 2006 (31)  Delaware Journal o f  Corpora te Law  234.  
 




difference is that the rule has been partially codified in the Companies Act 
of 2008 in South Africa,30 and in Canada generally (by federal law) 31 and in 
Ontario specifically (by provincial legislation), 32 in conjunction with the 
common law, while in the USA  common law is still also relied on. 33 The 
business judgment rule originated in the USA, and its interpretation there 
has influenced its application in both Canada and South Africa. 34 
 
Similar to the situation in Canada, the regulation of higher education in the 
USA is left to the states rather than being federally governed. Cont rol of 
public higher education institutions in the USA has been achieved through 
the creation of external governing boards. 35 These boards are very similar 
to those in Canada. Public higher education 36 institutions in Georgia have a 
considerable amount of institutional autonomy and are governed by the 
Georgia Board of Regents,37 which is the counterpart of the South African 
Department of Higher Education and Training.38 The Board of Regents 
allows its public universities to manage themselves as they deem fit, in the 
best interests of the institution, and will only undertake an investigation into 
the affairs of an institution if it considers it necessary. This includes the 
 
30 Section  76(4)  of  the Companies Act of  2008.  
 
31 Section  123 of  the CBCA.  
 
32 The common law is s t i l l  app lied in  bo th Sout h  Afr ica and Canada.  See s 135 of  the  
OBCA.  
 
33 P into  AR and Branson  DM Unders tanding  Corporate Law  4 t h  ed (Lexis Nexis  2013)  
3 .  
 
34 The Business Judgment  Rule is  discussed more fully  in  para 5 .4  be low.  
 
35 Fowles  J  Publ ic  Higher  Educat ion Governance:  An Empir ical  Examination  (Published  
Doctoral  thesis  Universi ty  of  Kentucky 2010)  1 .  
 
36 As  in  South  Afr ica ,  pr ivate inst i tu t ions are a lso corporat ions.   
 
37 See ht tp: / /www.usg.edu/regen ts /  for  more on the Board of  Regents ( Date of  use:  28  
August  2018) .  Now it  should be  mentioned  that  the  Board of  Regents does no t  gover n  
any pr iva te h igher  education ins t i tut ions.   
 




institutions being responsible for choosing their own form of institutional 
governance.39 
 
Higher education in Canada is not federally controlled. Instead, its 
regulation is left up to the provinces.40 In Ontario, the Ministry of Training, 
College and Universities are responsible for the administration of laws 
relating to higher education. This Ministry is similar to the Department of 
Higher Education and Training in South Africa (DHET), except for the fact 
that the Ontario Ministry does not involve itself in universities’ activities or 
their management. Most importantly, the Ontario Ministry has no power to 
place universities under administration or to dissolve their boards 41 as in 
South Africa.42  Institutional governance of universities is in some instances 
similar to the position in South Africa, but it seems that institutions have 
higher levels of autonomy to manage their own affairs than is the case in 
South Africa. There are various examples of Ministerial overreach in South 
Africa; the impact this has on public higher education in South Africa is an 
overregulated system of higher education. However, considering the 
current state of public higher education institutions, there might be a need 
for more regulation in South Africa than in other jurisdictions.43 The Ontario 
Ministry will not involve itself in the affairs of public universities unless i t is 
requested to do so, and does not have the authority or power to take over 
 
39 See the  Board of  Regents Po licy  Manual s  2 .7 .  
40 Shanahan  T,  Nilson M and Broshko L The Handbook of  Canadian  Higher  Education  
Law (McGill -Queen  Univers i ty  Press 2016)  11 .  
 
41 The Board i s  the counterpar t  of  the Counci l  in  South Afr ican univers i t ies.  
 
42 See ht tps: / /www.ontar io .ca/page/min is try - train ing-col leges-un ivers i t ies  (Date of  use :  
28 August  2018) .  This i s  discussed  more fu lly  below in  para 5 .5 .2 .  
 
43 For  example ,  in  2015  Blade  Nzimande,  Min ister  of  Higher  Education  and Tra ining ,  
announced a  0% fee increase for  2016 but  admit ted that  i t  was no t  known where the  
shortfal l  would  come from.  Fur thermore,  the decision  to  invest igate the affa irs  of  a  
universi ty  and/or  place  an  inst i tu t ion  under  administrat ion i s  tha t  o f  the Min is ter .  
Another  example i s  the  proposed  im plementa t ion of  the  Central  Appl ica t ion System 
(CAS) where the Min is try  wi l l  prov ide for  a  central  poin t  for  al l  h igher  education 
applicants.  They wi l l  therefore provide for  the oversigh t  and admin istrat ion of  a l l  
applicat ions,  ensuring  a  cer ta in  amount of  control  of  the administrat ion  and placement  




the management of a university in the event of any allegations of 
mismanagement.  
 
5.2 THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE USA 
 
5.2.1 Introduction to the American legal system 
  
Like South Africa and Canada, the American legal system also has an 
English heritage44 and is based on principles found in the English common 
law.45 Although the Constitution and other statute laws supersede common 
law, the courts still apply common law principles. 46 The Constitution of the 
United States47 was adopted in 1787 and ratified in 1788,48 is the supreme 
law49 of the land. It is one of the oldest written constitutions of the western 
world.50 The USA Constitution provides certain powers to the federal 
 
44 The USA was founded as a  un ion of  three colonies tha t  claimed independence from 
the Bri t i sh  Crown in  1776 where  the  Declarat ion of  Independence also or igina ted f rom.  
 
45 Hal l  KM, Wiecek WM and Finkelman P American Legal History  2 n d  ed (Oxford  
Univers i ty  Press 1996)  4 .  
 
46 The common law wil l  be considered where  there i s  no leg isla t ion  by Congress,  where 
there  are  voids,  or  the Const i tu t ion  i s  s i len t .  See  the  United  Sta tes Departm ent of  State  
“Out l ine of  the US Legal  System” (2004)  7  http: / /u fdc.uf l .edu /AA00011695/00001   
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
47 Hereinaf ter  referred to  as the  USA Consti tut ion .  ht tp : / /consti tu t ionus.com/  (accessed :  
13 July 2016) .  For  more on the Amer ican Const i tu t ion in  general ,  see  Chemerinsky E  
Const i tu t ional Law: Principles  and Pol ic ies  5 t h  ed (Wol ters Kluwer 2015) .  
 
48 United States Depar tment of  State  “Outl ine  of  the US Legal  Sy stem” (2004)  7 .  See  
http: / /usa.usembassy.de /etex ts /gov/ou tl ine lega lsystem.pdf  (Date of  use :  28 August  
2018) .  The  Declara t ion  of  Independence  au thored by Thomas Jef ferson ,  was  signed in  
1776.  Although  i t  has  no bind ing au thori ty ,  i t  i s  of ten  invoked by  cour ts  and  played a 
role  in  the Const i tu t ion  that  was later  promulgated.  See Chemer insky Const i tu t ional 
Law: Princip les and Pol icies  9 .   
 
49 Art ic le  VI of  the USA Const i tu t ion s tates  th is .  
 
50 The USA Consti tut ion organises the USA’s  bas i c pol i t ical  inst i tut ions and compr ises  
seven  ar t icles.  The  Consti tu t ion  i s  based on  the separat ion of  powers  of  the leg is la t ive ,  
execut ive and judicia l  branches of  government .  See in  gene ral ,  Von Mehren AT and 
Murray  PL Law in the  Uni ted S tates 2nd  ed  (Cambridge ,  2007)  103;  Duigen B The US 
Const i tu t ion and Const i tut ional law  (Bri t tann ica Education Press 2013) .  3  –  9 .  In 
Marbury v  Madison  5  (1803)  US (1  Cranch)  137 i t  was ru led  tha t  the  fed era l  judic iary  
may review the consti tut iona li ty  of  ac t ions taken by t he legis lat ive and execu tive 
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government and other powers to the various states. 51 The executive powers 
have not only been granted in terms of the USA Constitution, but also by 
the implied separation of powers doctrine. 52 The USA Bill of Rights plays a 
central role in American law and government and remains a fundamental 
symbol of the freedoms and culture of the nation. 53 States have their own 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. The states are therefore 
 
branches of  the  nat ional  government .  See May CN and  Ides A Consti tu t ional Law:  
Nat ional  Power and Federa li sm  (Aspen Law and  Business 1998)  2;  9  –  12.  
 
51 Von Mehren and Murray Law in  the  United  Sta tes  103.   
 
52 Each branch was prov ided wi th  cer ta in  responsib il i t ies,  but  to  ensure that  no branch  
became too powerfu l ,  the USA Const i tu t ion embedded var ious ways in  which the  
branches can  oversee each other .  The  USA f i rmly bel ieves  in  th e ru le  of  law and  op ted  
for  a  sys tem where the thr ee  basic  functions of  government  namely leg is la t ive,  
execut ive and jud ic ial  were d ivided among three separate  and coord inated branches of  
government .  For  more on the separa t ion of  powers ,  see  in  general  
ht tp: / /www.usconsti tut ion.net/const top_sepp.html  (Date of  use:  28 August  2018) .   Thi s  
impl ied doctr ine v iews federa l  powers as d ivided among the judicia l ,  execu tive and  
legis lat ive branches.  See Weaver  RL e t  al .  Ins ide Consti tut ional Law:  What Mat ters 
and Why (Wol ters Kluwer 2009)  93.  The  doctr ine also  governs how the  branches share 
power and  work together  cooperat ively .  See in  genera l ,  Duigen  The US Consti tut ion 
and Const i tu t ional Law  x i i i ;  and United Sta tes Depar tment of  State  “Outl ine of  the US 
Legal  System” (2004)  7 ;  h t tp : / /u fdc.uf l .edu /AA00011695/00001   (Date of  use :  28  
August  2018) .7 ;  Keefe  WJ and Ogul MS The American  Legisla t ive  Process  9 t h  ed  
(Pren tice-Hal l  Inc 1997)  47.  The div ision  of  powers among the branches was des igned  
to  crea te a  sys tem of  checks and ba lances and lessen the possib il i ty  of  tyrannica l  rule ;  
in  order  for  the  government to  ac t ,  a t  leas t  two branches  must  agree.  See Chemer insky 
Const i tu t ional Law: Principles and Polici es  1  -  3 .  The rule of  law is  a  pr inc iple in  
terms of  which al l  people and jur is t ic  ent i t ies are accountab le to  laws tha t  are  
publical ly  promulgated,  equally  enforced,  independent ly  adjud icated  and  which  are  
consis ten t  with  in ternat ional  human r ights pr inc i ples.  See more information on the rule  
of  law on  http : / /www.uscourts .gov/educat ional -resources/educat ion a l-
act ivi t ies /overv iew -rule - law (Date of  use:  28 August  2018) .  
 
53 See the  Bi l l  of  Rights on 
https: / /www.consti tut ionfacts.com/con ten t/consti tu t ion /f i les /Consti tut ion_Bi llOfRights
.pdf  (Date of  use:  28  August  2018) .  The  Bi l l  of  Righ ts compr ises of  the fol lowing 
amendment I :  f reedom of  rel igion,  speech,  and the press ;  r ights of  assembly and 
peti t ion ;  amendment I I :  r ight  to  bear  arms; amendment I I I :  housing  of  so ldiers ;  
amendment IV: search and arrest  wa rrants ;  amendment V: r ights in  cr iminal  cases ;   
amendment VI:  r ights to  a  fa ir  t r ia l ;  amendment VII :  r ights in  c ivi l  cases ;  amendment  
VIII :  bai l s ,  f ines,  and punishments;  amendment  IX: r ights reta ined by  th e people;  and  
amendment X: powers re tained by the  states and the people.  For  more on the Bi l l  of  
Righ ts see in  genera l  Curr ie  DP The Consti tut ion  of  the United Sta tes:  A  Primer for the 
People  2nd ed (The Univers i ty  of  Chicago Press  200 0)  10 –  12;  26 .  For  a  discussion of  
the South Afr ican Bil l  o f  Rights,  see Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .2  above.  The Const i tu t ion 
provides the cen tra l  government  with  a  l imi ted l is t  of  powers.  For  more on federa l i sm 
in  general ,  see  Backer  Comparative Corporate  Law: Uni ted S tates,  Europ ean Union,  
China  and Japan  64.  “Federa li sm” genera l ly  refers to  the ver t ica l  div is ion of  author i ty ;  
Chemerinsky Const i tu t ional Law:  Princ iples  and Policies  3 .  The  matter  of  McCulloch v 




empowered to pass, enforce and interpret laws as long as they are not in 
violation of the USA Constitution.54 USA federalism was established in the 
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.55 In terms of these provisions, 
national powers are delegated.56 Federal authority is limited to the powers 
granted to it by the USA Constitution. The authority of the states, on the 
other hand, consists of all the powers not granted to the federal 
government.57  Furthermore, the powers of the federal government are 
regulated by the principles of separation of powers and concurrent 
authority.58 Although significant authority was granted to the federal 
authority, broad powers were also granted to the states. 59 The supremacy 
clause in the Constitution forbids any state law to contradict either the  USA 






54 For  more on federal ism, see in  general ,  h t tp : / / system.uslegal .com/federal ism/  (Date 
of  use :  28 August  2018) ;  Fletcher v  Peck  10 US (6 Cranch)  87 (1810)  where the federal  
judic iary for  the f ir s t  t ime s truck down a s tate  law on the ground tha t  i t  v io lated the  
USA Const i tu t ion .  See  May and Ides  A Const i tu t ional Law: National Power and  
Federal ism  18.  
 
55 Backer  Comparative Corpora te Law United  States,  European Union,  China and 
Japan:  Cases and Ma teria ls 557 –  571;  and more specif ica l ly  the mat ter  of  Louis K.  
Ligget  Co.  v  Lee ,  288 US 517,  53 S Ct.  481 (1933) .  
 
56 Keefe and Ogul  The American Legis lat ive  Process  49 -  50.   
 
57 Ten th amendment  to  the USA Const i tu t ion  states  the  fo l lowing: “The powers no t  
delega ted to  the Un i ted  Sta tes by the Consti tut ion,  nor  prohib ited by  i t  to  the s tates,  
are reserved to  the  s ta tes respect ive ly,  or  to  the people.”  
 
58 Von Mehren and Murray Law in  the  United  Sta tes  105.  
 
59 Von Mehren and Murray Law in the United S tates  106.  These powers are 
encapsulated  in  each s ta tes’  Const i tut ion.   
  
60 Art icle  VI ,  para  2  of  the USA Const i tu t ion is  commonly refer red to  as the 
“supremacy c lause .”  I t  es tabl i shes tha t  the federa l  Const i tu t ion wil l  take precedence  
over  s tate  laws and even s tate  const i tu t ions .  The or ig ins of  the law of  federa l  
supremacy can be traced back to  the op inions of  the two judges in  the mat ters of  
McCul loch  v Maryland  17 US (4 Wheat )  316 (1819)  and Gibbons v  Ogden  22 US (9  
Wheat)  1  (1824) .  In  general ,  see  May and Ides  Const i tu t ional Law: Nat ional Power and  




5.2.2 Corporate Law in Georgia 
 
(a) Background and incorporation of a corporation 
 
The federal government of the USA has the power to pass corporate law 
through the commerce clause in article 1, section 8 of the USA 
Constitution.61 However, regulation of corporate law is usually left up to 
individual states, with securities regulation as their federal counterpart. 62 
Corporation laws are general, and the incorporator decides as to which 
state the corporation will be incorporated in. This means that a corporation 
does not need to be incorporated in the state that it is situated in. Each 
corporation will thus be formed in terms of the corporate laws of its chosen 
state of incorporation.63 Corporations are subject to the internal affairs 
doctrine.64 This doctrine prescribes among other things how the internal 
affairs relating to the directors, shareholders and officers are governed by 
the state law of incorporation.65 In selecting a jurisdiction to incorporate in, 
 
61 Winship  V “Teaching  Federa l  Corporate Law” 2013  (8)  Journal  of  Business  & 
Technology Law 218.  See ar t icle  1 ,  s  8  of  the USA Cons ti tut ion  
https: / /www.law.corne ll .edu/consti tut ion/ar t icle i#sect ion8  (Date of  use :  28 August  
2018) .  See Watk ins MW “Federa l  Incorpora tion (II)”  1918 -1919 Michigan  Law Review  
145 –  164 regard ing his tory of  the Congress’s  power over  c ommerce.  For  more  on the  
commerce clause in  genera l ,  see  ht tps : / /www.bri tann ica.com/topic/commerce -c lause  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
62 Winsh ip 2013 Journal of  Business & Technology Law  217 ;  Pin to  and Branson  
Understanding  Corpora te Law  3; Park  JL “Reassessing  the Dist inction  Between 
Corpora te and Secur i t ies Law” 2017 UCLA Law Review  118 –  182.  
 
63  Tung F “Before Competi t ion :   Orig ins  of  th e Interna l  Affair s Doctr ine” 2006 Iowa J 
Corp .  
 
64 Backer  Comparat ive Corpora te  Law:  United  States ,  European  Union,  China and  
Japan  165.  
 
65 Harvard Law Review “Internal  Affa irs doct r ine:   Theore tical  Just if icat ions and  
Tenta tive Explanat ions for  i t s  cont inu ed Primacy” 2002 1480.  For  more  on the interna l  
af fair s  doctr ine,  see  in  genera l  Stevens M “In ternal  Affa ir s Doctr ine :  Californ ia  versus 
Delaware in  a  Fight  fo r  the Right  to  Regulate  Fore ign Corporat ions”  2007 BCL Rev 
1047 -  1087;  Beve r idge NP “The In terna l  Affair s Doctr ine:   The Proper  Law of  a  
Corpora t ion” (1989)  The Business Lawyer  693  -  719;  Balouziyeh JMB A Legal Guide  to  
Uni ted Sta tes Business  Organiza tions:   The Law of  Partnersh ips,  Corporat ions and  
Limi ted Liabi l i ty  Corporat ions  2 n d  ed  (Springer  2013)  50;  Tung (2006)  Iowa J Corp  L  
39 -  51;  Choi SJ  and Guzman AT “Choice and Federal  In terven tion in  Corpora te Law” 




a corporation will select corporate law rules that maximise the interests of 
shareholders. Therefore, corporations have strong incentives to choose to 
incorporate in a state that maximises shareholder welfare.66 Any disputes 
relating to a corporation’s internal affairs will be dealt with in accordance 
with the law of the incorporating state. 67 Many corporations tend to 
incorporate primarily in the state of Delaware because of the benefits of 
incorporation in this state.68 For instance, four69 of the largest companies 
situated in the State of Georgia are incorporated in the State of Delaware.70  
In contrast, in South Africa, all companies must be registered and 
 
66 Choi and Guzman 2001 Virginia  Law Review  961 –  962.  
 
67 The USA has  a  trad i t ion of  regu l a t ing corporate  gove rnance at  s tate  leve l ,  as  
ref lected  in  Cort  v  Ash  422 US 66,  84  1975.  In  th is  Supreme Court  judgement,  the  
fol lowing was conf irmed: “Corporat ions are crea tures of  sta te  law,  and investors  
commit the ir  funds to  corporate directors on the  understanding that ,  except  where  
federa l  law express ly  requires cer ta in  responsib il i t ies of  direc tors with  respec t  to  
stockholders,  state  law wil l  govern the internal  affa ir s  of  the corporation .” See in  
genera l ,  Winsh ip 2013 Journal of  Business & Technolo gy Law  218 ;  Gordon JN and 
Ringe WG The Oxford Handbook on Corporate La w and Governance  (Oxford  
Univers i ty  Press 2018)  1065.  
 
68 The focus of  the comparative ana lysis of  the US is  the state  of  Georgia .  But,  br ief ly ,  
there are a  few reasons  for  companies to  i ncorporate main ly in  the  s ta te  of  Delaware :  
the f ir s t  i s  tha t  the tran sac tion cost  explanation of  the corpora te char ter  prov ides a  
differen t  perspect ive on  state  competi t ion .  Delaware’s pers isten t  large market  share is  
maintained by a f ir st -mover  advantage  crea ted by the  rec iprocal  relat ion tha t  develops  
between the char ter ing state  and f irms due to  their  substant ial  investments in  asse ts  
that  are specif ic  to  the charter ing transact ion.  Transact ions  be tween  a  f irm and  i ts  state  
of  incorpora tion ex tend over  a  long per iod ,  and  r eincorpora tion in  another  state  i s  not  
cos t less.  Secondly ,  a  s ta te  wi th  a  favourable corporation  code  must  guarantee  i t s  codes’  
continued responsiveness to  be successful  in  the  corporate char ter  market .  Delaware i s  
bes t  posi t ioned to  co mmit  i tself  to  responsiveness because i t  has so  much  to  lose .  
Thirdly,  Delaware’s const i tu t ional  provis ion  mandates that  a l l  changes in  the  
corporat ion code  must  be adopted by  a two -thirds vo te  of  bo th houses of  state  
legis lat ion.  This then makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to  renege on ex i s t ing  provis ions in  the state  
code.  Fourth ly,  Dela ware also has a  h igh proport iona te f ranch ise tax  and invests in  
asse ts  that  can be character ised as  legal  cap ita l .  The combinat ion of  al l  these factors  
crea tes an  in tang ible  asse t  wi th  v ar ious quali t ies,  a  reputat ion for  responsiveness  that  
f irms weigh  in  their  incorporat ion.  See Backer  Comparat ive  Corpora te Law:  United  
States,  European Union,  China and Japan  184 –  187; Greenf ield  K “Democracy and the 
dominance of  Delaware in  Corpora te  La w” (2004)  Law and Contemporary  Problems  on  
Delaware’s supremacy;  Steve ns 2007 Boston  College Review  1066 –  1076.  
 
69 Delta  Air l ines Inc,  Coca -Cola Inc,  Uni ted Parcel  Serv ice Inc and Home Depot Inc.  
 
70 Harowitz D and Leaf  P “The In ternal  Affair s Doctr ine Ver sus a  Conf l ict ing 
Contrac tual  Choice of  Law Provision” Bloomberg BNA Corpora te  Accountab il i ty  
Report  (2012)  2;  for  an  appl ica t ion  of  the  in te rnal  affa ir s  doc tr ine see Rosenmiller  v  




incorporated in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 , and are subject to the 
provisions of this Act.71 The incorporation of a corporation in the state of 
Georgia is discussed below in more detail. 72 
 
(b) The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) 
 
One of the most influential acts relating to corporate law in the USA is the 
MBCA.73 The Committee on Business Corporations of the American Bar 
Association published the revised Model Business Corporations Act in 
1950.74 The primary purpose of the MBCA was to assist the states in 
amending their own business corporation statutes.75 The MBCA was 
designed as a general corporation statute that can be enacted by a state 
legislature and applies to for-profit business corporations. The MBCA is 
devoted to the internal affairs of a corporation which includes the inter -
relationship of the corporation, its shareholders, directors and the 
corporation’s relationship with the state. 76 This Act also prohibits certain 
forms of management conduct and relies on fiduciary duties to assist in the 
 
71 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  above.   
 
72 See para  5 .2 .3(c)  below.  
 
73 In  1928,  the Commissioners on Uniform S tate Laws  promulgated  the Uniform 
Business Corporat ions Act ,  which was adopted  by only three states ,  namely Louisiana,  
Washington and  Kentucky.  For  more on this  Ac t ,  see in  general  Wilson JR “The  
Uniform Business Corporations Act” 1947(1)  Texas Law and Legis la t ion  309 –  330;  
Amer ican  Bar  Associa t ion Model Business Corporat ion Act  –  Off ic ial  Text  with  Off ic ial  
Comment and S tatu tory  Cross -References  rev ised through 20 02  x ix  –  xx.  The  MBCA 
played an impor tant  ro le  in  forming corpora te law in  Georgia .  See Campbell  W “The 
Model  Business Corpora tions Act” 1956  The Business  Lawyer  98 –  99 for  a  d iscuss ion  
of  i t s  or igin  and purpose .  
 
74 I t  was  ca l led “revi sed” to  dis t ingu ish  i t  f rom the  1946 version.  See  Garre t t  R 
“His tory,  Purpose  and  Summary  of  the  Model  Business Corpora tion  Act” 1950  The 
Business  Lawyer  1 .  
 
75 Amer ican Bar  Associat ion  Model  Business Corpora tions  Act:  Off icial  Text  wi th  
of f icia l  comment  an d statutory cross -re ferences  revised  through 2002 xxi –  xx ii ;  Hanks  
JJ and  Scr iggings LP “Protec ting  Directors and Off icers f rom Liab il i ty  –  The  Inf luence  
of  the Model Business Corporations Act” 2000 The Business Lawyer  15.  
 
76 Steadman CW “Liabi l i t ies of  D i rectors under  the Model  Business Corporation Act”  
1952 The Business Lawyer  9 .  For  more on  the interna l  affa irs  doctr ine,  see  para  




management and effective corporate governance of companies.77  It is up to 
each state to enact its own state corporate law legislation. The state of 
incorporation of a corporation will, therefore, govern all aspects of 
corporate law, including finance, governance and the powers of the 
corporation.78 The MBCA has no legal force unless it is enacted by a state 
legislature since the enactment of the MBCA by state legislature is 
voluntary, states often  adopt versions of the MBCA that have been slightly 
revised to reflect local circumstances. A state may also choose to adopt 
only a portion of the MBCA and complete its body of corporate law by 
including either locally drafted legislation or legislation that has been 
borrowed from another state’s corporate law. 79   
 
(c) The Georgia Code 
 
Georgia was one of the first colonies that gave full recognition to the 
English common law relating to corporations. 80 The first Georgia Code was 
passed in 1968 and was based on the MBCA. 81 The Georgia Code of 2017 
provides for the incorporation of corporations, partnerships and 
associations.82 The formation of a corporation in Georgia is a formal 
process whereby the incorporators file the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation with a state official in accordance with title 14 of the Georgia 
 
77 Branson DM “Recent Changes to  the Model Business Corporat ion Act:   Death Knells  
for  Main Street  Corpora tio n Law” 1993 Nebraska  Law Review  259.  
 
78 See para  5 .2 .3(a)  for  more on  the  in ternal  affai rs  doctr ine  and  the  incorporation  of  a  
corporat ion in  the  USA.  
 
79 Bainbr idge  SM Corporate Law  2 n d  ed (Thomson Reuters  2009)  1  –  8  fo r  incorporat ion 
in  te rms of  the MBCA.  
 
80 The f i rs t  corpo rat ions were educational ,  e leemosynary and non -prof i t .  
 
81 Carney WJ “Change in  Corpora te Pract ice under  Georg ia’s New Business Corporat ion 
Code” 1989 Mercer Law Review 656.  
 
82 Georgia Code of  2017,  t i t le  14 h ttps: / / law.just ia .com/codes/geo rgia /2017/t i t le -14 /   
(Date of  use :  31 Ju ly 2018) .  For  the remainder  of  this  chap ter ,  only the relevan t  
sec tions  wil l  be  ind ica ted.  However ,  th is  research,  focus  on corporat ions,  i s  con t a ined  
in  Chapter  2  o f  t i t le  14 of  the Georg ia Code  of  2017 .  The other  type of  business  




Code of 2017.83 The general powers of a company are contained in 
paragraph 14-2-302 of the Georgia Code of 2017.84 The information relating 
to shareholders is provided in paragraph 14-2-7, while directors are dealt 
with in paragraph 14-2-8. The control and management of a corporation in 
Georgia are vested in its board of directors.  
 
(d) Directors and officers 
 
The Georgia Code of 2017 provides for both officers and directors.85 This 
Code differs significantly from the previous versions of the Code after the 
Governor of Georgia signed the House Bill 192 into law.86 The Georgia 
Code now provides for a codified version of the business judgment rule. 87 
This rule applies to officers and directors of Georgia corporations, including 
officers and directors of financial institutions. 88  In terms of the Georgia 
Code of 2017, all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and 
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and 
subject to oversight, of its board of directors, subject to any limitation 
 
83 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14 -2-201.  
 
84 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-302.  
 
85 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-8 for  both d irectors and off icers.   
 
86 The Bi l l  was passed  in  May 2017,  and i t  came into effect  on  1 July 2 017.  See in  
genera l  Eversheds Su ther land “Georg ia Governor  Signs into  Law Revis ions to  Business 
Judgment Rule,  Codifying Protec tions for  Banking and Corpora te Off icers and  
Directors”  h t tps : / /us.eversheds -suther land.com/NewsCo mmentary/Legal -
Aler ts/199370/Legal -Aler t-Georgia-Governor-Signs- in to-Law-Revisions - to-Business-
Judgment-Rule-Codify ing-Protect ions-for-Banking-and-Corporate-Off icers-and-
Directors  (Date of  use :  1  August  2018) .  
 
87 In  terms of  this ru le ,  d irec tors and off icers a re  afforded a presumpt ion  of  good fai th  
and ordinary care in  the performance  of  their  duties.  See in  genera l  Shu -Acquaye  F 
“Amer ican Corpora te  Law:  Director’ s  Fiduciary  Duties  and Liab il i ty  during Solvency,  
Insolvency  and Bankrupt cy in  Public  Corpora t ions”  UPR Business  Law Journal  8  –  9 .  
The business judgment rule  i s  d iscussed more fu lly  in  para 5 .4  be low.  
 
88 Sowers TE  “Business Judgment Rule in  Georg ia Strengthened By New Law” Berman 
Fink Van Horn P.C.  Attorneys  h t tps: / /www.bfvlaw.com/business - judgment-ru le- in-




outlined in the articles of incorporation.89 The articles of incorporation may 
also prescribe qualifications for directors. The board of directors must 
consist of one or more individuals, with the number specified in accordance 
with the articles of incorporation. This differs slightly from the situation in 
South Africa, where the Companies Act of 2008 specifies in section 66(2) 
that a private company or a limited liability company must have at least one 
director while a public or non-profit company must have at least three 
directors. The MOI may specify a higher number of directors.90 The Georgia 
Code of 2017 provides for the term that a director may serve in a 
corporation. Accordingly, the terms of the initial directors expire at the f irst 
shareholders’ meeting at which directors are elected. Thereafter the terms 
of all other directors will expire at the next annual shareholders meeting 
following their election. The position in South Africa is different, as 
directors may serve for indefinite terms.91 The Georgia Code of 2017 
provides for the resignation of directors as well as the removal of 
directors.92 In South Africa, both the board of directors and the 
shareholders may remove a director whereas in Georgia a director may 
only be removed by a shareholder. The shareholders may remove a 
director with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation or a bylaw 
adopted by the shareholders provide that directors may only be removed 
for a cause.93 A vacancy may be filled by either the shareholders or 
directors, which is similar to the position in South Africa.94 In Georgia, a 
board of directors may determine the remuneration of directors unless the 
 
89 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-805.  
 
90 A MOI is  similar  to  ar t icle s o f  incorporat ion in  the USA. See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  for  
more on the  South Afr ican Companies  Act of  2008.  
 
91 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-801; s  68 of  the South Afr ican  Companies Act  of  2008.  
 
92 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-807 and §14-2-808 .  
 
93 Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .9  above for  a  discussion of  the removal of  a  d irector  in  terms  of  
the Companies Act of  2008; Georg ia Code of  2017 §14-2-808.  The removal of  directors  
in  the  USA is deal t  with  in  para 5 .2 .3  below.  
 





articles of incorporation provide otherwise. In South Africa, the 
remuneration of directors must be paid in accordance with a special 
resolution.95 The board of directors may appoint officers and may assign the 
responsibility for preparing the minutes of the directors and shareholders’ 
meetings and for maintaining records of the incorporation to an officer of 
the corporation.96 It seems that the Georgia Code makes a distinction 
between officers and directors: officers are not perceived to be equal to 
directors, which differs from the position in South Africa. In South Africa, 
officers are perceived to be equal to directors.97  
 
(e) Duties of directors 
 
Duties of corporate officers and directors are determined by state law, but 
in general, it is accepted that there are three basic duties in the USA, 98 
namely, the fiduciary duties of care and diligence, 99 loyalty100 and obedience. 
 
95 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-811.  See s 66(8)  and (9)  of  the South Afr ican Companies  
Act  of  2008.  
 
96 Georg ia Code  of  2017 §14-2-840.  
 
97 The Companies Act  of  2008 provides  a  def in i t ion of  “prescr ibed of f icer” as fol lows:   
“prescr ibed off ice r” means a person who,  with in a  company ,  performs any funct ion that  
has been des ignated by the Min iste r  in  terms of  sec tion  66(10)  of  the Act.   See Chapter  
4 ,  para 4 .4 .2  above  for  a  discuss ion on prescr ibed off icers .  The funct ions of  of f icers  
are con ta ined  in  the Georgia Code of  2017 §14-2-841.  The focus  of  th is research wi l l  
remain  on directors.  Off icers,  however ,  a l so have a standard of  conduct ,  presumption  
of  good fai th  and  ordinary care ;  see  §14 -2-842.  
 
98 Knepper  and  Baily  Liabil i ty  o f  Corporate  Off ice rs and Direc tors  11.   
 
99 Brodsky  E and Adamski MP Law of  Corporate Off icers  and Direc tors:  Rights,  Duties  
and Liabi l i t ies  (West  2009)  2 -1 –  2-43 for  a  fu l l  d iscussion  of  the  duty  of  care.  Cass idy 
(2009)  Ste l lenbosch Law Review 387.  See  fur ther  Loos (ed)  Directors’  Liabi l i ty:  A  
Worldwide Review  109  for  a  fu r ther  discussion about the duty of  care  in  the USA. The  
duty of  care  requi res d irec tors to  perform the ir  du ties  with  the  necessary  di l igence  
required of  a  reasonable person in  s imi lar  c ircumstances,  which may vary,  depending  
on the con text .  This duty has f our  sub-du ties :  the duty to  monitor ,  the duty to  inquire,  
the duty to  be in formed and the duty to  make reasonable decisions.  See In  re Cit igroup 
Inc.  Shareholder  Derivative Lit igat ion  964 A2d 106 (Del.  Ch 2009)  where an ac tion  
was brought  by the shareholde rs cla iming that  the board of  d irectors  breached their  
f iduciary duty to  the company.  However ,  th is  claim was re jec ted by  the court .  See 
Mil ler  GP The Law of  Governance,  R isk Managemen t and Compliance  (Wol ters Kluwer  
2014)  49 –  53;  Loos  (ed)  Direc tor’s Liabi l i ty:  A  Worldwide  Review  110 for  a  
discuss ion of  the  la t ter  case.  In  general  see,  Fanto JA Director’s and  Off icer’s Liab il i ty  
2 n d  ed (Pract icing Law Inst i tu te  2014)  for  more on the d uty of  care see pages  2-36 –  2-
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Upon accepting the office of director or officer of a corporation, a person 
assumes a duty of loyalty to the company and its shareholders, and a duty 
to act with care in fulfilling his or her responsibilities. In the USA, the duty 
of care is considered a fiduciary duty, as opposed to Canada and South 
Africa, where it is regarded as a separate duty.101 In the USA, Courts have 
identified the duty of care and the duty of loyalty as the primary fiduciary 
duties of directors. As long as directors comply with these duties, they will 
be entitled to protection in terms of the business judgement rule.102 The duty 
of care requires directors and officers to consider all available information 
to them when overseeing the corporation’s business. 103 Directors can be 
 
43; Cahn and Donald Comparative Company L aw  332 –  338 for  more  on the duty of  
care as wel l  as  Hansen 1993 The Business  Lawyer  1355 –  1360;  Brodsky and Adamski  
Law of  Corporate Off icers and Direc tors  pages 2-1 –  2-61 for  more on the duty of  care .   
  
100 For  more  on the du ty  of  loyal ty  see in  general  Cahn and Donald Comparative  
Company Law  332 –  347.  In  the matter  of  Guth  v Lof t  Inc  5 A 2d 503,  510 a direc tor’ s  
duty of  loyal ty  towards the company was considered.  The direc tor  of  a  candy company  
took an  opportun ity  fo r  himself  to  purchase  the rec ipe of  Pepsi  Cola instead of  
purchasing i t  for  the benefi t  o f  his company.  The company expla ined the legal  posi t ion  
as  fol lows,  “corporate o ff icers  and  directors  are  not  permit ted to  use thei r  posi t ion of  
trus t  and confidence to  fur ther  the ir  pr iva te  in terest .  A publ ic  po licy has  estab li shed a  
rule  tha t  demands of  a  corporate off icer  or  director ,  peremptor i ly  and  inexorably,  the  
most  scrupulous observance of  his duty,  not  on ly aff irmat ive l y to  protect  the interest s  
of  the corpora tion committed to  his charge,  but  a lso to  refra in  f rom doing anyth ing that  
would  cause   in ju ry to  the corporat ion,  o r  to  deprive i t  of  prof i t  or  advantage  which  has 
ski l l  and  abi l i ty  might properly  br ing  to  i t ,  o r  t o  enab le  i t  to  make  in  th e  reasonable 
and lawful  exerc ise of  i t s  powers .  The  ru le that  requ ires an undivided and unse lf i sh 
loyal ty  to  the  corporat ion demands tha t  there sha ll  be no  conf l ict  be tween  duty  and 
se lf - in teres t .”   See a lso  In  re  Southern  Peru  Cop per Corp.  Shareholder Der ivative  
Li t iga tion 30 A.3d 60  (Del .  Ch.  2011) .  
 
101 D’Si lva  ALW and Wood G “Director’ s  Duties in  Canada:  Six Key  Concepts”  May 
2015 http: / /www.canadianmandalaw.com/d i rec tors-du ties- in-canada-s ix-key-concepts /  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
102 The business  judgment rule  in  Georgia has now been codif ied.  This  i s  discussed  
more fully  in  para 5 .4  below. Forrester  and Feber  Fiduciary Duties and Oth er 
Responsibi l i t ies o f  Co rporate Direc tors and  Off icers  13 .  
 
103 Brodsky  and  Adamski  Law o f  Corporate Of f icers  and Directors:  Righ ts,  Dut ies and  
Liab il i t ies 2-11; Forres ter  and  Feber  Fiduciary Duties and  Other Responsib il i t ies of  
Corpora te Directors and Off i cers 15.  I t  i s  important  tha t  directors make informed 
decisions.  They need to  obtain  and consider  al l  relevant  in formation ;  they need to  take 
t ime to  evaluate and consider  the informat ion;  ask quest ions and probe assumptions;  
unders tand the  terms of  the t r ansac tions;  enter  in to  d i scuss ions regarding  the 
transac tion or  mat ter ;  unde rs tand the corpora tions’  f inancial  statements and stand ing;  
review and moni tor  the performance of  the CEO as well  as other  sen ior  managers;  and  
remain informed about the corporat io ns’  opera t ions.  See in  general  McEwen V Kelly  
140 GA;  Shannon e t  a l .  v  Mobley 166  GA 430  –  436 (1928);  Shu-Acquaye Univers i ty  of  
Porto Rico Business  Law Journal 4 –  5 .  The MBCA  states in  s  8  that  a l l  corpora te  
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responsible for both malfeasance104 and nonfeasance.105 The MBCA version 
of the duty of care is that directors must discharge their duties in good 
faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a similar position 
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner reasonably 
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation. 106 The Georgia Code 
of 2017 makes provision for a director’s standard of conduct in paragraph 
14-2-830; which states: 
(a) A director shall perform his/her duties as a director 
in good faith and with the degree of care an ordinary 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances.  
(b) In performing his/her duties a director may rely 
upon: (1) other officers, employees or agents of the 
corporation whom the director reasonably believed to be 
reliable and competent in the functions performed; and 
(2) information, data, opinions, reports or statements 
provided by officers, employees, agents of the 
corporation, legal counsel, public accountants, 
investment bankers or other persons as to matters 
involving the skills, expertise or knowledge reasonably 
believed to be reliable and within such person’s 
professional or expert competence. 
 
powers shal l  be  exercised by or  under  the auth ori ty  of  the board of  dir ec tors of  the  
corporat ion and the business and affa ir s  of  the corpora tion sha ll  be managed by or  
under  the  direct ion and subject  to  the overs ight  of  the board of  d irec tors .  
 
104 This refers to  wrongdoing,  espec ia l ly  by a public  off ic ial .  See in  general ,  Pin t o and 
Branson Corporate Law  223 –  224.  
 
105 This refers to  fa i lu re to  perform an ac t  requ ired by law.  See  in  general ,  Pin to and  
Branson Corporate Law  221 –  222.  
 
106 Sec tion  8.30 (a)  of  the MBCA. The 2005 amendments to  the MBCA resul te d in  a  
revised sec tion 8.01 (b)  to  make c lear  tha t  “the  business and af fair s  of  the corporation  
sha ll  be managed by  ….  and subject  to  the  oversigh t ,  of  i ts  board of  directors.”   I t  a l so 
added a  new sec tion  8.01 (c)  which sta tes the fo l lowing,  “these respon s ibi l i t ies include 
at tent ion to  business performance and p lans;  major  r i sks to  which the corporat ion i s  or  
may be exposed;  the performance and compensa tion of  senior  off icers;  pol ic ies and  
pract ices to  foster  the corporat ion’s compl iance with  law and e thic a l  conduct ;  
prepara t ion o f  the corporation’s f inancia l  s tatements ;  the e ffec t iveness of  the 
corporat ion’s in ternal  controls ;  arrangements  for  provid ing adequate and  t imely 
information  to  direc tors ;  and  the composi t ion  of  the board and i t s  commit tees,  takin g  
into  account the impor t ant  role  of  the  independent  directors.”  There was  a lso  an 
amendment to  the s tandard of  conduct  and  sect ion 8.30(c)  was added  thereby codify ing 
a director’ s obl iga tion to  disclose to  the  board informat ion known to  the director  to  be  
mater ia l  to  the board’s decision making and overs ight  function .  I t  fur therm ore added 
sec tion 8.42(b)  which provides for  an off icer’s obliga tion to  inform superior  off icers or  
the board of  directors about mater ia l  informat ion and mater ial  v iolat ions of  law  known 
to  him or  her .  See  Olson JF and Briggs AK “The Model Business Corpora t ion Act and  
Corpora te Governance:   An Enabl ing Sta tute moves toward normat ive standards” 2011  
Law and Contemporary Problems  pages 31 –  38  for  more on how the  MBCA changed 
direc tor ’ s  conduct .  
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(c) There shall be a presumption that the process a 
director followed in arriving at decisions was done in 
good faith and that such director has exercised ordinary 
care; provided, however, that this presumption may be 
rebutted by evidence that such process constitutes gross 
negligence by being a gross deviation of the standard o f 
care of a director in a like position under similar 
circumstances.” 
(d) Nothing in this section shall: 
(i) In any instance when fairness is an issue, such as 
consideration of the fairness of a transaction to the 
corporation as evaluated in §14-2-861, after the burden 
of proving the fact or lack of fairness otherwise 
applicable; 
(ii) Alter the fact or lack of liability of a director under 
the Georgia Code, including the governance of the 
consequences of an unlawful distribution under §14-2-
832 or a conflicting interest transaction under §14-2-861; 
(iii) Affect any rights to which the corporation or its 
shareholders may be entitled under another law of the 
state or of the United States; or  
(iv) Deprive a director of the applicability, effect, or 
protection of the business judgment rule. 
 
Furthermore, the duty of care requires directors to undertake certain 
responsibilities and not to be negligent in performing these duties. 
Directors must, at all times, make informed decisions. In the event of 
directors violating their duty of care by making negligent or ill-advised 
decisions, they can be liable for malfeasance. 107 The duty of care sets a 
standard of conduct while the business judgment rule limits judicial inquiry 
into business decisions and acts as protection for directors who are not  
acting negligently. For liability to be incurred, the negligence must be the 
 
107 Shu-Acquaye Universi ty  of  Porto  Rico Business  Law Journal  3 –  9 ;  Hansen  1993 The 
Business Lawyer ;  P into  and Branson Understanding Corporate Law  221;  Francis v  
Uni ted Jersey Bank 432 A.2d  814 (NJ 1981) .  The  case  involved a  fami ly owned  
corporat ion,  which operated as a  reinsurance  broker .  The  brokers of  th is  f irm decid ed 
to  se l l  some of  the r i sks of  the ir  corpora tion to  other  insurance brokers thereby  
faci l i ta t ing the divers i f ica t ion of  those r i sks .  These transact ions resu lted in  the 
reinsurance  brokers holding funds fo r  the insurance companies whi lst  industry  prac tice 
required segregation of  funds.  The Pri tchard  sons ran the corpora tion  together  with  
their  mother ,  Mrs Pri tchard who was a  direc tor  of  the company,  whi le  her  sons formed 
par t  o f  the  management.  However ,  she  chose  to  leave  the  business  to  her  sons.  The sons 
channeled the var ious insurance companies’  funds into  a  sing le account and then  
personally  borrowed from the account wi thout subsequent repayment.  The trustee sued  
Mrs  Pr i tchard  fo r  breach of  her  duty  of  c are.  In  confirming  tha t  she  had breached  th is  
duty,  the  cour t  confirmed tha t  d irectors  should have some sor t  of  understanding  of  the  
business,  keep in formed about act ivi t ies ,  perform general  monito r ing,  includ ing 
at tendance of  meet ings and be fami lia r  to  a  cer tain  extent  with  the f inancia l  s tatements  
of  the corporat ion.  The court  a lso held that  the duties of  di rec tors of  publical ly  traded  




proximate cause of the loss. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in 
respect of the amount of loss or damages. 108 The duty of care requires a 
director to act in good faith and base a business decision on adequate 
information.109 A director’s negligence is determined on by the facts and on 
a case-by-case basis.110 The duty of good faith prohibits conduct that is 
motivated by an intent to impede, interfere with or harm the company in 
any way. A certain standard is also expected of directors in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. These responsibilities consist of two basic functions, 
namely, decision-making111 and an oversight function.112 In the case of In re 
 
108 Pin to and Branson Understanding Corporate  La w  225  –  227.  In  the matter  of  Smith v  
Gorham  488  A.d 858  (Del .  1985) ,  the Delaware Cour t  held  tha t  the direc tors  had  
breached the ir  duty of  care and were no t  protected by the business judgment rule .  In  
this matter ,  the company was t rying to  f igure  out  ways  to  raise the i r  s tock,  bu t  no 
act ion was  taken.  Mr.  van Gorham the Chairman of  the  Board as well  as the CEO took  
i t  upon h imself  to  contact  an  investor ,  Mr.  Pr i tzker ,  without the pr ior  knowledge of  the 
Board of  Direc tors.  Mr.  Pr i tzker  agreed to  buy the com pany for  $55 a share.  This p r ice 
was,  however ,  a t  l east  40% h igher  than the current  market  pr ice .  There was some 
opposi t ion  to  the  offer  f rom some of  the o ther  off icers.  A meet ing was  ca l led  which  
took place without proper  notice.  Aft er  only meeting for  ap proximately  two hours,  the 
board decided  to  accep t  the of fer  and present  i t  to  the  shareholders.  The  Board  received  
l imited  adv ice from any  f inancial  expert  or  adv isor .  The court ,  in  making i ts  decision ,  
used  the concept of  gross negl igence as  “ the  proper  standard  for  determining whether  a  
business judgmen t  reached by the board  of  directors was an  informed one”.  The cour t  
found that  the  d irec tors were  gross ly  negl igen t  in  being  un informed of  the va lue  of  the  
company or  van Gorham’s rol e in  forc ing the sa le  and es tab li shing  the pr ice and  
approving the sa le  a f te r  only two hours  without proper  not ice o r  reason for  such an 
urgent  meet ing.  
 
109 Brodsky Law of  Corporate Of f icers and Directors:  Righ ts ,  Dut ies and Liabi l i t ies  
2 :12.  
 
110 Where d irec tors make  decisions  l i kely  to  affec t  shareholder  weal th ,  the duty  of  care  
requires that  the dec is ions be made on the basis of  reasonable d i l igence.  Directors,  
however ,  are  given  wide discret ion with in which they may act  wi thout  fear  of  l iabi l i ty  
under  the business judgment rule .  The business  judgment rule  does not  apply when th e 
direc tor  has a  conf l ict  of  interest  o r  has breached his/her  duty  of  care.  Trad it iona lly ,  
the duty of  care requires  that  directors act  as reasonable people under  al l  c ircumstances  
involving a del iberat ive  decision-making process based on cred ible in format ion.  See  
Brodsky Law of  Corporate Off icers and Directors:  Righ ts,  dut ies and  l iab il i t ies  2 :2 ;  
Knepper  and Baily  Liabi l i ty  of  corpora te o f f icers and d irec tors 91.  
 
111 This  function  usua l ly  per tains  to  per iod ic at tent ion to  corpora te  sys tems and  
controls,  pol icy i ssues o r  any matter  necess i tat ing a director ’s inqui ry.  
 
112 This funct ion usually  per ta ins  to  the formula t ion of  corpora te  pol icy  and s trategic 
corporate goals.  When carrying  out  their  dut ies,  d irector s are  expected to  ac t  in  good  
fai th ,  in  the best  in teres ts  o f  the company and with  the necessary care  that  a  person in  a  
similar  posi t ion would reasonably deem appropr iate .  In  some s tates,  the  f iduciary duty 
of  care to  the company and  i t s  s takeholders i s  d ef ined by a jud ic ial  doctr ine whi le  in  
other  sta tes  the s ta tutory formula tions rep lace  or  supplement the common law. For  
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Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation113 the Delaware Court of Chancery 
found that the officers and directors of Disney did not breach any fiduciary 
duties by offering employment to a new president,  only to fire him a year 
later.114 In Brock Built LLC v Blake 115 the Georgia Appeals Court dealt with a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a director. The court found that mere 
negligence does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.116 This is similar 
to the provisions of section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008, except that 
the South African version is much clearer regarding the degree of skill 
necessary.117 
 
those s tates that  have adopted the MBCA, section 8.30 prescr ibes the standards of  
conduct  for  d irec tors.  See Shue -Acquaye 2011  UPR Business Law Journal Vol 2 5 .  In  
Smith v .  Van Gorkom 48 8 A.2d 858,  the Delaware Supreme Cour t  he ld  direc tors l iab le 
for  making an un informed decision  in  a  case no t  involv ing personal  ga in,  f raud  or  bad  
fai th  and  the du ty  of  care has  taken  on  new s igni f icance  a s an actual  source of  l iab il i ty .  
See  Brodsky  and Adamski Law of  Corpora te Of f icers and Directors:  R ights,  Duties  and 
Liab il i t ies  2-41.  
 
113 In  re  Wal t  Disney Co.  Deriva tive  Lit igat ion  (2005)  No.  Civ .  A.  15452  WL 2056651  
(Del .  Ch) .  See  Monks RAG and  Minow N Corporate Governance 4 t h  ed  (John  Wiley  & 
Sons  2008)  235 on this decision .  
 
114 The shareholders of  Disney a l leged that  the di rectors had breached their  f iduciary  
duties in  appoint ing Michael  Ovitz  in  the f irs t  p lace,  while  not  properly  consider ing 
the offer  of  employment.  One  of  the d irectors  of  Disney  negot ia ted  the employment  
contract  with  Ovitz  without hav ing proper  board approval .  Fo llowing  h is  appointment,  
c lashes be tween the new president  and the other  execut ives fol lowed.  The boar d wanted  
to  terminate his employment,  but  there was  no just  cause,  which  tr iggered the  
obliga tion to  pay Ovi tz  a  severance package of  about $140 mil l ion.  The court  
concluded  that  Ovitz  d id  not  breach h is f iduc iary du ty of  loyal ty  by  accept ing h is  
severance  payment,  because  he d id no t  negotia te  the terms of  his employment  during  
his term of  employment  and he played no role in  the dec is ion to  t r igger  the severance  
payment  through  termination  without cause.  The cour t  al so found that  the direc tors  did  
not  commi t wasteful  expenditure  because  the corporation  was be tter  of f  without Ovi tz  
as  i ts  pres iden t .  Fur thermore,  the  cour t  determined that  the d irectors  did  not  breach  any  
f iduciary duty  re lated to  thei r  service at  the t ime of  Ovi tz’s d ismissa l .   
 
115 Brock  Bui l t  LLC v Blake  686 S.E.2d  425 (2009)  GA. Here inaf ter  refer red to  as  Brock 
Buil t  v  B lake.  For  a  summary of  th is  case,  see  
ht tp: / / law.jus t ia .com/cases /georgia/court -of-appeals/2009/a09a1537-0 .html (Date of  
use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
116 Lant ta  L “What’s the correct  f iduc iary standard when a t rus tee contro ls family ent i ty  
held by trust?” March 2014 http : / /bryancavef iduciary li t igat ion.com/whats - the-correct-
f iduciary-standard-when-a- trustee-controls-fami ly-enti t ies -held-by-the- trust  (Date  of  
use :  28 August  2018) .  
 




The duty of loyalty (and good faith)  requires a fiduciary to act in the best 
interest of and in good faith to his/her corporation and shareholders118 and 
to refrain from receiving improper personal benefits as a result of their 
relationship with the corporation. A lack of good faith may involve actual 
intent to harm the corporation, or an intentional dereliction of duty and a 
disregard for the director’s duties.  The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to 
act in good faith for the benefit of the company, thus meaning that this duty 
prohibits self-dealing, misappropriation of corporate assets, conflicts of 
interests, lack of independence and disloyal conduct. 119  In Stone v Ritter120 
the Delaware Court characterised the duty of good faith as part of the duty 
of loyalty. The court held that the directors had breached their duty of 
loyalty by failing to implement any reporting or information system controls, 
or where there was such a system, their failure to monitor or oversee its 
operation. The court found that the directors had breached their duty of 
loyalty by failing to institute a legal compliance system. It should be noted 
 
118 Knepper  and Bai ly  Liabil i ty  of  Corporate Of f icers and Direc tors  12 on more of  the  
duty of  loyal ty;  Cahn and Donald Comparat ive Company Law  344 –  347 on the duty of  
loyal ty;  Hi l l  CA and McDonnel l  BH “ Stone  v Rit ter  and the Exp anding Duty of  
Loyal ty” 2007  Fordham Law Review 1769  -  1796; and  Brock Bui l t  LLC v Blake  No.  
A09A1537 (Ga.  App.  Nov.  6 ,  2009) .  In  South Afr ica,  the duty is  towards the company  
and not  the shareholder  direc t ly .  See Chapter  4 ,  4 .2 .5  ab ove.  
 
119 In  re Walt  Disney Co.  Deriva tive Li t igat ion  (2005)  Civ.  A 1552 (De l.  Ch) ,  referred  
to  above,  the court  found that  the d irectors did  not  breach the ir  f iduciary du ty of  
loyal ty;  Harvard Law Review Associat ion “Corporate Law: Fiduciary Dut ies of  
Directors.  Delaware Court  of  Chancery  f inds Disney Directors no t  l iab le for  app roval  
of  an employment agreement provid ing $140 mi ll ion termination payment.  In  re Wal t  
Disney Co.  Deriva tive Lit iga tion ,  no.  Civ.  A  15452,  2005 WL 2056651 (Del .  Ch.  Aug 9,  
2005)” (2006)  Harvard  Law Review  926.  
 
120 Stone v Rit ter 911 A.2d 362,  370 (Del.  200 6) .  In  this matter ,  the  shareholders  
brought a  der ivat ive act ion af ter  i t  came to  l igh t  that  the company  had paid mil l ions in  
f ines and penalt ies ar i sing from the Federa l  Bank Secrec y Act.  The shareholders  
al leged tha t  the d irec tors had breached  the ir  duty  to  ac t  in  good fai th  because  even  
whi le  the company had a programme to  monitor  compl iance,  i t  was no t  adequate  
enough to  prevent  vio la t ions which  led  to  penal t ies.  The Chancery Cour t  dismissed  the  
compla int  on  the basis that ,  as confirmed In  re  Caremark  Interna tional Inc.  Deriva tive  
Li t iga tion 698  A.2d 959 (Del.  Ch.  1996) ,  “d irectors can on ly be l iab le in  s i tuat ions 
involving a sustained or  sys temat ic  fa i lure of  the board to  exercise  overs ight ,  and the  
Cour t  found tha t  the complain t  d id  no t  establ ish  the  r equ is i te  lack of  good fa i th  on  
which to  base l iabi l i ty .”  See Demetr iou AJ and Olmon JT “Stone v Ri t ter :  Delaware  
Supreme Cour t  Aff irms the Caremark Standard  for  Corporate Compl iance Programs” 
2007 
https: / /www.americanbar .org/newsle t ter /publica t ions/aba_heal th_esource_home/Volum
e3_06_demetr iou.h tml  (Date of  use :  1  August  2018) .  See Hi l l  and McDonnel 2007 (76)  
Fordham Law Review  1769 –  1796.  
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that corporations may not indemnify directors or officers for breaches of 
loyalty where the director or officer has acted in bad faith. 121 
 
The duty of obedience compels fiduciaries to abide by legal standards.122 
This duty derives directly from the fiduciary duty of one person acting on 
behalf of another.123 Directors should not exceed the powers conferred on 
them by the company.124 If directors exceed their powers, they may be 
personally liable.125 
 
These duties are similar to the ones contained in section 76 of the 
Companies Act of 2008, with the notable exception that the duty of care is 
considered a separate duty in South Africa and is not part of the fiduciary 
obligation.126 
 
(f) Removal of directors 
 
One of the most important mechanisms through which shareholders control 
directors is the power of removal. Directors are appointed at the annual 
general meeting of a corporation and hold office until the next annual 
general meeting unless removed early. The shareholders have the power to 
remove the entire board or a single director, with or without cause at a 
shareholders’ meeting in terms of the Georgia Code of 2017. The 
shareholders can replace the directors at the meeting or leave it up to the 
 
121 Forrester  and  Feber  Fiduciary Dut ies and  Other  Responsib il i t ies of  Corporate  
Direc tors  and Off icers 18 –  19.  
 
122  Palmter  AR “Duty of  Obedience :  The Forgotten Duty”  2010 –  2011 New York  La w 
School Law Review  458.  
 
123 Atkinson  R “Obedience  as the Foundation of  Fiduciary Dut ies” 2008  (34)  Journal of  
Corpora tion  Law  48 .  
 
124 Knepper  and Baily  Liabil i ty  o f  Corporate  Off icers and Direc tors  11.   
 
125 Pa lmer 2010  –  2011 New York Law School Law Review  460.  
 
126  See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .5  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the f idu ciary dut ies and the duty  
of  care in  South  Afr ica .  
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remaining directors to fill the vacancies. 127 Title 14-2-808 in the Georgia 
Code of 2017 makes provision for shareholders to remove directors from 
the board. It states that: 
(a) the shareholders may remove one or more 
directors with or without cause unless the articles of 
incorporation or a bylaw adopted by the shareholders 
provides that directors may be removed only for cause.  
(b) If a director is elected by a voting group of 
shareholders, only the shareholders of that voting group 
may participate in the vote to remove him. If cumulative 
voting is authorized, a director may not be removed if the 
number of votes sufficient to elect him under cumulative 
voting is voted against his removal.  
(c) If cumulative voting is not authorized, a director 
may not be removed if the number of votes sufficient to 
elect him under cumulative voting is voted against his 
removal. If cumulative voting is not authorised, a director 
may be removed only by a majority of the votes entitled 
to be cast.  
(d) If the directors have staggered terms as provided 
in title 14-2-806, directors may be removed only for 
cause, unless the articles of incorporation or a bylaw 
adopted by the shareholders provides otherwise.  
(e) A director may be removed by the shareholders 
only at a meeting called for the purpose of removing him 
and the meeting notice must state that the purpose, or 
one of the purposes, of the meeting is removal of the 
director. 
 
The Georgia Code of 2017 only provides for shareholders to remove 
directors, while the South African Companies Act of 2008 provides for both 
shareholders and the board of directors to remove directors in terms of 
section 71.128 The Georgia Code of 2017 does not make provision for 






127 Hermance  JP and Quiros PA “The Dynamics  among Shareholders,  Directors and 
Off icers in  Corpora te  Organisat ion under  Georg ia Law”  1985 (37)  Mercer Law Rev iew  
93.  
 
128 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .9  above  for  the removal of  directors  in  terms of  the  
Companies Act  of  2008.  
 
129 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .10 above for  a  discussion of  declar ing a director  delinquent  




(g) Liability of directors 
 
The Georgia Code of 2017 provides for liability of directors for unlawful 
distributions only and is therefore not discussed further. The South African 
Companies Act of 2008 provides for general liability of directors for, 
amongst others, the breach of their fiduciary duties. 130   
 
(h) Financial institutions in the State of Georgia 
 
Title 7 of the Georgia Code of 2017 governs financial and banking 
institutions.131 Title 7-1-490 provides that “directors and officers of a bank or 
trust company shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in 
good faith and with the degree of diligence, care, and skill which an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.” 132 
The provisions of this title were also changed when House Bill 192 was 
signed into law; it now also provides for the business judgment rule in 
respect of the decisions of directors of banks as provided for in  § 14-2-








130 Georg ia Code of  2017  §14-2-832.  See  s 77 of  the  Companies Act  of  2 008; and 
Chapter  4  para 4 .2 .8  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the l iabi l i ty  of  directors  in  terms of  the  
South Afr ican Companies Act o f  2008.  
 
131 This i s  similar  to  the regula t ion  by the Ba nks  Act  of  1990  under  South Afr ican  law.  
See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  and 4.3  a bove for  a  discussion of  the Companies Act of  2008  
and the Banks Act of  1990.  The focus of  the d iscuss ion of  these prov isions i s  on the 
regula t ion of  directors o f  banks .  
 
132 This sec t ion a lso makes s imi lar  prov is ions to  the Georgia Code of  2017 § 14-2-830 
and wil l  not  be repeated .  
 
133 The South Afr ican Banks Act of  1990 does not  provide for  the business judgment  




5.2.3 Corporate Governance 
 
(a) General governance framework 
 
The USA corporate governance relies less on voluntary codes and the 
“comply or explain” method found in the voluntary corporate governance 
codes of many jurisdictions, and more on mandatory regulation in the 
statutes mentioned above.134 Various other common law jurisdictions like 
South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada have opted for a more 
lenient approach in the form of enabling or partially enabling governance 
codes of practice, rather than mandatory legislation.135 This results in 
companies in these jurisdictions being able to choose the governance 
practices they want to adopt from a list of best practices, but they must 
disclose their choices and the resulting governance structures.136 The USA 
regulatory regime is based more on hard law and a regulatory state and 
relies on a “one size fits all” approach,137 which is opposite to the 
governance practices in South Africa. 138 In South Africa, “soft law”139 and 
 
134 For  a  comprehensive d iscuss ion of  corpora te  governance in  the USA in genera l  see  
Jackson G Understanding Corpora te Governance in  the United Sta tes:  An Histor ica l  
and Theoret ica l  Reassessment (2010)  Hans Bockler S t i f tung  
http: / /www.boeckler . de /pdf/p_arbp_223.pdf  (Date of  use:  28 August  2018);  Lessambo 
The In ternat ional  Corporate Governance  System: Audit  Roles and Board  Oversigh t  46 –  
61.  Other  jur i sdict ions  that  uses the “comply or  explain” method  is  the Uni ted  
Kingdom, the Nether lands,  and Germany.  King IV  have moved to  the “apply and 
expla in” method,  see Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3  above for  a  d iscuss ion on King IV .  
 
135 “Voluntary” or  “enab ling” refers to  the company’s choice to  adopt corpora te  
governance  prac tices or  stand ards in  the  absence of  m andatory  leg isla t ion.  Mandatory  
means lega lly  manda ted  where  penalt ies  wil l  app ly to  those who fai l  to  comply wi th  the  
legis lat ion.  Three  major  common law jur isd ict ions ou ts ide  the USA, namely,  Canada,  
the Uni ted  Kingdom and Austral ia ,  have  par t ial ly  enab l ing  reg imes where  a  code  of  
bes t  prac tice i s  couple d  with  a  mandatory disc losure ob liga tion .  See in  general ,  Anand  
2006 Delaware Journal  of  Corpora te  Law 229;  Zadkovich  J “Mandatory Requirements ,  
Voluntary Rules and ‘Please Expla in’ :  A Corporate  Governance  Quagmire” 2007 
Deakin Law Review  23  –  28;  Inst i tut e  of  Directors The Handbook o f  Internat ional  
Corpora te Governance:  A Def ini t ive Guide  (Kogan Page 2005)  180 –  192;  Carda le M A 
Practical  Guide to  Corporate Governance  5 t h  ed  (Sweet & Maxwel l  2014)  33 –  40.  
 
136 Anand 2006 Delaware  Journal o f  Corporate  Law 229 -  230.  
 
137 Anand 2006 Delaware  Journal o f  Corporate  Law  229.  
 
138 For  ins tance,  in  South Afr ica,  the volun tary King IV code is  the appl icable corpora te 
governance  code,  and in  Englan d,  the  UK Combined Code ,  whi le  the USA has  a  ru le -
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self-regulatory mechanisms like codes are primarily relied on.140 There have 
been several corporate failures in the USA. 141 These failures resulted in a 
significant re-examination of corporate governance in that jurisdiction. 
There were various legislative changes in the form of the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, also known as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) as well as regulatory 
change in the form of new governance guidelines142 by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE),143 and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
 
based approach ,  which  inc ludes mandatory compliance with  leg is la t ion and stock 
exchange requirements .  The emphasis i s  on  regula tory enforcement rather  than 
voluntary  compliance .  See Broshko EB and  Li K “Cor porate Governance Requir ements  
in  Canada  and the  United Sta tes:  A Legal  and  Empir ical  Compar ison of  the Pr incip les -
based  and  Rules -based  Approaches”  (2006)  
http: / /papers. ssrn.com/sol3 /papers .cfm?abstract_id= 892708 (Date  of  use :  28  August  
2018) .   
 
139 This  refers  to  ru les tha t  a re non -bind ing or  emerging  norms,  which may or  may no t  
eventua lly  lead  to  bind ing law.  I t  i s  not  ye t  grounded in  a  recognised  formal  source  of  
law.  See  in  genera l  Naicker  M The Use  o f  So ft  Law in  the In ternat ional  Legal Sys tem o f  
in  the  Context  o f  Global Governance (Published  LLM thesis  Univers i ty  of  Pre tor ia  
2013)  2  –  46;  Shaffer  GC and Pollack M “ Hard vs.  Soft  Law: Al ternat ives,  
Complements,  and Antagonists  in  In terna tional  Governance”  2010 Minneso ta Law 
Review  707 –  799; Shelton D “Sof t  Law” 2008  The George Washing ton  Univers i ty  Law 
School  1  –  30 .  
 
140 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  corpora te governance in  South  
Afr ica.   
 
141 Solomon J Corpora te Governance and Accountabil i ty  (Wiley 2013)  28.  In  the USA 
some of  these corpo ra te fai lures were  Enron,  WorldCom, Adelphia  Communica tions and  
Tyco.  These corpora te  fai lures  resu lted in  the USA enact ing var ious s ta tutes to  improve 
corporate governance complian ce.For  more  on  the  Enron  co llapse,  see in  genera l  
Aronson NH “Preventing Fu ture Enrons:   Implementing the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of  
2002” 2002 Stanford Journal of  Law, Business & Finance  127 –  128;  Coglianese C 
“Legi t imacy  and Corporate  Governance” 2007 Delaware Journal  of  Corporate  
Governance  162; Millon D “Who ‘Caused’  the  Enron De bacle?” 2003  Washing ton & 
Lee  Law Review 310 -311.  
 
142 For the  NYSE’s corporate  governance guide,  see 
https: / /www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/ l i s t ing /NYSE_Corporate _Governance_Guide.pdf  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
143 Doherty  DP et  al .  “The Enforcement ro le  of  the New York Stock Exchange” 1991  
(85)  Northwestern Universi ty  Law Review  637 –  651;  Cochrane JL e t  al .  “The Struc ture  
and Regula t ion of  the New York Stock Exchange” 1992 The Journal  of  Corpora tion  
Law  57 –  77;  Dine J and Koutsias M The Nature of  Corpora te Governance:  The  




Automated Quotation (NASDAQ). 144 One of the biggest failures to date in 
the USA was Enron.145 This company was perceived to be highly successful 
until its sudden filing for bankruptcy. After its collapse, the questions arose 
why various key role players in Enron like the board of directors and 
gatekeepers like the auditors, securities analysts and rating agencies 
missed the red flags relating to the high levels of dishonesty, fraud and 
corruption that were subsequently uncovered. 146 The lack of independence 
of both the board of directors and auditors of Enron is relevant to this 
study, especially in the context of the recent collapse of Steinhoff in South 
Africa.147 Following the Enron collapse, various initiatives aimed at the 
 
144 Carda le  A  Pract ical  Guide  to  Corpora te  Governanc e  185;  and Yeoh P “The  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002: Time for  some Tinkering?” 2007 Bus Law Rev  90 –  93.  For  
more in  the NYSE and NASDAQ, see Inst i tute  of  Direc tors The Handbook  of  
Internat ional Corporate  Governance  185; Heppell  JL “List ing on NASDAQ –  The Nuts  
and Bolts”  1998 (56)  The Advocate  853  –  863.  
 
145 Enron f i led for  chap ter  11 bankruptcy on 2 December 2001.  Shor t ly  af ter  the Enron  
scandal ,  the  WorldCom scandal  broke when on 25 Jun e  2002 i t  was  confirmed that  
Wor ldCom had overs ta ted earn ings  during 2001 a nd 2002.  I t  subsequently  f i led for  
bankruptcy on  21 July 2002.  In  the  months tha t  fol lowed,  ev idence of  poor  corpora te  
governance ,  weaknesses  and fraudulen t  ac t iv i t ies emerged,  and severa l  class ac t ion  
lawsuits  were f i led aga ins t  Enron.  One of  the  main acc usa tions re la ted to  f raud and 
mater ia l  missta tement in  the company’s f inancial  statements.  I t  seems that  there was  
l i t t le  or  no transparency in  the company and management knew much  m ore than  they 
were  let t ing  on.  See in  general  P il lay S  “Forc ing Canada’s H and?   The Effect  of  the  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Canadian Corpora te  Governance Reform” (2003 –  2004)  
Mani toba Law Journal  288 –  290;  Nemeroff  MN “Dodd -Frank:  Frankly an Ineff ic ien t  
Form of  Corporate  Governanc e”  2012  Universi ty  of  Flor ida Journal o f  Law and  Pu blic  
Policy  433  –  436;  Armour J  and McCahery JA After  Enron:  Improving  Corporate Law 
and Modernising  Securi t ies  Regulat ion in  Europe and  the  US  (Har t  Publishing  2006)  
135; Skeel  Jr  D et  al .  “Inside -Out Corporate  Governance” (2011)  JCL  149;  Mil ler  The 
Law of  Governance,  Risk Management and Compl iance  513  –  517 regarding Enron;  
Harr is  AB “Corporate Governance  af ter  Enron” 2002 Taxat ion o f  Financial  Products  13  
–  19.  
 
146 Mil ton 2003 Washington & Lee Law Review  311; Coffee JC “Understanding Enron:   
I t ’s  about the Gatekeepers,  Stup id” 2002 The Business Lawyer  1403 –  1409; Al i  PU and  
Gregor iou GN (eds)  In terna tional Corpora te Governance After Sarbanes -Oxley  ( John  
Wiley & Sons 2006)  20 –  23.  
 
147 According to  the Enro n Special  Invest igat ion  Committee,  the board of  Enr on was 
ineffect ive  and the  independence of  vir tua lly  every  direc tor  on  the board  was  
compromised in  one way or  another .  This includes the members of  the audit  committee.  
See  Gordon JN “What  Enron means for  the management  and contro l  of  the modern  
business corporat ion:   Some in i t ia l  ref lec t ions” 2002 The Universi ty  of  Chicago Law 
Review  1241 –  1242.  I t  is  no t  the inten tion of  this research to  go into  the deta i l  of  the 
Enron corporate f a i lu re,  bu t  ra ther  t he corporate  governance  changes  which  were 
implemented  af ter  the  collapse .  See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .2  above  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the  




improvement of corporate governance in the USA were put in place.148  
These examples provide a valuable illustration of the critical role of boards 
and board committees in the management of a company. Although 
companies were subject to legislation and corporate governance practices, 
the company collapses indicate a total disregard of existing legislation and 
regulation.  It also confirms the need for rigorous accountability practices.  
In the USA, the Enron collapse led to the promulgation of further legislation 
like SOX to try and prevent a similar collapse. The USA corporate 
governance system is primarily based on the laws of incorporation enacted 
in each of the states.149  Securities regulation plays an integral part in the 
USA, governing its securities industry for public companies. The SEC is the 
primary securities markets regulator in the USA. It plays a crucial role in 
protecting public shareholders through enforcement of federal securities 
laws.150 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided the SEC with the 
 
148 This inc ludes the crea tion of  the Corporate Fraud Task Force and the Enron Task  
Force wi thin the Jus t ice  Depar tment,  amendments to  the USA Sentencing Guide l ines,  
revisions to  the Just ice Depar tment’s Corpora te  Prosecut ion Guide lines ,  publ ica t ion  of  
the USA Secur i t ies Exchange Commiss ion (SEC) enforcement cr i ter ia  as well  as  
sign if icant  increases in  SEC funding,  and the  es tab li shment of  Publ ic  Accounting 
Oversigh t  Board and Audi tor  Independence.  On these ini t iat ives,  see Brick ley KF 
“Enron’s Legacy” 2004  Buffa lo Criminal Law Review 230 –  45;  on  the  Publ ic  Company 
Accounting Overs ight  Boa rd  and Audi tor  Independ ence,  see Al i  and  Gregor iou (eds)  
Internat ional Corporate  Governance After Sarbanes -Oxley  11  –  12.  
 
149  Interna l  corporate governance inc ludes the board of  directors,  shareholders’  r igh ts 
and commit tees ;  while  externa l  corporate  gover nance re la tes to  federa l  law,  
gatekeepers,  the SEC and other  publ ic  inst i t ut ions,  the stock markets,  and the market  
for  corpora te con trol .  See in  genera l ,   Ins t i tu te  of  Direc tors The Handbook o f  
Internat ional Corpora te Governance:  A Defini t ive Guide  180;  V Letsou P “The  
Challenging Face of  Corporate Governance Regula t ion in  the United Sta tes:   The  
Evolving Roles of  the Federal  and Sta te  Governments” 2009 Willamette  Law Review  
150 –  167;  See in  general  P into  AR “An Overview of  Uni ted States  Corpora te 
Governance in  Publica l ly  Trade d Corpora tions” 2010 The American Journal of  
Comparative Law  264 –  279;  Inst i tu te  of  Directors The Handbook o f  Interna tional  
Corpora te  Governance:  A Def ini t ive Guide  179 –  192; Po lson  L “Development of  
Corpora te Governance in  the con tex t  of  ‘Fu ll  Disc losur e’  in  the Uni ted States” 2002  
Mexican Law Journal  135 –  141.  
 
150  The SEC was founded during 1934 af ter  the passing of  the Secur i t ies Exchange Act 
of  1934.  The pr incipal  Acts  def ining  the SEC’s mandate  and  legal  f ramework  are  the  
Secur i t ies Act of  1933,  the  Secur i t ies Exchange  Act of  1934 and SOX. See in  general ,  
Du Plessis  (eds)  et  al .  Princip les o f  Contemporary  Corporate Governance  358;  Hanna J  
and Turl ing ton E “The Secur i t ies Act of  1933”  1933 –  1934 I l l inois Law Review  482 –  
507;  Ins t i tute  of  Direc tors The Handbook of  In ternat ional Corpora te Governance:   A 
Def ini t ive  Guide  2005 184; Doty  JR “The  Role o f  the  Securi t ies Commiss ion and  
Exchange Commiss ion in  an Internat ional ized Marketplace” 1992 Fordham Law Review  
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power to oversee and regulate the financial markets as well as 
considerable powers to investigate any contravention of legislation, 
enabling it to bring civil actions to enforce the securities laws and 
recommend criminal actions to federal prosecutors. 151 The SEC requires 
public companies to disclose important financial and other related 
information to the public.152 However, the powers provided by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to the SEC were not sufficient to prevent abuses of 
power and subsequent corporate failures.  
 
 
s71;  Calder  A Corporate Governance:  A Pract ical  Guide to  the Legal Frameworks and  
Internat iona l Codes of  Practice  (Kogan Page  2008)  16;  Pin to 2010 The American  
Journal of  Comparative law  275.  The miss ion of  the SEC is to  protec t  investors ;  
maintain  fa ir ,  order ly ,  and eff icien t  markets ;  and fac il i ta te  capi ta l  formation.  The SEC 
str ives to  promote a  market  env ironment tha t  i s  worthy of  the public 's  t rus t .  The SEC 
also has a  s trong enforcement capac ity ,  which may resu lt  in  admin istra t ive or  l i t iga t ion  
proceed ings aga ins t  companie s that  are non-complian t  wi th  the secur i t ies leg isla t ion .  
For  more on  SEC enforcement,  see  ht tps : / /www.sec.gov/about. shtml  and 
https: / /www.sec .gov/ l i t igat io n.sh tml  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018);  Kennedy WM 
“Securi t ies and Exchang e Commission” 1939 Commercial  Law Journal  383 –  390;  V 
Letsou 2009 Willamette  Law Review  149 –  199.   
 
151 Some of  the  importan t   sect ions  of  this  Securi t ies Exchange  Act a re:  Sect ion 4  
es tabl i shes the Securi t ies Exchange Commiss ion,  whi le  s  4E re lates  to  enf orcement 
invest igat ions;  s  6  relates  to  nat ional  securi t ies exchanges,  while  s  6(3)  contains the  
l i st ing standards and condit ions  for  tra ining  see SEC websi te  for  a  l is t ing  of  al l  th e 
applicable legislat io n;  s  9  con ta ins  the  prohib it ion  aga inst  manipu lat io n of  secur i ty  
pr ices;   s  10A contains the aud it  requ irements ;  s  10A(j)  makes auditor  rotat ion 
mandatory ;  s  10(A)(m)  conta ins  the standards of  audi t  committees;  s  12 contains the 
registrat ion requ irement  fo r  securi t ies ;  s  13A re lates  to  repor t ing  and record  keeping;  s  
14B rela tes to  corpora te governance;  s  15E(t )  per tains to  the board of  directors,  
independence and management  of  conf l ict  of  in terests  and  s  18 con tains the l iab il i ty  for  
mis leading statements made;  h t tps: / /www.sec.gov/answers /about - lawsshtml.h tml  (Date 
of  use :  8  August  2018) .  See in  genera l  Smerdon  R A Pract ica l  Guide to  Corporate  
Governance  4 t h  ed  (Sweet & Maxwell  2010)   616 –  628;  Tracy  JE and MacChesny AB 
“The Secur i t ies Exchan ge Act of  1934”  1934 (32)  Michigan Law Review  1025 –  1068;  
Hanna J “The Secur i t ies  Exchange Act of  1934”  1934(xxii i)  Cal iforn ia Law Review  1  –  
29;  Pinto  2010 The American Journal  of  Comparat ive  law 275.  
 
152 The SEC has the power to  impose  both cr iminal  and c ivi l  sanct ions  to  enforce the  
law.  See in  genera l ,  Inst i tu te  of  Directors The Handbook of  In ternat ional Corporate 
Governance:   A Defin i t ive Guide  2005 184; Busbee D “Corpora te Gover nance:  A 
Perspective 2003 Law and Business Review o f  the Americas  6 ;  Jenn ings RW “Self -
Regula t ion in  the Securi t ies Industry :   The  Role of  the Secur i t ies and Exchange  
Commission” 1964 Law and Contemporary Problems  663 –  690.  Sec tion 21 of  the 
Secur i t ies Ex change  Act re la tes to  i nvest iga tions,  in junctions and  prosecut ion of  
offences;  and  s 32  con ta ins  the penal t ies  for  non -compl iance.  See in  general ,  the SEC’s 
enforcement  website   h t tps: / /www.sec .gov/ l i t iga t ion.sh tml  (Date of  use :  10  August  
2018);   Brickey 2004  Buffa lo Criminal Law Review  240 –  254;  Mark G “SEC 




Following the corporate failure of Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
was promulgated.153 This Act had a profound impact on corporate 
governance in the USA. Public companies in the USA bear the brunt of the 
various corporate governance changes that followed the Enron corporate 
failure. Private companies do not sell shares to the public, they do not list 
on any stock exchange, and they are not subject to SOX. However, this 
does not mean that private companies do not have to comply with the 
principles of good corporate governance. They must adhere to the 
corporate governance principles contained in their state corporation laws. 154  
SOX came into force in 2002  and introduced significant changes to the 
regulation of financial practice and corporate governance as well as 
securities law.155 SOX applies to all issuers, including foreign private 
 
153 The Publ ic  Company Accounting Reform and  Investor  Pro tec tion  Act of  2002 i s  
genera l ly  re ferred  to  as “SOX.” Du Pless is (eds)  et  a l .  Princip les of  Contemporary  
Corpora te Governance  358;  Bainbr idge The New Corporate Governance:   In  Theory  
and Practice176.  SOX is deal t  with  in  more de tai l  below in  subsect ion (b) .  
 
154 Inst i tu te  of  Direc tors The Handbook o f  International  Corpora te Governance:   A  
Def ini t ive Guide  2005 184 .  
 
155 I t  was named af ter  senator  Paul  Sarbanes and Representat ive Michael  Oxley who 
were the main archi tec ts of  the Act.  See in  general  Bainbridge Corporate Governance  
after  the  Financia l  Cris is  5  –  9 ;  Hanson GR “Recent  Developments  affect ing the  
l iab il i ty  of  Profess ionals,  Off icers and Directors”  2004(39)  Tort  Tr ial  & Insurance  
Practice Law Journal  688.  Al though SOX re lates  more  to  accounting,  and is  not  
applicable to  higher  educat ion  ins t i tut ions ,  i t  const i tutes impor tan t  federal  leg isla t ion  
in  the USA rel at ing to  corporate governance of  public  companies .  See in  genera l  
Smerdon A Practical  Guide to  Corpora te Governance  628 –  642;  Kieff  FS and Paredes 
TA Perspec tives on Corporate Gover nance  (Cambr idge 2010)  420 –  428;  Kimb B 
“Sarbanes -Oxley Act” 2003(40)  Harvard Journal on Leg isla t ion  235 –  252;  Wiley RA 
“Sarbanes -Oxley Act” 2006(50)  Boston Bar Journal  10 –  13 ;  see Du Plessis  (eds)  e t  al .  
Princip les o f  Contemporary Corporate Governance 358  –  362  for  a  d iscuss ion  of  some 
of  the provisions of  SOX. The six  main objec tives of  SOX are  the fol lowing: 
es tabl i shing  the Publ ic  Company  Accounting Overs ight  Board ;  enhancing  the  
independence  of  public  company auditors ;  regula t ing  corporate  governanc e  and  
responsib il i ty ;  enhancing f inancial  disc losure;  regula t ing  secur i t ie s analyst  conf l ic ts  of  
interes t ;  and  add ing  several  new substant ive  cr imes  under  the securi t ies  laws as  wel l  as 
enhancing  penalt ies for  viola t ions o f  secur i t ies and o ther  laws.  SOX focuses  more  
extensively  on the accounting industry  and on the responsib il i ty  of  top corpora te  
execut ives.  Not iceably one of  the p roblems wi th  accounting was the confl ic t  of  inte rest  
insofar  as  the  aud itors  of  companies  usual ly  also prov ided  consul t ing serv ices in  
addit ion to  the  aud its  that  they  under took.  Therefore,  there  was  n o incent ive for  the 
auditors to  undertake a  thorough audi t  in  fear  tha t  an  unhappy cl ient  tak ing his /her  
consu lt ing business e lsewhere.  See in  genera l  P il lay 2003  –  2004 Mani toba Law 
Journal 285 –  286 and 290 –  297; Johnson LPQ and Sides  MA “The Sarbanes -Oxley 




issuers,156 who have registered securities under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or have filed a registration statement 
under the United States Securities Act of 1933. 157 These failures were 
considered to be the result of inadequate existing legislation. SOX 
introduced significant changes relating to corporate governance for 
companies listed on stock markets pertaining to accounting, auditing and 
reporting.158 SOX expressly prohibits certain actions and attaches heavy 
administrative, civil and criminal penalt ies and sanctions to companies for 
non-compliance.159 It applies to companies, including any non-US company 
that is required to file reports with SEC, since it is listed with the NYSE or 
the NASDAQ or has made a registered offering of securities within the 
USA.160 SOX mandates changes that affect executive compensation, 
shareholder monitoring and board monitoring. 
 
Further changes include restrictions on insider trading and enhanced 
financial disclosures.161 SOX also indirectly affects private companies. Many 
 
156 James R,  Brod C and Bibko E “The Appl ica t ion  of  the Uni ted States Sarbanes -Oxley  
Act  to  Non-US Issuers” 2003 Business Law Internat io nal  101 –  126 ;  Dine and Kouts ias 
The Nature of  Corporate Governance:   The S ignif icance o f  Nat ional Cultural  Ident i ty  
141.  
 
157 Smerdon A Practica l  Guide  to  Corpora te Governance  628;  Dine and  Kouts ias The 
Nature of  Corpora te  Governance:  The S igni f icance o f  Na t ional  Cul tura l  Iden ti ty  140 –  
141.  
 
158 Kamar E,  Karaca-Mandic P and Tal ley  E “Going Pr iva te Decisions  and the Sarbanes -
Oxley  Act  of  2002:   a  cross  country  analys is”  2009 (25)  Journal o f  Law, Economics  
and Organisat ion  1 .  
 
159 Thomson 2008 Journal  Business an d Technology Law 393 –  415; Russe l  JD “The  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002: New Criminal  Penalt ies and Civ il  Remedies  for  Corpora te  
Misconduct”  2002(36)  Oklahoma Bar Journal  3477 –  3490;  Lerner  CS and Yahya  MA 
“Left  Behind” af ter  Sarbanes -Oxley” 2007  American Criminal Law Review  1383 -  1416.   
 
160 Hendr ikse and Hefer -Hendrikse Corpora te Governance Handbook  97; Skeel  et  a l .  
2011 JCL  154 –  159; Falenck i  CA “Sarbanes -Oxley:  Ignoring the Presumption agains t  
Extra terr i tor ial i ty” 2004 The George Washing ton Interna tional  Law Review 1211 –  
1238.  
 
161 These changes inc lude in ter a l ia  d irec t ions for  SEC and na tional  secur i t ies  
exchanges,  which  inc lude the NYSE and  NASDAQ, which must  es tabli sh s tandards  
regula t ing to  aud it  commit tees.  See Holmstrom and Ka plan “The state  of  US Corporate 
Governance:  What’s  r ight  and what’ s wrong? ”  20 –  21 
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states aligned their corporate laws to SOX. The enhanced compliance 
standards on state level affected private companies.162 One of the important 
creations under SOX was the establishment of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is responsible for the 
establishment of enhanced quality control mechanisms to conduct 
inspections, launch disciplinary proceedings and apply sanctions where 
necessary.163 Both the SEC and PCAOB are agencies that hold a 
considerable amount of power with regard to the regulation and 
enforcement of financial and accounting standards in the USA. 164 It is clear 
from the discussion above that public companies are subject to a higher 
standard of corporate governance. This can be expected, as the failure of a 
public company will have a greater negative impact on the economy then 
the failure of a private company. 
 
On 21 July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into power.165 This Act 
provided for significant changes to federal financial regulation and new 
 
http: / /www.nber .org/papers /w9613.pdf  (Date of  use :  28  August  2018) .  SOX requires 
more de tai led d isclosure of  off -ba lance shee t  f inancings  and specia l  purpose ent i t ies,  
which  wil l  resul t  in  i t  b eing more  diff icu lt  to  manipulate  f inancia l  s ta tements.  I t  a l so 
enhances board moni tor ing which main ly  focuses on increasing the power,  
responsib il i ty  and independence of  the audi t  c ommit tee .  F inal ly ,  SOX also increases 
both the management and the board’s responsibil i ty  for  f inancial  report ing as wel l  as 
imposing  cr iminal  penalt ies for  misreport ing.  See  Johnson  and  Sides  2004 Will iam 
Mitche ll  Law Review  1149 -1150.  
 
162 Dine  and  Kouts ia s  The Nature  o f  Corpora te Governance:   The  S ignif icance  o f  
Nat ional  Cultura l  Iden ti ty  141.  
 
163 Ali  and Gregoriou (eds)  Internat ional Corpora te Governance After Sarbanes -Oxley  
11;  see in  general  Publ ic  Company Account ing  Overs ight  Board h ttps: / /pcaobus .org/  
(Date of  use:  10 August  2018) ;  Innes W “The Unaccountabi l i ty  of  the Accounting 
Regula tors :  Analyzing  the  Consti tut iona li ty  of  the Publ ic  Company Account ing 
Oversigh t  Board” 2009 The John Marshall  Law Review 1025  –  1048;  Weiss  EJ “Some 
thoughts on  an  agenda  for  the  Public  Company Account ing Ov ers ight  Board” 2003 
Duke Law Journal  491  –  515.  Pr ior  to  the  enactment of  SOX, the  aud it ing  profess ion 
was sel f - regu lated,  and  i t  was clear  af te r  the var ious  corpora te fa i lures tha t  the  
audit ing profess ion  wi l l  benef i t  f rom being  regu lated.  See in  genera l ,  Markham JW and  
Gjyshi  R (eds)  Research Handbook on  Securit ies Regula tion  in  the  United  Sta tes 
(Edward Elgar  Publish ing Limited  2014)  287 –  291.  
 
164 Innes  2009 The John Marshal l  Law R eview  1020.  
 
165 The Dodd-Frank Act was ye t  ano ther  response to  the f inancia l  cr i s is  that  took p lace 
in  2008.  However ,  the roo t  cause for  these fa i lures is  debatab le;  some b lame 
deregulat ion whi le  o thers suggest  greed on the par t  of  lenders,  borrowers and in vestors 
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substantive requirements that apply to a broad range of market 
participants, including public companies that are not financial institutions.166 
The Act provided for, amongst others, corporate governance and executive 
compensation reforms and new registration requirements for hedge fund 
and private equity fund advisors. 167 The aim of the legislation is to “promote 
the financial stability of the USA, by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system to end “too big to fail”, to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices and for other purposes.” 168 
 
Neither SOX nor the Dodd-Frank Act applies to higher education 
institutions. However, it is essential to provide an overview of these 
laws/statutes as it provides some context to the “hard law” approach of the 
United States as well as how the USA dealt with corporate failures like 
Enron.169 
 
In view of the similarities between the recent Steinhoff corporate failure 
and that of Enron, it is the author’s view that South Africa should take a 
 
caused the cr is i s .  Many  others poin t  the f ingers to  corpora te gove rnance fa i lures o f  
major  f inancial  ins t i tut ions.  However ,  the Dodd-Frank does noth ing  to  address the 
global i sat ion tha t  creates incen tives  for  excessive deb t  and  impair s employment  i n  the 
USA, thus rendering fu ture debt  cr i ses inev itable.  For  more on the D odd-Frank,  see in  
genera l  Ramirez SA “Dodd -Frank  as Magino t  Line”  2011 Chapman Law Review  Vol  
15 110; Bainbridge Corporate Governance af ter the Financial  Crisis  9  –  19;  Skeel  
2011 JCL  150;  Enochs  CR “Update  on the Dodd-Frank  Act”  2014 (36)  Houston Journal 
of  Interna tional Law  341 –  378.  
 
166 Nemeroff  2012 Universi ty  of  Flor ida Law Journal  of  Law and Publ ic  Pol icy  431 –  
432.  Dodd-Frank  wi l l  d ramat ical ly  reworked  th ree cruc ial  areas:  (a)  in terna l  corpora te  
decision-making ;  (b)  th ird -par ty  gatekeepers ;  and (c)  f inancial  der iva t ives.  See Skeel  
2011 JCL  150.  
 
167 See a summary of  Dodd -Frank Financial  Regula t ion Legislat ion 
http: / /corpgov. law.harvard.edu/20 10/07/07 /summary -of-dodd-frank-f inancia l -
regula t ion- leg is la t ion /  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
168 Preamble of  the Dodd -Frank Act .  See Smith LR and Muniz -Frant ice l l i  VM “Strategic  
Shortcomings of  the Dodd -Frank Act 2013 The Anti trus t  Bul le t in  619 and 622 –  628 on 
the strateg ic d iff icul t ies  of  the Dodd -Frank Act.   
 
169 I t  i s  importan t  to  have this overv iew in  l ieu of  the recent  Steinhof f  scandal  in  South  




stronger approach to corporate governance as the softer approach of South 
Africa does not seem to be effective enough.170 It is as yet not clear whether 
the legislative changes in the USA have been effective to change 
governance practices. It must be reiterated that no legislation will ever 
change criminal behaviour.  Steinhoff was subject to the Companies Act of 
2008 and because it was listed on the JSE, the company had to comply 
with the King Report on Corporate Governance. However, Steinhoff was 
incorporated in the Netherlands and has a two-tier board, namely a 
management board and a supervisory board. Despite being subject to both 
South African and international legislation, it is clear from the findings that 
Steinhoff’s supervisory board did not exercise proper oversight of the 
management board. There was an apparent disregard of good corporate 
governance practices and a continued failure to take responsibility for the 
failures. Even after the crisis broke in December 2017, the board 
authorised exorbitant additional payments to certain executive members of 
the executive management, although they had formed part of the 
management team that ignored corporate governance practices and 
legislation in the first place.171 Steinhoff is an example of a board of 
directors that ignored not only legislation, but also the application of 
applicable corporate governance practices. Although the investigations into 
the Steinhoff-matter have not yet been concluded, there should be 







170 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .1  above for  a  d i scuss ion of  Steinhoff .   
 
171 Steinhoff  i s  incorpora ted in  the Nether lands and  has a  two - t ier  board st ructure,  
which  i s  common amongst  European  companies.   However ,  th is  st ructure  over  
complica tes governance.  See Rossouw J and Styan J “Steinhoff  co llapse :  a  f ai lure o f  




(b) The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles for Corporate 
Governance: Recommendations and Analysis 
 
In this paragraph, the ALI Principles172 and comparable principles of 
Georgia corporate law are considered.173 The American Law Institute 
confirmed that these principles are voluntary. 174 The ALI initiated a project 
regarding corporate reform in 1978.175 After several tentative iterations of 
the ALI Principles, they were eventually published in 1994, and are 
reviewed from time to time.176 This was a very contentious project due to 
some fundamental changes proposed to, for example, the structure and 
composition of the board of directors and derivative suits. 177 The ALI 
Principles do not cover all areas of corporate law, but rather focus on the 
 
172 See the Amer ican  Law Inst i tu te  (ALI)  on h ttps: / /www.ali .o rg/  (Date of  use :  28  
August  2018) .  The project  was en ti t led “Pr inc ip les of  Corpora te Governance:   Analysis 
and Recommendat ions”,  hereaf ter  referred  to  as  the ALI Princip les.  The  Amer ican Law 
Inst i tu te ,  Princip les o f  Corpora te Governance:  Analys is a nd  Recommendations  were  
approved during  31 May 1992.  See in  general  Hansen  1993 The Business Lawyer  1355; 
du Pless is  (ed)  e t  a l .  Princip les o f  Contemporary Corpora te Governance  355 -  357 for  
more on the ALI Principles ,  as well  as Knowles MF and Flannery C “The ALI 
Princip les of  Corpora te  Governance  Compared  with  Georgia Law” 199 5 Mercer Law 
Review .  For  the  purposes  of  this  research,  the  focus i s  on  the  du ty of  care and the  
business judgment ru le .  For  a  ful l  d iscussion of  the other  pr inc iples,  see Knowles an d  
Flannery 1995 Mercer Law Review .  
 
173 The  focus remains  on  d irec tors and  o ff icers  and the ir  du ties and  l iab il i t ies.  The ALI  
Princip les  are  not  discussed in  de tai l .  
 
174 This was  conf irmed by way of  email  correspondence wi th  the American Law 
Inst i tu te .  
 
175 This pro jec t  grew out of  v ar ious conferences held dur ing 1977 and  1978,  fol lo wing 
which the f ir s t  ten ta t ive draf t  was published  in  1982.  Mofsky JS and Rubin RD 
“Introduction :  A Symposium on the  ALI Corpora te  Governance  Pro jec t”  1983 
Univers i ty  of  Miami Law Re view  173;  Goldstein  1984 The George  Washing ton Law 
Review  503 –  504.  
 
176 See in  general ,  Knowles and Flannery 1995 (47)  Mercer Law Review  2 ;  Eisenberg  
MA “An Overview of  the Princip les of  Corpora te Governance” 1993 (48)  The Business  
Lawyer  1271 –  1296;  Mitchell  LE “Private  Law,  Publ ic  Interest? :  The  ALI Princ iples of  
Corpora te Governance” 1993 (61)  The George Washing ton Law Review  871 –  897.  
 
177 Chef f ins BR (ed)  The History o f  Modern US Corpora te Governance  (Edward Elgar  
Publ ish ing 2011)  557 –  558;  Dooley  MP “Two Models o f  Corpora t e  Governance” 1992  




objectives and conduct of the business corporation; 178 the structure of the 
corporation; the duty of care; the duty of fair dealing; 179 and the role of 
directors and shareholders. Section 3.01 of the ALI Principles establishes 
that the principal senior executives appointed by the board of directors are 
responsible for the management of the corporation. One of the basic 
functions of the board is to select and oversee management. In terms of 
section 3.02, senior management is subject to the functions and powers of 
the board.180 The authority of senior managers as set out in the ALI 
Principles is virtually identical to the position adopted in Georgian case 
law.181 Section 3.02 of the ALI Principles lists five functions the board of 
directors should182 perform, and seven functions that it may183 perform.184 The 
section also recognises the board’s ability to delegate authority to its 
 
178 See Seligman J “A Sheep in  Wolf’ s Cloth ing:  The American Law Ins t i tute’s  
Princip les o f  Corpora te Governance Project ” 1986 –  1987 Washing ton Law Review  325 
–  381 for  a  cr i t ique  on t hese  pr inc iples.  
 
179 For  more on  corporate f iduciar ies  and  s 2 .01 of  these  pr incip les,  see  Ryan  PJ  
“Strange Bedfel lows: Corporate Fiduciar ies and the Genera l  Law –  Compliance in  s  
2 .01(a)  of  the American Law Ins t i tute’s Princ iples o f  Corporate  Governance ” 1991  
(66)  Washing ton Law Review  413 –  502.  
 
180 This i s  the posit ion  of  the G eorg ia Code of  2017 § 14 -2-801.  
 
181 Knowles  and  Flannery 1995 Mercer  Law Review 8;  Holl iday  Construct ion Company v  
Sandy Springs Associates 198 Ga.  App 20,  400 S.E.2d 380 (1990);  Cooper v  G.E.  
Construc tion  116  Ga.  App.690,  158 S.E.2d 305 (1967) .  
 
182 These funct ions are to  selec t ,  regular ly  evaluate,  f ix  the compensa tion of ,  and,  
where appropr ia te ,  rep lace the pr inc ipal  sen ior  execut ives;  oversee the  conduct  of  the  
corporat ion’s business  to  eva lua te whether  th e business is  be ing properly  managed;   
review and ,  where  appropriate ,  approve the  corporat ion’s f inancia l  objectives and 
major  corporate plans and act ions;  rev iew and,  where appropria te ,  approve major  
changes in ,  and determinat ions o f  other  major  quest ions  of  choice respec ting the 
appropria te  aud it ing and account ing pr incip les and prac tices to  be used in  the 
prepara t ion  of  the  corporation’s  f inancial  statements;  and  perform such  other  funct ions 
as a re prescr ibed by law or  assigned to  the board under  a  s tand ard of  the corporat ion.  
See  general ly ,  Knowles and Flannery  1995 Mercer Law Review 9.  
 
183 These  functions are  to  ini t ia te  and adopt  corporate  plans,  commitments  and act ions;  
in i t ia te  and adopt changes in  accounting pr inc iples and prac t ices ;  provide adv ice a nd  
counse l  to  the pr inc ipa l  sen ior  execut ives;  ins t ruct  any committee,  p r incipal  senior  
execut ive  or  o ther  off icer….  and  rev iew the act ions  of  any committee,  pr incipal  senior  
execut ive or  other  off icer ;  make  recommendat ions to  shareh olders;  manage the  busi ness  
of  the corporat ions;  and act  on al l  o ther  corp orate mat ters no t  requ ir ing shareholder  
approval .  See genera l ly ,  Knowles and Flannery  1995 Mercer  Law Review 9.  
 




committees.185 The ALI Principles require that large publicly held 
corporations have an audit committee, 186 and suggest that smaller 
corporations also do so. In addition, all corporations are advised to have a 
committee responsible for the nominations of directors and large 
corporations are recommended, also to have a committee responsible for 
executive remuneration.187  This is similar to the recommendations of King 
IV, except that the committees recommended by King IV would apply to all 
governing bodies, not only to large corporations. 188 However, the Georgia 
Code of 2017 does not contain any recommendations for specific 
committees, which allow companies to choose committees suited to their 
needs.189 The position in South Africa is different, as specific committees 
are prescribed in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 for certain types of 
companies. Companies may also constitute other committees to assist it.190 
 
Section 4.01 of part IV provides for the duty of care 191 as well as the 
business judgment rule.192 The ALI Principles do not impose a higher 
 
185 The  Georgia Code  of  2017 provides  for  co mmit tees  in  §14-2-825,  yet  i t  does  not  
prescr ibe  sp eci f ic  committees.  
 
186 The ALI Princip les  s ta te  tha t  the aud it  committee should at  least  consis t  of  three  
direc tors,  the majori ty  o f  whom have no sign if icant  re la t ionship  with  the cor pora tion’s 
sen ior  execu tives .  In  addit ion ,  the  members may no t  curren tly  b e  employed  by the  
corporat ion or  have been employed by the corporation  with in the prev ious two years.  
The purpose of  this commit tee  i s  to  implement and suppor t  the board’s oversigh t  
function .  See  Knowles a nd Flannery  1995  Mercer Law Review 14 and  s 3 .05 of  the  ALI  
Princip les.  For the du ties of  the audit  commit tee ,  see s  3A.03 of  the ALI Princip les.   
 
187  See s 3 .04(a)  and s 3 .05 of  the ALI Princip les;  Knowles and Flannery 1995 Mercer  
Law Review 15; 14.   
 
188 King IV i s  discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  above.  The requ ired commit tees in  
terms of  the 2014 Reporting Regula tions  is  d iscussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .4  above .  
 
189 See the  Georgia  Code of  2017 t i t le  14 -2-825.  
 
190 Yet ,  the Act does  not  p rohibi t  the establ ishment of  any o ther  commit tees.  
 
191 I t  s tates the fo l lowing:  “…a d irec tor  or  o ff icer  has a  du ty to  the corporation  to  
perform the d irec tor’ s o r  off icer’ s functions  in  good fai th ,  in  a  manner  tha t  he  or  she  
reasonably be lieves to  be i n  the best  in teres ts  of  the corporat ion and with  the care that  
an ordinar i ly  prudent person would reasonable be expected to  exercise in  a  l ike 
posi t ion  and under  s imi lar  c ircumstances”.  See  Knowles and  Flannery 1995 Mercer Law 
Review 16 –  18.  See para 5 .2 .3  (d)  be low for  a  discu ss ion of  direc tor’ s duties.  See para  
5.2.3  (e)  abov e for  the discuss ion of  the di rec tor’s standard of  conduct  in  terms of  the 
Georgia Code of  2017.  
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degree of care on the directors of banks and other financial institutions 
than that which is required for the directors of other business corporations. 
The Georgia Code of 2017 has now codified the business judgment rule in 
the Banking Code of Georgia.193 In South Africa, a higher degree of care is 
expected of directors of banks and financial institutions.194 Section 4.01(b) 
of the ALI Principles reiterates the board’s authority to delegate any 
function of the board provided the delegation to comply with sections 4.02195 
and 4.03196 of the ALI Principles. The Georgia Code of 2017 has similar 
provisions.197 This is also similar to the provisions of section 72 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 in South Africa that provides for the delegation of 












192 See Knowles and  Flannery 1995 Mercer  Law Review 18  –  20.  See also para 5 .4  
below for  a  discussion  of  the cod if ica t ion  of  the business  judgment  rule  in  the G eorg ia  
Code of  2017.  
 
193 See  para  5 .4  below for  a  discuss ion of  the codi f ica t ion  of  the  business  judgment  ru le  
in  the  Georgia  Code of  2017.  
 
194 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .3  above for  a  d isc uss ion of  the  directors  of  banks in  South  
Afr ica.  
 
195 In  accordance with  th is sect ion,  the ALI Principles  e laborate on the abi l i ty  of  
direc tors and  off icers  to  rely  on information obta ined  from d irectors,  off icers ,  
corporate employees,  experts  and o ther  per sons  who are  bel ieved to  mer i t  confidence.  
 
196 In  accordance wi th  th is  sec t ion,  the  ALI Principles  expand  on the authorisa t ion  
given in  s  4 .01(b)  for  a  direc tor  to  re ly  on informat ion obtained from a commit tee o f  
the board .  
 
197 Tit le  14-2-830 (b)  of  the Geor gia Code of  2017; see K nowles and Flannery 1995  




5.3 THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE 




The Dominion of Canada was created under the auspices of the British 
North America Act of 1867 (BNA Act). 198 The Canadian Constitution 
includes the Constitution Act of 1867, 199  the Constitution Act of 1982, 
various other statutory enactments and orders of the council as well as 
other documents, which are sometimes referred to as the unwritten 
constitution or the common law constitution. 200 The Constitution Act of 1867 
details the power and jurisdictions of the government as well as 




198 The BNA Act es tab li shes the rules of  federa l i sm, which are essen tial ly  the rules that  
al locate the  governmental  power between  the  federal  par l iament and the  prov incial  
legis latures.  The Consti tut ion Act of  1867 and the Const i tu t ion Act of  1982 are statu tes  
enacted for  Canada by the Uni ted Kingdom Par l iament in  i t s  role  as imper ia l  
Par l iament .  See in  genera l ,  Gal l  The Canadian Legal Sys tem  57;  Hogg PW 
Const i tu t ional Law o f  Canada (Thomson Creswel l  2007)  1-12.2 -  1-13,  1-3.  –  1-6;  
Bour inot  JB “Federa l  Const i t u t ion of  Canada” 1890 (2)  Judicia l  Review  131 –  14;  
Monahan PJ and Shaw B Const i tu t ional Law  4 t h  ed (Irwin Law 2013)  4  –  6 .  
 
199 This was or iginal ly  the  BNA Act,  but  was renamed the Co nsti tut ion Act of  1867;  see  
Regimbald G and Newman D The Law of  the Canadian Consti tut ion  (LexisNexis 2013)  
5  –  6 .  
 
200 The Const i tu t ion  Act o f  1982 made some important  changes  to  the  Const i tu t ion.  The  
lead ing instrument was the Canada Act of  1982,  a  short  s tatu te  of  the United Ki ngdom 
Par l iament ,  which terminated the au thor i ty  of  the Uni ted Kingdom over  Canada.  
Schedule  B of  the  Canada Act  of  1982 conta ins  the  Char ter  of  Righ ts .  The Const i tu t ion  
Act  of  1982 prov ided  for  the fo l lowing: the  change of  the  name of  the  BNA Act  to  the  
Const i tu t ion Act of  1867 and the  provision  of  a  def i nit ion of  the phrase “Consti tut ion 
of  Canada.”  The Consti tut ion  of  Canada  i s  def ined in  s  52(2)  of  the  Const i tu t ion  Act  of  
1982.  See in  genera l  Gall  The Canadian Legal Sys tem  57 ;  Hogg Consti tut ional Law of  
Canada  1 -6  –  1-12.2;  New Brunswick Broadcast ing Co  v Nova  Sco tia  (1993)  where the 
Supreme Court  of  Canada he ld that  the def ini t ion  as provided in  s  52(2)  is  not  
exhaustive.  The Cour t  fur thermore he ld tha t  the unwr it ten  doct r ine  o f  p ar l iamentary 
pr ivi lege should be included in  the def ini t ion ,  al though s 52 (2)  makes  no ment ion of  
par l iamentary pr ivi lege.  See Gall  The Canadian Legal Sys tem  57.  For  more on the  
consti tut ional  development of  Canada ,  see in  general  Monahan and Shaw Const i tu t ional  
Law  31 –  52.  See  in  general  Rothman LI ,  Elman BP and Gal l  GL Consti tu t ional Law: 




Canada, like South Africa, was once a British colony.201 The Constitution 
Act of 1867 divides the authority for the judicial system between the federal 
government and the provincial governments.  202 In 1931, Canada officially 
ceased to be a British Colony, and the British Parliament lost most of its 
power to pass laws in the country.203 The common law, much like in South 
Africa and the USA, applies in Canada. 204 Canada has independent national 
and regional governments, each operating in its own jurisdiction. 205 In 
 
201 During the 18 t h  and 19 t h  century,  Canada as we know it  today did no t  exist .  Canada  
star ted changing dur ing  th e mid-1800s when the Canadian legis la ture was es tab li shed,  
and the country  s tar ted  enact ing i ts  own legis lat ion.  See Gal l  The Canadian Legal 
Sys tem  51 –  61;  for  more on  the Canadian Const i tu t ion see  
ht tp: / /www.jus t ice.gc.ca /eng/cs j - sjc/ jus t /05.h tm l  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
202 The provinc ia l  governments are Ontar io ,  Quebec,  Bri t i sh  Columbia ,  Alber ta ,  Nova  
Scotia ,  Mani toba,  Newfoundland ,  Pr ince Edward I s land,  Saskatchewan and New 
Brunswick .  See  in  general ,  Teep le  D “The History and Role  of  the  Supreme Cour t  of  
Canada” (2002)  Austra l ian Law Library  218;  Rothman,  Elman and Gall  Const i tut ional  
Law: Cases,  Commentary and Princ iples  247 –  253.  
 
203 I t  was no t  un ti l  1949 that  Bri tain  ceased to  be t he ul t imate au thori ty  in  Canadian  
law.  Unt i l  that  year ,  legal  cases f rom Canadian courts could be appealed to  the Jud ic ial  
Commit tee o f  the  Bri t i sh  House of  Lords,  which  acted as a  Supreme Court .  In  1949,  the 
r ight  of  appeal  to  Bri ta in  was abol ished,  makin g the Supreme Cour t  of  Canada the new 
highest  lega l  body in  the country.  Canadian law was then f ina lly  sovereign.  For  more  
on the Sta tute  of  Westminster ,  see Gal l  The Canadian Legal Sys tem  57 ;  Hogg  
Const i tu t ional Law o f  Canada  3-4  –  3-7 ;  Regimbald  and Newm an The Law of  the  
Canadian  Consti tut ion  6 .  
 
204 For  more informat ion,  on th e  Canadian legal  system see  
http: / /www.thecanadaguide.com/lega l -sys tem  (Date of  use:  28 August  2018  In  terms 
of  the Consti tut ion Act of  1982 ,  there are e leven sovere ign legisla t ive bodies in  
Canada,  one be ing the  Parl iament of  Canada ,  and the others the ten provinc ia l  
legis latures.  The Canada Act of  1982,  i ts  Schedule B,  and the Const i tu t ion Act of  1982 
were  enacted by  the Un i ted Kingdom Par l iamen t  on 29  March  1982 when they  rece ived  
royal  assent .  The  Canada Act  of  1982  came into  force  immediately .  See  in  genera l  Gal l  
The Canadian Legal System  57;  Hogg Consti tu t ional Law of  Canada  3 -9;  for  more on 
the Par l iament  of  Canada,  see  h t tp : / /www.par l .gc.ca /defaul t .aspx?Language=E   (Date 
of  use :  28 August  2018) .  Though Canada is  a  federat ion with  power shared between the  
loca l  and national  leve ls  of  government,  the Ca nadian  jus t ice  sys tem is  said  to  be  
unitary ,  meaning federa l  and provinc ia l  court s are not  independent f rom one another ,  
but  ra ther  operate  with in a  s ingle sys tem.  
 
205 The Canadian federa l  government  i s  d ifferent  to  tha t  of  the USA s ince  the BNA Act  
provides the prov inces  with  only  enum erated powers to  make laws and the  residuary 
power to  the  federal  Par l iament .  In  the USA, res iduary power is  lef t  to  the states.  In  
terms of  s  91(2)  of  the  Canadian Const i tu t ion,  the Canadian Federa l  Par l iament was 
given the power to  regulate  trade and com merce while  the USA Congress on ly has  
l imited  power  to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign nat ions,  and among the severa l  states  
and with  Indian  tr ibes .  In  terms of  the  Canadian  Consti tut ion banking,  marr iage,  
divorce  and  cr iminal  law were  lef t  in  the  hands of  the Canadian  Federal  Par l iament  
whi le  in  the  USA it  was  lef t  to  the s tates .  See Hogg Consti tut ional  Law of  Canada  
(Carswell  2015 Student  Edit ion)  5 -15 –  5-16.  Furthermore,  Canada has a  b icamera l  
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Canada, there are three levels of government.206 Section 93 of the 
Constitution Act specifically gives the provincial legislature the exclusive 
power to make laws in relation to education. The provinces, therefore, have 
the direct responsibility to develop and regulate legislation pertaining to 
higher education as well as to provide support to institutions. 207 The Crown 
is synonymous with the government, and its powers are derived from 
statutory as well as common law. Statutory powers are created by an Act of 
Parliament.208 The Cabinet is the centre of the federal government and is 
 
legis lature compr ising  the House of  Com mons and the Senate.  See Richard JD 
“Federa li sm in  Canada” 2005 –  2006 (44)  Duquesne Law Review  6 .  
 
206 F irs t ly ,  the federa l  level ,  which deals wi th  matters as descr ibed  in  the  Consti tut ion  
Act genera l ly ,  affects  the whole country.  Secondly,  there are  the pr ovincia l  
governments,  which  provide each  province  the power to  dea l  wi th  mat ters  as descr ibed 
in  the Consti tut ion Act ,  such as educat ion,  hea lth  care,  some na tural  resources and road  
regula t ions.  Sometimes the federa l  and  provincia l  governments share respo nsibi l i ty .  
Thirdly,  there i s  the municipal  leve l  o f  government.  Th is is  t he leve l  tha t  i s  usual ly  
based in  a  c i ty ,  town or  dis tr ict  (a  munic ipal i ty ) .  Municipa l  governments are  
responsib le for  areas such as l ibrar ies,  parks,  community  water  sys tems,  local  p o lice,  
roadways and park ing.  They rece ive author i ty  for  these areas f rom the provinc ia l  
governments.  For  more information on the  differen t  levels of  government see,  
ht tp: / /www.lop.par l .gc.ca/Ab out/Par l iament/Educat ion/ourcountryourpar l iament /html_b
ooklet / three- leve ls-government-e .html  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
207 Canada is  a  hereditary  monarchy wi th  the  monarch inheri t ing the off ice of  hea d of  
state .  At present ,  Queen  El izabeth I I  i s  Canad a’s off ic ial  head  of  state ,  a l though  al l  her  
powers and responsib il i t ies have been transferred to  the Governor  General ,  who is  the  
Queen’s represen tat ive.  The Queen p lays no act ive ro le  in  the day- to-day management 
of  the country.  The Prime Minis ter  of  Can ada i s  the par l iamentary leader  of  the  
poli t ical  par ty  tha t  has a  major i ty  of  seats in  the House of  Commons.  See  in  genera l ,  
Shanahan and Jones 2007 Higher Education  Research and Deve lopment  32 ;  Hogg  
Const i tu t ional Law o f  Canada  9-9  –  9 -10.  The  Governor  Genera l  has  the same 
consti tut ional  role  in  Canada as the queen  has  in  England.  The governor  general  has 
extensive lega l  powers in  terms of  the  Canadian Consti tut ion,  which  are der ived from 
both the common l aw and statu tes.  The USA, on the other  hand,  i s  a  r epublic  with  an  
elec ted  president ,  more l ike  South  Afr ica .  See  Monahan  and Shaw Const i tu t ional Law 
12.  For  more on the  queen and the governor  genera l  see Monahan and Shaw 
Const i tu t ional Law 56-  64;  Hogg Consti tut ional  Law of  Canada  9-2 .  
 
208 These powers inc lude the r igh t  to  appoin t  senators,  super ior  cour t  judges and the  
l ieu tenan t  governors o f  the prov inces as well  as  the power to  summon and disso lve the  
House of  Commons,  the exclus ive  r igh t  to  recommend mo ney b il ls  and the r ight  to  
assen t  to  leg is la t ion.  T he Canadian Const i tu t ion does no t  spec if ica l ly  ment ion the  
posi t ion of  the Pr ime Minister ,  and the posit ion  is  a  c rea ture of  convention.  The main 
functions  of  the  Pr ime Minis ter  are  t o  form a  government  an d  to  choose  and  preside 
over  the  Cabinet .  The  power  to  enact  laws i s  vested in  the  Parl iament  o f  Canada,  which 
consis ts  of  the Senate,  the elected House of  Commons and the Queen.  A bil l  must  be 
approved by bo th the House of  Commons an d  the Senate and  be s igned  by the  Queen or  
the Governor  Genera l .  The prov inces are responsib le for  laws in  re la t ion to  areas of  
provincial  jur i sd ict ion and may be enac ted by the elected Legislat ive Assembly of  the  
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led by the Prime Minister. The Cabinet directs the federal government by 
determining priorities and policies and ensuring their implementation.  
Ontario has a unicameral parliament.  
 
Part V of the Constitution Act provides for the establishment of the 
provincial constitutions. The provincial government of Ontario is led by the 
Premier. Sections 69 and 70 of the Constitution Act provide for the 
legislative power in Ontario and confirm that there is a Legislative 
Assembly in Ontario. The government of Ontario has 28 Ministries, one of 
them being the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. 209  
 
5.3.2 Corporate law in Ontario (Canada) 
 
As is the case in South Africa, Canadian company law is based on the 
English Joint Stock Companies Act,  which came into force in 1844.210  
Corporate law in Canada is based on four principles, namely, corporate 
responsibility, managerial power, majority rule and minority protection. 211 
Business corporations are incorporated either federally212 or provincially.213 
 
province and approved by the l ieu tenan t  g overnor .  See in  genera l  Monahan and Shaw 
Const i tu t ional Law 58 –  61,  64 –  66,  83,  87,  91 –  94.  
 
209 This  Ministry  is  enacted by the  Ministry  of  Training,  Col leges  and  Universi t ies  Act  
R.S.O.  1990 c.  M.  19.   For  more information on  th is  Min istry ,  see 
ht tps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/minis try - train ing-colleges-un ivers i t ies   (Date of  use :  28 
August  2018) .  See para 5 .5 .2(b)  be low for  a  d iscussion  of  th is Ministry .  
 
210 Vic t .  Cc.  110 & 11 1 1855.  For  more on the  h is tory of  corpora tions see Wel l ing B 
Corpora te La w in  Canada:  The Governing Princip les  3 r d  ed (Scribb lers Publishing  
2006)  46 –  57.  
 
211 Welling  B Corporate Law in  Canada:  The  Govern ing Princ iples  3  rd  ed (Scribb ler s  
Publ ish ing)  58.  For  a  discuss ion of  the  evolution of  Canadian Corporate Law see  
McGuiness KP The Law and Practice o f  Canadian Business  Corpora tions  (Butte rwor ths  
1999)  lxxiv –  lxxv ii .  
 
212 Canada  Business Corporations  Act (CBCA).  The advantages  of  federal  incorpora tion  
are (a)  the r igh t  to  carry on business in  any  province in  Canada ,  as long as t he  
corporat ion compl ies wi th  provincia l  leg is la t ion ;  and (b)  the r igh t  to  carry on business 
in  any  province  under  i ts  own name even  though  a prov inc ia l ly  incorporated 
corporat ion wi th  the  same or  similar  n ame may exis t .  See Day  M and  Aron B Ontario  
Corpora te  Procedures  4 t h  ed (Carswell  2001)  34.  Financial  ins t i tu t ions typical ly  
incorpora te  under  federal  leg is la t ion ;  l ike  the  Bank Act  SC 1991 C 46;  Emes AS 
“Corporate Governance and Dir ectors Duties 2011”  Tor ys LLP 
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In Canada, there are eleven corporate law jurisdictions. For the purposes 
of this research, the focus is on Ontario due to the fact that its public 
universities are corporations. In 1975, the CBCA214 was implemented by the 
federal government of Canada, based on the recommendations of the 
Dickerson Committee.215  Most corporate statutes in Canada followed the 
CBCA. In 1982, Ontario enacted the OBCA, which is similar to the CBCA.216   
Section 92(11) of the Constitution Act  provides the provinces with the 
power to incorporate corporations.217 Corporations incorporated in a 
province are limited to conducting their business within that one province, 
whereas a corporation that is federally incorporated has the right to operate 
throughout Canada.218 As is indicated above, the primary source of federal 
 
http: / /www.torys.com/Publicat ions/Documents /Publ ica t ion%20PDFs/AR2011 -21.pdf  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .   
 
213 In  Ontar io ,  i t  i s  the  OBCA or  the Ontar io  Co rporations Act.  
 
214 Sec tion 4 of  the Act  states tha t  the purposes o f  the Act are to  rev ise and reform the  
law appl icab le to  business corporat ions  incorporated to  carry on business throughout  
Canada,  to  advance the  cause of  uniformi ty of  business  corpora tion  law in  Canada and 
to  provide a  means  of  al lowing  a n order ly  transference  of  cer tain  federal  companies 
incorpora ted  under  var ious Acts of  Par l iament  to  th is  Act .  The CBCA is the  product  of  
Dickerson,  Howard;  Leon and Gets,  au thors of  the Federa l  Proposals for  a  New 
Business  Corpora tions Law for  Canada.  A d raf t  s ta tute  in  1971  culminated in  the  
CBCA.  See fur ther  Gray W Canada Business Corpora tions Act  (Carswell  1998) ;  
Steward  LaRue L “Sign if icant  Reform of  the Canada Business  Corpora ti ons Act” 2004  
(10)  Law and Business Review of  the Americas  215 –  217.  
 
215 Dickerson RVW, Howard JL and  Gets L  Proposals for  a  New Business  Corporat ions 
Law for Canada  (Ot tawa 1971) .  See a lso Suther land H et  al .  Fraser & S tewart:  
Company Law of  Canada  6 t h  ed  (Carswell  1993)  4 .  The  CBCA replaced the Canada  
Corpora tions Act of  1964 –  1965,  which in  retu rn revised the former Companies Act of  
1934.  This in  return  was a  rev is ion of  the 1902 Act  whose predecessors were the 
Canada Join t  Stock Companies Act of  1877 a nd the Canada Jo int  Sto ck Companies 
Let ters Patent  Act of  1869.  
 
216 The  OBCA rep laced the  Companies Acts  of  1907 in  1942,  which in  turn  replaced  the  
Ontar io  Companies Act of  1897 and the  Ontar io  Jo int  Stock Companies  Letters  Patent  
Act  of  1874.  See Suther la nd et  al .  Fraser  & S tewart:  Company Law of  Canada  4 .  See  
Well ing Corporate  Law in  Canada:  The  Governing Princip les  44 .  Both the  CBCA as  
wel l  as the OBCA are d iscussed more ful ly  be low in  para 5 .3 .3 .  
 
217 Nichol ls  CC Corporate Law  (Emond Montgomery Publ ica t i ons  Limi ted 2005)  15;  
Well ing Corporate Law in  Canada:  The Governing Princ i ples  1  –  3 ;  Van Duzer  The 
Law of  Partnerships & Corporat ions  99;  Wel l ing Corporate  Law in  Canada:  The 
Governing  Princ iples 2.  
 
218 This  terr i tor ial  l imi ta t ion emanates  f rom the Const i tu t ion  Act  of  1867  in  ss  92,  92  
and 95.  See in  genera l  Well ing Corporate La w in  Canada:  The Governing Princ iples  7 ;  
Gil len  M e t  a l .  Corporat ions and Partnerships:  Canada  (Kluwer  law 1994)  12 ;  
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corporate law in Canada is the CBCA.219 In terms of section 3(4) of the 
CBCA, there are limitations on certain corporations to carry on businesses. 
No corporation shall carry on the business of a bank; an association to 
which the Cooperative Credit Associations Act of 1991220 applies; a 
company or society to which the Insurance Companies Act applies; or a 
company to which the Trust and Loan Companies Act of 1991221 applies. 
Section 3(5) of the Act specifically states that “…..[n]o corporation shall 
carry on business as a degree-granting educational institution unless 
expressly authorised to do so by a federal or provincial agent that by law 
has the power to confer degree-granting authority on an educational 
institution”. 
 
The CBCA applies to all corporations and body corporates that were 
enacted in terms of this Act222 while the Canada Not-For-Profit Corporations 
Act of 2009 (CNCA)223 applies to every federal corporation, and to the 
 
Sutherland H,  Horsley DB and Edmiston JM Fraser’s Handbook on Ca nadian Company 
Law  7 t h  ed (Carswell  1985)  3 .  See the mat ter  of  Bonanza Greek Gold Mining Co Ltd  v  
The King (1916)  1  AC 566 (Ont JCPC) where a  min ing company incorporated in  
Ontar io  a rranged  contracts wi th  the Federal  Crown re lat ing to  mining operat ions in  
Yukon Terr i tory.  This co rporation sued on the contrac ts ,  but  the Crown deni ed l iab il i ty  
based  on the  fac t  tha t  the corpora tions’  min ing ac tiv i t ies in  Yukon fel l  outs ide i t s  
authorized act ivi t ies  in  terms of  the terr i tor ial  l imita t ion .   
 
219 Accord ing to  s  3  of  the  CBCA, the Act  app l ies to  a  body  corpora te tha t  cont inues as  
a  corporat ion under  this Act.  A body corpora te  includes  a  company or  other  body  
corporate wherever  or  however  incorporated.  Section 4  s ta tes the purpose of  the Act as 
fol lows,  “… to  rev ise  and reform the law applicable to  business corpora tions  
incorpora ted  to  carry  on business  throughout Canada to  advance the cause of  
uniformi ty of  business corporat ion law in  Canada;  and  to  provide a  means of  a l lowing  
an order ly  transference of  cer tain  federa l  companies incorporated  under  var ious Acts of  
Par l iament  to  this Act”.  A corporat ion  means a  body corporate incorpora ted or  
continued under  th is Act,  and not  d iscont inued under  the Act.  See in  genera l  Gi l len et  
al .  Corporat ions and  Partnersh ips:  Canada  19;  LaRue Stewar t  Law and Business 
Review of  the Americas  215 –  234;  Faken Mart ineau DuMoulin  LLP Canada Business  
Corpora tions Act  & Commentary  (Lex isNexis 2016) ;  McGuinness  KP Canadian  
Business  Corpora tions  Law  2 n d  ed  (LexisNexis 2007)  for  more  on the  CBCA .  For  more  
on federa l  power to  incorporate see Well ing Corporate  Law in  Cana da:  The Govern ing 
Princip les  22 –  29 .   
 
220 Cooperat ive Credi t  Associa t ions Act  S.C.  1991,  c .  48.  
 
221 Trus t  and Loan Companies Act  S.C.  1991  c.  45.  
 
222 Section  3 of  the CBCA.  
 
223 Canada Not-For-Prof i t  Corpora tions Act (CNCA) SC 2009,  c23.  
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extent provided for in part 19,224 to body corporates without share capital 
incorporated by a special Act of Parliament.225 A corporation’s governing 
document is its articles of association. In terms of section 102(1) of the 
CBCA, the directors are directed to manage or supervise the management 
of the business and affairs of the corporation. The CBCA 226 provides that 
these powers may be delegated, although subject to certain limitations.227  
 
In Ontario, the leading corporate law legislation is the Ontario Corporations 
Act and the OBCA.228 These two Acts are different insofar as the Ontario 
Corporations Act applies to social companies as defined in this Act and 
does not apply to any corporation or body corporates to which the OBCA 
applies. The Ontario Corporations Act applies to higher education 
institutions. A corporation may be incorporated under the OBCA 229 with its 
powers restricted by its articles of incorporation. 230 The Not-For-Profit 
 
 
224 This sec tion i s  en ti t led “Special  Act Bodies  Corpora te wi thout  Share Capi ta l .”  In  
terms of  s  3(4) ,  incorporation  or  con tinuance under  th is Act does  not  confer  any  
authori ty  on a  corpora tion to  carry  on ac tiv i t ies as a  degree -gran ting educational  
ins t i tut ion or  to  regu la te  any  ac tiv i ty ,  includ ing  a p rofess ion  or  trade .  I t  does no t  apply 
to  higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions.  
 
225 I f  the CBCA applies to  a  corporat ion,  the CNCA will  not  app ly.  The CBCA also does  
not  apply  to  h igher  education inst i tu t ions.  
 
226 Section  115(1)  and  (3) .  
 
227 The CBCA therefore ap plies to  al l  federal ly  incorporated corpora tions.  VanDuzer  AJ 
The Law of  Partnerships  & Corporat ions 3ed ( Irwin Law 2009)  97.  
 
228 For  a  br ief  his tory on the OBCA, see Lavine S The Business Corpora tions Act:  An  
Analysis  (The Carswell  Company  Limited 1971)  1  –  4 .  
 
229 Sec tion 3(2)  of  the OBCA. On incorporat ion in  Ontar io ,  see McGuinness Canadian  
Business Corporat ion Law  8  –  11.  On provincial  power to  regulate  corporations,  see 
Well ing Corpora te Law in  Canada:  The Governing Princip les  12 –  21.  
 
230 The  powers  are r es tr icted to  lending  and  invest ing money on  mortgag e  of  rea l  esta te  
or  otherwise ,  or  wi th  i t s  powers restr icted by i t s  ar t ic les to  accep ting and execu ting  the  
off ice of  l iquidator ,  receiver ,  ass ignee,  t rustee in  bankruptcy or  truste e  for  the benef i t  
of  credi tors and to  accepting the du ty of  and act ing gene ral ly  in  the  winding up of  
corporat ions,  par tnersh ips and  estates,  o ther  than es ta tes of  deceased persons,  and  shal l  
not  by reason thereof  be deemed to  be a  corporation  with in the m eaning of  the  Loan  
and Trust  Corporat ions Act .  The  number o f  i t s  shareholders,  exc lusive  of  persons  who 
are in  the employment of  the corpora tion,  sha ll  be l imit ed by  i t s  ar t icles of  
incorpora tion to  f ive,  and no such corporat ion shall  i ssue debt  ob ligat ions except  to  i ts  
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Corporations Act of 2010 does not replace or repeal the Ontario 
Corporations Act;  it only repeals section 2 of the Corporations Act and 
makes other amendments.231 Public higher education institutions are 
considered not-for-profit corporations and the ONCA will, therefore, be 
applicable once it comes into effect .232 The ONCA is scheduled to come into 
effect in 2020 after Bill 154 has been passed.233 It will clarify the rules for 
governing a corporation and increase accountability; it will clarify that not -
for-profit corporations may earn “profit” through commercial activities; 
provide an alternative option to audits for these entities; enhance the rights 
and responsibilities of members, and provide for actions to be taken when 
members do not act in the best interest of the entity.234 This Act, once it has 
commenced will provide for among other things the removal of directors 
(section 26); declaration of a conflict of interest in a contract (section 41); 
the standard of care (section 43); and the business judgment rule (section 
44). It is important to take note of these provisions as some of the 
amendments recommended in this thesis are similar. 
 
(a) Management of a corporation 
 
Under the CBCA, OBCA and the Ontario Corporations Act, the control and 
management of a corporation are divided among the shareholders, 
directors and officers. The shareholders make a financial investment in the 
corporation, which then, in turn, provides a shareholder with certain rights, 
 
shareholders,  or  borrow money on  the  securi ty  of  i t s  p roperty  except  f rom i t s  
shareholders,  or  receive money on deposi t  or  of fer  i ts  securi t ies to  the public .  
 
231 I t  should be no ted that  the CNCA is federa l  legis la t ion w hi ls t  the ONCA is spec if ic  
to  the  s ta te  of  Ontar io .  
 
232  See Car ter  TS and Man TLM “The Nuts  and  Bolts  of  the Ontar io  Not -For-Profi t  
Corpora tions Act,  2010”  2011 (IX) In ternat ional  Journal of  Civ i l  Society .  
 
233 See the  Ontar io  Non Profi t  Network “Ontar io  Not  For  Prof i t  Corpora tions Act” 
https: / / theonn.ca/our -work/our-regu latory-envi ronment/onca /  (access on:  3  December 
2018) .  
 
234 See “Rules  for  no t -for-prof i t  and chari table corporations ”  
h t tps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/ru les -not-prof i t -and-chari tab le-corporat ions  (Date of  use :  




like voting and election of directors. However, the shareholders’ 
involvement is limited to fundamental decisions like the sale of a business 
or the winding up of the corporation. The directors and officers of a 
company have the responsibility for the day-to-day management of a 
corporation. Both the CBCA235  and the OBCA236 restrict how directors may 
delegate their responsibilities. It is up to each board of d irectors to 
implement policies and procedures as well as to impose internal control 
systems to restrict and regulate the manner in which the delegated 
authority is exercised within the corporation. 237 The Ontario Corporations 
Act does not provide for directors to delegate their functions. 
 
 
235 Sec tion 115(1)  provides as fol lows: “ Direc tors  of  a  corpo rat ion may appoint  f rom 
their  number  a  managing director  who is  a  res ident  Canadian or  a  committee of  
direc tors and de lega te to  such managing d irec tor  or  committee any of  the powers  of  the  
direc tors.”   Sec t ion  115(3)  places l imitat ions  on  the  delega tion of  au thori ty  o f  direc tors 
as  fol lows:  “Notwi ths tanding subsec tion  (1) ,  no  managing d irec tor  and no commit tee  of  
direc tors has author i ty  to  submit  to  the shareholders any  quest ion or  m atter  requir ing 
the approval  of  the shareholders;  f i l l  a  vacancy among the d irec tors or  in  the off ice of  
auditor ,  or  appoin t  add it ional  d irec tors;  i ssue securi t ies except  as authorized by the 
direc tors;  issue shares  of  a  ser ies under  section 27  excep t  as au thorized by the 
direc tors;  declare div idends;  purchase,  redeem or  otherwise acquire shares i ssued by 
the corporat ion;  pay a commiss ion ref erred to  in  sect ion 41  except  as authorized by the  
direc tors;  approve a management proxy c ircu lar  referred to  in  Par t  XIII ;  approve a 
take-over  bid  c ircular  or  dir ec tors’  circular  referred to  in  Par t  XVII;   approve any  
f inancia l  s ta tements re ferred to  in  sec tion  155 ; o r  adopt,  amend or  repeal  by - laws .”  
 
236 Section 127(1)  provides as fol lows: “ Subjec t  to  the ar t ic les or  by - laws,  directors of  
a  corpora tion  may appoint  f rom their  number a  managing direc tor  or  a  committee of  
direc tors and de lega te to  such managing d irec tor  or  commit tee any of  the powers of  the  
direc tors.”  Sect ion  127(3)  provides for  the l imita t ions as fol lows:   no managing 
direc tor  and no  commit tee of  di rec tors has au thori ty  to  submit  to  the shareholders  any 
question or  matter  requi r ing the approval  of  the  sharehold ers;  f i l l  a  vacancy amon g the 
direc tors or  in  the off ice of  audito r  or  appo in t  or  remove any of  the  chief  execut ive  
off icers,  however  des ignated,  the chief  f inancia l  off icer ,  however  designated,  the cha ir  
or  the pres iden t  of  the corporat ion;  sub jec t  to  sec tion 184 ,  i ssue securi t ies except  in  
the manner  and on the terms author ized  by the direc tors;  declare d ividends;  purchase,  
redeem or  otherwi se acquire shares issued  by the corpora tion ;  pay  a commission  
referred  to  in  sec tion  37 ;  approve  a management  informat ion circular  referred t o  in  Par t  
VIII ;  approve  a take-over  bid  circular ,  d irec tor’ s c ircu lar  o r  i s suer  bid  c ircular  re ferred  
to  in  Par t  XX of  the  Secur i t ies Act ;  approve any f inancia l  s tatements referred to  
in  clause 154  (1)  (b)  of  the Act and Par t  XVIII  of  the  Securi t ies Act ;  approve an 
amalgamation under  sec tion 177  or  an amendment to  the ar t icles under  subsec tion 168 
(2)  or  (4) ;  o r  adopt,  amend or  repea l  by - laws.”  
 
237 McGuinness Canadian Bus iness  Corpora te  Law  835;  Ins t i tute  of  Directors  
“Direc tors  Responsib il i t ies in  Canada”  2014 Osler  4 -5 ;  Calkoen  WJL The Corporate 
Governance Review  7 t h  ed (The Law Reviews 2017)  67;  Rei ter  BJ Directors  Duti es in  




(b) Fiduciary duties of directors 
 
Directors and officers are responsible for the management of the business 
and affairs of the corporation. This is governed by the corporate statute of 
each province. In performing their mandate, directors have two main types 
of duty that are imposed on both directors and officers, namely, a duty of 
care and one of loyalty and good faith. 238  Directors cannot choose to 
contract out of these duties and may be held personally liable for breaching 
them.239 The duty of care requires the director to invest adequate time, act 
carefully, make informed decisions and act with the diligence and skill that 
a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. 240  In 
accordance with the duty of loyalty, a director must act honestly and in 
good faith, in the best interests of the corporation. 241 
 
The CBCA, OBCA and the Ontario Corporations Act impose these duties.242 
The CBCA reinforces the common law fiduciary duties of directors of 
federally incorporated companies in addition to the fiduciary duties owed by 
them.243  The CBCA,244 CNCA,245 OBCA246 and the Ontario Corporations Act 247 
 
238 Nicholls  Corporate Law  285 ;  Rei ter  Directors Dut ies in  Canada  35 –  36.  
 
239 See Inst i tu te  of  Corporate Direc tors  (Osler)  “Director’ s responsibi l i t ies in  Canada”  
(October  2014);  ht tps : / /www.icd .ca/getmedia /581897ca -d69d-4d4f-a2a2-
ca6b06ef223b/5467_Osler_Direc tors_Responsibi l i t ies_ -Canada-FINAL.pdf .aspx  
(accessed on  16 Apr il  2016 )  7 .  
 
240 Reiter  Direc tors  Duties  in  Canada 49 –  57.  
 
241 Reiter  Direc tors  Duties  in  Canada 37 –  49.  
 
242 Once the ONCA commences ,  i t  wi l l  a lso prov ide for  f iduciary dut ies.  See Van Duzer  
The Law of  Partnerships  & Corporat ions  339.  
 
243 The f iduc iary du ties  and du ty of  care and sk il l  are  con ta ined in  s  122 of  the CBCA, 
which  provides as  fol lows: “ (1)  Every di rec tor  and off icer  of  a  corporat ion in  
exerc is ing the ir  powers and discharg ing the ir  duties shal l  (a)  act  honestly  and in  good  
fai th  wi th  a  view to  the best  in teres ts  of  the  corporat ion;  and  (b)  exercise  the ca re,  
d i l igence  and  sk il l  that  a  reasonably  prudent person  would exerc ise in  comparab le  
circumstances .  (2)  Every director  and  off icer  o f  a  corpora tion  sha ll  comply wi th  this  
Act ,  the  regulat ions ,  ar t icles ,  b y- laws and  any  unanimous shareholder  agreement.”   See 
also Kitching A “Direc tor’s  Liabi l i ty  under  the Canada  Business Corporations Act”  
(October  2008)  Library of  Parliament  Fasken Mar tineau DuMoul in  LLP Canada 




provide for fiduciary duties248 as well as duties of care.249 The ONCA, once in 
force, will also contain similar provisions to the CBCA, CNCA and the 
OBCA concerning fiduciary duties and standards of directors ’ conduct.250   
 
The OBCA in section 134(1) and the Ontario Corporations Act in section 
127(1) provide for both duties as follows: 251  
Every director and officer of a corporation in exercis ing 
his or her powers and discharging his or her duties to the 
corporation shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation;252 and (b) 
exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably 
prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances.253   
 
244 Par t  X of  the CBCA per t ains to  Directors and  O ff icers.  
 
245 Section  148.  
 
246 Par t  IX of  the OBCA pertains to  Directors and Off icers.  
 
247 Section  127(1)  of  the Ontar io  Corporat ions Act.  
 
248 In   LAC Minera ls v  Internat ional Corona Res ources Ltd  (1989)  61 D.L .R (4 t h)  14  
(S.C.C) the Supreme Court  of  Canada fou nd tha t  a  f iduc iary rela t ionsh ip genera l ly  has 
three charac ter i st ics namely (a)  the f iduc iary has scope for  the exercise of  some power 
of  discre t ion ;  (b)  the f iduciary  can  uni latera l ly  exerc ise this power  of  discret ion so as 
to  affec t  the benef icia ry’s leg al  or  pract ica l  in terest ;  and (c)  the  benef ic iary i s  
pecul iar ly  vulnerab le to  or  at  the  mercy of  the f iduc iary  hold ing the discret ion of  
power.  See  Fasken Martineau DuMoulin  LLP Canada Business Corporat ion s Act  & 
Commentary  85 ;  Frame v Smith  (1987)  2  S .C.R 99 (Canada)  which i s  the leading case 
of  th is  def ini t ion ;  Hanse ll  C Direc tors  and Off icers  in  Canada:  Law and  Practice  
(Carswell  2013,  Vol 2)  9 -2.  
 
249 Levin  JA,  Shakeel  B and Campbe l l  F  “Director’ s and Off icers’  Dut ies and  
Responsib il i t ies (Paper  presented  at  the Corporate Summit Toronto,  November 1995)  
12 –  13.   
 
250 Carter  TS and  Prendergast  MP “Dut ies and Liabil i t ies o f  Directors  and Off icers  of  
chari t ies and Non-Profi t  Organisat ion s” 2011  The Law Society  o f  Upper Canada  –  
Emerging i ssues in  Director’ s and  Off icer’ s Liabil i ty  2011.   
 
251 The  dut ies  are  ident ica l  in  the CBCA and CN CA: s  122  (1)  of  the  CBCA; s148  (1)  of  
the CBCA; and s 43(1)  of  the  ONCA.  For  a  discussion  of  these  dut ies as  contained  in  
the CBCA, see Sopow N Direc tors  and Standards:  The Problem of  Insuf f ic ien t  
Guidance (Publ ished LLM thesis  Universi ty  of  Western Ontar io  2016)  1  –  60.  
 
252 See Hanse ll  Direc tors and  Off icers in  Canada:  Law and Practice  9-19.  This  
formula tion i s  s imilar  to  s  76(2)  (a)  and  (b)  o f  the South  Afr ican  Companies Act of  
2008:  see Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .5  above for  a  discussion of  these  dut ies in  South  Afr ica .  
 
253 This prov ision  inc ludes  both the  duty of  good fai th / loyal ty  and  the duty  of  care.  This 
formula tion i s  similar  to  s  76( 2)  (c)  of  the South Afr ican Companies Act of  2008.  I t  i s  
important  to  note tha t  s imi lar  to  South Afr ica ,  the f iduciary obl igat ion  and duties of  
care are regarded as separate  duties.  See Well ington Corpora te Law in  Canada:  The  
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The duty of loyalty and good faith has been codified in Canadian corporate 
statutes.254 This duty requires each director to act in the best interests of 
the corporation;255 to recognise and avoid conflicts of interest; not to divulge 
confidential information received in their capacity as director and not use 
that information for personal gain to the disadvantage of the corporation. 
Furthermore, a director may not divert opportunities for his/her personal 
benefit or the benefit of any other business if the corporation itself can 
benefit from the opportunity.256  The duty of loyalty and good faith is owed to 
the corporation, and not to the shareholders or creditors 257 unless there are 
special circumstances establishing a fiduciary relationship between a 
director and a shareholder or creditor. 258 The Canadian Supreme Court 
 
Governing  Princip les  327;  Well ington  B,  Smith L and  Rotman LI  Canadian Corpora te  
Law: Cases,  Notes  and Mater ials  (LexisNexis 2006)  316 –  321.   
 
254 See in  general  Gray WD “A Sol ic i tor’ s perspective on Peoples v  Wise” 2004 –  2005 
Can Bus LJ  185  –  187.  This duty has  been codif ied vi r tua lly  the  same in  al l  the  s ta tues.  
 
255 Beamish v So lnick  (1980)  10 B.L.R 224 (Ont .  H.C) c i t ing the Business Corpora tions  
Act .  In  this matter  i t  was found tha t  the defendant director  in  a  two -person corporat ion 
who refused  to  s ign necessar y  clos ing documentat ion that  was in  the bes t  in teres ts  of  
the corpora tion,  was in  breach  of  h is f iduc iary  duty in  terms of  s  122  (1)  and  was  l iab le 
for  damages incurred to  the corporat ion as wel l  as l iable to  the plain t if f  personal ly  for  
a  port ion of  his d amages  resu lt ing from hi s loss of  guarantee.   
 
256 See in  general  Tory’s LLP “Responsibi l i t ies  of  Direc tors  in  Canada” 16  
f i le : / / /C:/Users/corl iavdw/Downloads /Responsib il i t ies_of_Direc tors%20(5) .pd f  (Date  
of  use :  16 Apr il  2016) .  Reiter  Direc tors’  Dut ies in  Canada  37 –  42;  McGuinness The 
Law and Pract ice  of  Canadian Business  Corporations  (Butte rwor ths  1999)  690  –  691 ;  
Broder  and  McClintock  A  Primer for Director s  of  not- for-pro fi t  corporat ions  21.  The 
posi t ion i s  similar  in  South Afr ica with  the  corporate  opportun ity  ru le ,  see Chapter  4 ,  
para 4 .2 .5 (a) ;  s  76(2)(a)  –  th is  sec tion  does no t  sp ec if ica l ly  ment ion for  t he  benef i t  of  
another  business,  bu t  th is  can be inf erred because oppor tuni t ies meant  for  a  company  
cannot be diver ted to  another .  
 
257 Peoples  Department S tores v  Wise Inc  (2004)  3  S.C.R;  BCE v  1976 Debentureholders  
(2008)  3  S.C.R.  See Gray 2004 –  2005 Can Bus LJ  186.  
 
258 Kaufman JA,  Cat ton J and Fabiano D “T he Role  of  the Direc tor  today:   Do you real ly  
want  th is job?” Fasken  Martineau  http : / /www.fasken.com/fi les/Publ ica t ion/4a5725ea -
c345-4013-a9e4-07eb8947d0d4/Presentat ion /Publicat ionAttachment/9203d1dd -0bf5-
4517-b5b4-23ea77858ae9/The_Role_o f_the_Director_Today .pdf ;  Kearns  “Inst i tu t iona l  
Autonomy in  Higher  Educat i on: A strateg ic approach” 1998 (22)  Publ ic  Productivi ty  & 
Management  Review  (See a lso  Dylex Ltd  (Trustee o f)  v  Anderson  (2003) ,  63 OR (3d)  
659 at  para 20 ;  and Peoples Department S to re  Inc  v  Wise  (2004)  3  R .S.C 466 –  467 




confirmed in Peoples Department Stores Inc (trustee of) v Wise 259 that 
directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors, the duty is owed to the 
corporation.260 More specifically, the court recognised that directors owe the 
statutory fiduciary duty to the corporation, and not to any stakeholder that 
may have a financial interest in the corporation.261  The decision in the 
 
259 (2004)  3  S.R.C.  461.  Hereinaf te r  referred  to  as  “the Peoples  matter .”   In  th is  matter ,  
Peoples Department Stores Inc was wholly  o wned by Wise Stores Inc.  Wise Stores was  
a  public  corporat ion and three b ro thers were the shareholders as wel l  as d irectors of  
this  corpora tion .  In  February 1994,  the shareholders dec ided to  implement a  jo int  
inventory procurement policy for  the retai l  s to res of  both these corpor ations.  The 
Peoples Store was to  purchase al l  s tock  from North Amer ica,  while  Wise Stores would  
purchase from outs ide North Amer ica.  In  terms of  th is po licy,  the two corpora tions  
would share the responsib il i ty  for  purchasing.  By  Dec ember 1994,  bankruptcy 
proceed ings in  terms of  the Bankruptcy and Inso lvenc y Act were ins t i tuted agains t  both  
corporat ions.  Soon af ter  the inso lvency proceed ings s tar ted,  the Peoples Store trustee 
brought an act ion aga inst  the Wise brothers in  their  capaci ty  as directors,  a l leg in g tha t  
they,  by  implement ing the inventory  procurem ent pol icy,  had  breached  both their  dut ies 
of  loyal ty  and care in  te rms of  sect ion 122(a)  and (b)  of  the CBCA, ac ting in  favour  of  
Wise Stores to  the pre judice of  Peoples Stores and  to  the detr iment of  the  credi tors of  
the Peoples  Stores.  The  court  a quo  found  in  favour  of  the  c la imant  while  adopting  the 
princip le tha t  the direc tor’s du ties of  loyalty  and care also extended to  credi tors when a 
corporat ion was fac ing bankruptcy.  The c our t  found that  by imple menting the inventory  
procurement pol icy by  the Wis e bro thers,  a  breach of  both du ties had occurred in  
rela t ion  to  Peoples Stores.  The  Quebec Cour t  of  Appeal ,  however ,  overturned  th is  
decision  and  adopted  the posi t ion  that  the  du tie s of  d irec tors are  not  o wed to  cred itors.  
The court  held  that  a l though dire ctors  may  consider  the  in teres ts  of  var ious  groups of  
stakeholders,  i t  i s  not  a  requirement that  they do so.  The court  fur ther  confirmed tha t  
the interests  of  the  corporation  are th e  most  important  and  sho uld  not  be confused  wi th  
the interests  of  any  stake holders.  The Supreme Court  of  Canada  subsequently  a lso  
dismissed the appeal  by  the trus tee in  bankruptcy and upheld the rul ing by the Quebec  
Cour t  of  Appeal .  This  is  one of  the lead ing  cases in  Canadian la w pertain ing to  
direc tor’ s f iduc iary du t ies and who m they are  owed to .  See in  general ,  Thomson D 
“Direc tors ,  Credi tors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or  a  Duty not  to  Oppress?”  
2000 Univers i ty  of  Toronto Faculty  of  Law Review  31 36.  See in  general ,  Khimj i  MF 
“Peoples v  Wise  –  Conf lat ing Director’s  duties ,  oppress ion,  and stakeholder  
protec tion” 2006 U.B.C.  Law Review  217  –  225) ;  Francis C “Peoples Department Stores  
Inc v  Wise :   The  Expanded Scope of  Directors’  and Off icers’  Fiducia ry  Duties and  
Dut ies of  Care” 2004 –  2005 Can Bus LJ  175 –  183;  Fasken Mart ineau  DuMoulin  LLP 
Canada Business Corporat ions Act  & Commentary  88  –  89;  and the discussion of  th is  
case in  Well ington ,  Smith and Rotman Canadian Corporate Law: Cases,  Notes and  
Mater ials  312 –  316 ;  Gray 2004 –  2005 Can Bus LJ  186;  Iacobucci  E “Indetermin acy  
and the Canadian Supreme Court ’s Approach to  Corpora te Fiduciary  Dut ies” (2009)  
Can.  Bus.  L.J  234;  and Francis 2005 Can Bus LJ 178.  
 
260 See Peoples Department Store Inc v  Wise  (2004)  3  R.S.C.  466 –  467;  Royal Bank v  
Firs t  P ioneer Investments  Ltd  (1979)  27  O.R.  (2d)  conf irming  that  there  are  no  
authori t ies  conf irming that  a  director  owes a  f iduciary du ty to  the  c reditors  of  the  
company.  
 
261 See in  general ,  MacPherson DL “The Supreme  Cour t  Reins ta tes Direct or’s Duty –  A 
Comment on  Peoples Department Stores v  Wise” 2005 Alberta Law Review  383 –  405;  
Lee IB “Peoples Department S tores  v  Wise  and  the “Best  Interest  of  the Corpora tion”  
2005 Canadian Business Law Journal  212 –  222;  Gray 2005  Canadian Business Law 
Journal  184 –  199 ;  Francis 2005 Canadian  Business Law Journal  175 –  183;  Alexander  
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Peoples matter was confirmed in BCE v 1976 Debentureholders262 where 
the court considered the interests of a corporation in a takeover situation. 263  
 
(c) Duty of care 
 
In addition to the duty of loyalty and good faith, a director must also 
“exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent pe rson 
would exercise in comparable circumstances.” 264 In terms of the common 
law, directors are only required to demonstrate the degree of care, 
diligence and skill that could reasonably be expected of his/her having 
regard to his/her knowledge and experience. The court in the Peoples 
matter distinguished between section 122(1)(a) and (b) of the CBCA. 265 In 
the Peoples matter, the court confirmed the objective test for the duty of 
care, and pronounced that “….directors and officers will not be held to be in 
breach of their duty of care under section 122 (1) (b) of the CBCA if they 
act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis.” 266  
 
SM Direc tors  Duties  under  the  CBCA:   Shareholder Theory  versus S takeholder Theory 
Considera tion o f  S takeholder Theory’s Legal and Moral Supremacy (Publ ished LLM 
thesis  Univers i ty  of  Toronto 2012)  1  –  53.  
 
262 (2008)  3  S.C.R.  This was a  second landmark case,  conf irming that  a  f iduciary duty  
and the duty  of  care  are  owed to  the corpora tion and not  to  o ther  s takeholders,  a l though 
other  stakeholder  r igh ts m ay be considered.  See Fa sken  Mar tineau DuMoul in  LLP 
Canada Business  Corpora t ions Act  & Commentary  89.  
 
263 In  the BCE v 1976 Debentureholders  mat ter ,  the Supreme Court  upheld  the precedent  
es tabl i shed in  the Peoples matter  and  confirmed  that  the di rec tors m ust  act  in  the bes t  
in teres ts  of  the corpora tion,  and in  do ing so,  may consi der  the  in teres ts  of  var ious 
stakeholders.  However ,  there is  no requirement for  them to  do so.  See  in  general ,  
Bradley SP “BCE Inc v  1976 Debentureholders :  The new Fiduciary  duties  of  Fair  
Treatment ,  Statu tory Compliance and Good Corpora te Ci t izenship?” 20 09 –  2010 
Ottawa Law Review  327  –  349; Du Pont  G and Genest  A “The  BCE Lit igation :  Revising 
Dut ies of  Direc tors,  Plans of  Arrangement and the Oppression Remedy”  2008 Canadian  
Tax Foundation  1  –  24.  
 
264 Sec t ion 134(b)  of  the OBCA. See Tory’s Responsib il i t ies  of  Directors  
f i le : / / /C:/Users/corl iavdw/Downloads/Responsi b il i t ies_of_Direc tors%20( 2) .pdf  17  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
265 Gray 2004 –  2005 Can Bus LJ  186 .  
 
266 (2004)  3  R.C.S.  463 .  See Ins t i tute  of  Corporate  Directors (Osler)  “Director’ s 
Responsib il i t ies in  Canada” (October  2014)  9 ;  Broder  and McClintock “Pr i mer for  
Directors of  Not -For-Profi t  Corpora tions:  Righ ts,  Dut ies and Pract ic es” 16 ;  Cassels  
Brook Attorneys “Fiduciary Duty and the Duty of  Care owed on ly to  the Corporat ion” 
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In order to meet the requirement of diligence, directors must ensure that 
they are informed about and obtain expert advice on specif ic issues. 
However, a director may nonetheless be deemed to have been diligent if 
he/she had been misled or received incorrect information. There is no 
requirement for a director to have any particular education or experience, 
which is similar to the position in South Africa.267 
 
The decisions of directors and officers must be reasonable business 
decisions considering all circumstances, including the prevailing socio-
economic conditions. The courts are reluctant to second-guess the 
application of business expertise in corporate decision-making.268  
 
(d) Removal of directors 
 
Section 122 (1) and (2) of the OBCA provide for the removal of directors as 
follows:269 
(1) Subject to clause 120 (f), the shareholders of a 
corporation may by ordinary resolution at an annual or 
special meeting remove any director or directors from 
office. 
(2) Where the holders of any class or series of shares 
of a corporation have an exclus ive right to elect one or 
more directors, a director so elected may only be 
removed by an ordinary resolution at a meeting of the 




http: / /www.casselsbrock .com/Doc/Fiduciary_D uty_and_Duty_of_Care_Owed_Only_to_ t
he_Corporat ion_17311  (Date of  use :  16 August  2018) .  
 
267 Inst i tu te  of  Corpora te Directors (Osler)  “Director’ s Responsibi l i t ies in  Canada”10; 
Reiter  Direc tors’  Duties  in  Ca nada 49 –  53.  
 
268 Feltham IR and Rauenbusch WR “Dire ctor’ s and Off icer’s  Liabi l i t ies in  Canada”  
(1976)  Can Bus LJ  327; Broder  and McClin tock “Pr imer for  Directors of  Not -For-Profi t  
Corpora tions:  Righ ts,  Duties and Prac tices” 17 ;  Osl er  “Direc tors Duties in  Canada” 10.  
 
269 The CBCA makes  a  similar  provis ion in  s  109(2) .  Furthermore,  sec t ions 26(1)  and  
(2)  ONPCA also have a  similar  provision,  except  tha t  they refer  to  members and no t  
direc tors.  Nathan HR “Removal of  Direc tors  by Corpora t ions” Minden Gross LLP 
http: / /www.mindengross .com/docs/publ ica t ions/removal -of -directors-of-business-




The Ontario Corporations Act also provides for the removal of directors in 
section 127(2) and states the following: 
(1) The members of a corporation may, be passing a 
majority of the votes cast at a general meeting, of which 
notice specifying the intention to pass such resolution 
has been given, remove from office any director or 
directors, except persons who are directors by virtue of 
their office. 
(2) A director elected by a group of members that has 
an exclusive right to elect the director may be removed 
only by a resolution passed by a majority of the votes 
cast by the members of that group at a general meeting 
of which notice specifying the intention to pass such 
resolution has been given. 
 
 
In South Africa, both the shareholders and the directors may remove a 
director in terms of the Companies Act of 2008. There is no provision in 
any of the Canadian acts providing directors with the opportunity to make 
representations before their removal is put to the vote.270 In addition to 
having to comply with the Ontario Corporations Act, universities are also 
subject to their own incorporating statutes which could make provision for 
the removal of management.271  There are no statutory provisions in Canada 
that provide for delinquency declarations in respect of di rectors, as 
provided for in the South African Companies Act of 2008. 272 
 
5.3.3 Corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance practices in Canada are shaped by statutes such as 
the CBCA and the OBCA273 as well as best practices.274  
 
270 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .9  above  for  a  discussion of  the removal  of  d irectors in  South  
Afr ica.  
 
271 See para  5 .5 .2  be low for  a  discussion  of  higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions in  Canada.  
 
272 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .10 above for  a  d iscussion about del inquency proceed ings  
against  directors in  South Afr ica.  
 
273 See  para 5 .3 .4(a)  below for  a  d is cussion of  the governance prov is ions  of  these two 
Acts.  
 
274 Calkoen The Corpora te Governance  Review  64;  the Ins t i tute  of  Directors promote  
good governance in  Canada.  See the i r  websi te  for  more informat ion 
http: / /www.icd.ca/About - the-ICD/Corpora te -Governance .aspx  (Date of  use :  20 August  
2018) .  
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Corporate governance regimes in Canada and the United States differ in 
some fundamental respects, although there are certain similarities.275  
Canada, like South Africa, prefers a “principles-based” approach, with the 
exception of mandatory rules relating to audit committees and the 
requirement that companies disclose the extent of their compliance with the 
suggested “best practices” in Canada.276 The Canadian corporate 
governance regime is one of voluntary adoption of best practices but with 
mandatory disclosure of either the adoption of these best practices or 
disclosure of how the corporation intends to achieve its goals. 277 Canada 
follows a “comply or explain” approach, which is different from the “apply 
and explain” approach of South Africa.278 Canada does not have a code 
similar to King IV in South Africa. Instead, various guidelines and best 
practices apply, for example, the National Policy 58-201 (Corporate 
Governance Guidelines),279 National Instrument 58-101 (Disclosure of 
Corporate Governance Practices), and Multilateral Instrument 52-110 
(Audit Committees).280 National Policy 58-201 applies to all reporting 
issuers other than investment funds; it, therefore, applies to both corporate 
and non-corporate entities. However, these are guidelines which are not 
 
 
275 For  more  on the  model  of  corporate governance in  Canada see Liao  C  “A Canadian  
Model o f  Corpora te Governance” 2014 Dalhousie Law Journal .  
 
276 Broschko and Li 2006 Canadian  Inves tment Review for thcoming  1 .  
 
277 Nat ional  Ins trument 58 -101 para 2 .1;  Sa lter io  SE,  Conrod JED and  Schmidt RN 
“Canadian Evidence of  Adherence to  ‘Com ply or  Explain’  Corpora te  Governance 
Codes:   An  Internat ional  Compar ison”  20 13 Accounting  Perspect ives 27 ;  MacAulay  K 
et  al .  “The Impact  of  a  Change in  Corpora te  Governance Regula t ions on Firms in  
Canada” 2009  Quarter ly  Journal of  Finance and  Accounting  30 ;  32 –  34.  
 
278 According to the “comply or  exp la in” approach in  Canada,  the  p rovincia l  corporate  
regula t ion  establ i shes mandatory  disc losure  of  governance .  Therefore ,  corporations  can 
be compl ian t  with  these  requirements by ei ther  complying  with  them or  by expla ining  
why they are  non-complian t .  See  Sal ter io ,  Conrod and Schmidt 2013  Accounting  
Perspect ives  23.  See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  above for  a  discussion of  the posi t ion in 
South Afr ica.  
 
279For th is po licy ,  see h t tp : / /www.osc.gov.on .ca /documents/en/Secur i t ies -
Category5/rule_20050415_58 -201_gov-pract ices_2.pdf  (Date of  use:  28  August  2018) .  
I t  came into effec t  on 30 June 2005 .  
 




meant to be prescriptive, and users are “encouraged” to develop their own 
corporate governance practices. 281 National Instrument 58-101 contains 
disclosure of corporate governance practices, and it applies to a reporting 
issuer other than an investment fund or issuer of asset-backed securities, 
as defined in National Instrument 51-102; a designated foreign issuer or 
SEC foreign issuer as defined in National Instrument 71-102;282 an 
exchangeable security issuer or credit support issuer that is exempt under 
para 13.3 or 13.4 of National Instrument 51-102; an issuer that is a 
subsidiary entity if the issuer does not have equity securities, other than 
non-convertible, non-participating preferred securities, trading on a 
marketplace, and the person or persons who own the issuer are subject to 
the requirements of this instrument, or an issuer who has securities listed 
or quoted on a USA marketplace and is in compliance with the corporate 
governance requirements of that USA marketplace. 283 These requirements 
apply to all corporations listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), with 
less extensive disclosure provisions required for TSX Venture companies. 284 
The Canada Securities Administrators (CSA) announced in 2002 that each 
province would be responsible for ensuring the enforcement of the TSX 
“comply or explain” code.285 The Canadian policies and instruments referred 
 
281 See para 1 .2  of  Nat ional  Po licy 58 -201.  These  guidel ines are only four  pages long  
and cover  board composi t ion (para  3 .1  and  3.2) ;  meet ings  of  independent d irec tors 
(para 3 .3) ;  board manda te (para 3 .4) ;  posi t ion d escr ipt ions (para 3 .5) ;  or ientat ion and 
continu ing education (para 3 .6 ,  3 .7) ;  code of  business conduct  and  eth ics (para 3 .8  and  
3.9) ;  nominat ion of  directors (para 3 .10 –  3 .14) ;  compensa tion (para 3 .15 –  3 .17);  and 
regular  board as sessments (para 3 .18) .  
 
282 National Ins trument 51 -102  re lates  to  the  Continuous Disclosure and Other  
Exempt ions  Relat ing to  Fore ign I ssuers.  
 
283 See the  ful l  na t ional  instrument 58 -101 on 
http: / /www.alber ta secur i t ies.com/Regulatory%20Instruments /5328198 -v1-58-
101_NI_Consolidat ion_Eff_Dec_31_2016.pdf  (Date of  use :  20 August  2018) .  There  i s  
also the Nat ional  Ins trument 13 -101 which re la tes to  the System for  E lectronic 
Document Analys is  and Retr ieval  (SEDAR).  
 
284 Salte r io ,  Conrod  and Schmidt 2013 Accounting  Perspect ives 27.  
 
285 The  corpora te  governance code of  the TSX consis ts  of  the  fol lowing:  Corporate  
Governance Pol icy,  Nat ional  Pol ic y 58-201 and Nat ional  Ins trument 58-101 and the  
guide to  Good Disc losure;  se e ht tps: / /www.tsx .com/l is t ings/ t sx -and-tsxv-issuer-




to above are significantly influenced by the USA SOX Act of 2002, the USA 
Stock Exchange Listing Requirements (NYSE) as well as the “comply or 
explain” regime of the United Kingdom.286 In Canada, securities regulation 
plays a vital role in both the economy and corporate governance, which is 
also the case in South Africa and the USA.287 The TSX is the primary 
securities regulator in Canada. As a result of the turmoil in the USA 
markets during 2002, Canada wanted to re-establish investor confidence in 
Canadian securities. The Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act 
(Budget Measures)288 became effective on 7 April 2003 and provides for 
securities regulation in Ontario. This Act is based on SOX in the USA and 
introduced significant amendments to the Ontario Securities Act. 289 The TSX 
has also adopted governance standards applicable for listed companies. 290 
 
(a) Corporate governance provisions of the CBCA and the OBCA 
 
Both the CBCA and the OBCA provide for processes and structures used to 
direct and manage the business and affairs of the corporation with the 
objective of enhancing the shareholders’ interests.291 The OBCA provides 
 
286 Salte r io ,  Conrod  and Schmidt 2013 Accounting  Perspect ives 28.  
 
287 See Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .1  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  securi t ies regula t ion in  South  
Afr ica and para 5 .2 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  securi t ies regulat ion in  the USA.  
 
288 The Keeping the  Promise f or  a  Strong Economy Act (Budget  Measures)  S.O.  22 ;  also  
known as Bi l l  198.  See in  genera l  Green R “Canada’s Bil l  198 simi lar  to  US’s Sarbanes 
Oxley  Act” August  2014  h t tp: / /www.asyma.com/blog /canadas -bi l l -198-similar - to -u.s .s -
sarbanes-oxley-ac t  (Date of  use:  28August  2018);  see Bi l l  198 on 
https: / /www.ontar io .ca / laws/statu te/S02022  (Date of  use:  21 August  2 018);  Lampe J  
and Spiro  M “Corporate  Governance Developments in  Canada” Goodmans LLP 
http: / /www.goodmans.c a /docs/Corporate%20Governance%20Developments%20in%2 0Ca
nada.pdf  (Date of  use :  21 August  2018);  Emerson HG and Clarke GA “Bi l l  198 and  
Ontar io’s Securi t ies Act:   Giving Investors and the OSC added muscle” 2003 Fasken 
Mart ineau.  
 
289 Ontar io  Securi t ies Act R.S .O.  1990 S.5.  
 
290See Toronto Stock Exchange Corporat e Governance https : / /www.tsx.com/l is t ings/ t sx -
and-tsxv-issuer-resources/ t sx - issuer-resources/corporate -governance  (Date of  use:  21  
August  2018) .  
 
291 The CBCA is not  d iscussed in  much de tai l  here as the focus remains  on corporate  




the foundation of corporate governance in Ontario. The OBCA prescribes 
certain requirements in respect of the structure of the board. Corporations 
that are “offering”292 or “distributing” shares must have at least three 
directors;293 directors must be 18 years or older, of sound mind and must 
not be bankrupt;294 and at least twenty-five percent of the directors must be 
Canadian residents.295 The OBCA also requires one-third of the directors of 
an offering company to be independent.296 Directors are elected by 
shareholders at each general meeting. If directors are not elected, the 
previously elected director will remain in his/her position until a successor 
has been elected.297 The Act also provides for the fiduciary duties of 
directors as well as their duty of care. 298  Both the OBCA and the CBCA 
require offering or distributing companies to have an audit committee, 
consisting of a minimum of three directors, each of whom must be 
independent of the corporation. The audit committee is responsible for 
reviewing the corporation’s annual financial statements. 299  Except for the 
requirement of an audit committee for companies in Ontario, no other 
committees are prescribed in terms of the OBCA, and it is left to companies 
 
292 Is  def ined  in  the OBCA as a  corporat ion offer ing securi t i es to  the public .  
 
293 Sect ion  115(2)(b)  of  the OBCA, s  102(2)  of  the  CBCA.  
 
294 Section  118(1)  of  the OBCA; s 105 (1)  o f  the CBCA.  
 
295 Section  118(3)  of  the OBCA; s 105(3)  of  the  CBCA.  
 
296 Sec tion 115(3)  of  the  OBCA; s 102(2)  o f  the CBCA requires that  at  least  two  
direc tors be independ ent .  
 
297 Section  119 of  the OBCA; s 106 of  the  CBCA.  
 
298 Sect ion 134  of  the OBCA. The f iduciary du ties  of  d irec tors a re d iscussed in  para  
5 .3 .2  above.  
 
299 Sec tion 158(2)  of  the OBCA; s 171(3)  of  the  CBCA. See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4(b)  
above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the aud it  committee requirements for  a  publ ic  comp any in  
South  Afr ica .  See  also  Mult i lateral  Instrument  52 -110 relat ing to  aud it  committees.  See 
in  genera l ,  Tory’s LLP “Responsibi l i t ies of  Direc tors in  Canada”  2009 8 –  11; 
Campbel l  N “Holding  Audi t  Commit tees  Accountable” 1990  Canada Business Law 




to constitute appropriate committees and to delegate certain functions to 
them.300 
 
(b) Voluntary associations promoting good governance 
 
Various voluntary associations promote good governance amongst 
corporations in Canada. One of these associations is the Canadian 
Coalition of Good Governance (CCGC), which promotes good governance 
and represents the voice of the shareholder. 301 Another voluntary 
association is the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD), which is committed 
to promoting high corporate governance standards.302 The ICD published its 
corporate governance guidelines in 2012.303  
 
5.4 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
 
The business judgment rule originated in the USA and, more specifically, in 
the State of Louisiana, during the first half of the 19 th century.304 It was 
 
300 Section 127 of  the OBCA; Tory’s LLP “Responsib il i t ies of  Direc tors in  Canada” 
2009 7.  
 
301 I t  i s  a  volun tary associa t ion whose members are shareholders  of  companies in  
Canada.  See in  genera l  ht tp: / /www.ccgg.ca /  (Date of  use:  21 May 2016) .  The websi te  of  
this  body  l i st s  var ious  polic ies and bes t  p rac tices .  Some of  these  po licies inc lude  the  
fol lowing: Direc tors’  Guidebook; Directors Co mpensat ion;  Execut ive Comp ensation ;  
Governance Monitor ing,  Voting and Shareholder  Engagement .  See in  general  
ht tps: / /www.ccgg.ca /ind ex.cfm?pagepath=Pol ic ies&id=17581  (Date  of  use :  21 August  
2018) .  
 
302 For  more informat ion on the ICD, see h t tps: / /www.icd.ca/About - the-ICD/Corpora te -
Governance.aspx  (Date of  use :  17 August  2016) .  
 
303 See the guidel ines  on https : / /www.icd.ca/ge tmedia/7421107f -9197-4fa7-812a-
840958d3eb6b/ICD-Corporate -Governance-Guidelines- ( inc luding-Board -
Mandate) .pdf .aspx  (Date of  use :  16  August  2016) .  The mandate,  funct ions and  
responsib il i t ies of  the board of  direc tors of  the  ICD are subject  to  the p r ovis ions of  the  
ICD’s by laws,  the Canada Corporat io n’s Act  and i t s  regu lat ions and the Canada Not -
For-Profi t  Corpora tions Act .  
 
304 See  Percy  v  Mi llaudon  8  Mar t  (n . s)  68,  1829 WL 1592 (La  1829) .  This  case rela tes  
to  the l iab il i ty  of  d irectors for  the wrongdo ing of  the bank’s pres ident  and cashier .  The  
court  found tha t  the  directors  were  not  l iable,  expla ining  that  a  bank  direc tor  i s  no t  
l iab le if  he /she exerc ised ordinary care .  See Scarborough R and Olderman R “Why does 
the FDIC sue bank off icers?  Explor ing the boundaries of  the business judgment rule  in  
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developed by state courts in terms of common law. 305 According to this rule, 
there is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 306 
Thus, directors are able to rely on the protection of the business judgment 
rule where they have acted in good faith and in the best interest of the 
corporation in making business decisions, and are therefore not considered 
to have been in breach of their fiduciary duties. 307  
 
According to Bainbridge, the business judgment rule is poorly understood, 
as there is a lack of coherent and unified theory relating to it and its 
limitations. Bainbridge’s theory is that this rule is designed to effect a 
compromise between two competing values: authority and accountability.308 
The duty of care determines the standard of conduct while the business 
judgment rule offers a balance by limiting judicial enquiry into business 
decisions made by directors acting in good faith and the best interests of 
the company.309 The business judgment rule encompasses a series of 
 
the  wake of  the g rea t  recess ion” 2015  Fordham Journal of  Corpora te  & Financial  Law  
373;  C L.S 1829; McMil lan 2013 Will iam & Mary Business Law Review  526.  
 
305 Although this a  common la w pr inc iple,  some of  the s ta tes such as Delaware and 
Georgia went on  to  codi f y this ru le  in  their  corporate law codes.  
 
306 Westbrook AD “Does Banking Law have something to  teach Corporat ions Law about  
Directors Duties?” 2016  Washburn Law Journal  400;  see in  genera l  on the common law  
business  judgment  rule  Godbold  v  Branch Bank11  Ala  191 ,  199,  1847 WL 159;  Smith  v  
Pra ttv i l le  Mfg .  Co 29 Ala 503 1857  (Uni ted States) ;  Percy v  Mil laudon  8  Mart .  (n . s)  68 
1829 WL 1592  (La  1829)  (United  Sta tes) ;  Hodges  v  New England  Screw  Co 1 RI 312 
(1850)  (United  Sta tes) ;  Arsh t  SS “The Business Judgment Ru le Revis i ted” 1979 Hofstra 
Law Review  93.  
 
307 Aronson  v  Lewis  473 A.2d 805 (Del 1984) ;  Hansen 1984  The Business  Lawyer  1360  –  
1361; Lynch  JJ  “The Business  Judgment  Rule  Reconsidere d” 1981  –  1982 The Forum  
453 –  454; Sharfman BS “The Impor tance of  the Busine ss Judgment  Rule” 2017 NYU 
Journal of  Law & Business  29 –  30 .  
 
308 Bainbridge SM “The Business Judgment Rule as  Absten tion Doctr ine” 2004 
Vanderb il t  Law Review  84;  McMillan 2013 Will iam & Mary Business  Law R eview  526.  
 
309  See Para-Medica l  Leasing  Inc v  Hange n  (1987)  739 P2d  717 (Wash  Ct .  App) where  
a  direc tor  was sued for  breach of  the f iduciary duty of  care and c laimed protect ion 
under  the  business judgment  rule .  The  court  held  that  for  corpora te o ff icers,  t he  
business judgment ru le  l imi ts the agent’ s duty o f  care,  sta t ing “ in  consider ing the  
act ions  of  a  corporate  off icer ,  the business judgment ru le  rather  than  the s tandard  of  
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presumptions relating to decisions made by directors. The presumptions 
only relate to the exercise of a director’s judgment, although a conscious 
decision not to act can also fall within their ambit. There are three elements 
to the business judgment rule, namely, a threshold review of the objective 
financial interest of the board whose decision is under attack, a review of 
the board’s subjective motivation and an objective review of the process by 
which it reached the decision under review. 310   
 
One of the leading cases relating to the business judgment rule is Smith v 
Van Gorkom. In this matter, shareholders challenged the decision of the 
board of Trans Union Corporation to recommend that shareholders vote in 
favour of a tender offer made by the purchaser. Two of the shareholders 
claimed that the directors did not act with the necessary due diligence in 
their decision and the company suffered damages due to the low purchase 
price. The court agreed and found that the directors had breached their 
duty of care and should not receive protection under the business judgment 
rule.311  
 
The decision in FDIC312 v Loudermilk313 was significant in respect of the 
business judgment rule as applied in Georgia. 314 In this matter, FDIC sued 
 
ordinary care appl ies” .   See also Johnson 2005 The Business Judgment Lawyer 450; 
Pin to and Branson  Understanding Corpora te Law  3 .  
 
310 The business  judgment  rule  can  be invoked by a board  or  a  direc tor  when  al l  the  
elements are present .  The rev iewing court  wil l  then de termine  whether  the board made 
a decis ion to  act  or  refrain  f rom ac ting  whether  a  major i ty  of  the board was 
dis interested wi th  respect  to  the  decision ;  whether  the board careful ly  considered  the 
issue and considered al l  available informat ion before ac t ing ;  and whether  the dec ision  
was taken  in  good  f a i th  and in  the bes t  in te r es t  of  the  company .  See Varal lo  GV, 
Dreisbach DA and Rohrbacher  B Fundamenta ls of  Corporate Governance:  A guide for  
Direc tors  and Corpora te Counci l  2 n d  ed (American Bar  Associat ion 2009)  60 –  61.  
 
311 Smith  v  Van Gorkom  488 A2.d 858  (Del.  1985) .  Westbrook  20 16 Washburn  Law 
Journal  401 –  402; Roper  JM “Smith v  Gorkom :   A Narrow In terpreta t ion of  the 
Business Judgment Rule” 1986 Capita l  Universi ty  Law Review  729 –  738;  Sharfman 
2008 Delaware Journal of  Corporate Law  288 –  309;  Herzel  L  and Katz L “Smith v  Van 
Gorkom :   The  Business judging Business Judgment” 198 6 The Business Lawyer  1187 –  
1193; Bainbridge 2004 Vanderb il t  Law Review  92 –  95.  
 
312 FDIC is the Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation,  a  USA government corpora tion  
providing deposit  insurance to  deposi tor s  in  the USA.  
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nine former officers and directors of the bank, alleging that they had been 
grossly negligent under Georgia tort law in their approval of ten commercial 
real estate loans, which resulted in the bank sustaining nearly $22 million 
in losses. The defendants argued that the business judgment rule relieved 
officers and directors from any liability for ordinary negligence. FDIC 
alleged that the business judgment rule was not part of the State of 
Georgia’s common law, and even if it were, it did not apply to bank officers 
and directors. The District Court determined that the matter was unsettled 
under Georgia law and referred the matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reconciled the tension between the 
common law and the statute by splitting the common law business 
judgment rule in Georgia into two parts, namely, the final decision and the 
decision-making process. The Supreme Court thus concluded that 
Georgia’s business judgment rule protects both bank and corporate 
directors and officers from ordinary negligence claims. 315 The decision in 
Loudermilk overruled previous decisions.316 The court in Loudermilk 
confirmed that the Georgia business judgment rule no longer provided 
complete protection against liability where directors and officers made 
business decisions. The court explained that “….the rule in Georgia, as in 
other jurisdictions, acts as a presumption in favour of officers and directors 
 
 
313 FDIC v Loudermi lk 295  Ga 579,  596,  761 S.E .2d 332,  345 (2014) .   See Scarborough 
and Olderman 2015 (XX) The Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 381 –  382.  
 
314  See Scarborough and Olderman 2015 (XX) The Fordham Journal of Corporate 
& Financial Law 380 –  384 for  a  posit ion on  the bus iness judgment rule  in  Georgia.  
Furthermore,  see Brock Buil t  LLC v Blake  300  Ga App 816,  821 2009.  
 
315 The Dis tr ict  Cour t  posed the fo l lowing quest ion to  the Supreme Court:  “Whethe r  
Georgia’s business  judgm ent  rule  precludes  as a  mat ter  of  law a  c la im for  o rdinary  
negligence agains t  the off icers and d irectors of  a  bank in  a  lawsuit  brought by the  
FDIC as rece iver  for  the banks.”   The  Dis tr ict  Cour t  “was  not  convinced that  Georgia 
law affords  bank d irectors a nd off icers  the pro tec tion  of  the business judgment  rule  in  
a lawsui t  by FDIC”.   See Loudermi lk  984 F.  Supp 1354,  1359 (2013) ;  Mayson CG and 
Moore JC “Banking and  Finance”  2017 Georgia State Universi ty  Law Review  3  –  4 .  
 
316 See Flex ible Products Co v Ervast  284 Ga App 178,  643 S.E 2d 560,  564 (2007);  
Brock Buil t  LLC v  Blake 300 Ga.  App 816 ,  822,  686 S.E.2d 425,  460  (2009) .  See in  
genera l ,  Scarborough and Olderman 2015 Fordham Journal o f  Corporate & Financia l  




and generally precludes claims against officers and directors for their 
business decisions that sound in ordinary negligence.” 317  
 
The business judgment rule in Georgia protects the wisdom of directors’ 
and officers’ decisions unless those decisions “were shown to be made 
without deliberation, without the requisite diligence and assess the facts 
and circumstances upon which the decisions are based, or in bad faith ”.318 
House Bill 192 was drafted in direct response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Loudermilk.319 In accordance with this Act, both the banking and 
corporate codes were amended to include a presumption that the process 
undertaken has been conducted in good faith unless evidence that 
demonstrates gross negligence is presented.320 House Bill 192 codified the 
business judgment rule in the Georgia Corporations Code and confirmed 
that when a court considers claims regarding directors and officers 
decision-making process, the relevant standard will be gross negligence. 321 
 
 
317 FDIC v  Loudermi lk  295  Ga (2014)  para 2 .  
 
318 Loudermi lk  295  Ga a t  585,  761 S.E.2d  a t  338;  Mayson and Moore  2017 Georgia 
State Universi ty  Law Review 4-5.  
 
319 Mayson and Moore 2017 Georgia S tate Univers i ty  Law Review 5.  
 
320 Eversheds Suther land  “Georgia  Governor  signs  in to  law rev isions  to  bus iness  
judgment rule ,  codify ing protec tions for  bank ing and corpora te off icers  and directors”  
October  2017  https: / /us.eversheds -suther land .com/NewsCommentary /Legal -
Aler ts/199370/Legal -Aler t-Georgia-Governor-Signs- in to-Law-Revisions - to-Business-
Judgment-Rule-Codify ing-Protect ions-for-Banking-and-Corporate-Off icers-and-
Director s  (Date  of  use :  6  August  2018) .  The banking code can be  found in  the  Georgia  
Code  of  2017 in  t i t le  7 ;  whi ls t  the  corporate  code can be  found  in  t i t le  14;  Cary  MP 
“2016 Georgia Co rporat ion and  Business Org an isa t ion  Case Law Developments”  March 
2017 Bryan Cave LLP  10 –  12.  This  matter  i s  curren tly  under  appeal  to  the  Eleven th  
Circui t  Court  in  Georg ia .   
 
321 See  in  genera l ,  Alston and Bird “Streng thening the  Georgia  Business Judgmen t  
Rule”  10 May 2017 
https: / /www.alston.com/en/ins ights/publicat ions/2017/05/strengthen ing - the-ga-
business- judgment-rule  (Date of  use:  13 November  2018) ;   Cobb Law “New L aw 
Strengthens Georgia’s Business Judgment Rule” 11  October  2017  
https: / /cobblawgroup.ne t/blog /2017/10 /11/new - law-strengthens-georgias -business-




The introduction of the business judgment rule in Canadian law began with 
an Ontario judgement, Brant Investments v KeepRite Inc322 that involved a 
dispute between directors of the corporation and its minority shareholders. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the directors had not acted 
oppressively, nor did they unfairly prejudice the minority shareholders . The 
Ontario Court of Appeal outlined the basis of the rule as follows: “Business 
decisions, honestly made, should not be subject to microscopic 
examination, there should be no interference simply because a decision is 
unpopular with the minority.”323 Following the Brant Investments decision, 
the business judgment rule was adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Maple Leaf Foods Inc v Schneider Corp .324 In this case, the minority 
shareholders brought an action against the directors of the company, 
alleging that the directors had disregarded the interests of the shareholders 
when they failed to provide Maple Leaf with an opportunity to outbid the 
successful purchaser of the business. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
considering whether the board had failed to discharge its duties, referred to 
the business judgment rule as follows:  
The law as it has evolved in Ontario and Delaware has 
the common requirement that the court must be satisfied 
that the directors have acted reasonably325 and fairly. The 
 
322 Brant Inves tments v  KeepRi te  Inc  (1990)  O.J.  No.  683,  3  O.R (3d)  289 at  301 (Ont.  
CA).  McGuinness The Law and Practice of  Canadian Business Corpora tions 774.  For  a  
ful l  d iscussion  o f  this  case,  see  Puri  P  et  al .  Cases ,  Mater ials  and Notes  on  
Partnersh ips and  Canadian Business Corporat ions  5 t h  ed (Carswell  2011)  324 –  334.  
323 Reiter  Direc tors  Duties  in  Canada 51  –  52.  
 
324 Maple Lea f  Foods Inc v  Schneider Corp (1998)  O.J .  No.  4142,  42 O. R.  (3d)  177 a t  
192 (Ont .  CA) .  Nicholls  Corporate  Law  305 ;  Pente Investment  Ma nagement  Ltd 
Schneider Corp  (1998)  42 O.R.  (3d)  1998 (Carswel l  Ont 4035 (C.A) ;  Puri  et  a l .  Cases ,  
Mater ials and Notes on  Partnersh ips and Canadian Business Corpora tions  334 –  340;  
Gray 2005 Canadian Busine ss  Law Journal 195 –  196;  Anand A and Condon  M 
“Wea ther ,  Lea ther  and the Obl iga tion to  Disclose :   Kerr  v  Daniel  Leather Inc ” 2006  
Osgoode Hall  Law Journal  738 –  739.  
 
325 According to  Eisenberg MA,  “[a]  dec ision may be unreasonable i f  there are good  
reasons for  and aga ins t  the dec is ion but  under  the circumst ances a  person of  sound 
judgment ,  g iv ing appropriate  weight  to  the reasons for  and agains t ,  would not  have 
made the decision .  Accordingly,  a  decision may be unreasonable even  thou gh i t  was 
supported by some af f irmative reasons and was therefore expl icab le,  a l though on  
balance object ively und esirable.”  Eisenberg 1997 Universi ty  of  Miami Law Review  584;  
Allaire  Y and Rosseau S “To  Govern in  the In terest  of  the Corpora tion:   What i s  t he  
Board’s Responsibi l i ty  to  Stakeholders Other  than Shareholders?” 2015 Journal of  




court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable 
decision not a perfect decision. Provided the decision 
taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court 
ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board, 
even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on 
the board’s determination. As long as the directors have 
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, 
deference is accorded to the board’s decision…This 
formulation of deference to the decision of the board is 
known as the “business judgment rule.326  
 
The business judgment rule is articulated in the CBCA,327 OBCA and 
ONCA.328 Section 135 (4) of the OBCA provides as follows:329   
a director is not liable under section 130 and has 
complied with his or her duties under subsection 134 
(2) if the director exercised the care, diligence and skill 
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised 
in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good 
faith on, (a) financial statements of the corporation 
represented to him or her by an officer of the corporation 
or in a written report of the auditor of the corporation to 
present fairly the financial position of the corporation in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles; (b) an interim or other financial report of the 
corporation represented to him or her by an officer of the 
corporation to present fairly the financial position of the 
 
326 Maple Lea f  Foods Inc v  Schneider Corp (1998)  O.J .  No.  4142,  42 O.R.  (3d)  177 a t  
192 (Ont.  CA) at  36;  Rei ter  Direc tors  Duties  in  Canada 52.  Also see  Peoples 
Department S tores Inc ( trus tees of )  v  Wise (2004)  S.C.J No 64 3 S.C.R 461 a t  67  
(S.C.C.)  where the Supreme Cour t  of  Canada refer red to  Maple  Leaf  Foods  wi th  
approval  and descr ibed the business  judgment  rule  as  fol lows: “Directors and o f f icers  
wil l  not  be  held  to  be  in  breach of  the du ty of  care  under  s  122(1)(b )  of  the CBCA i f  
they ac t  prudent ly  and  on a reasonably informed basis.  The decis ions  they make  must  
be reasonable business  dec is ions in  l igh t  of  al l  the circumstances about which  the  
direc tors or  off icers  knew or  ought to  have known.  In  de termining whethe r  d irec tors 
have ac ted in  a  manner  that  breached the du ty of  care,  i t  is  wor th  repea ting tha t  
perfec tion i s  no t  demanded.  Courts are  i l l - sui ted and should be  re luc tant  to  second -
guess the app lica t ion of  bu siness  exper t i se  to  the considera t ions tha t  are inv o lved in  
corporate dec is ion -making,  but  they are capable,  on the facts of  any case,  of  
determining  whether  an  appropriate  degree of  prudence and d il igence was brought to  
bear  in  reach ing what i s  cla imed to  be reasonable business dec ision a t  the t ime i t  was  
made.  Daley H “Recent Developments in  Directors and Off icers Liabil i ty” Wardle 
Daley Bernste in  LLP 3;  see para 5 .3 .2(b)  above for  a  discuss ion  of  the Peoples  
Department  Store  mat ter .  
 
327 Section  123 of  the  CBCA.  
 
328 Sect ion 44  of  the ONCA.  Once i t  commence s ,  i t  wi l l  be  appl icable to  h igher  
educat ion ins t i tut ions.  
 
329 The Corporat ions Act 1990 c.38 does no t  con tain  a  s imi lar  prov ision ;  McGuinness  
The Law and Pract ice  of  Canadian Busi ness  Corpora tions 774.  The  focus in  th is  
chapter  of  the  thes is remains on Ont ar io  and  therefore  the  version in  the OBCA is 
discussed .  The Ontar io  Corpora tions Act that  is  current ly  s t i l l  appl icable to  higher  




corporation in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles; (c) a report or advice of an officer 
or employee of the corporation, where it is reasonable in 
the circumstances to rely on the report or advice; or (d) a 
report of a lawyer, accountant, engineer, appraiser or 
other person whose profession lends credibility to a 
statement made by any such person.  
   
In Stelco Inc (Re) (2004) O.J. No. 4899 (S.J.C.)330 Justice Farley voided the 
appointment of two new directors to the Stelco board of directors. The court 
emphasised the importance of other stakeholders’ interests and applied the 
decision in the Peoples matter,331 that “….although a judge supervising a 
CCA proceeding develops a certain “feel” for the corporate dynamics and a 
certain sense of direction for the restructuring, this caution is worth keeping 
in mind (i.e., that judges are not qualified to make business decisions). The 
court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors, or to the 
seat of the chair of the board, when acting in its supervisory role in the 
restructuring process”. The new directors successfully appealed the 
decision. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that a lower court had no 
authority in terms of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act  of 1985332 
to interfere with the composition of a board. The Court of Appeal also found 
that the judge in the lower court had erred in failing to give effect to the 
business judgment rule by rejecting the suggestion that he should respect 
and give deference to the business judgment of the Board. 333   
 
330 Stelco Inc (Re)  (2004)  O.J .  No.  4899 (S.J.C.) .  These new direc tors were associa ted  
with  two companies who,  along wi th  other  shareholders,  would obta in  40% interest  in  
Ste lco through share accumula tion dur ing the company’s restructur ing .  Judg e Far ley 
found that  the remainder  of  the board fe l t  that  they had no opt ion b ut  to  agree to  the  
appointment  due  to  concern tha t  the  shareholders  would take  over  the  board,  wi th  the  
goal  of  maximis ing shareholder  value as opposed to  bui lding a bet ter  corpor at ion.  
Ste lco’s  unions  opp osed these appointments  s ince  they feared  that  the majori ty  of  
shareholders  would seek  to  raise  the share pr ices in  the hope  of  sel l ing  the shares for  a  
profi t .  See  Dube  J “Courts’  Role in  the Boardroom –  The Stelco  Directors Case ” 2005  –  
2006 Pratt’ s  Journal  Bankruptcy Law  156 –  161.  
 
331 See a  d iscuss ion o f  this  mat ter  in  para 5 .3 .2(b)  above.  
 
332 Companies’  Credi tors Arrangement Act R.S.C.  1985 c C36.  
 
333 Leon JS and Armstrong SJ “Business Judgment and Defensive Decis ion -Making :  
Directors  and  Off icers  Dut ies and Responsib il i t ies af te r  Peoples”  Fasken  Mart ineau  
LLP  12 –  15  ht tp : / /www.fasken.com/fi les /Publicat ion/f6c57e93 -41dd-4ccb-a1cf-
edab27d2d8de/Presenta t ion/Publ ica t ionAt tachment/1bdf40b6 -1f92-41e3-a4b0-
aeffdb1aec59/BUSINESSJUDGMENT.PDF  (Date of  use:  1  June 2016) .  
333 
 
The application of the business judgment rule differs in the USA and 
Canada. The Canadian version of the business judgment rule requires that 
director’s actions be in the best interests of the corporation only, and not in 
the interests of the creditors or shareholders, as is required under the USA 
version. The courts in the USA apply the business judgement rule by 
considering two factors, namely, the decision-making process, to determine 
whether the decision was adequately informed; and the reasonableness of 
the final decision.334 In accordance with the USA version of the business 
judgment rule, directors will be protected if their decision was “rational” 
while the Canadian version requires that director ’s decisions must be 
“reasonable”.335 In Unique Broadband Systems, Inc. (Re)336 2014 ONCA 538, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal reaffirmed the duties of directors and officers 
and clarified the way in which the business judgment rule should be 
applied. The decision in this matter is significant from the perspective of 
corporate governance, and shareholders’ rights in its confirmation of the 
following aspects: that independent or third-party advice may be necessary 
to justify executive compensation; the business judgment rule has no 
application where directors and officers make decisions that have no 
legitimate business purpose and are in breach of their fiduciary dut ies; and 
executive compensation agreements that are inconsistent with statutory 
fiduciary duties will not be enforced by the courts. 337 
 
 
334 Canada’s approach i s  s imi lar  to  th e approach in  South Afr ica  -  see Chapter  4  para  
4 .2 .7  above for  a  discussion  of  the  business  judgment  rule  in  South  Afr ica.  See  Sopow 
Direc tors  and Standards:  The Problem of  Insu ff icien t  Guidance  24.  
 
335 Tory’s “Responsibi l i t ies  of  Directors  in  Canada” 11 .  A ra tional  decision  tes t  i s  
based on a gross  negl igence standard whi le  a  reas onable dec ision test  is  based on an  
ordinary negl igence standard;  Rei ter  Directors Dut ies in  Canada 54 ;  Puri  e t  a l .  Cases,  
Mater ials and Notes on Partnersh ips and Canadian Busine ss Corporat ions  5 t h  ed 307 .  
 
336 Unique Broadband  Systems ,  Inc .  (Re)  2014 ONCA 538.  
 
337 Unique Broadband Systems Inc (Re)  214 ONCA 538; Fleming M and Basmadjian  A 
“Cour t  of  Appeal  Clar if ies  Directors  Fiduciary  Duties  and the Business  Judgment  Rule  
for  Executive  Compensa tion  Mat ters”  Dentons Securi t ies Li t iga tion  
http: / /www.canadiansecuri t iesl i t igat ion.com/court -of-appeal-clar if ies-d irec tors-
f iduciary-dut ies-and- the-business- judgment-rule -for-execu tive-compensation -mat ters  
(Date of  use :  2  June 2016);  Ri tchie L,  Gleason -Merc ier  C and MacDougal A “ Ontar io  




Although the application in the various jurisdictions may differ slightly, the 
common purpose of the business judgment rule is to protect directors and 
officers that make reasonable and/or rational business decisions in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
 
5.5 HIGHER EDUCATION 
 




The first institutions of learning in the USA predate the American 
Revolution.338 Local and state governments were responsible for the 
governance of higher education institutions. 339 Similarly, to South Africa in 
 
Compensation” 2014 https: / /www.osler .com/en /resources/governance/201 4/ontar io -
court-of-appeal-upholds -f inding-of-breach  (Date  of  use:  23 August  2018) .  
 
338 They  were  inf luenced by inst i tu t ions  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Harvard  College  was  
es tabl i shed  in  1636,  and between i t s  founding and the  American  Revolut ion,  nine  
colleges were establ ished.  Rudolph F The American College an d Universi ty:  A History  
(Univers i ty  of  Georgia Press 1990)  3  –  22 ;  Geiger  RL The His tory o f  American  Higher  
Educat ion:  Learn ing and Cul ture f rom the founding to  World War II  (Pr inceton  
Univers i ty  Press 201 5)  1  –  8 .  
 
339 See the mat ter  of  Dartmouth College v  Woodward (1819)  17 US 518.  During  1816,  
the s ta te  leg isla ture  of  New Hampshire passed  new laws that  revised  this  char te r  and  
changed  the  co llege  from private  to  public ,  how the  t rustees were se lected  as  we l l  as  
the dut ies of  the trus tees.  The trustees a t  t he t ime f i led sui t  and al leged that  th is  was 
against  the  Consti tut ion .  They rel ied on ar t ic le  1 ,  sect ion 10 of  the  Const i tu t ion,  which 
prevented the sta te  f rom impair ing on a con tract .  This decis ion was an  important  one  
for  higher  education in  the USA as i t  not  on ly  clear ly  demarcated public  and pr ivate 
ins t i tut ions  but  i t  a l so sol idif ied  the  au tonomy of  char tered inst i tu t ions and pro tec ted  
them from interference  from the governme nt.  The Court  agreed  with  t he co llege,  and 
the law was struck down,  al lowing t he  col lege  to  proceed as a  pr iva te col lege .  For  a  
ful l  background  of  the  histor ica l  development  of  h igher  education ,  see  Thelin  JR,  
Edwards JR and Moyen E “Higher  Educat ion in  th e Uni ted Sta tes –  His tor ica l  
Development” http : / /educat ion.stateunivers i ty .com/pages/2044/Higher -Education- in-
Uni ted-Sta tes.h tml  (Date of  use:  28 August  2018) .   
See a  summary of  the Dartmouth Col lege v  Woodward  case on  
http: / /www.amer icanbar .org/groups/public_education /in i t ia t ives_awards/s tuden ts_ in_ac
tion/dar tmouth .h tml  (Date of  use:  28 August  2018);  Fowles Public  Higher  Education  
Governance:  An Empir ical  Examination 7; Vasudev  PM “Corporate  Law and i t s  
eff ic iency :   A Review of  His tory” AJLH  2008  –  2010. ;  and  Mitchel l  LE,  Cunningham 
LA and Haas JJ Corporate Finance  and Governance:  Cases,  Mater ials and Problems 
for  an Advanced Course  in  Corpora tions (Carol ina Academic Press  2006)  8  –  10 fo r  a  
335 
 
the pre-1994 era, education was racially segregated in the USA. Until the 
middle of the twentieth century, higher education meant segregated 
education for the majority of black people in the USA. 340  In 1896, the 
Supreme Court decision of Plessy v Ferguson341 confirmed that the 
“separate but equal”342 practice was a reasonable solution for preventing 
the mixing of races.343 From the establishment of the Cheney State College 
until 1954, black people in the USA were primarily educated in historically 
 
discuss ion of  this case .  The King of  England granted a char ter  to  the Dar tmouth  
Col lege during 1759 ,  which s t ipu lated the purp ose of  the school,  how i t  would be  
governed and managed as wel l  as g iving land to  the co llege.  
 
340 The f ir st  b lack co llege was es tab li shed in  1817 in  response to  the d iscr iminat ion tha t  
took place against  b lack  people before the c iv i l  war  in  the USA. The a i m establi sh ing  
this co llege was to  prov ide black st udents with  educat ion in  amongst  o ther ,  l ibera l  ar ts ,  
which was s imilar  to  the  educat ion provided in  p redominantly  whi te  ins t i tut ions (PWIs)  
See ,  general ly ,  Kujov ich G “Equal  Opp ortun ity  in  Higher  Educat io n  and the Black  
Publ ic  Col lege :   The Era of  Separat e but  Equal” 1987 (72)  Minnesota Law Review  37 ;   
Tollet t  KS “Blacks,  Higher  Educat ion and In tegrat ion” 1972(48)  Notre  Dame Law  195 ;  
Lito lff  EH Higher education desegregation:  An Analysis of  S tate  Ef forts i n  Sys tems 
formerly Operat ing Segregated Sys tems of  Higher Education  (Published DPhi l  thesis  
Louisiana Sta te  Univers i ty  2007)  47 –  50; Penn EB and Gabbidon SL “Criminal  Just ice  
Educat ion at  Histor ical ly  Black Colleges and Universi t ies :  Three decades of  prog ress” 
2007 (18)  Journal o f  Criminal Jus t ice Educat i on  138.  
 
341 Plessy  v  Ferguson 136 US 537  (1896) .  Hereinaf ter  refer red to  as  the  Plessy v  
Ferguson mat ter.  See  Hi l l s trom LC Defin ing moments:   P lessy v  Ferguson  
(Omnigraphics Inc 2014)  33 –  107 for  a  discuss ion of  th is case,  the his tory leading  up 
to  the cou r t  dec is ion as  well  as an  overv iew of  segregation ;  Groves HE “Separate but  
Equal :  The Doctr ine of  Plessy v Ferguson” 1951  (12)  Phylon  (1940 –  1956)  66 –  72.  
 
342 The Fourteen th Am endment in  the USA Const i tu t ion addresses many aspec ts  of  
ci t izensh ip and the r igh ts of  c i t izens and i t  fea ture prominently  in  the matter  of  Brown 
v Board of  Education  347 USA 483  (1954) .  For  more information  on the Fourteen th 
Amendment,  see  ht tps: / /www.law.corne ll . edu/const i tu t ion /amendmentx iv  (Date  of  use:  
28 August  2018);  Ransmeier  JS “The  Four teenth Amendment and  the ‘Separa te  but  
Equal’  Doctr ine” 1951 (50)  Michigan  Law Review  203 –  260 .   
 
343 The interpretat ion o f  the “separa te  bu t  equal  rule” s tems from the Four teenth  
Amendment and means ,  “no sta te  sha ll  deny to  any person with in i ts  jur isd ic t ion the 
equal  protect ion of  law”.  Therefore,  a  s ta te  had the  r igh t  to  adopt a  pol icy  of  
segregat ion as long as i t  provided  for  substant ial  equal  fac i l i t ies for  those segrega ted 
from the regular  faci l i t ies.  This  dec ision  resul ted in  separate  ra i lroad coaches  for  the  
races,  separate  wai t ing  rooms in  ra i lroad and  bus stat ions,  dual  sys tems of  publ ic  
educat ion,  separate  water  fou nta ins in  publ ic  buildings and the rear  seat  of  the  bus for  
black  passengers.  For  more on  the ”separa te  but  equal”  doc tr ine ,  see  Westin  AF 
“Segregation and Discr iminat ion in  Higher  Education” 1950 (10)  Lawyers Guild  Review  
210;  Beit tel  AD “Effec ts of  the  ‘ Separa te  bu t  Equal’  Doctr ine  of  Education”  1951 (20 )  
The Journal of  Negro  Education  140  –  147; Stefkovich JA and Leas T “A Legal  History  
of  Desegregat ion in  Higher  Education” 1994 (63)  Journal of  Negro Education  407 –  
411;   Muff ler  JP “Education and  the Se para te  But Equal  Doctr ine” 1986  (17)  The Black  




black colleges and universities. In the landmark decision in  Brown et al. v 
Board of Education of Topeka344, the Supreme Court declared it 
unconstitutional to have separate public schools for black and white 
people.345 The Brown judgment struck down the precedent created in Plessy 
v Ferguson and racial discrimination was no longer allowed in schools. 346   
 
Before the Civil War,347 black people in Georgia did not receive any formal 
education; in fact, it was illegal to teach slaves to read or write. 348 In 1867, 
the first college for black students, the Atlanta University, was founded in 
Georgia.349 In Hunt v Arnold350  three black women brought a class action 
 
344 Brown e t  a l .  v  Board of  Educat ion o f  Topeka  347 USA 483  (1954) .  See  Sanders  F  
“Brown v Board of  Education :  An Empir ical  reexamination of  i t s  ef fect  on Federa l  
Distr ic t  Cour ts” 1995 (29)  Journal of the Law & Society Association Review 731 –  756;  Klarman 
MJ Brown v Board of  Education and  the Civ i l  Rights Movement  (Oxford 2007);  L ito lff  
Higher Educat ion Desegregation:  an  Anal ys is  of  Sta te  Ef for ts in  Sys tems formerly 
Operat ing Segregated Sys tems o f  Highe r Educat ion  8  –  11.  
 
345 Penn and Gabbidon 2007 (18)  Journal of  Criminal Jus t ice Educat ion  139;  Li tolff  
Higher Educat ion Desegregation:  An Analysis  of  S tate  Ef forts in  Systems for merly  
Operat ing Segregated S ys tems o f  Higher Educat ion  1 .  
 
346 See Loevy RD (ed)  The Civ il  R ights Act  of  1964:   The Passage of  the Law tha t  ended  
Racia l  Segregation  (S ta te  Universi ty  of  New York Press 1997)  1  –  364 for  more on this  
Act .  
 
347 The Civ il  War took  place be tween 1861 –  1865 .  
 
348 1829 Ga.  Laws 171 .  See O’Brien M “Discr iminatory  Effects :  Desegregation 
Lit iga tion in  Higher  Educat ion in  Georgia” 1999 (8)  Wil l iam & Mary  Bil l  o f  Righ ts  
Journal  7 .  
 
349 The Morr i l l  Act  o f  1862 provided funding for  the es tabl i s hment of  sta te  land gran t  
colleges.  In  1890,  the Morri l l  Act  o f  1890 was passed .  This Act which requ ired a l l  
s tates to  ensure that  there was an equ itable  div ision of  funds be tween whi te  and  black 
colleges in  order  for  them to qualify  for  funding.  Georg ia w as one of  the s ta tes that  
remained segregated.  The Board  of  Regents p layed a  pa r t  in  ensur ing  segregation  in  
public  h igher  education  in  Georgia .  The Board  of  Regents would ass ist  s tudents who 
applied for  access to  a  univers i ty  or  co llege to  obtain  scholars h ip at  an out -of-s ta te  
ins t i tut ion.  When the s tudent  d id  not  want to  accep t  thi s p lacement,  the Board of  
Regents would f ind other  ways to  exc lude the student  f rom admiss ion to  a  public  
faci l i ty  in  Georg ia.  The Board of  Regents adopted var ious pol ic ies prev ent ing black 
students f rom enro ll ing  at  al l -white  schools .  Even af ter  the Brown  decision,  Georgia  
st i l l  res is ted  any at tempt of  desegregation ,  go ing as far  as to  promulgate leg isla t ion  
ensur ing that  no state  funding would be avai led to  any ins t i tut ion that  was rac ial ly  
integrated.  See in  general  O’Br ien 1999 (8)  Wil l iam & Mary Bi l l  o f  R ights Journal  7 .  
For a  h istory  of  the  establi shment  of  b lack  co l leges  in  Georgia ,  see O’Br ien  1999 (8)  
Will iam & Mary Bi l l  o f  Righ ts Journal  8 –  21.  See para 5 .5 .2(b) ( i i)  bel ow for  a  
discuss ion of  the Board  of  Regents of  Georg ia.  
 
350 Hunt v  Arnold  172 F.  Supp.  847 (N.D Ga 1959) .  
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against the university system of Georgia after being denied access to the 
Georgia State College of Business Administration. They alleged that the 
college was acting unconstitutionally by segregating races and that the 
admission policy of the college was discriminatory. The court agreed with 
the applicants and found that the college was racially segregated, which 
contravened the applicants’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.351    
 
Desegregation in Georgia began in 1961 with the decision in Holmes v 
Danner352 where the Federal Court ordered the University of Georgia to 
admit two black students. It was strengthened by the passing of the Civil  
Rights Act of 1964, which provided a federal agency with the power to 
monitor state compliance with the directive of the Brown decision. In the 
event of non-compliance, state funding would be denied. This Act also 
provided a financial incentive to institutions for voluntary compliance.353  
 
(b) Regulation of higher education 
 
Historically, American higher education has primarily been self-regulatory 
in respect of non-profit, private and public institutions. 354 The post-
secondary education sector in the USA consists of colleges, universities, 
community colleges and for-profit and non-profit private institutions. The 
incorporating state’s legislation determines the type of institution. 355 Most 
 
 
351 Hunt v  Arnold  172 F.  Supp.  847 (N.D. Ga 1959)  856 –  857.  
 
352 Holmes v Danner  191 F.  Supp.  394 ,  410 (M.D. Ga.  1961) .  
 
353  O’Brien 1999 (8)  Wil l iam & Ma ry Bil l  o f  Righ ts Journal 22.  
 
354 Lahey JL and Grif f i th  JC “Recent trends in  Hig her  Educat ion:   Accountabi l i ty ,  
Effic iency ,  Technology and Governance” 2002 (52)  Journal o f  Legal Education  528 .  
 
355 US Depar tment of  Educat ion “An Overv iew of  US Higher  Educatio n  Governance”  
2005 24 –  27 .  For  more on  the  post - secondary educat ion in  the USA ,  see  
ht tps: / /www2.ed.gov/about/off ices / l is t /ous/ in ternational /usnei /us /ed li te - structure-
us.html  (Date of  use :  28 august  2018);  Eckel  P and King J “A n Overview of  Higher  
Educat ion in  the United  States” 2004 American Council  on  Education  1  –  18;  Nat ional  
Inst i tu t ion  for  Academic Degrees and  Universi ty  Evaluat ion “Overview: Qu a li ty  
Assurance System in Hi gher  Education –  United Sta tes of  Amer ica” 2010 6;  Helms L 
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public and all private institutions in the USA are licensed or chartered as 
corporations. They are mostly self-governed in terms of academic affairs, 
administration, fund-raising, resource allocation and public relations. 356 The 
law applicable to higher education emerged from both federalism and the 
separation of powers. Legal issues pertaining to higher education in the 
USA may thus arise in courts, Congress, state legislature as well as local 
government legislative bodies.357 The USA Constitution does not expressly 
provide for education, leaving its regulation to the states in terms of the 
Tenth Amendment of the USA Constitution. 358 The Constitution of each state 
addresses school and tertiary education in general and provides for the 
funding of higher education and the promulgation of relevant legislation. In 
the USA, there is a combination of both state and national control, and 
governing boards are appointed to lessen the extent of government 
intervention.359 The Legislature of each state delegates the authority for 
policymaking and oversight of higher education institutions to external 
 
“Comparing  Li t igat ion in  Higher  Education :   The United Sta tes and  Austra l ia  2007” 
2009 Internat ional  Journal of  Law & Educat ion  38.  
 
356 US Depar tment of  Educat ion (DOE)  “ An Overview of  US Higher  Edu cat ion 
Governance” 2005 27.  The DOE is a  federa l  de partment of  education .  I t  is  the pr imary 
agency for  the federal  government  and i s  responsib le fo r  implement ing  any legislat ion 
passed by  Congress  per taining to  education.  
 
357 Kap lin  WA and Lee BA The Law o f  Higher Education  5 t h  ed ( Jossey-Bass 2014)  7 .  
 
358 The s ta tes can crea te,  organise,  suppor t  and even disso lve public  higher  education  
ins t i tut ions .  See in  general  Urchick K US Education Law:  I s  the Righ t  to  Educat ion in  
the US in  Compliance  with  Interna tio nal Human Rights? (Published LLM thesis  
Mich igan State  Univers i ty  2007) .  Accord ing to  the Tenth  Amendment,  the powers no t  
delega ted  to  the  USA Federa l  government  by the Consti tut ion nor  exc luded from sta te  
regula t ion  are  le f t  up  to  each  s ta te ,  see 
ht tps: / /www.law.corne ll .edu/consti tut ion/ tenth_amendment  (Date of  use :  28 August  
2018);  Mangan MJ “The  Tenth  Amendment” 1962 (48)  Women Lawyers  Journal  20,  27 ;  
Sega l  BL “A Rational  Basis  for  Tenth Amendment  Federa li sm” 1984  (30)  Wayne Law 
Review  1269 –  1308.  
 
359 Taylor  JS and De Lources Machado M “Governing Boards in  Publ ic  Higher  
Educat ion Ins t i tut ions:   A Perspect ive from the Uni ted Sta tes” 2008 Tertiary Education  




governing boards.360 It is the responsibility of the state to ensure a balance 
between institutional autonomy and public accountability.  
 
Institutional autonomy is not absolute. 361 Higher education governance is 
divided into two categories: internal governance, which refers to the 
structures, and processes by which an institution governs itself, and 
external governance, which concerns the structures and processes by 
which outside stakeholders are involved in the governance and affairs of 
institutions.362  The so-called “external law” within higher education is 
created by both the federal and provincial governments. The federal 
government has limited powers, as the USA Constitution does not provide 
express powers with regard to higher education. However, through i ts 
express and implied powers, the federal government still exercises 
substantial authority over both public and private higher education 
institutions.363 The US Department of Education is responsible for ensuring 
equal access to education and promoting educational excellence. The 
office of the Secretary of Education is responsible for the overall direction, 
supervision, and coordination of all activities of the Department and is the 
principal adviser to the President on Federal policies, programmes, 
enforcing federal legislation and activities related to education in the United 
States.  The Deputy Secretary focuses on elementary and secondary 
education, while the Under-Secretary focuses on higher and adult 
 
360 US Depar tment of  Educat ion “An Overv iew of  US Higher  Edu cation  Governance”  
2005 30.  These  boards a re responsib le for  the  management of  higher  educat ion,  similar  
to  the  Department  of  Higher  Education  and Training in  South Afr ica.  
 
361 Toma JD “Expanding  Peripheral  Act ivi t ies,  Increasing  Accountabi l i ty  Demands and  
Reconsider ing Governance in  US higher  educat ion” 2007  (26)  Higher  Education  
Research and Development  58.  
 
362  Kaplin  and Lee The Law o f  Higher Educat ion  19.  
 
363 Express  powers fo r  instance include the power to  ra ise and spend  funds  as Congress  
provides var ious  types of  federa l  a id  to  most  public  and pr ivate ins t i tut ions in  the  
USA. Under  i t s  implied powers,  Congress may establ ish condi t ions on how inst i tu t ions 
may spend the ir  funding  and on how they must  acco unt for  the expendi tu re.  See Kapl in  




education.364 Currently, the Secretary of Education is planning a major 
overhaul of higher education in the US. Some of the intended changes 
include the introduction of the “borrower defence” rule, which provides that 
borrowers who allege that they were misled or defrauded by their 
institutions regarding the outcome of a higher education program and can 
prove that their institution knowingly made false statements365 may be 
eligible to have their loans “forgiven.” Secretary DeVos also plans to repeal 
the “gainful-employment rule” which seeks to punish programs whose 
graduates bear high student loans.366 These plans of the Secretary of 
Education confirm that there some is federal involvement in higher 
education. 
 
The federal Higher Education Act of 1965 provided federal aid programmes 
for institutions.367 In 2008, the Act was reauthorised368 as the Higher 
Education Opportunity Act of 2008.369 The purpose of this Act was to 
 
364 See in  genera l ,  h t tps: / /www2.ed.gov/about/off ices / l i st /om/fs_po/ osods/ intro .h tml  
(Date of  u se :  27 November 2018);  Jackson A “ Betsy DeVos was jus t  Confirmed as  
Educat ion Secretary —  here 's  what  she wil l  Control”  2017-02-07 Business Insider .   
 
365 Accord ing to  repor ts,  th is  rule  wil l  make  i t  nex t  to  impossible for  defraude d s tuden ts  
to  obta in  rel ief ,  thereby sav ing the country money.   See in  general ,  Kre ighbaum A “A 
More Restr ic t ive Rule for  Defrauded Borrowers” Ins ide Higher  Ed  (da te  published :  26 
July 2018);  Hansen C “Proposed Changes in  Borrower -Defence Rules Would Make I t  
Tougher  for  Defrauded Students to  Get Debt  Relief” The Chronical  o f  Higher 
Educat ion  2018-07-25.  
 
366 See in  genera l .  Kre ighbaum A “Winners  and Losers f rom DeVos Approach” Inside  
Higher Ed  (publ ished on  7 August  2018) ;  Thomason A “ DeVos Plans to  Ax Gainfu l-
Employment Rule,  Which Ta rge ted For -Profi t  Colleges” The Chronical  of  Higher  
Educat ion  2018-08-27.  
 
367 Hegj i  A “The Higher  Educat ion Act (HEA): A Primer” 2014 CRS 1 –  45 
http: / /www.higheredcomp liance.org /resources /nps70 -020614-12%20%284%29.pdf  
(Date of  use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
368 Reau thorisat ion means  that  the Act creates ,  extends or  makes changes to  a  federa l  
programme and speci f ies the amount of  money the government ma y spent  to  undertake  
the p rogramme.  See  Lacey A and Murray  C “The Nuts and Bo lts  of  Reauthor iza t ion”  
2015 Career Educat ion Review ht tps: / /www.thompsoncoburn.com/docs/defaul t -
source/publ icat ion-documents/ the -nu ts-and-bol ts-of-
reauthor iza t ion .pdf?sfvrsn=0&sfvrsn=0  (Date of  use :  27 November 2018) .  
 
369  Lowry RC “Reauthorizat ion of  the Federal  Higher  Education Act and Accountab il i ty  




provide opportunities for students with intellectual disabilities to obtain 
access to post-secondary education.370  It is also important to take note of 
the role played by the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) for 
universities and colleges in the governance of higher education boards. 
The AGB was founded in 1921, and its membership represents about 1,300 
boards, which comprise about 1,900 colleges and universities.371 It 
advocates the importance of good governance in higher education in the 
USA.  
 
The USA has a system of shared governance. This means that the 
governing boards of each institution share governance duties between the 
president of the institution and its academic structure.372 The governing 
board members and officers like the president and executive management 
of the institution hold fiduciary responsibilities. Their fiduciary duties 
include duties of care, loyalty and obedience. These duties also require 
board members to make careful decisions, in good faith and the best 
interests of the institution. Decisions should also be consistent with the 
public or charitable mission of the institution, and there should not be any 
undue influence from any other party.373 In 2015, the AGB issued a 
statement on the fiduciary duties of governing board members.  This 
statement confirmed that according to statutory and common law, officers 
and board members of corporations, including non-profit corporations as 
 
370 Lee SS “Overview of  the Higher  Education Opportuni ty  Act Reauthoriza t ion”  
October  2009 Insigh t  
ht tps: / / th inkcol lege.net / si tes/defau lt /f i les/f i les /resources/h igher%20education%20oppor
tunity%20act%20overview.pdf  (Date  of  use :  28 August  2018) .  Post - secondary  
educat ion includes univer s i ty  or  col lege educat ion.  
 
371  See  the  Associat ion of  Govern ing Boards  ht tps: / /www.agb.org/about -agb (Date of  
use :  28 August  2018);  not  al l  of  the boards in  the USA are members of  this inst i tu t ion.  
 
372 “Governing  Boards”  are similar  to  th e  Counci ls  of  universi t ies  in  South Afr ica  while  
the “President” is  simi lar  to  the Vice -Chancellor  or  Rector  in  South Afr ica.  The  
academic s truc tures are similar  to  those of  the  Senate  in  South  Afr ica .  
 
373 See the Associat ion of  G overning Boards “Fiduciary Dut ies”  




well as public bodies that operate as universities or colleges, stand in 
fiduciary relations with their institutions.374 
 
The governance structures and processes of public and private institutions 
differ because they are created differently, have different objectives and 
missions and derive authority to operate from various sources.375 In 1819 
the distinctions between private and public institutions and the roles of 
governing boards for both private and public sectors were clarified in 
Dartmouth College v Woodward 376  Private universities in the USA are 
usually not-for-profit corporations, and in some instances, may be for-profit 
institutions.377 The government has limited involvement in these institutions, 
which are deemed corporations and are governed accordingly. Therefore, 
all the legislation applicable to not-for-profit corporations as well as for-
profit corporations applies to private universities in the USA, depending on 
their classification.378 All private institutions are responsible for electing 
their own boards.  379    
 
374 See  the s ta tement on f iduc iary du ties of  governing board members 1  –  11  
https: / /www.agb.org/si tes /defau lt /f i les/u27174/statement_2015_f iduciary_duties.pdf  
(Date of  use:  28 August  2018);  Tay lor  and De Lourdes Machado  2008 (14)  Tert iary  
Educat ion and Management  246.  
 
375  Kaplin  and Lee The Law of  Higher Education  19.  Pr iva te higher  educat ion i s  
discussed  in  deta i l  as the focus remains on public  higher  educat ion.  
 
376 Dartmouth  Col lege  v  Woodward  17  US 518 ,  1819.   In  th is  matter ,  the  King  of  
England  had  gran ted a char ter  to  Dartmouth  Col lege  in  1769.  This  char ter  con ta ined  the  
purpose  of  the school,  descr ibed  i ts  struc ture  and s t ipu lated how i t  would be governed.  
In  1816,  the s ta te  legislature of  New Hampshire passed laws that  revised the char ter ;  
the change in  law resu lted  in  the College be ing changed f rom a pr ivate to  a  pu bl ic  
college;  i t  a l so changed  the dut ies of  the trustees.  The exis t ing trus tees f i led sui t  and 
al leged tha t  the Legis lator  had v iola ted  the  Const i tu t ion  as the change of  char ter  
consti tuted a  cance lla t ion of  a  contrac t .  The Court  agreed with  the College an d i t  was  
changed back to  a  pr ivate co llege.  See fur ther  Kezar  A “Rethink ing  Publ ic  Higher  
Educat ion Governing  Boards Per formance:   Resul t s  of  a  National  Study of  Govern ing 
Boards in  the United Sta tes” 2006  (77)  Journal o f  Higher Education  1005 .  
 
377 The focus of  th is thes is  is ,  however ,  on  publ ic  inst i tu t ions.  
 
378 Information rece ived from Prof  Barbara Lee ,  co -author  of  The Law of  Higher  
Educat ion  5 t h  ed ( Jossey-Bass 2014)  by way of  an emai l  dated 16 July 2016 .  See in  
genera l  Lahey and Gr iff i th  2002 (52)  Journal o f  Legal Education  536 ;  US Depar tment 
of  Educat ion “Organisat ion of  US Education :  Tert iary Educat ion” 2008; Muirhead PP 
“Government Rela t ions  wi th  Pr iva te Inst i tu t ions” 1974 Higher Education Research  
Report  27 –  36; Merr i l l  HK “The Encroachment of  the F ederal  Government in to  Priva te  
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(c) External governance of public higher education institutions 
 
The combination of state, rather than federal control as well as the 
constitution of governing boards is intended to lessen the extent of 
government intervention in the affairs of public higher education institutions 
in the USA.380 Each state confers the responsibility for external governance 
to its Board of Regents or a board of trustees as the governing board.  Two 
types of boards are recognised, namely, consolidated governing boards 
and coordinating boards.381 Consolidated governing boards provide for a 
more powerful form of governance than coordinating boards. Consolidated 
governing boards, on the other hand, are responsible for both the 
coordinating functions as well as the day-to-day management of 
institutions, which includes finances, granting of degrees, staff and 
property. They are, therefore, the sole entities charged with the control of 
public higher education institutions. On the other hand, coordinating 
boards, work alongside institutional governing boards and are created with 
specific powers. Their involvement in the governance of public individual 
institutions in that state is prohibited in terms of the statutory provisions of 
that specific state. Coordinating boards mainly focus on matters like credit 
transfer and programmatic duplication across institutions. It is left  to each 
state to choose the type of governing board best suited to it, in accordance 
with its statutory provisions. 382  
 
Inst i tu t ions of  Higher  Educat ion” 1994 Br igham Young Univers i ty  Education and Law 
Journal  63 –  85.  
 
379 Eckel  and  King American Council  on Education  11.  
 
380 Taylor  and De Lourdes  Machado  2008 (14)  Teri tary Education and  Manageme nt  246.  
 
381 Fowles Public  Higher Educat ion Governance:  An empir ica l  examinat ion 5 25;  Taylor  
and De Lourdes  Machado 2008 (14)  Teritary Education and  Management  246 ;  
McGuinness AC “Models of  Postsecondary Edu cat ion Coord inat ion and  Governance  in  
the Sta tes” 2003 Educat ion Commiss ion of  the Sta tes 
ht tps: / /www.legis.nd.gov/assembly /62 -2011/docs/pd f /13.9245.01appendix.pdf  (Date  of  
use :  24 August  2018) .  
 
382  See in  genera l ,  Fowles Public  Higher Education Governance:  An Empir ica l  
Examinat ion  26 –  27 for  more on the choice of  governing boards of  the states.  Also ,  
see  Mil le t t  JD “ State  Coordinat ing  Boar ds and State -wide  Governing  Boards” 1975  New 
Direc tions for Inst i tu t ional Sta tu te  1  -10.  
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The legislature of each state delegates the authority for policymaking and 
oversight of higher education institutions to these governing boards. 383  The 
power granted to the boards varies from state to state. These boards act as 
a type of “buffer” between the institutions and the government. 384 The 
degree of state control varies from state to state. In some states, the 
governing boards oversee the institutions, prescribe funding levels, 
establishing accountability measures, drafting policies and approving new 
academic programmes.385 In others, the state board only has an advisory 
capacity and therefore has little direct authority over the institutions. 386   
 
Public universities in Georgia are governed by the University System of 
Georgia (USG)’s Board of Regents, a constitutional body 387 appointed by 
the Governor of Georgia in terms of the Georgia Constitution ,388 and 
regulated in terms of the Georgia Code of 2017 .389 The Georgia Constitution 
grants the Board of Regents the exclusive right to govern, control and 
manage the USG.390 Public universities are created as “units” of the Board 
of Regents and operate as juristic entities within the ambit of the Board of 
Regents. The Board of Regents has its own bylaws providing for its 
 
 
383 US Depar tment of  Educat ion “An Overv iew of  US Higher  Education  Governance”  
2005 30.  
 
384 Tandberg  DA “The Condi t ion ing Role of  Sta te  Higher  Education Governance  
Struc tures” 2013 (84 )  Journal o f  Higher Educat ion 507,  510.  
 
385 Twenty-f ive  s ta tes ha ve consol ida ting  boards –  these  include Georgia ,  F lor ida and 
Arizona.  See Fowles Public  Higher Educat ion Governance:  An  Empirical  Examinat ion  
25.  
 
386 Twenty-f ive  sta tes  have coor d ina ting  boards  –  these  inc lude  Texas ,  New Mexico and  
Californ ia.  See Fowles Public  Higher Education Governance:  An Empirical  
Examinat ion  25.  See  Eckel  and King 2004 American Council  on  Education  3 .  
 
387 Const i tu ted in  terms of  ar t icle  VIII ,  s  IV of  the Geor gia Const i tu t ion.   
 
388 Art ic le  VIII ;  s  IV of  the Georg ia Consti tut ion.  
 
389 Tit le  20 ,  Chapter  3  of  the Georg ia Code of  2017.  
 
390 Ar t ic le  VIII ,  s  IV of  the Georg ia Consti tut ion.  Curren tly  the  sys tem consists  of  
thir ty-f ive ins t i tut ions of  higher  learn ing,  a  mar ine  research  inst i tu te  and  a  cen tral  




governance.391 The Chancellor is appointed by the Board of Regents and 
serves as the USG’s chief executive officer. The Chancellor oversees all 
matters pertaining to funding, administration and operation of public 
universities and colleges.392    
 
Georgia has a consolidated governing board. 393 The Georgia Board of 
Regents was created by the Reorganization Act of 1931, as part of a 
reorganisation of Georgia’s state government.394 For the first time, public 
higher education in Georgia was unified under a single governing and 
management authority.395 The Georgia Constitution grants the Board of 
Regents the exclusive right to govern, control, and manage the University 
System of Georgia (USG) and all USG institutions. 396 The Governor 
appoints members of the Board of Regents for a term of seven years, and 
they may be reappointed for subsequent terms.397 The members of the 
Board of Regents donate their time and expertise to serve the state. Their 
position is voluntary and without financial remuneration.398 The Board elects 
 
391 See the by laws of  the Board of  Regents,  h t tp : / /www.usg.edu/ regen ts /by laws  (Date o f  
use :  28 August  2018) .  
 
392 For  more on the chancel lor ,  see  h t tp : / /www.usg.edu /chancellor /  (Date of  use:  28  
August  2018) .  See fur ther  the Bylaws  http : / /www.usg .edu/ regen ts /bylaws  for  the dut ies  
of  a  chancellor .  
 
393 Taylor  and De Lourdes  Machado  200 8 (14)  Teri tary Education and  Management  255.  
 
394 In  June 1934 an amendment to  the  Bankruptcy Act ,  provid ing for  the reorganisa t ion  
of  corporat ions was s igned in to  law.  The amendment gran ted re l ief  to  fa i l ing 
organisat ions which were fac ing insolvency.   See  in  general  Montgomery WR “The 
Corpora te Reorgan iza t ions Act :  An  Analysis of  the provisions of  the  law” August  1934  
Corpora te  Reorganiza tions:  A Month ly  Magazine Devoted  to  the Law o f  Corporate  
Reorganizat ions ,  Rai lroad Reorgani zat ions and Municipa l  Relief  15-44 .  
 
395 See the USG facts on  https: / /www.usg .edu/news/usgfac ts  (Date of  use:  25 August  
2018) .  
 
396 See  the  overv iew on  https: / /www.usg.edu /pol icymanual /  (Date  of  use:  25  August  
2018) .  
 
397 The Governor  is  the  Head of  Sta te .  
 
398 Other  than a min imal  per diem  to  cover  meals and lodging on days,  they meet .  
Today,  the Board of  Regents i s  composed of  nineteen members,  f ive of  whom are  
appointed from the s tate -a t- la rge,  and one  from each of  the s tate’s fourteen  
congress ional  d is tr icts ,  see  ht tps: / /www.usg.edu /news/usgfac ts  (Date of  use :  25 August  
2018) .  
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a Chancellor who serves as its chief executive officer and the chief 
administrative officer of the USG. The Board of Regents oversees the 
public colleges and universities that comprise the USG and has oversight 
of the Georgia Archives and the Georgia Public Library. 399 The Board of 
Regents fulfils its obligations by implementing rules and policies for the 
governance of the USG.400 All public higher education institutions in Georgia 
must comply with the Board of Regents’ Policy Manual.401 The Board of 
Regents prescribes the duties of the Chancellor, who reports to the Board 
on the prompt and effective execution of all resolutions, policies, 
procedures, rules and regulations of public higher institutions in the State 
of Georgia.402 The objective of the Board of Regents’ Office of Internal Audit 
is to “support the USG management in meeting its governance, risk 
management, compliance and internal control responsibilities while helping 
to improve organisational and operational effectiveness and efficiency”. 403 
The Compliance and Ethics Programme was established during 2007 at the 
request of the Chancellor of the USG. 404 The chief audit officer405 was 
requested to create the programme, which was done in accordance with 
 
 
399 See general  informat ion on the  Boar d of  Regents on h ttp : / /www.usg.edu/r egents/   
(Date of  use :  25 August  2018) .   
 
400 Some of  these  pol ic ies  inc lude  the  Board  of  Regents Policy  Manual ,  Academic & 
Student Af fairs Handbook ,  Bui lding Pro jec t  Manual ,  Business Procedure Manual ,  
Cont inuing Educat ion Guide lines ,  Copyrigh t  Policy ,  Ethics & Compliance Program ,  
Human Resources Adminis trative Manual and  Informat ion Technology Handbook.  See 
in  general  h t tps : / /www.usg.edu /pol ic ies/  (Date of  use :  25 August  2018) .  
 
401 See  the  Pol icy  Manual  on http : / /www.usg.edu/policymanual/  (Date of  use :  25 August  
2018) .  This Policy Manual  regula tes the univers i t ies and dea ls wi th  off icers of  the 
Board of  Regents,  ins t i tut ional  governance,  academic affa ir s ,  s tuden t  af fair s ,  pub lic  
serv ice,  research,  f inance and  business,  personnel ,  fac i l i t ies,  informat ion,  records  and 
publicat ion,  in formation  technology and miscel laneous  matters.  
 
402 Sec tion 1 of  the Pol icy  Manual.  The Chancel lo r  fulf i l s  a  similar  role  to  that  of  the  
South Afr ican Min ister  of  Higher  Educat ion and  Train ing.   
 
403 See in  genera l  h t tps: / /www.usg.edu /audit /  (Date  of  use:  25 August  2018) .  
 
404 This means  tha t  i t  is  va lid  across  al l  ins t i tut ions.   
 
405 John Fuchko  III ,  Vice Chancello r  for  In ternal  Audi t  & Compliance/Chief  Audit  




federal guidelines for these types of programmes.406 The primary function of 
the programme is to “promote the highest standards of ethical and 
professional conduct within the USG and to ensure compliance with all 
applicable laws, regulations and policies; to coordinate and support USG 
institutional ethics and compliance functions; and to conduct compliance 
investigations and reviews as needed to discharge an effective compliance 
programme”.407 The Compliance Board Policy and the USG’s Ethics Policy  
serve as the primary policy framework for the Compliance and Ethics 
Programme.408   
 
(d) Institutional governance of public higher education institutions 
 
The internal structures of institutions vary, based on their size and the 
degree programmes that the institutions offer. 409 Usually, lay boards of 
trustees govern the universities and colleges (institutional governing 
boards).410 The size, structure and appointment of members of institutional 
 
406  Informat ion supplied by Mr.  Fuchko by  way  of  email  dated 15  May 2015.  There  
were many reasons for  s tar t ing th is programme; however ,  the main reason was ensur ing  
ethical  behaviour  in  compl iance wi th  relevant  legis lat ion.  This programme is  in tended 
to  assist  the Board ,  the Chancel lor  and o ther  members of  the  inst i tu t ional  management  
in  the  discharge of  the ir  compl i ance oversigh t  responsib il i t ies.  
 
407 See the Univers i ty  System of  Georg ia’s Eth ics and Compl iance programme 
https: / /www.usg.edu /organiza tional_effec tiveness/eth ics_compliance  (Date of  use :  25 
August  2018) .  
 
408 See the  Ethics and  Compl iance  Char ter  on  
https: / /www.usg.edu /assets/organ izat ional_effec tiveness / documents/2018_USG_Compl i
ance_and_Eth ics_Charter .pdf  (Date of  use:  25 August  2018) .  The Univers i ty  Systems 
Offices’  (USO) Compl iance and Ethics Programme  is  responsible fo r  direc t ing the 
USG’ Off ice Compliance function that  oversees the management of  the USO-specif ic  
compliance  r isks.  The Compl iance  and Eth ics Programme  responsibi l i t ies  include  in ter  
al ia  the fol lowing: develop and manage a USO compl iance and e th ics funct ion to  
manage USO-specif ic  compliance r isks ;  advise  the Board of  Regents,  the Chancell o r  
and inst i tu t ion manageme nt on sign if ican t  campus or  USO compliance r i sks an d  
provide  ac tion  steps  to  mi t igate  sign if icant  compliance  r i sks;  coord inate  and  support  
USG inst i tu t ional  compl iance funct ions;  conduct  compliance invest igat ions and reviews 
as needed to  discharge  an effec t ive compliance and e thics  programme; and rece ive  
reports of  a l leged employees malfeasance and forward those repor ts ,  in  consul tat ion 
with the  USG Chief  Legal  Off ice to  the  Attorney General’ s Off ice for  invest iga tion .  
 
409 Kaplin  and  Lee The Law o f  Higher Ed ucat ion  21.  
 
410 The term “ lay board”  refers to  the f act  that  the members of  the board are lay  
persons,  meaning that  they do no t  necessar i ly  have any exper ience in  the  governance of  
348 
 
governing boards also vary. The board members of public institutions are in 
many cases, political appointments and are often selected by the Governor 
of the state where the institution is located.411 In some states and at many 
community colleges, board members are chosen through a general election 
process.412 The institutional governing board is the highest decision-making 
authority in the university. The governing board is the counterpart of the 
Council on South African public higher education institutions.413 The 
decision-making authority in institutions is shared among various formal 
and informal groups, which participate in the decision-making in multiple 
matters affecting the institution. These groupings include the President of 
the institution, the student governing bodies, staff, academic structures, 
and so on.414 Each board member is in a fiduciary relationship with the 
institution and must act in the best interest of the institution as well as with 
the necessary care and skill that is required. 415 The President of each 
institution is responsible for providing overall leadership to the institution, 
managing its finances and budget, developing and executing the 
institution’s strategic plan and establishing systems of accountability and 
performance. In addition to the President, other senior administrators 
 
higher  education.  See  Taylor  and De Lourdes Macha do  2008 (14)  Teritary Educa tion 
and Management  246.  
 
411 Taylor  and De Lourdes  M achado  2008 (14)  Teri tary Education and  Management  247.  
 
412 For  more on the elec t ion of  public  boards,  see Taylor  and De Lourdes Machado 2008  
(14)  Teritary Educat ion and Managemen t  247 –  248.  
 
413 Henard  F and Mit ter le  A “Governance and  Quali ty  Guidel ines in  Higher  Education”  
OECD 50.  See  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b.1)  above for  a  discussion  of  the Council  of  a  
higher  education ins t i tut ion in  South Afr ica.  
 
414 Forrest  JJF and Kinser  K Higher Educat ion in  the Uni ted  S tates:  An Encyclopedia  
(ABC-CLIO 2002)  279; Assoc ia t ion of  Governing Boards (AGB) Whi te Paper :  “Shared  
Governance –  Changing  of  the  Times” 2017 
https: / /www.agb.org/s i tes /defau lt /f i les/ report_2017_shared_governance.pd f  (Date of  
use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
415 Associa t ion  of  Govern ing Boards  (AGB) “AGB Board of  Directors  Sta tement  on the 
Fiduciary  Duties  of  Govern ing Board Members” 2015  
https: / /www.agb.org/sta tements/2015 -07/agb-board-of-directors- s tatement-on-the-
f iduciary-dut ies-of-governing-board  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) ;  Associa t ion  of  
Governing Boards (AGB) “ AGB Board  of  Director ’s Statem ent  on Board 
Accountabi l i ty”  2015 https : / /www.agb.org/si tes/defau lt /f i le s /agb-




provide leadership in various divisions.416 In addition to the fiduciary duties 
and the duties of care and skill, public institutional boards also have basic 
responsibilities which can be summarised as follows:  to ensure that the 
institution has an updated mission statement which is aligned with public 
interests; participate in executing the executive strategic institutional plan 
and monitor its progress; ensure the institution’s fiscal integrity; preserve 
and protect the assets of the institution; preserve and protect the 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom of the institution; ensure that 
institutional processes and policies are current; engage regularly with the 
institution’s significant contingencies; ensure high levels of transparency 
and ethical behaviour, and periodically assess the board and board 
committee performance.417 The structure and management of each public 
institution differ. Institutions have the freedom to establish their own 
institutional governance structures. 
 
The Board of Regents provides for two important governing documents, 
namely the Policy Manual418 and the Business Procedures Manual.419 The 
Georgia Board of Regents provides for institutional governance of the 
 
416 Taylor  and De Lourdes  Machado  2008 (14)  Teri tary Education and  Management  246.  
For more on the role  of  the President ,  see  Stoesse l  JW “ Conceptua lizing  the Shared 
Governance Model  in  American Hig her  Education:  Consider ing the Governing Board ,  
President  and Facu lty”  2013 Inquiries Journal 
http: / /www.inquir iesjour nal .com/ar t icles /818/2 /conceptual iz ing -the-shared-governance-
model- in-american-higher -education -consider ing-the-govern ing-board -pres ident -and-
facul ty  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) ;  S toesse l”  2016 Inquiries Journal  
h t tp: / /www.inquir iesjournal .com/ar t icles /1346/responsiveness - in-amer ican-higher-
educat ion- the-evolut ion -of- inst i tut iona l -governance-structures  (Date o f  use :  27 August  
2018);  Forrest  and Kinser  Higher Education  in  the United S tates:  An Encyclopedia  
281-  282.  
 
417 This i s  not  an al l -encompassing l i st  bu t  serves  to  provide a  general  idea of  the b asic  
responsib il i t ies of  an inst i tu t ional  board.  Se e Associat ion of  Governing  Boards “Board  
Responsib il i t ies” ht tps: / /www.agb.org /br iefs/board -responsibi l i t ies  (Date of  use:  27  
August  2018)  Forrest  and Kinser  Higher  Educat ion in  the Uni ted S tates:  An  
Encyclopedia  285.  
 
418 See the fu l l  Pol icy  Manual  on h ttps: / /www.usg.edu/pol icymanual/  (Date o f  use:  27  
August  2018) .  
 
419 See the  ful l  Business Proc edure  Manual  on 




public universities in Georgia in its Policy Manual.420 It also provides for 
academic,421 student422 and financial matters, including the signature of 
contracts, donations, travel, auditing and insurance. 423 The Board of 
Regents elects the Presidents of the USG public inst itutions for a term of 
one year, which can be extended until the Board either acts to reappoint 
the President for the remainder of a one-year term or chooses not to 
reappoint the President. The appointment of a President is made subject to  
the Board of Regents’ policies. USG Presidents are not entitled to a written 
employment contract.424 The Board also has the authority to remove the 
President of an institution for just cause, in which case the person removed 
would not be eligible for re-employment within the USG.425 The President of 
a public higher education institution is the executive head of that institution 
and is the counterpart of the South African Vice-Chancellor or Rector. The 
President reports to the Chancellor of the Board of Regents, and he or she 
is responsible for the operation and management of the institution and the 
execution of all directives issued by the Board and the Chancellor.426 The 
 
420 See in  genera l  the  Pol icy Manual   h t tps : / /www.usg.edu /pol icymanual/sect ion2/  (Date  
of  use:  27 August  2018)  This sec tion covers  the elect ion of  the USG ins t i tut ion 
Presidents by  the Board of  Regents;  the procedure to  se lec t  inst i tu t ion Presidents;  
performance asse ssments of  ins t i tut ion Pres i den ts ;  president ia l  t rans i t ions;  pres iden tial  
autho r i ty  and responsibil i t ies;  pres iden t’s  meet ings;  organ isat iona l  structure and 
changes;  and pres ident ia l  compensat ion.  
 
421 Para 3  of  the Policy  Manual  covers academic affa ir s  at  i ns t i tut ions,  inc luding  
genera l  po licy ,  facul t ies,  curr icu lum,  the  calendar  of  a cademic  act ivi t ies,  grad ing  
system, c rea tion  and termination  of  academic programs,  the Regents’  read ing and 
wri t ing sk il l s  requirements,  degrees ,  academic advisement and academi c  textbooks.  
 
422 Para 4  of  th e Pol icy Manual  covers s tuden t  af fair s  at  a l l  inst i tu t ions,  includ ing the  
genera l  pol icy ;  undergraduate admiss ions;  student  residency;  Regent’ s f inancia l  
assis tance;  disc ipl ine o f  s tuden ts ;  appeals,  immunisat ions  and  the Univers i ty  System 
Student Advisory Council .  
 
423 Para 7  of  the  Pol icy  Manual  covers  a l l  aspec ts  of  f inancia l  and  business act ivi t ies  at  
a l l  ins t i tut ions ,  inc luding the genera l  policy,  the USG budget ,  tu i t ion and fees,  pr ivate  
donations to  the USG and i t s  ins t i tut io ns ,  fund management,  t ravel ,  purchasing,  
insurance,  con tracts,  audit ing ,  misce l laneous,  informat ion securi ty  po licy,  the Board of  
Regents '  r et iree  hea lth  benefi t  fund investment policy and ident i ty  thef t .  
 
424 Para 2 .1  of  the Pol icy Manual .  
 
425 Para 2 .5 .3  of  the  Pol icy  Manual .  
 




President of each institution may delegate his or her authority and 
responsibilities in terms of the Policy Manual unless the Board of Regents 
provides otherwise.427  Each institution is responsible for having a strategic 
plan in which institutional priorities are defined and through which each 
institution’s mission is carried out in accordance with the strategic direction 
of the Board of Regents.428 
 
The Board of Regents maintains sound control of institutions by means of 
its various managerial policies and procedures. However, public higher 
education institutions in Georgia retain high levels of institutional autonomy 
in comparison with those at public institutions in South Africa. For instance, 
although the Board has the authority to remove an institution’s President, 
there is nothing in any of its policies that provides the Board of Regents 
with authority to intervene in the affairs of a public higher education 
institution. In South Africa, the Higher Education Act of 1997 is very 
prescriptive in this regard and provides the Minister with the power to 
appoint an administrator and dissolve its council. 429 
 
Each institution is responsible for appointing its academic governance 
body. Paragraph 3.2 of the Board of Regents Policy Manual refers to 
“faculties”, which appear to be the counterpart of the South African 
faculties.430 The Chancellor of the Board of Regents, the USG Office of 
Academic Affairs and the Presidents of each institution, together with their 
administrative officers and faculties, develop, adapt and administer the 
 
427 Para 2 .6 .5  of  the  Pol icy  Manual .  
 
428 In  add it ion,  each  inst i tut ion i s  responsib le  for  having  a fo rmal process in  p lace to  
assess ins t i tut iona l  effect iveness  and to  ensure  tha t  the resu lt s  of  the  asse ssments  are 
used for  inst i tu t ional  improvement .  Each ins t i tu t ion must  assess  at  least  the fo l lowing: 
bas ic  academic sk il l s  at  entry ,  general  educat ion ,  degree programmes and academic and 
adminis tra t ive  suppor t  p rogrammes.  See para  2 .9  of  the Po licy  Manual.  
  
429 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4 .2  above  for  a  discussion  of  minister ial  in te rventi ons  in  
South Afr ica.  
 
430 See in  genera l ,  h t tps: / /www.usg.edu /pol icymanual/sect ion3/C337  (Date of  use :  27 




academic methods and procedures deemed by them to be most effective in 
promoting academic matters in each institution.431 Proper functions by the 
academic structures include the following: prescribing the teaching capacity 
of each faculty member; determining the minimum and a maximum number 
of students per class, and defining the nature and form of academic 
records to be kept by each faculty.432 Each institution is also responsible for 
maintaining accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools Commission on Colleges.433 In all the institutions, the faculty 
consists of the academic corps and administrative officers.434 The Faculty 
Council, Senate, Assembly or any other academic structure at a USG 
institution is responsible for appointing a secretary who must keep a formal 
record of all meeting proceedings. All meetings held by these academic 
structures must comply with the Georgia Open Records Act435 and the 
Georgia Open Meetings Act.436 In addition, the USG Faculty Council 
(USGFC), which is similar to the South African Senate, must provide a 
voice on academic and educational matters. 437 The Board of Regents 
annually allocates funds to the USG institutions and is responsible for the 
approval of the budgets of the institutions.438 The State Auditor performs a 
 
431 See  the Univers i ty  Sy stem of  Georgia’s academic programs on 
https: / /www.usg.edu /academic_programs/  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
432 Para  3 .1  of  the Pol icy  Manual.  See  in  genera l  Babbit t ,  Franke and  Lee  2015 Journal  
of  Col lege and  Universi ty  Law  94 –  109.  
 
433 Para 3 .1  of  the Pol icy Manual .  See in  general  the websi te  of  the Southern  
Associa t ion  of  Col leges  and Schools  Commission on Col leges fo r  in format ion re la t ing  
to  accredi ta t ion ;  ht tp : / /www.sacscoc.org/  (Date of  use:  27 August  2018) .  In  South 
Afr ica,  accredi tat ion i s  done through the Counci l  of  Higher  Education  (CHE).  
 
434 The Corps of  Ins truc tion consis ts  of  the fol lowing:  ful l - t ime professors,  associate  
professors,  ass is tan t  p rofesso rs,  ins truc tors,  lec turers,  sen ior  lec turers,  pr inc ipa l  
lec turers and teaching  personnel  and such o ther  s taff  as  approved  by the board  of  each 
ins t i tut ion.  See in  general ,  para 3 .2  of  the Pol icy Manual  for  more in format ion abou t  
the facul t ies.  
 
435 Tit le  50-18-70 of  the Georgia Code of  2017.  
 
436 Tit le  50-14-1 of  the Georgia Code of  2017.  
 
437 See in  genera l  para 3 .2 .3 .1  of  the  Pol icy  Manual  for  more on the USGFC.  
 




financial statement audit of each USG institution. 439 The director of internal 
audit at each institution reports directly to the President of that institution. 
The President of each institution must determine the organisational and 
operating reporting relationships of the internal auditors at his or her 
institution and must exercise oversight of institutional risk management as 
defined in section 7.15 of the Policy Manual.440  
 
Primarily, the Business Procedure Manual sets forth the essential 
procedural components that each institution within the USG must follow to 
meet both the Board of Regents’ policy mandates and the statutory or 
regulatory requirements of the state of Georgia and the federal 
government. The Business Procedure Manual provides professionals with 
the necessary information and tools to perform more effectively. Moreover, 
the Manual serves as a useful reference document for seasoned 
professionals at USG colleges and universities who need to remain curren t 
with changes in the Board of Regents’ policy and state law. The USG’s 
accounting policies conform to the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) in the USA, which applies to all public higher education 
institutions in Georgia.441 
 
(e) Misconduct in the higher education sector 
 
Despite the measures in place to combat misconduct and corruption in 
higher education in the USA, there are still frequent reports on education 
corruption and wrongful conduct in higher education institutions in the 
USA.442 In one of these instances, the former president of Morris Brown 
 
439 See  para  7 .10.1  of  the Policy  Manual  for  more on  state  aud its ;  
h t tp: / /www.audits .ga.gov/  (Date  of  use:  27 August  2018) .  
 
440 Para 7 .10.2 of  the  Pol icy Manual .  
 
441 See  in  genera l  para  1  of  the Business Procedure Manual  wi th  regards to  the 
account ing standards and compl iance.  
 
442 Johnson  VR “Higher  Education ,  Corrup tion  and Reform ” 2012  (4)  Contemporary 




College in Atlanta, Georgia, pleaded guilty to embezzling $3.4 million of 
federal money earmarked for student funding.443  
 
The Business Procedure Manual provides for the investigation of 
malfeasance at institutions by the Board of Regents. The USG Office of 
Internal Audit and Compliance has the primary obligation of investigating 
reported malfeasance involving the University System Office.444 Incidents 
involving suspected malfeasance by an employee must be reported to the 
USG Director of Ethics and Compliance once an initial determination has 
been made that employee malfeasance may have occurred. 445 Except for 
the investigation of malfeasance at institutions, neither the Business 
Procedure Manual nor the Policy Manual provides for any other specific 
investigations by the Board of Regents into the affairs of institutions. The 
Board of Regents can intervene when requested to do so by an institution, 
or when any mismanagement comes to its attention, which, in the opinion 
of the Board of Regents, requires intervention. This is very different from 
the way in which the DHET deals with investigations pertaining to public 
institutions in South Africa. 446     
 
The investigation in 2012 into the affairs of one of the higher education 
institutions, the Georgia Perimeter College (GPC), serves as an example. 447 
 
443 Johnson 2012 (4)  Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 480 and Romano L 
“College’s ex -Pres ident  P leads Guil ty  of  Fraud” May 2006  Washing ton Post   
 
444 Malfeasance implies any conduc t  or  act  carr ied  out  by a public  off icia l  tha t  cannot  
be lega lly  just if ied or  confl ic ts  wi th  the  law including,  bu t  no t  l imited  to ,  f raud ,  waste 
and abuse .  See  s  16.4.4  of  th e  Business  Procedure Manual ;  
h t tps: / /www.usg.edu /business_procedures_manual/sec tion16/C1526  (Date of  use :  27  
August  2018) .  
 
445 Para  16.4.5 .  See  ht tps : / /www.usg .edu/business_procedure s_manual /sec tion16/C1526  
(Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
446 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4  above for  a  ful l  d iscuss ion of  the in terven tions by the DHET 
into the a ffai rs  o f  higher  ed ucation inst i tu t ions in  South A fr ica.  
 
447 The ob jec tives of  the  invest iga tion  were to  offer  an  opin ion on the effect iveness and  
accuracy of  in terna l  communica tions on the budgeting process,  f inancia l  t ransact ions 
and management dec is ions regard ing the same and offer  an op inion  on the  in t ernal  
controls  for  budget ing and f inancial  repor t in g  with  a  focus on  areas where weaknesses  
may have ex isted in  processes to  a l low for  unauthorised  or  f raudulen t  expenditures,  
355 
 
This investigation was mandated after the GPC faced an unprecedented 
fiscal shortfall in April 2012, of which the former President of the GPC 
notified the USG. During the investigation it was found that senior GPC 
administrators had failed to perform certain key fiduciary duties; 448 the 
GPC’s spending had exceeded its revenue each year since 2009; ongoing 
use of reserves to meet operational costs was not sustainable; each 
member of the GPC’s former fiscal leadership team claimed to have been 
unaware of the GPC’s fiscal condition, and effective execution of assigned 
duties would have allowed the GPC’s former fiscal leadership team to be 
aware of and subsequently to manage the GPC’s fiscal affairs and budget 
effectively. It was clear from the financial reports that the spending 
exceeded revenue, reserves were being reduced, and cash was dwindling. 
The GPC’s Chief Business Officer (CBO) had not provided the GPC’s 
President with timely and reliable financial information for the President’s 
use in managing the institution. However, it was also apparent that the 
President had not performed the necessary financial due diligence 
associated with his responsibilities as president of  the institution nor had 
the CBO performed his assigned duties in good faith. 449 The CBO indicated 
that he had not reviewed the GPC’s financial statements and that he had 
relied on the Budget Director to bring budget or fiscal problems to his 
attention. In summary, the Board of Regents declared that the GPC’s fiscal 
problems would have been preventable if the relevant management team 
had exercised its duties with the care expected of them .450 
 
recording  and  repor t ing .  This  information  was  out l ined in  an  engagement le t ter  d ated  
10 May 2012,  p rovided  to  me by the Board of  Re gents.  
 
448 Among these f iduciary duties  was  the  responsib il i ty  for  unders tand ing and managing  
the ins t i tut ion’s f i scal  a ffair s .  
 
449 According  to  the  job  descr ipt ion,  the  CBO is  the “ch ief  f inancia l  off icer  o f  the  
college,  responsible to  the pres ident  for  pro v iding leadership  and ensuring in tegr i ty ,  
stabi l i ty  and exce llence in  the  f i scal  and adminis trat ive opera t ions of  the  ins t i tut ion.”  
 
450 This information  was  provided by  the Bo ard  of  Regents  during  an inte rv iew in  Ju ly 
2015. Another  example  of  such an invest iga t ion was the Board of  Regents’  2013 
invest igat ion into  the conduct  of  the  Georg ia Regents Univers i ty  (GRU)  (Off ic ial  
report  da ted 14 May 2013 1 –  7 ,  8) .  Accord ing to  the Board of  Regents,  there had been  
a lack of  awareness  of  relevan t  board po licy and  r egulat ions ,  and  board  policy  had  been 




It is clear that the Board of Regents takes investigations seriously , and that 
it takes swift action to investigate any mismanagement or problems 
prevalent in higher education institutions. However, its investigations are 
conducted and recommendations made in such a manner that it does not 
threaten the institutional autonomy of higher education institutions, unlike 
the rather intrusive way in which the DHET conducts its investigations in 
South Africa including the DHET’s power to take control of the university’s 
affairs by appointing an administrator and dissolving its Council. 
 
5.5.2 HIGHER EDUCATION IN CANADA 
 
(a) Historical overview of the higher education system 
 
The first permanent European colonial settlement in Canada was Quebec, 
founded by Champlain in 1608. The early education initiatives focused on 
“civilising” aboriginal people through schooling and religious conversion. 
 
the GRU’s home.  The objec tives of  the invest igat ion were to  determine the fac ts  and 
circumstances per ta ining to  the use of  ins t i tu t ional  resources and personnel  connected  
with a  family wedding held at  the  Pres iden t’ s res idence on 20  Apr il  2012;  determine  
whether  sa id  use  had  been consis ten t  wi th  app lic able  pol ic ies,  procedures  and o ther  
standards govern ing USG employees and the  use of  s ta te  resources ;  address o ther  
issues  that  might ar i se  during the  course  of  the rev iew;  and  provide recommendat ions  
as appropria te  to  address any vio la t ions,  con tro l  weakn esses or  other  i ssues as may be  
noted dur ing the engagement.  Fo llowing this  invest iga tion ,  the Board  of  Regents  made  
the fol lowing recommendations:  tha t  the universi ty  implement a  comprehensive effor t  
to  train  i t s  sen ior  admin is tra tors on  the  requ irements assoc ia ted  with  Board Pol icy  an d 
USG procedure ;  enhance coord ina tion  effor ts  among  senior  adminis trators;  ensure  thei r  
use  of  the GRU resources are consistent  with  Board Pol icy and state  regulat ions.  I t  was  
found tha t  the  use of  a  GRU -owned bus  for  a  p r iva te  event  a t  the Pres ident’ s res idence 
had vio lated Board Po licy,  s ince i t  t ranspir ed that ,  the GRU sen ior  administrators had 
authorised  the  use of  a  GRU -owned bus to  transport  guests for  a  pr ivate even t  he ld at  
the GRU Presiden t’ s residence) .  The use of  GR U personnel  to  work at  the even t  had  
contravened the Board Pol icy ( seven GRU perso nnel  had provided var ious services at  
the pr iva te event ) .  Furthermore,  the  GRU had  not  obtained the requ ired approvals  for  
improvements made to  the GRU President’ s home.  Subs equent to  the  release of  the 
report ,  the ins t i tut ion has  ei ther  a lready implemente d  some of  these  recommendat ions  
or  was  in  the  progress o f  implementing  correc tive ac t ion  to  address  al l  the i ssues  ra ised  
in  the report .  The t ime f rames in  which the invest i ga tion  was  done,  and  the subsequ ent  
implementat ion of  the  recommendat ions were impr essively rapid,  especial ly  when 
taking  in to  considerat ion tha t  an  administrat ion process  in  terms of  the Higher  
Educat ion Act of  1997 for  a  univers i ty  in  South Afr ica can tak e two years or  longer .  
The Fina l  Report  based  on th is  invest igat ion was provided  t o  the  au thor  by the Board 




The Roman Catholic Church assumed responsibility for education during 
the French colonial period. The Jesuits founded the first secondary school 
in 1635 while the College de Quebec was the only higher education 
institution until 1760.451 The American Revolution had an essential influence 
on higher education in Canada during the British colonial period. The 
colonial legislature created the first colleges. In 1789, the first college was 
founded in Windsor, Nova Scotia, and this was followed by the college of 
New Brunswick in Fredericton in 1800. In 1821, McGill College was 
established, and King’s College in York452 was awarded a charter from the 
British Crown in 1827.453 It was clear from the outset that the provinces had 
different approaches when it came to higher education. 454  Higher education 
in eastern Canada involved a diversity of institutional types including 
public, private, secular and denominated institutions. The British North 
America (BNA) Act of 1867 played an important part in the regulation of 
higher education in Canada. The Act created the state of Canada, and it 
prescribed a federal government. The responsibility for education was 
assigned to the provinces.455 The need to review higher education 
 
451 Jones GA Governments ,  Governance and Canadian Universi t ies  (Higher  Education :  
Handbook on  Theory  an d Research  1996)  338; Forest  JJ F and Altbach P In ternat ional  
Handbook o f  Higher Ed ucation  (Spr ing 2011)  629.   
 
452 York la ter  became Toronto.  King’s College a t  York la ter  became the Univers i ty  of  
Toronto dur ing 1849.  
 
453 Jones Governments,  Governance and Cana dian Univers i t ies  339.  
 
454 For  instance ,  the Roman Catho lic  Church  played a major  r ole  in  educat ion in  general  
in  Quebec,  whi le  Ontar io  only  provided government f inancial  support  to  secular  
universi t ies.  
 
455  The  relat ionsh ip between these  inst i tu t ions  and t he government  was l imi ted and  
ambiguous.  More  publ ic  univers i t ies began to  emerge over  t ime and  inst i tu t ions al l  
s truggled wi th  the rela t ionship between universi t ies and government and the  
appropria te  governance  s truc ture for  a  universi ty .  From t ime to  t im e prov incial  
governments  found themselves  involved  in  disputes  be tween denominatio nal  
ins t i tut ions  and the  governments found i t  hard to  de termine the ir  ro le  in  the affa ir s  of  
publical ly  funded universi t ies .  See  Jones G “An Introduction  to  Higher  Education  in  
Canada”  (2014)  Higher  Educat ion Across Nations 4.  Forest  and Al tbach Interna tional 
Handbook of  Higher Education  632 According to  Locke,  ins t i tut ions s truggled with  the 
issues of  the rela t ionsh ip between the government and the un iversi t ies and  what the  
appropria te  univers i ty  governanc e  structure  for  a  public  inst i tu t ion  was.  Locke W,  
Cummings WK and Fisher  D (eds)  Changing Governance and Management in  Higher  




governance came about when political leaders in the Ontario government 
were accused of interfering with the governance of the University of 
Toronto. The Ontario government attempted to address these issues by 
creating a Royal Commission on the University of Toronto and University 
College in 1906, with the mandate to review the relationship between the 
government and university governance. 456 The Commission recommended a 
structural solution in its report entitled Report of the Royal Commission on 
the University of Toronto.457 First, it was proposed that the provincial 
government delegate its authority over the university to a board. 458 The 
second concept recommended by the Commission was bicameralism.459 
The Commission’s final report included the proposed University of Toronto 
 
456 This commission was  refer red to  as  the  Flavelle  Commiss ion.  Premier  Whitney  
announced the crea tion of  the R oyal  Commiss ion and the membersh ip was drawn from 
the educat ion,  pol i t ica l  and business el i te  of  Toronto.  Joseph Flavelle  was appointed as 
chair  of  the commission.  This repor t  became one of  the most  import ant  documents in  
the histo ry of  Canadian higher  edu cat ion.  See Shanahan,  Ni lson and Broshko Handbook 
of  Canadian Higher Education  65; Jones GA, Shanahan T and Goyan P “The Academic  
Senate and Universi ty  Governance in  Canada”  (2004)  CJHE 38; Boggs AM Ontario’s  
Royal Commiss ion on the Universi ty  o f  Toronto,  1905 –  06:  Poli t ical  and His tor ica l  
Factors tha t  In f luenced  the Fina l  Report  o f  the Flave lle  Commission  (Publ ished MA 
thesis  Univers i ty  of  Toronto 2007)  32.  
 
457 The Legislat ive Assembly of  Ontar io  1906.  
 
458 Report  o f  the Royal Commiss ion on the Univers i ty  o f  Toronto xii  –  xxi i i .  
 
459 The Commission recommended that  the Board oversee the admin is trat ive affa ir s  of  
the Univers i ty  o f  Toronto and tha t  the Senate oversee  the  academic af fa ir s .  The 
representat ives of  the  Senate would include represen tat ives of  the col l eges ,  
adminis tra t ion,  graduates and each facu lty  would be  responsible for  such  academic  
matters such  as the condit ions  for  grant ing of  degrees.  According  to  this  sys tem,  the 
Board and the Senate share the accountab il i ty .  South  Afr ica also has a  bicameral  
system in the fo rm of  Council  and  Senate.  See Jones Governments,  Governance and  




Act of 1971.460 The University of Toronto Act set the example for other 
institutions in Canada for university funding and university  state relations.461 
 
By the 1950s, bicameralism was the dominant governance model in 
Canadian universities. However, during the 1960s, there were calls for 
higher faculty and student participation in university governance, which in 
turn led to essential governance reforms for Canadian universities. The 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and the Canadian 
Association of University Teachers jointly sponsored a national review of 
university governance. Consequently, the Duff-Berdahl Commission was 
appointed in 1966 to address the various issues raised by stakeholders. 
This commission received dozens of submissions and undertook a national 
research tour. The government amended most of the universities’ charters 
in response to various recommendations from the universities. These 
reforms took the form of changes to the composition of the board as well as 
of the Senate.462  
 
 (b) Current regulation of higher education.  
 
Higher education governance in Canada is decentralised, with federal and 
provincial levels of governance. There is, however, no federal Minister of 
 
460 Report  of  the Royal  Commiss ion on  the  Universi ty  of  Toronto  238  –  243.  See in  
genera l  Amara l  A,  Jones GA and Karse th B  Governing  Higher Education:  N ational 
Perspect ives on Inst i tu t ional Governance  (Kluwer Academic Publ ishers 2002)  216.  
Subsequently ,  the Univers i ty  of  Toronto abandoned bicamera li sm in  favour  a  sing le  
governing council  tha t  exc luded  bot h  externa l  and  in ternal  const i tuencies.  Th is  i s  
discussed  more  ful ly  be low.  Boggs Ontario’s Royal Commiss ion on  the  Universi ty  o f  
Toronto,  1905  –  06:  Poli t ica l  and His tor ica l  Factors  tha t  Inf luenced the Fina l  Report  
of  the  Flave lle  Commiss ion  35.  
 
461 Boggs Ontario’s Royal Commiss ion on the  Universi ty  of  Tor onto ,  1905 –  06: 
Poli t ical  and His torica l  Factors  tha t  Inf luenced the  Fina l  Report  o f  the Flave lle  
Commission  4 .   
 
462 Shanahan,  Nilson and Broshko Handbook of  Canadian Higher Education  65;  Jones  
GA, Shanahan T and Goyan P “Universi ty  Governance in  Canadian Higher  Educat ion”  




Education.463 The framework for university governance in Canada is 
extremely complex. There is a significant amount of legislation involved, 
from the Constitution Act of 1867, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom, the provincial acts or charters incorporating universities, as well 
as provincial not-for-profit corporations’ legislation.464 Each university is 
granted specific powers by its incorporating Act.465 Depending on the 
jurisdiction in which the university is incorporated, it may also be subject to 
applicable provincial not-for-profit legislation.466 It seems Canadian 
universities enjoy high levels of institutional autonomy  compared to higher 
education institutions in South Africa. This is also the opinion o f the Task 
Force on University Accountability.467   
 
An international comparison indicates that Canadian public higher 
education institutions have the lowest level of government involvement. 468 
 
463  Shanahan ,  Ni lson and  Broshko Handbook o f  Canadian Higher Education  9  –  10 ;  
Waddington  D “Chal lenges  of  C anada’s  Decentral ized  Education  System” 2018  College  
Quarterly  h t tp: / /co llegequarter ly .ca/2018 -vol21-num02-spr ing/chal lenges -of-canadas-
decent ral ized-educat ion -system.html  (Date of  use :  28 August  2018);  Jones 2014  Higher  
Educat ion Across  Nat ions  1 ;  Locke  e t  a l .  (eds)  Changing  Governance and Management 
in  Higher Education:   The Perspec tives of  the Academy  53.  
 
464 Shanahan,  Ni lson  and Br oshko Handbook o f  Canadian High er Educat ion  59.   
 
465 In  some provinces l ike Alber ta ,  univers i t ies are  es tab li shed and governed by a sing le  
Act ,  s imi lar  to  the posi t ion  in  South Afr ica.  In  Alber ta ,  the Post -Secondary Learn ing 
Act of  2004  governs h igher  educa t ion.  In  Ontar io ,  univers i t ies are es tabl i shed and 
governed by the ir  own incorpora ting  ac ts,  l ike  the Univers i ty  of  Toronto Act  of  1971  
and the York Univers i ty  Act of  1956.  
 
466  Shanahan,  Nilson and  Broshko The Handbook of  Canadian Higher Educat ion La w  
59;  Locke et  a l .  (eds)  Changing  Governance  and Management in  Higher  Education:   
The  Perspec tives o f  the  Academy  154.  In  Ontar io ,  the  Business Corporations  Act  i s  
current ly  app licable,  bu t  wi l l  soon be rep laced by the  Not-For-Profi t  Corporations Act.  
 
467 Minist ry of  Education  and Train ing “Un ivers i ty  Accountabi l i ty :   A Strengthened  
Framework”  1993  Report  of  the Task Force on Universi ty  Accountabi l i ty  32.  
 
468 The degree of  independence from government ,  whilst  substan tia l ,  i s  inf luenced  by 
condit ions and expecta t ion s from the government in  rela t i on to  the provision of  
funding.  This means tha t  whi ls t  each univers i ty  may pursue i t s  mission ,  i t  must  do so  
within the con tex t  of  post - secondary education  polic ies.  Informat ion supplied by Mr 
Barry McCar tan from the Min is try  of  Tra ining ,  Col leges and Univ ersi t ies.  See Locke,  
Cummings and Fisher  (eds)  Changing Governance and Management in  Higher 
Educat ion:  The Perspect ives o f  the Academy 632;  Anderson  D and Johnson R 
“Universi ty  au tonomy in  twenty countr ies”  1998 Centre for Cont inued  Educat ion,  the 
Austra lian  National Universi ty  17; Amara l ,  Jones and  Karset h  Govern ing Higher  
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The Constitution Act gives exclusive authority to each province in Canada 
to make laws concerning education. Higher education in Canada is 
primarily dealt with on a provincial level, and each province has 
mechanisms in place for coordinating and regulating higher education. In 
Ontario, incorporating statutes specific to that institution establish most 
universities. They are autonomous not-for-profit corporations.469 These 
corporations do not have shareholders, and they are subject to different tax 
and reporting arrangements than for-profit corporations.470 The 
incorporating acts determine the powers of the university in financial and 
academic matters and provide for the governance structure and 
composition, including whether government appoints any members to the 
board and the number of people elected from other consistencies like 
students, faculty and alumni.471 These universities have significant 
independence to enable them to pursue their mission within the context of 
government postsecondary education policies. It is required that the 
internal governance processes of universities be transparent and 
conducted democratically.472 The Ministry of Training, Colleges and 
Universities confirmed during an interview that the Ontario government 
expects publicly assisted universities to be accountable to the government 
 
Educat ion:  National Perspec tives on Ins t i tut ional Governance  217;   Jones G e t  al .  
“Provincial  Overs ight  and Universi ty  Autonomy in  Canada :  Findings  o f  a  Compara tive  
Study of  Canadian Univers i ty  Governance” 2017 draf t  paper  accepted for  p ublicat ion in  
the Canadian  Journal o f  Higher Education .  
 
469 Jones,  Shanahan and Goyan 2001 Tertiary Education and Management  136;  Locke ,  
Cummings and Fisher  (eds)  Changing Governance and Management in  High er 
Educat ion:  The Perspect ives o f  the Academy 154 .  
 
470 They are,  however ,  a  jur is t ic  ent i ty ,  which can  hire  employees,  enter  into  contracts,  
sue  and be sued  as well  as own proper ty .  See Locke e t  a l .  (eds)  Changing Governance 
and Management in  Higher Educat i on:   The Perspec tives of  the  Academy  154.  
 
471 Amaral ,  Jones and Karse th Governing Higher  Educat ion:  Nat ional Perspec tives on 
Inst i tu t ional Governance 215.  
 
472 Informat ion suppl ied by Mr Barry McCartan ,  Direc tor  in  Post -Secondary Education 
in  the  Ministry  of  Tra ining,  Colleges and Universi t ies,  Ontar io  af ter  an interview at  the 




on how they are spending the funding received.473 It is also expected of 
universities to be transparent in their internal governance processes.474 
 
 (i) Public and private higher education 
 
There are some differences between the regulation of public and private 
higher education in Canada and the USA. In Canada, there are only a few 
private higher education institutions, while in the USA, almost half of the 
higher education institutions are private. Most universities in Canada are 
public since they are partially funded by the government.475 There are three 
types of higher education institution in Canada, namely, institutes, colleges 
and universities.476 As mentioned above, universities are not-for-profit 
corporations, charities or both. The incorporating statute of each institution 
provides for both substantive and procedural autonomy of the governing 
bodies of institutions to act in the best interest of the university. Most 
universities in Ontario have a predominantly bicameral system of 
governance, with the exceptions of the University of Toronto and University 
of Ontario Institute of Technology, where bicameralism was abandoned in  
favour of a unicameral structure. 477 
 
473 Interv iew took p lace on 28 June 2016 wi th  Mr  Barry McCartan from the Min istry  of  
Train ing,  Col leges and Univers i t ie s.  
 
474 Conf irmed during the inte rview wi th Mr McCar tan on 28 June  2016 .  
 
475 Each pub lical ly  assis ted universi ty ,  excep t  for  Queens Univers i ty  and Univers i té  de  
Hears t ,  is  es tabl i shed or  cont inued  by an indiv idual  act  of  the  Ontar io  Legislature as  a  
pr ivate corporat ion.  These ac ts were or i g ina lly  enacted or  amended at  dif feren t  t ime 
per iods,  general ly  when  a universi ty  was es tab l ished or  when s ignif icant  changes was 
affec ted .  Separate  acts  exis t  for  some aff i l ia ted and federa ted un iversi t ies and  
denominational  col leges ( information  supplied  by Mr.  Barry McCartan  from the  
Minis try  af ter  a  vi s i t  to  the Minis try  off ices on 28 June 2016) .  
 
476 Locke,  Cummings and  Fisher  Changing Governance  and Management in  Higher  
Educat ion:   The Perspec tives  of  the Academy  155 -  157.   
 
477 Jones,  Shanahan and  Goyan  (2004)  CJHE 39.  A unicameral  s tructure involves on ly  
one govern ing body  instead of  two.  For  the purposes o f  th is thesis  the  governance  
documents of  the Univers i ty  of  Toronto  and Ryerson Univers i ty  are  considered .  One  
regula te s a  un icamera l  and one a b icam era l  governance  structure.  I t  is  c lear ly  no t  
possib le to  d iscuss the governance documents of  al l  22 public  un ivers i t ies,  but  these  
two examples  provide  an overview of  the type of  governance documents  and policies in  
place  for  publ ic  un ivers i t ies in  Ontar io .  In  1971,  the  Univers i ty  of  Toronto requested  
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A private institution  generally does not receive funding from the provincial, 
territorial or federal governments, but instead receives private funding 
through alumni donations, faculty research grants and tuition fees. 478 
Private higher education institutions can be incorporated as not -for-profit 
corporations and/or charities or for-profit corporations.479 These institutions 
are established for the purpose of distributing profits to individual directors, 
employees, owners or shareholders.480 Private institutions481 may not receive 
grants or funding from the government, but their students remain eligible 
for financial assistance under provincial government programmes.482 The 
institutional governance structures for private and public institutions are 
very similar. In Canada, similarly to South Africa, a higher education 
institution may only award degrees or refer to itself as a univers ity if 




that  the Legislature provide for  a  unicameral  governing  body wi th  jur isd ic t ion  over  
both f inancial  and  academic  matters .  By 1988,  i t s  Govern ing Council  had de lega ted i t s  
authori ty  on  f inancial  matters to  a  Bus iness Board  and i t s  authori ty  on academic 
matters to  an Academic Board .  The Univers i ty  of  Ontar io  Ins t i tute  Of  Technology  
followed a similar  strategy by prov iding i t s  Academic Counci l  wi th  author i ty  on  
academic mat ters.  ( Infor mat ion supplied by Mr.  Barry McCartan from the Ministry  
during an interview wi th  him a t  the Minis try  on 28 June 2016) .  
 
478 The research for  th is  thes is  focuses mainly  on public  un ivers i t ies in  Ontar io .  
 
479  Josh i  JM and Paivandi S Private Higher Education:  A Global Perspec tive  (BR 
Publ ish ing Corpora tion  2015)  14;  Shanahan,  Nilson and Bro shko The Handbook of  
Canadian  Higher Education Law  43.  
 
480 See types o f  higher  education ins t i tut ions in  Canada  
https: / /www.universi tyguideonl ine.o rg /en /InternationalPathways/types -of- ins t i tut ions-
in-canada (Date of  use :  16 March  2016) .  
 
481 Current ly ,  there  are  approximately  19 pr ivate universi t ies  located  in  f ive prov inc es.  
Unl ike publ ic  ins t i tu t ion s,  the vas t  major i ty  of  pr ivate degree -grant ing ins t i tu t ions  
charge the same tui t ion  fees for  bo th domestic  and in ternat ional  s tudents  and in  most  
cases,  the fees a re the same regardless of  the undergraduate degree programme:  
ht tps: / /www.universi tyguideonl ine.org /en /InternationalPathways/types -of- ins t i tut ions-
in-canada (Date  of  use :  29 August  2018) .  See Josh i  and Paivandi  Private Higher  
Educat ion:  A Global Perspec tive  15.  
 
482 Shanahan,  Ni lson  and Br oshko The Handbook o f  Canadian Higher Education Law  43.  
 




(ii) External governance of public higher education institutions 
 
The federal government plays no direct role in higher education. Each 
province is responsible for regulating higher education. The federal 
government’s role is limited to contributing funds to the provincial ministry 
responsible for education.484 The Ministry of Training, Colleges and 
Universities is responsible for higher education institutions in Ontario, 
Canada. This was established by the Ministry of Training, Colleges and 
Universities Act.485 However, the Ministry and higher education institutions 
operate at arm’s length from one another. In Ontario, the Ministry of 
Training, Colleges and Universities is responsible for the administration of 
laws relating to education and skills training. 486 It is also responsible for 
post-secondary education by developing policy directions 
for universities and colleges of applied arts and technology;  planning and 
administering policies relate to basic and applied research in this sector; 
authorising universities to grant degrees; distributing funds allocated by the 
provincial legislature to colleges and universities; providing financial 
assistance programmes for post-secondary school students, and 
registering private career colleges.487  
 
484 Through  the Canada  Student Loans Programme,  which  i s  adminis tra ted  in  
collabora tion wi th  the provinces,  the federa l  government ha s also been play ing an  
important  ro le  in  prov id ing f inancial  ass istance to  s tuden ts s ince 1964.  See  Shanahan,  
Nilson and Broshko The Handbook o f  Canadian Higher Educat ion Law  26 -  28.  
 
485 In  accordance  with  the  Min is try  of  Train ing,  Col leges and Univers i t ie s Act R.S.O.  
1990 c.  M.  19.   
 
486 The fo llowing  ac ts  are re levan t  to  the adminis tra t ion of  educat ion  in  Ontar io:  
Minis try  of  Train ing,  Col leges  and  Univers i t ies  Act  R.S.O.  1990 c .M 19; Colleges  
Col lect ive Barga ining  Act R.S.O.  1990 c .C 15;  Higher  Educat ion Q uali ty  Council  Act  
2005 S.O.  c .28;  Ontar io  Col lege of  Art  & Design  Act 2002 S.O.  c .8 ;  Ontar io  College of  
Appl ied ar t s  and  Technology Act 2002  S.O.  c .8;  Ontar io  Col lege  of  Trade s  and  
Apprent icesh ip Act 2009  S.O c .22;  Post - secondary Education Choice and Exce llence  
Act  2000 S.O.  c .36 ;  Pr ivate  Career  Colleges Act  R.S.O.  1990 c .U.3;  Universi ty  
Expropria t ion  Powers  Act  R.S.O.  1990  c.U.3 ;  Universi ty  Foundations Act 1992  S.O.  
c .22;  Universi ty  of  Ontar io  Inst i tu te  o f  Technology  Act  2002 S.O.  c .8 .  
h t tps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/minis try - train ing-colleges-un ivers i t ies (Date of  use:  28  
August  2018) .  
 
487 See more informat ion  on the Min istry  of  Train ing,  Col leges and  Univers i t ies 
ht tps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/minis try - train ing-colleges-un ivers i t ies (Date of  use:  24  
January 2019) .   
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The Ministry enters into strategic mandate agreements  with each public 
university and each college of arts and technology. 488 These agreements 
outline the role of each institution in the post-secondary system and 
indicate how the institution aims to achieve its system-wide objectives.489 
The Ministry exerts significant influence over university decision-making 
through its policies and procedures that govern the provision of public 
funding. Universities are accountable for the expenditure of public funding 
in a number of ways and various policies regulating funding provides for 
ongoing operational as well as capital and research funding. 490 All public 
universities are also subject to the Ontario Corporations Act in addition to 
their own incorporating statutes.491 These incorporating statutes provide that 




488 In  these agreements ,  the Min is try  acknowledges the Universi ty’s autonomy and the  
Univers i ty  acknowledges  the  ro le  of  the  Ministry  as  the  Province’s  steward  of  
Ontar io’s post- secondary education syst em.  
 
489 These ob jec tives are supported by specif ic  m etr ics  which are intended to  measure  
outcomes in  a  var ie ty  o f  areas,  such as measures of  jobs,  innovation and the economy,  
teach ing and learning,  s ize and composit ion of  the st udent  body,  research and grad uate  
educat ion,  programme offer ings and co llaborati on  to  suppor t  student  mobil i ty  
( i informat ion suppl ied by Mr.  Barry McCartan f rom the Min is try) .  The agreements are 
published  on the Min is try’s  websi te  and are available  to  the p ublic ,  which  enhances 
transparency.  See  h ttps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/a l l -col lege -and-univers i ty -s trategic-
mandate-agreements  (Date of  use:  27 August  2018) .  These  agreements  contain  the  
fol lowing:  un iversi ty’s  key areas of  d ifferent ia t i on;  a l ignment wi th  the  different iat ion 
policy  framework ;  teaching and learn ing;  s tudent  populat ion;  research and graduate  
educat ion;  programme offer ings;  ins t i tut ional  col labora tion  to  support  student  
mobil i ty ;  aspirat ions;  enrolment growth;  graduate a l loc a tion ;  f inancial  susta inab il i ty ;  
and min is try/government commitments.   
 
490  One of  these pol icies is  the student  fee policy tha t  determines  student  fees  
( information supplied by Mr.  Bar ry McCartan f rom the Min istry  during  an in terv iew on 
28 June 2016) .  The  Min is try  also has sign if ican t  in f luence  over  how much tu i t ion fees 
may be  charged by un ivers i t ies through means  such  as se t t ing a  tu i t ion fee po licy or  
f ramework as  wel l  as  the d esign  and  funding  of  studen t  ass istance  programmes and as  a  
condit ion of  enrolment  in  a  un iversi ty  programme being taken into  account when  
dis tr ibu ting annual  operat ing funds .   
 
491 The Ontar io  Corpora tions Act i s  discussed in  para 5 .3 .2(c)  above.  
 




Public universities are subject to audits by the Ontario Auditor General493 
while the Ontario Ombudsman494 has investigative authority with respect to 
certain types of complaints received about universities. Provincial 
governments may require universities to have certain internal quality 
assurance structures to ensure high-quality degree programmes. However, 
universities still operate independently and control their own academic, 
admissions and standards policies as well as degree requirements, 
programme offerings and staff appointments. 495 The Ministry in Ontario has 
no formal reporting requirements for public universities other than filing 
their annual audited financial reports with the Ministry. By contrast, in 
South Africa, universities are subject to various reporting requirements in 
terms of the 2014 Reporting Regulations as well as statutory provision for 
ministerial interventions.496 
 
 (iii) Institutional governance of public higher education institutions 
 
The arrangements regarding the structure, function, programming and 
governance among provincial governments and Canadian colleges vary 
from province to province.497 In Ontario, there are twenty-two public 
 
493 For  more information  on the Auditor  General ,  see ht tp: / /www.audito r .on.ca/  (Date  of  
use :  27 August  2018) .  The Off ice of  the Audi tor  Genera l  of  Ontar io  i s  an independent 
off ice  of  the  L egislat ive Assembly  tha t  conducts  va lue -for-money and f inancia l  aud its  
of  the provinc ia l  government,  i t s  min is tr ies and agencies .  I t  a lso aud i ts  organ isa t ions 
in  the  broader  publ ic  sector  that  receive  provincia l  funding ,  such as hospi ta ls  and long -
term care homes,  un iversi t ies,  col leges  and school boards.  
 
494For more informat ion on the Ombudsman,  see  
ht tps: / /www.ombudsman.on.ca/Home.aspx  (Date of  use:  27 August  2018) .  The 
Ombudsman is  an  independent  off ic er  of  the Legisla ture  who investigates complain ts  
f rom the public  about Ontar io  government services,  recommending improvements fo r 
governance and resolv ing indiv idual  i ssues .  The Ombudsman has a  process for  lay ing 
compla ints,  which can be found on  ht tps : / /www.ombudsman.on.ca /About -Us/Who-We-
Oversee /Univers i t ies.aspx  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
495 Shanahan,  Ni lson  and Broshko The Handbook o f  Canadian Higher Education Law  46.  
 
496 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  above.  
 
497 Shanahan,  Ni lson  and  Broshko The Handbook  of  Canadian  Higher Education  Law  




universities,498 each incorporated under its own statute or charter. These 
statutes govern universities in Ontario and assign responsibility to at least  
three decision-making authorities within the universities. The management 
structures of universities in Canada are similar to those in South Africa: 
their governing board is similar to the South African Council , and both 
jurisdictions provide for an academic Senate. The governing statute of 
each university prescribes the relevant management structures, and there 
are, therefore, differences between the management structures at various 
universities and their naming conventions. 499 Jones indicates that the 
majority of board members are lay members. There are also student 
members as well as faculty and alumni representatives on the governing 
board. The average size of a university governing board, according to 
Jones, is twenty-seven members while the average size of the academic 
senate is fifty-eight members.500 
 
The governing statutes assign to the university board the authority over the 
conduct, management and control of the property, revenue, expenditure, 
business and affairs of the university. 501 A division of authority exists 
between the board and the Senate, as detailed in each statute.502 The 
Senate is responsible for all academic matters while the third decision-
making authority is the central academic administration. Each incorporating 
 
498 For  more informat ion on universi t ies in  Ontar io ,  see  
ht tps: / /www.ontar io .ca /page/on tar io -univers i t ies  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .   
 
499 Jones GA and Skolnik ML “Govern ing  Boards  in  Canadian  Univers i t ies:  
Character i s t ics,  Role,  Function,  Accountab il i ty  and Representa t ives” 1995 Paper 
presen ted a t  the Annual  Meet ing  o f  the Associa tion for the S tudy o f  Higher Educati on  
5 .  
 
500 Jones,  Shanahan & Goyan 2001 Tertiary Educat ion and Management  141.  
 
501 Board members are  not  remunerated for  the ir  services,  a l though  no incorporating  act  
prohibi ts  th is  ( informat ion suppl ied by  M r Barry McCar tan from the  Minis try  resu lt ing 
from an in terv iew with  him on 28 June 2016) .   
 
502 Boards and Senates coordinate ac t ions in  many areas.  I f  the Senate dec ides to  crea te  
a  new programme, for  instance,  the board must  ag ree to  approve funding ( infor mat ion  
suppl ied  by Mr Bar ry McCar tan f rom the  Min is try  based on  an  in terv iew with  him on  
28 June  2016) .  See Jones and Skoln ik 1995  Paper presented  at  the Annual Meeting  of  




act provides for the composition of the governing body. The appointments 
to the board are as follows:  the government appoints one-quarter of the 
members to the board; one quarter is elected by a constituency and one 
quarter is appointed by the board itself. The remaining members are ex 
officio, appointed by some other organisation or by the Senate. 503  This is 
similar to the provisions of section 27 of the South African Higher 
Education Act of 1997.504 
 
The duties of Ontario boards include appointing and removing the 
President and senior administrators and appointing and removing teaching 
staff but only upon the recommendation of the President. Boards have the 
authority to determine the duties and salaries of all employees. They have 
general financial powers like determining the tuition fees, investing funds 
and borrowing money and have the authority to decide to affiliate or 
federate with other universities or colleges. 505 The Senate is a larger body 
than the governing board, and it has the authority to establish, control or 
regulate the academic or education policy of the university. 506 The authority 
to establish or terminate faculties, schools, institutes, departments or 
chairs is shared between the board and the Senate. Senate further 
determines all course study or curricula as well as admission standards 
and academic qualifications. It also exercises authority over conducting 
examinations and appointing examiners, awarding degrees, diplomas and 
 
503 Jones and Skoln ik 1995 Paper presen ted at  the Annual Meeting o f  the Associat ion  
for the Study of  Higher Educat ion  7  –  8 ;  Amara l ,  Jones and Karse th  Govern ing Higher 
Educat ion:  Nat ional Perspec tives on Ins t i tu t ional Governance  218 .   
 
504 This i s  d iscussed more  f ully  in  Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2 (b.1)  above.  
 
505 Chan YL and Richardson AW “Board Go vernance in  Canadian Universi t ies” 2012 
Account ing Perspec tives  42 –  45;  Jones and Skoln ik 1995 Paper presen ted at  the 
Annual Meeting o f  the Associa tion  for the Study of  Higher  Education  10 –  17.  
 
506 Jones  GA, Shanahan  T  and Goyan  P “Trad it ional  Governance  Struc tures  –  Current  
Pol icy Pressures :   The Academic  Senate and Canadian  Univers i t ies” 2002 (8)  Tert iary  
Educat ion and Management  32 -33.  For  more on the Senate in  Canadian uni versi t ies,  
see  Pennock  L et  a l .  “Assess ing the Role  and Struc ture of  Academic Se nates  in  
Canadian Universi t ies,  2000 –  2012” 2015 (70)  Higher Educat ion  503 –  517.  For  more 
on the work of  a  Senate  member,  see Jones,  Shanahan and Goyan CJHE 2004 (XXXIV) 




academic awards.507 The governing boards have limited decision-making 
authority over the Senate.508 Faculties are subordinate to the Senate, and it 
is their responsibility to manage their particular discipline. The Dean is the 
head of the faculty and has to supervise the academic work of that 
particular faculty.509  
 
The incorporating statute of each institution in Ontario determines the term 
of office of the President, which may not exceed four years, as well as 
his/her duties and responsibilities. The President is responsible for the day-
to-day management and operation of the university. This role is very similar 
to that of the Vice-Chancellor in South Africa. Some of the functions of the 
President include recommending appointments, promotions, removal of 
members from academic and administrative positions, summoning faculty 
meetings, establishing committees as well as preparing and presenting the 
annual report and budget of the board and signing of contracts.510   
 
Vice-Presidents or Provosts are usually responsible for the administration, 
advancement, research and academic functions and report to the 
President. These two positions are similar to those of the Deputy Vice-
Chancellors, Vice-Principals or Pro-Vice-Chancellors in South African 
 
507 Informat ion suppl ied by Mr Barry McCartan  f rom the Min istry  fo l lowing a v is i t  to  
the Minis try  on 28  June  2016.  See in  genera l  Pennock e t  al .  2016 Canadian Journal  of  
Higher Educat ion  74 –  87;  Jones ,  Shanahan and Goyan 2002 Tert iary Educat ion and 
Management  29 –  44.  
 
508 The approximate s ize of  a  univers i ty  Senate is  between f if t y-eigh t  and six ty -one,  
al though  th is may range from less than  twenty  members  to  several  hundred members.  
Most  members are elected to  the  Senate f rom within a  spec if ic  consti tue ncy.  Most  of  
these members are elected f rom facul t ies,  students,  a lumni ,  board  m embers,  non-
academic  employees etc .  See Amaral ,  Jones  and  Karse th  Govern ing Higher Educat ion:  
Nat ional Perspec tives on Inst i tu t ional Governance  219;  Shanahan,  Ni lson and Broshk o  
Handbook o f  Canadian Higher  Educat ion  69 ;  and Jones,  Shanahan and  Goyan (2004)  
CJHE  45.  S  28 of  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  1997 prescr ibes the  Senate  and i t s  
requirements in  South Afr ica.  See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .4 .2  above .  
 
509 Shanahan,  Nilson and  Broshko Handbook o f  Canadian Higher E ducat ion  71;  Meek  
VL e t  al .  ( eds)  The Changing Dyna mics o f  Higher Educat ion Middle Management  
(Springer  2011)  83 –  101.  
 




universities. In Ontario, public universities also have various other senior 
officers, one of them being the Secretary or Registrar of the university. The 
duties of the Secretary include being secretary to the board and Senate, 
maintaining the rolls of graduates and honorary graduates of the university, 
signing diplomas and other duties as assigned by the President. The 
Secretary or Registrar is a key member of the executive leadership group 
of the university and is responsible for the legal documents, regulations 
and policies as well as for the student enrolment management of the 
university.511  This role is similar to the role of the Registrar in South African 
universities.512 
 
Beside the enacting statutes of each of the universities as well as the by-
laws, several universities also have extensive governance policies and 
documents in place. The University of Toronto was established by the 
University of Toronto Act, 1971 as supplemented by the By-law Number 
2.513 Its other governing documents are noteworthy. The Expectations and 
Attributes of Governors and Key Principles of Ethical Conduct  state that 
“…..the Governors are the stewards of the university and each governor 
must act in good faith with the view to the best interest of the university as 
a whole, to defend the autonomy and independence of the university and to 
enhance its public image.514” Furthermore, the university also has a 
Mandate of Governance515 and Principles of Good Governance,516 as 
 
511 Shanahan,  Ni lson  and Broshko Handbook o f  Canadian Higher Ed ucat ion  Press 73.  
 
512 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b)(b 5.4)  above on the role  of  the Registrar  in  South  
Afr ican universi t ies.  
 
513 For  the  Universi ty  of  Toronto By -Law, see  
ht tp: / /www.governingcounc il .u toron to.ca /Asse ts /Govern ing+Council+Digita l+Assets/Po
lic ies/by law2.pdf  (Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
514 See  
http: / /www.governingcouncil .u toron to.ca /Asse ts /Govern ing+Council+Digita l+Assets/Ta
sk+Force+on+Governance/2010 -2011+Documentat ion/Expect .pdf  (Date of  use:  27  
August  2018) .  Also see the Associa t ion of  Governing Boards “Board of  Director’ s 
statement  on the  Fiduciary Dut ies  of  Governing Board  Members”  
http: / /agb.org /s i tes /defaul t / f i les/u27174/s ta tement_201 5_fiduciary_duties.pdf  (Date  of  
use :  27 August  2018) .  
 
515 See  
371 
 
approved by the Governing Council on 28 October 2010. Although South 
Africa has similar documents like the Guidelines for Good Governance 
Practices and Governance Indicators for Councils of South African Public 
Higher Education Institutions and the institutional Council Codes of 
Conduct, the contents are not as specific as those of their international 
counterparts. These documents could be emulated by South African 
universities as good examples of sound corporate governance principles as 
they provide for wider coverage of governance principles and confirm the 
fiduciary duties and responsibilities of the management of these 
institutions.  
 
 (c) Investigation into the affairs of a university 
 
The federal government of Canada has no direct role in education: its 
involvement is limited to contributing funds for higher education. There is 
nothing in the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities Act that 
provides the Ministry with the power to take over the management of a 
university or to intervene in the affairs of an institution. The Minister may 
appoint a consultant or advisory body to investigate any serious concern. 517 
One example of alleged mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty took 
place at the Western University of London, Ontario. In June 2015, a task 
force was instructed by the Board of Governors of the institution in 
response to the issue of the President’s compensation relating to a 
decision made by the governing board that doubled the President’s salary. 
This was done despite having to retrench staff, the existence of vacant 
 
http: / /www.governingcouncil .u toron to.c a /Asse ts /Govern ing+Council+Digita l+Assets/Ta
sk+Force+on+Governance/2010 -2011+Documentat ion/mandate.pdf  (Date of  use:  27  
August  2018) .  Th is  document clear ly  ar t ic u la tes  the d ifference  be tween  governance and  
adminis tra t ion,  which  i s  not  done in  the South Af r ican documents.  
 
516 See  
http: / /www.governingcouncil .u toron to.ca /Asse t s /Govern ing+Council+Digita l+ Assets/Ta
sk+Force+on+Governance/2010 -2011+Documenta t ion/pr inc iples.pdf  (Date of  use :  27  
August  2018) .   
 




positions and bigger class sizes. Furthermore, in April 2015 there had been 
a vote of no confidence in the President by Senate. 518 The Report of the 
Governance Review Task Force to the Board of Governors was published 
on 19 November 2015.519 This report explains the process the task team 
followed and confirms the fiduciary duties of the board as the duty of care, 
duty of loyalty and the duty of obedience. 520  In the author’s opinion, these 
examples illustrate that there are high levels of autonomy at higher 
education institutions in Canada. The Ministry does not involve itself in 
investigations in the affairs of an institution in the event of allegations of 
mismanagement or irregularities. Instead, inquiries and/or independent 
taskforce teams are used to investigate and make recommendations to the 
institutions. These independent task teams can be organised by the 
university’s governing board or it can emerge from an external source like 
the Auditor General. The Ministry exercises “soft power” over these 
matters. However, the Ministry is not powerless; it has the authority to 
rescind the incorporating statute of an institution, if deemed necessary. 521 
The Ontario Ombudsman is another important stakeholder in external 
university governance.522 In 2015, the Ombudsman Act of 1990523 was 
 
518 Informat ion suppl ied by Prof  Theresa S hanahan in  an email  dated  18  April  2016.  
 
519 For  the  ful l  report  see 
ht tps: / /www.uwo.ca /univsec /pdf/Report_of_ the_Governance_Review_Task_Force.pdf  
(Date of  use :  27 August  2018) .  Another  example occurred dur ing the 1990s when  
f inancia l  audi ts  turned up ir regu lar i t ies at  three Ontar io  un ivers i t ies.  The response was 
the creat ion of  the Taskforce on Univers i ty  Accountab il i ty .  The  Minis try ,  the 
provincial  students’  assoc ia t ion,  facul ty  assoc iat ions  as wel l  as the universi ty  s taff  
assoc iat ion sponso red this invest iga tion.  Although the audit  was tr iggered by the 
taskforce ,  the scope of  the taskforce was system wide .  The  Report  of  the Governance 
Review Task  Force  to  the Boar d  of  Governors  ca lled for  in creased accountab il i ty  of  
governing boards and heig htened un iversi ty  report ing requirements across the p rovince 
at  a l l  pub lic  universi t ies.  This report  s tar ted  a  trend of  increased  accountabi l i ty  
report ing  by universi ty  governin g boards in  Ontar io  as well  as  Canada .   
 
520 The Repor t  of  the Governance Review Task Force 5  –  6 .   
 
521 I t  is  an act  of  the provincial  legislat ive assembly.  Informat ion supplied by Prof .  
Theresa Shanahan in  an emai l  da ted 18 Apr il  2016.  
 
522 See h ttps : / /www.ombudsm an.on .ca /About -Us/The-Ombudsman-Act.aspx  (Date  of  
use :  27 August  2018) .  
 




amended to provide the Provincial Ombudsman with jurisdiction over 
school boards, municipalities and universities. This may have resulted in 
additional scrutiny of institutional governance and calls for changes to 
university governance.524 The Ombudsman’s authority to investigate 
complaints is described in the Ombudsman Act.525   
 
(d) Fiduciary duties and standard of care by governing boards 
 
According to Chan and Richardson, the fiduciary duties of board members 
are no different from those of board members of publicly listed companies. 
Board members must comply with the O.L.D. standard of conduct, which 
stands for “Obedience,526 Loyalty527 and Diligence”528 in discharging their 
duties and governance responsibilities. These standards were drafted to 
assist university boards in understanding their responsibilities of due 
diligence arising from legislation that affects universities.529  In Canada, the 
common law duties of care apply in addition to any standard of care 
 
524 Information  supplied  by Mr.  Barry McCar tan  f rom the  Minis try  dur ing  an inte rview 
with him on  28 June 2016.  
 
525 See h ttps: / /www.ombudsman.on.ca /About -Us/Who-We-Oversee/Universi t ies.aspx  
(Date of  use :  27  August  2018) .  The  Ombudsman has a  fu l l  complain t  procedure fo r  both 
the publ ic  and for  un ivers i ty  employees.  Complain ts may be lodged online af ter  a l l  
o ther  avenues have been exhausted.  See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b.6)  above for  a  
discuss ion of  the  off ices  of  the ombudsman a t  public  un ivers i t ies in  South Afr ica.  
 
526 Obedience  infers to  ac t ing honestly  and in  good fai th ;  obeying the s tatutes,  by - laws,  
terms and other  appl icable laws;  and ensure that  donor  funds are spen t  in  an  
accountable and responsib le way in  accordance wi th  the donor’s ins truc tions See 
Council  fo r  Ontar io  Un ivers i t ies “Governance:  Board  of  Governors and Senate”  2002 7.  
 
527 Loyalty  inc ludes to  ac t  in  the best  in terests  of  the univers i ty ;  ensure that  there i s  no 
confl ict  be tween the bo ard and the un ivers i ty ;  boa rd members should not  compete wi th  
the un iversi ty  to the  un iversi ty’s de tr iment ;  no t  to  take an oppor tuni ty  meant for  the 
universi ty  for  themselves.  Council  fo r  Ontar io  Univers i t ies “Governance:  Board of  
Governors and Senate” 200 2 7.  
 
528 Di l igence includes  fol lowing the prudent person rule;  the board member  should use 
his /her  sk il l  and  expert ise  in  the bes t  in teres ts  of  the  univers i ty ;  the  board member  
should  use  common sense  and  good judgment;  and  the  board  member should  be  
informed and act  responsib ly.  Cou ncil  for  Ontar io  Univers i t ies “Governance:  Board of  
Governors and Senate” 2002 7.  
 
529 Chan  and Richardson 2012 Accounting Perspect ives  33  –  34;  Council  for  Ontar io  




prescribed in other applicable legislation, including in some of the 
university Acts. The Ontario Corporations Act, which  applies to public 
higher education institutions in conjunction with their incorporating statutes, 
contains a standard of care as follows: “Every director and officer, in 
exercising his or her powers and discharging his or her duties to the 
corporation, shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best 
interest of the corporation; and exercise the care, diligence and skill that a 
reasonable prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.”530  
 
The duties and responsibilities of the governing boards of Ontario 
universities are generally set out in the incorporating statutes of each 
university, the Ontario Corporations Act and the common law. In 1991, the 
Minister of Colleges and Universities formally constituted a task force to 
investigate university governance. Its mandate was to develop 
recommendations for a framework to provide for the clear accountability of 
Ontario’s universities to the public. 531  One of the recommendations of the 
task force was that legislation should be introduced to provide for fiduciary 
duties and the duty of care and skill. 532 
 
Many of these constituting Acts are silent on director ’s duties and the 
standard of care, while other institutions specifically provide for them. One 
such an institution is the University of Ontario Institute of Technology. This 
university was established by the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology Act, which provides for the powers and duties of directors, and 
stipulates the standard of conduct as follows, “every member of the board 
shall exercise the powers and carry out the duties of his or her office 
diligently, honestly, in good faith, in the best interests of the university and 
 
530 See para 5 .3 .2(b)  above  f or  a  discussion of  f iduciary du ties and the du ty of  care and  
ski l l  in  Canada.  
 
531 Ministry  of  Educat ion  and Training “Univers i ty  Accountabi l i ty :   A Strengthened 
Framework” 1993  Report  of  the Task Force on Universi ty  Accountabi l i ty  16.  
 
532 Minist ry  of  Education  and Train ing “Univers i ty  Accountabi l i ty :   A Stre ngthened  




in accordance with any other criteria set out in the by-laws of the 
university.”533 University officers and company directors have duties towards 
their institutions and must comply with a certain standard of care. There 
may be different standards of care for officers of business corporations, 
not-for-profit corporations and charitable corporations. In Ontario, a 
standard of care of officers and directors is governed by the Charities 
Accounting Act, which applies to “any corporation incorporated for 
religious, educational, charitable or public purpose.”534 The Charities 
Accounting Act deems the corporation to be a trustee of the property held 
in trust for a charitable purpose. The officers and directors have fiduciary 
duties to the corporation to ensure they fulfil their duties as trustees. The 





The legal and education systems in the USA and Canada are complex. 
Both these jurisdictions have federal systems of government, different to 
that of South Africa. The comparative review of their higher education 
regulation provided some interesting insights which could be beneficial to 
South Africa. Public universities in both jurisdictions of Georgia (USA) and 
Ontario (Canada) are corporations.536 It was shown that higher education 
 
533 S.O.  2002,  c .  8 .  Hereinaf ter  refer red to  as the UOIT Act.  See s 9(3)  of  the UOIT Act.  
Similar ly ,  the Carl ton  Universi ty  in  Ottawa has a  Sta tement of  General  Duties ,  
Fiduciary  Responsib il i t ies and  Confl ict  of  In terest ,  which has  been  adopted  by the 
Board of  Governors.  This statement ou tl ines not  only the f iduci ary  duties of  the  
Governors bu t  also the ir  responsibi l i t ies  as Go vernors  and  the ir  obl igation  to  avo id 
confl icts  of  interests .  See the quest ions and answers on the dut ies of  the board of  
governors,  h t tp: / /car leton.ca/secr etar iat /boardofgovernors /wp -conten t/uploads/Board -
Q-and-A.pdf  (Date of  use:  27 August  2018) .  
 
534 R.S.O.  1990 c  C.10,  s  1 (2) .  
 
535 See para 5 .3 .2  above  for  a  discussion of  the Ontar io  Corpora tions Act and the  
standard of  care  i t  con ta ins.  
 




institutions are more autonomous than their counterparts in South Africa. 537 
Public universities in Ontario are not-for-profit corporations and are subject 
to their own incorporating statues as well as the Ontario Corporations 
Act.538 In the USA and Canada, public higher education institutions are 
successfully run as corporations, with highly effective institutional 
governing boards which have high levels of autonomy and with very little 
involvement from the government.539 In Ontario, universities report to the 
Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities 540 while in Georgia, 
universities report to the Board of Regents. 541 The approach to institutional 
autonomy by the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities is very 
similar to the approach of the Board of Regents, but it differs quite 
significantly from that of the DHET in South Africa. 542 In both Georgia and 
Ontario, public institutions are kept at arm’s length from their external 
governing bodies and are afforded high levels of autonomy.543 The external 
governing bodies do not intervene in the affairs of public institutions unless 
they are requested to do so. Investigations occur in both jurisdictions, but 
they are handled differently than in South Africa, where the Minister of 
Higher Education and Training has the power to place a public institution 
under administration and can even dissolve its Council. 544 There is no 
legislation, charter or policy providing either the Ministry of Training, 
Colleges and Training in Ontario nor the Board of Regents in Georgia with 
 
537 See discussion in  para 5 .5 .1  and 5.5 .2  above.  
 
538 See para  5 .3 .2  above for  a  discussion  of  the Ontar io  Corporations Act.  
 
539 See para 5 .5 .2  above for  a  discuss ion of  the inst i tu t ional  au tono my of  public  h igher  
educat ion ins t i tut ions in  Ontar io  Canada.  
 
540 See para  5 .5 .2  above for  a  discussion  of  th is Minis try .   
 
541 See para  5 .5 .1  above for  a  discussion  of  the Board of  Regents.  
 
542 The Depar tment  of  Higher  Education and  Tra ining is  d iscussed in  C hapter  2 ,  para  
2 .3 .1  while  the Board of  Regents is  discussed in  para 5 .5 .1  above.  
 
543 This  informat ion was  supplied during interviews conducted a t  the Board of  Regents 
and Ministry  o f  Tra ining,  Colleges and Univers i t ies  
 
544 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3  above for  a  discussion of  the minis ter ial  in tervent ions  in  




authority to take control of public universities or to dissolve their 
institutional governing boards. In Georgia, the Board of Regents would 
investigate the affairs of public universities should there be any allegations 
of mismanagement or fraud545 while the approach of their counterparts in 
Ontario is rather to leave the investigations to the institutional governing 
boards.546 In both instances, there would be findings and recommendations 
to the governing board of these institutions. In both these jurisdictions, 
there have been universities that have found themselves in financial trouble 
or which have faced allegations of mismanagement and/or fraud. However, 
neither the Board of Regents nor the Minister of Training, Colleges and 
Universities has found it necessary to take any drastic steps against 
universities, supporting the finding of high levels of autonomy. The South 
African Higher Education Act of 1997 has been amended numerous times, 
and the Minister has incrementally been provided with increased powers of 
involvement in the affairs of public universities. 547 The author submits that 
some of the practices of the DHET counterparts in Ontario and in Georgia 
provide useful insights into how investigations might be conducted. Specific 
aspects to consider are improved governance and management structures, 
including implementing consequences for Council and management of 
universities where mismanagement has been identified; implementing 
system-wide governance policies similar to those in Canada, and making 
express provision for the fiduciary duties and duty of care of Council and 
senior management; implementing a compliance and ethics programme 
similar to the one implemented by the Board of Regents in Georgia; and 
having an internal audit and compliance function within the DHET to 
support the management of universities in meeting their governance, risk 
management, compliance and internal control responsibilities while aiding 
the  improvement of organisational and operational effectiveness and 
 
545 See para 5 .5 .1(e)  above for  a  discussion of  the invest iga tions conducted into  the  
affair s  of  publ ic  un ivers i t ies in  Georg ia.  
 
546 See para 5 .5 .2(c)  above for  a  d iscussion of  the invest iga tions conducted into  the  
affair s  of  publ ic  un ivers i t ies in  Ontar io .  
 




efficiency. Implementing internal audit and compliance measures will be 
beneficial to the DHET as they will be able to ensure that all public 
universities comply with Reporting Regulations. This does not imply the 
outsourcing of the governance responsibility which obviously remains the 
responsibility of a university Council. It is not recommended that South 
African public higher education institutions should be incorporated as 
companies, which would then be subject to the Companies Act of 2008. 
Rather, in Chapter 6 below, it is recommended that some South African 
company law provisions be included in the Higher Education Act of 1997 to 
provide clarity and certainty in respect of certain principles of corporate 
governance. In this regard, the statutory provisions relating to the fiduciary 
duties and the duty of care that is provided for in the Ontario Corporations 
Act and which are applicable to public higher education institutions, offer a 
good example.548 It is clear from the report issued in 1993 by the Task 
Force on University Accountability that university accountability is taken 
seriously in Ontario. 
 








The objective of this thesis was to investigate governance challenges 
facing higher education institutions and to provide recommendations to 
assist these institutions in improving their governance and compliance 
practices and increasing their accountability. The research concluded that 
there is, in practice, little, if any, accountability for Council members and 
members of the executive management of public higher education 
institutions. Corporate governance practices in these institutions must 
improve, and Council members and members of executive management 
should, in appropriate circumstances, be held accountable for their actions. 
This chapter summarises the conclusions and recommendations made in 
previous chapters on ways to improve governance and compliance 
practices in South African higher education. The chapter also proposes 
certain amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1997 as well as the 
2014 Reporting Regulations.1 
 
A comparative analysis of higher education regulation in Georgia, USA and 
Ontario, Canada was conducted in this research. This analysis compared 
the various company laws, corporate governance and higher education 
regimes with those of South Africa to determine what lessons could be 
learned from these international jurisdictions. The study also considered 
the South Africa Companies Act of 20082 and the Banks Act of 1990.3 The 
purpose was not to undertake extensive scrutiny of the provisions of the 
two Acts as applied to company and banking law but to consider whether 
 
1 The suggested changes and amendments  are ind ica ted by underl ini ng while  delet ions  
are ind icated  by s tr ikethrough t ex t .   
 
2 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Companies Act  of  2008.  
 




some of the measures they contain might be appropriate to improve 
governance in the higher education sphere.  
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.2.1 Higher education challenges before and after the attainment of 
democracy  
 
Governance challenges were present in higher education before and after 
the attainment of democracy in South Africa. This thesis considered the 
higher education landscape during these two periods, although the focus 
was more on higher education during the latter period. 4 It became apparent 
that higher education in South Africa was initially fragmented, confusing 
and rife with inequality. Today, higher education is primarily regulated 
through the Higher Education Act of 1997, as well as various policy 
documents.5 King IV is also applicable to higher education institutions.6  
During the Apartheid era, higher education policies almost exclusively 
benefitted Whites. The legislation was put in place to prevent Blacks from 
attending universities earmarked for Whites. Blacks needed the consent of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs to be accepted into White universities. The 
promulgation of the Constitution underpinned the need for a systematic 
transformation of higher education aligned to the aspirations enunciated in 
the National Development Plan 2030 and African Agenda 2063. According 
to section 29 of the Constitution, read together with schedule 4, “everyone 
has the right to education, including basic adult education and further 
education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 




4 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .1 .1  for  more on  the  history of  Apar the id.  
 
5 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2  for  a  d iscus s ion of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997 as  well  
as the relevant  po licy development in  higher  educat ion.  
 
6 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  for  a  d iscuss ion of  King IV.  
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6.2.2 Institutional governance 
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 is the primary source of law regulating 
higher education institutions, and it contains the legislative framework for 
higher education institutions.7 The DHET is responsible for higher 
education in South Africa and derives its mandate from the Constitution. 
Higher education includes private and public higher education institutions. 
However, private higher education institutions must be registered 
companies and are governed by the Companies Act of 2008.8   
 
The Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for the institutional governance 
structure of public higher education institutions. 9 The Council of a higher 
education institution is its highest decision-making body, while the Senate 
is responsible for academic decision-making. The Council of each public 
higher education institution may make an institutional statute, subject to the 
approval of the Minister of Higher Education and Training, that will focus on 
various matters not addressed in the Higher Education Act of 1997. 10  The 
institutional statute will, for instance, set out the composition of the 
executive management of that institution and the committees of Council 
and Senate. Section 30 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 confirms that 
the Vice-Chancellor of each institution is responsible for the day-to-day 
management and administration of the institution. 11 Although public higher 
education institutions are all subject to the Higher Education Act of 1997, 
they are autonomous and therefore their management style, and naming 
conventions of internal positions may differ. The executive management of 
a public higher education institution will generally include the Vice-
 
7 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .1  for  a  d iscuss i on of  the leg isla t ive framework  for  higher  
educat ion ins t i tut ions.  
 
8 For  more on pr ivate higher  educat ion,  see Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(a)  above .  
 
9 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  inst i tu t ional  governance.  
 
10 Section  27 of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997; see Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b.1) .  
 




Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellors, the Registrar, Executive Deans and 
Executive Directors.12 Based on the findings of this research, it is 
recommended that members of the Council and the executive management 
be subject to increased accountability. 13 
 
6.2.3 Institutional autonomy and public accountability 
 
The 1997 White Paper and the Higher Education Act of 1997 confirm the 
institutional autonomy of higher education institutions. Institutional 
autonomy refers to the degree of self-regulation and administrative 
independence relating to various matters. 14 However, complete autonomy 
has never been promised since these public institutions receive public 
money and are therefore subject to public accountability. Each institution 
must thus report to the DHET on how it spends the public funding received 
from the government. The Higher Education Training Laws Amendment Act 
of 2012, which amended the Higher Education Act of 1997, provided the 
Minister with increased powers to intervene in the affairs of an institution. 
Several stakeholders in higher education expressed concerns that an 
increase in the Minister’s powers to intervene in the affairs of an institution 
posed a threat to institutional autonomy.15 One of the concerns raised was 
that the Minister of Higher Education and Training had been provided with 
more power to place a university under administration and to dissolve its 
Council, thereby threatening the institutional autonomy of higher education 
institutions.16 However, this research also proved that there were justifiable 
 
12 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the inst i tu t ional  governance framework  
of  public  higher  educat ion ins t i tut ions.  
 
13 See Chapter  3 ,  p ara 3 .3 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the fai lures in  South Afr ican 
universi t ies ;  para  3 .4  fo r  the var ious amendments to  the  Higher  Education Act of  1997;  
and paras 6 .3  and 6.4  be low for  the  var ious recommendat ions made.  
 
14 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .2 (a)  above for  mor e  on inst i tu t ional  autonomy .  
 
15 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .2 .1  above for  a  d iscuss i on of  inst i tu t iona l  au tonomy.  
 
16 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4  above for  a  discussion  of  the increased powers of  the 




reasons for the increase of the Minister ’s powers. It is also unlikely that the 
Minister would invoke these powers unless absolutely necessary. 
 
The comparative review contained in chapter 5 indicated that the position 
differs in international jurisdictions like the State of Georgia, and the 
Province of Ontario in Canada.  In these jurisdictions, their statewide 
governing board or Ministry does not have the power to take over the 
management of the institution. 
 
6.2.4 Ministerial interventions 
 
Several failures have occurred in the governance of South African public 
higher education institutions. Some of these institutions were placed under 
administration or investigated by independent assessors during 2008 and 
2012.17 The independent assessors’ reports of these troubled institutions 
were indicative of the following governance problems in public higher 
education institutions: factionalism in Councils; mismanagement of the 
affairs of the institution; Council members involving themselves in 
operational matters of the institution; ineffective functioning of Councils; 
fraudulent relationships between the Councils and the Vice-Chancellors 
and other staff of the institutions; and unacceptable conduct by Council 
members, to name a few. This thesis reviewed three independent 
assessors’ reports, administrators’ reports, as well as other documents 
relating to the investigation and/or administration processes of three of 
these institutions.18 It the author’s view these corporate governance failures 
in public higher education institutions played a direct role in the 
promulgation of the Higher Education and Training Laws Amendment Act of 
2012. The amendments effected to the Higher Education Act of 1997 
provided the Minister with more power to intervene in the affairs of a higher 
 
17 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2(b)  abov e for  a  d iscussion of  three  of  these inst i tu t ions that  
was placed under  admini strat ion.  
 
18 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the governance fa i lures,  inc luding 




education institution. In accordance with section 49A, the Minister can 
dissolve the Council of the institution and appoint an administrator to take 
over the functions of the Council. It was these amendments that caused 
concern amongst higher education stakeholders who feared that 
institutional autonomy was threatened by the increased powers of the 
Minister.19 The subsequent Higher Education Amendment Act of 2016 
attempted to address some of the concerns and to clarify other aspects. 20 
However, not all the concerns were addressed or clarified. 21 It is the 
author’s opinion that further amendments should be effected to increase 
the accountability of Council members and executive management as well 
as improve corporate governance processes and practices.22 
 
6.2.5 Company law and corporate governance 
 
The recommendations below are based on certain provisions relating to 
corporate governance issues contained in the Companies Act of 2008 and 
the Banks Act of 1990.23 The accountability of directors was strengthened 
by the provisions in the Companies Act of 2008, which imposed statutory 
fiduciary duties as well as duties of care and skill on directors. Th is both 
enhanced and clarified their obligations in terms of the common law.24  
Accordingly, should directors fail to act in good faith, for a proper purpose, 
in the best interests of the company or not act with the necessary care and 
skill; they will be in breach of their statutory fiduciary duties and incur 
 
19 See Chapter  3 ,  par  3 .4 .2  for  a  comprehensive d iscuss ion of  the minister ia l  
in tervent ions .  
 
20 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4  above for  a  discussion  of  the 2016 amendments .  
 
21 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Higher  Education  Amendment Act  of  
2016.  
 
22 See para  6 .3  be low f or  recommendat ions  regard ing amendments to  the High er  
Educat ion Act  of  1997 in  this regard.  
 
23 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Companies Act  of  2008 and para 4 .3  
for  a  discussion  of  the Banks Act of  2008.  
 




personal liability. There are no similar provisions in the Higher Education 
Act of 1997, and therefore there is no explicit statutory accountability for 
Council members nor the executive management of a public higher 
education institution. Although public higher education institutions are 
subject to common law fiduciary duties, no case law could be found where 
common law was invoked to hold a Council member or member of the 
executive management accountable for a breach of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, there is no statutory provision for the suspension or removal of 
errant Council members. Although there are some public higher education 
institutions, whose Council Codes of Conduct provide for the removal of 
errant Council members, the author believes that these code of conducts 
might be ultra vires the Higher Education Act of 1997.25 The Banks Act of 
1990 goes further and not only imposes fiduciary duties and the duty of 
care and skill on directors of banks but also requires banks to establish a 
compliance and corporate governance function. 26   
 
The higher education regulations in Georgia (USA) and the Province of 
Ontario Canada were also considered in this research. The study indicated 
that it was necessary to clarify the fiduciary duties and duty of care and 
skill of Council members and members of the executive management in the 
Higher Education Act of 1997.27 The Model Business Corporations Act 
(MBCA), the Georgia Code of 2017, the Canada Business Corporations Act 
(CBCA), the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) and the Canadian 
Not-For-Profit Corporations Act of 2010 contain similar provisions relating 
to the fiduciary duties of directors.28 In both these jurisdictions, Public 
universities are corporations. This is not the case in South Africa, where 
 
25 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .6  above for  a  d iscuss ion on the Counci l  Code of  Conduct .  
 
26 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .3  on a discussion  of  the Banks Act of  1990.  
 
27 See Chapter  5 ,  para 5 .2 .1  –  5 .2 .3  for  a  discussion of  the lega l  system of  the USA and  
the var ious company law pro vis ions relevan t  to  the State  of  Georgia.  Chapter  5 ,  para  
5 .5 .1  discusses higher  educat ion in  the USA.  
 
28 See Chapter  5 ,  para 5 .2 .3  for  a  d iscuss ion of  corporate law in  the  Sta te  of  Georg ia 




public higher education institutions are juristic entities in terms of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 and report to the Department of Higher 
Education and Training. Private higher education institutions must be 
registered companies and are governed accordingly. 29 
 
South Africa experienced several corporate failures which undoubtedly 
played a role in the publication of the King Reports on corporate 
governance.30  The fourth iteration of the King Report came into effect on 1 
April 2017. Compliance with all of the King Reports has been voluntary 
except where provisions are specifically enforced by, for example, the JSE 
Listings Requirements. King IV applies to all organisations regardless of 
their manner of incorporation and is therefore applicable to higher 
education institutions.31 King IV advocates the “apply and explain” 
approach. According to this approach, a governing body must apply the 
principles and explain how they are being given effect.32 However, since 
this is a voluntary code, the consequences of non-compliance are uncertain 
and somewhat difficult to enforce. 
 
6.2.6 2014 Reporting Regulations 
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations issued by the DHET provide guidance on 
what should be included in the annual report of each public higher 
education institution .33 These regulations were issued in two parts, namely, 
the regulations themselves and the implementation manual. However, the 
regulations contain some contradictory statements and confusing wording, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish between compliance requirements 
and mere guidelines. Based on the research undertaken, recommendations 
 
29 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(a)  for  a  discussion of  pr iva te h igher  education ins t i tut ions.  
 
30 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .2  for  a  h is tory on the King Reports .  
 
31 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  for  a  d iscuss i on of  King IV .  
 
32 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  for  a  d iscuss ion of  King IV .  
 




are made below suggesting amendments to clarify ambiguous wording in 
the regulations.34 Finally, it is recommended that it should be a requirement 
for higher education institutions to report on the interests they hold in 
commercial companies. 
 
The specific recommendations are discussed below. 
 




Specific recommendations are made below, preceded by specific 




It is recommended that the definitions provided below be included in the 
Higher Education Act of 1997. Before or after each definition, the reason 
for its inclusion is briefly stated, with reference to where it is more fully 
discussed in the preceding chapters, and it is indicated where the 
amendments related to this aspect are made below. 
 
(a)  “Conflict of interest”: 
 
Section 27(7)(c) of the Higher Education Act requires a Council member to 
declare a possible conflict of interest. Similarly, the same is required for all 
employees in terms of section 34 of the Higher Education Act of 1997. 
 
34
 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .5  above for  a  discussion  of  the 2014  Report ing Regula tions .  
 
35 The amendments  and recommendations wi l l  be indica ted by way of  “track changes” 
and delet ions  where re levant .   This method was chosen  as i t  i s  less complicated  than  
the genera l  way in  which amendments to  s ta tutes ar e ind ica ted.  Sect ions  not  be ing 
amended wi l l  be ind ic ated by way of  e l l ipsis  to  avoid any unnecessary  du plicat ion of  
the sec tions to  be amended.  Although s tatu tes usually  contain  relevant  def ini t ions in  
sec tion  1 of  the Act,  the  approach in  the Companies Act of  2008 has been follow ed.  For  




Executive management, as employees, will , therefore, have to declare a 
conflict of interest. Hence, it is important that a conflict of interest be 
properly defined in the Higher Education Act of 1997. The definition , as 
provided for in King IV is used for recommending a definition as follows:  36 
 
“Conflict of Interest”  refers to a situation where a 
person cannot make a fair decision because he/she may 
be affected by the result. This conflict is used in relation 
to members of Council, Senate and its committees, and 
occurs when there is a direct or indirect conflict, in fact or 
in appearance, between the interests of such member 
and those of the organisation. It applies to financial, 
economic and other interests in any opportunity from 
which the organisation may benefit as well as the use of 
the property of the institution, including information. It 
also applies to the member’s related parties holding such 
interests. 
 
(b) “Knowingly, “knowing” or “knows” 
 
In the author’s opinion, it is essential to include the above definition, which 
is the same one as contained in section 1 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
This definition will clarify when a person is deemed to have knowledge of a 
situation.37  
 
knowingly”, “knowing” or “knows” when used with 
respect to a person, and in relation to a particular matter, 
means that person either  
(a) “had actual knowledge of that matter;  
(b) was in a position in which the person reasonably 
ought to have (i) had actual knowledge; (ii) investigated 
the matter to an extent that would have provided the 
person with actual knowledge; or (iii) taken other 
measures which, if taken, would have reasonably been 
expected to have provided the person with actual 





The definition below is proposed to also refer to a Registrar of a public 
university, and not only with reference to a private institution, as follows: 
 
36 As  contained in  King IV 11.  
 
37 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .8  for  a  d iscuss ion of  section 424  of  the Companies Act of  
1973 rela t ing  to  “knowingly.”  
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Registrar” in the context of a private higher education 
institution refers to the Registrar referred to in section 
50(1). “Registrar” in the context of a public higher 
education institution refers to the compliance officer of 
the public higher education institution who is also 
responsible for the academic administration of the 
institution.  
 
(d)  “Share” 
 
The reason for including a definition of a “share” and a “shareholder” is that 
the shareholding held by higher education institutions in companies is 
discussed below in the recommendations relating to the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations. The recommended requirement that institutions must report 
on their interests held in these commercial companies is also discussed 
below. This definition is in accordance with section 1 of the Companies Act 
of 2008. 
 
Share” means one of the units into which the proprietary 
interest in a profit company is divided.  
 
(e) “Shareholder”  
 
This is in relation to any shareholder rights a public higher education may 
exercise with regards to any juristic entity, in accordance with the 
Companies Act of 2008 as follows:   
Shareholder” means the holder of a share issued by a 
company and who is entered as such in the certificated 
or uncertificated securities register, as the case may be; 
 
 
6.3.3 Duties of Councils of public higher education institutions  
 
The Council of a public higher education institution is constituted in terms 
of section 27 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 and is the highest 
decision making body of the institution. 38 Instances of apparent misconduct 
by Council members have indicated the need for clear provisions regarding 
 
38 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2  above for  a  d iscuss ion o f  the Counci l  of  a  public  h igher  
educat ion ins t i tut ion.  
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their duties, removal, suspension and disqualification of these members. 
Mechanisms to deal with misconduct in addition to those provided for in 
terms of section 27(7D) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 are also 
necessary.39 In some instances, merely disciplining Council members will 
not be enough. The recommendation below relates to the fiduciary duties 
and the duty of care and skill owed by directors to their company. It is 
recommended that similar provisions are included in the Higher Education 
Act of 1997 to ensure accountability in the event of misconduct by Council 
members. As seen above, section 76 of the Companies Act of 2008 
provides some guidance in this regard.40 It is also essential that there is 
provision for removing Council members as such members may not 
necessarily be employees. Even if they are employees of the institution 
when acting as Council members, they act in a different capaci ty. 
Therefore, as with the Companies Act of 2008, there is a need for 
provisions to remove Council members who do not act in the best interests 
of the institution.41  Furthermore, as with the Companies Act of 2008, there 
should be eligibility criteria for candidates elected to the Council. No 
institution should allow a candidate who is disqualified or ineligible to be 
appointed to the Council of the institution. 42 Currently, there is no obligation 
on an institution to evaluate the knowledge and experience of their Council 
members, which may lead to inadequate levels of knowledge and 
experience. Amending the Higher Education Act of 1997 to compel the 
Council of an institution to evaluate the knowledge and experience of their 
 
39 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .3 .2  above.  
 
40 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .5  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  sect ion 76 of  the Companies Act 
of  2008.  
 
41 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .9  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the removal of  d irec tors.   
 
42 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .10 for  a  d iscuss i on of  the del inquency  proceedings in  te rms 




Council members will improve governance. It is therefore recommended 
that section 27 be amended as follows: 43 
27(1) Member” in terms of this section, includes each 
council member, each member of a council 
committee and any person acting with delegated 
authority on behalf of the council. The council of a 
public higher education institution must govern the 
public higher education institution, subject to this 
Act, the institutional statute; and the council Code 
of Conduct; 
 (1A) Insert new 1A: the council and its members, as well 
as the council committees and their members, 
collectively and individually, and all who exercise 
delegated authority on behalf of council in terms of 
section 68(2), must exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of a council member  
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the institution;  
(c) avoiding conflicts of interest; and 
(d) with the degree of care, skill and diligence 
that may reasonably be expected of a 
person (i) carrying out the same functions in 
relation to the institution as those carried 
out by that member; and (ii) having the 
general knowledge, skill and experience of 
that member.44 
(1B) Insert new 1B: In respect of any particular matter 
arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of a member, will have 
satisfied the obligations of 27(1B)(a) – (d) if  
(a) the member has taken reasonably diligent 
steps to become informed about the matter; 
either the member had no material personal 
or financial interest in the subject matter of 
the decision; and  
(b) had no reasonable basis to know that any 
related person had a personal or financial 
interest in the matter; or the member 







43 For  the sake of  c lar i ty  and avoidance of  confusion the  whole sect ion i s  st ipulated  
here with  the  suggested changed underl ined.  The  def in i t ions are inc luded  in  each 
sec tion  in  l ine with  the Companies Act  of  2008.  
 
44 Section  76(3)  of  the Companies Act.  See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .5  above for  a  discussion  
of  this sect ion.   
 
45 This i s  in  accordance with  s  76(4)  o f  the Companies Act (busines s  judgment ru le) .   
See  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .2 .7  above for  a  discussion  of  the business judgment rule .  The  
inclus ion of  similar  provis ions to  s  76(4)  of  the  Companies Act of  2008  wi l l  prov ide 





(4A) Insert a new 4A: All members of council, 
irrespective of how they were selected or 
appointed, will be subject to the Code of Conduct 
as prescribed in subsection 7E. 
(5) ………………………………………………………… 
(5A) The eligibility criteria for nomination and election as 
a member of council of a public higher education 
institution, must be determined by the institutional 
statute and this Act.  
(a) A person is ineligible to be a member of council, if 
a person is –  
(i) a juristic person; 
(ii) an un-emancipated minor, or is under a similar 
legal disability; or 
(iii) does not satisfy any qualification criteria set out in 
the Institutional Statute of the public higher 
education institution; or 
(iv) was declared a delinquent director in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008 for the period as described 
in section 69(9); ` 
(b) A person is disqualified to be a member of council 
if- 
a court has prohibited that person to be a director, 
or declared the person to be delinquent in terms of 
section 162 of the Companies Act of 2008, or in 
terms of section 47 of the Close Corporations Act, 
1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984); the person- 
(i)  is an unrehabilitated insolvent; 
(ii)  is prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be a 
member of council; 
(iii)  has been removed from an office of trust, on the 
grounds of misconduct involving dishonesty; or  
(iv) has been convicted, in the Republic or elsewhere, 
and imprisoned without the option of a fine, or fined 
more than the prescribed amount, for theft, fraud, 
forgery, perjury or an offence- 
(aa) involving fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty;  
(bb) in connection with the promotion, formation or 
management of a company, or 
(cc) under this Act, the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 
of 1936), the Close Corporations Act, 1984, the 
Competition Act, the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001), the Securities 
Services Act, 2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004), or Chapter 
2 of the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption 
Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004).  
(5B) Any person who has been a member of a council of a 
public higher education institution –  
(a) under circumstances contemplated in sections 
49(B)(a) and 49E;  
(b) against whom an independent assessor has made an 
adverse finding in the report contemplated in section 
47(1)(b); and  
(c) any person who is ineligible in terms of section (5A).  
 (5C)Insert a new 5C: A public higher education 
institution must not: 
(a)  knowingly permit an ineligible or disqualified person 
to serve as a member of council; and 
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(b) allow a person, who becomes ineligible or disqualified 




(7) A member of a council or a member of a committee 
of a council or a person with delegated functions in 
terms of section 68(2) – 
(a) must be a person with knowledge and experience 
relevant to the objectives, and governance of the 
public higher education institutions. Each institution 
may assess the knowledge and experience of its 
council members annually or in the event of a 
vacancy and may set minimum requirements for a 
member to ensure that the council can rely on the 
required depth of knowledge and experience 
(b) must participate in the deliberations of the council or 
the committee of council, or  exercise any delegated 
function in the best interests of the public higher 
institution concerned; 
(c) must, before he or she assumes office, and annually 
for as long as he or she continues to hold such 
office, declare any business, commercial or financial  
activities, as well as any directorship held by him/her 
and those of his or her spouse or related person; and 
declare any gifts that he or she has received f rom 
entities that undertake business with the public 
higher education institution, or potential suppliers or 
service providers of the institution undertaken for 
financial gain that may raise a conflict or a possible 
conflict of interest with the public higher education 
institution;47 
(d) may not place him/her under any financial or other 
obligation to any individual or organisation that might 
seek to influence the performance of any function of 
the council; and 
(d) neither a member of council, nor his or her  spouse or 
a related person may not place him/her under any 
financial or other obligation to any individual or 
organisation that may seek to influence the 
performance of any function of the council; and  
(e) neither as member of council, nor his or her spouse 
or a related person may not have a conflict of 









46 This formulat ion is  based on ss 69  and 162 of  the Companies  Act of  2008 in  respect  
of  direc tors.  See Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2 .10.  
 
47 For  ins tance,  any Council  member must  declare  direc torships he/she ho lds in  
companies  to  ensure tha t  there is  no  conf l ic t  of  interes t  in  award ing tenders fo r  
ins tance.  Furthermore,  Counci l  members must  declare any  gif ts  tha t  they rece ive from 











10(1) Insert a new section 10: A member of a council of a 
public higher education institution shall vacate his or 
her position on the council, or council committee, if 
he or she –  
(a) dies; 
(b) resigns; 
(c) is absent without leave from three ordinary meetings 
of the council in any twelve-month period; 
(d) is declared to be of unsound mind by a court;  
(e) is removed from an office of trust by a court;  
(f) is declared a delinquent director by a court in terms 
of the Companies Act of 2008 for a term as 
prescribed in section 69(9);  
(g) is declared a delinquent council member by a court; 
(h) is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment; 
(i) becomes ineligible in terms of section 27(5B);  
(11)(1) Insert a new section 11: The council of each 
public higher education institution shall have the 
power remove a member of council, irrespective of 
who elected such council member, by vote of the 
majority of the members of council and in 
accordance with the relevant voting procedure of that 
particular higher education institution, prescribed by 
its institutional statute.  
(2) Prior to a vote as provided for in s 11(1),  
(a) a member must be given notice of the council 
meeting and the intended vote for the removal of that 
member; and 
(b) the member must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to make a representation, in person or 
through a representative, to the meeting, before such 
a vote can proceed. 
(3) If a member has  
(a) become ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 
27;  
(b) Incapacitated to the extent that the member is 
unable to perform the functions of a member, and is 
unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable 
time; 
(c) Neglected or been derelict in the performance of the 
functions of a member; or  
(d) breached one or more than one of the provisions of 
the Code of Conduct of the public higher education 
institution; 
then council, excluding the specific member, must 
determine the matter by way of voting and may remove a 
member whom it has determined to be ineligible or 
disqualified, incapacitated, or negligent or derelict as the 
case may be, subject to reasonable notice given to the 
member in terms of subsection (2) above as well as 
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allowing the member opportunity to make representations 
prior to voting. 
12(1) Insert a new section 12: Notwithstanding any 
liability incurred in terms of the provisions of this Act, 
a member may be held liable for a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, for any loss or damage or costs 
sustained by the public higher education institution 
as a consequence of any breach by the member of a 
duty contemplated in sections 27(7), 28(5) and 38A.  
(2) A member is liable for any loss, damage or costs 
sustained by the institution as a direct or indirect 
consequence of the member having 
(a) acted in the name of the public higher education 
institution, signed anything on behalf of the 
institution or purported to bind the institution or 
authorise the taking of any action by or on behalf of 
the institution, despite knowing that the member  
lacked the necessary authority in terms of the 
institution’s delegation of authority;  
(b) been a party to an act or omission by the institution 
despite knowing that the act or omission was 
calculated to defraud an employee, member or any 
stakeholder of the institution or had another 
fraudulent purpose; 
(c) signed, consented to or authorised the publication of 
(i) any financial statements that were false or 
misleading in a material respect or (ii) signed any 
contract or tender without the proper authorisation 
process. 
(4) Proceedings to recover any loss, damages or costs 
for which a person is or may be held liable in terms 
of this section may not be commenced more than 
three years after the act or omission that gave rise to 
that liability. 
(5) In any proceedings against a member other than for 
willful misconduct or willful breach of trust, the court 
may relieve the member, either wholly or partly, of 
any liability listed in this section, on any terms the 
court considers just if it appears to the court that:  
(a) The member is or may be liable but has acted 
honestly and reasonably; or  
(b) Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
including those connected with the appointment of 
the member, it would be fair to excuse the member.  48  
 
6.3.4 Committees of Councils and Senates 
 
King IV no longer prescribes specific committees to be established, but 
instead recommends that each governing body must assess what 
 
48 The proposed new s 27(12)  of  the  H igher  Education Act  of  1997  is  based on s 77 of  




committees are needed for that particular organisation.49 Section 29 of the 
Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for committees of Council and 
Senate.50 Various committees were considered above.51 It is recommended 
that the 2014 Reporting Regulations provide at least for the following 
specific Council committees: a committee on commercialisation and 
innovation, remuneration committee, audit committee, risk committee, 
social and ethics committee, information technology committee, tender and 
procurement committee, and governance and compliance committee.52 The 
Council committees will be responsible for the governance oversight of 
these committees. Moreover, an institution may arrange that some of its 
committees are combined where it would still meet the objectives of the 
regulations. 
 
The following amendment to section 29 is therefore proposed: 
29(4) Each public higher education institution must have 
certain committees as prescribed from time to time in 
the Regulations. The composition, manner of 
election, functions, procedure at meetings and 
dissolution of a committee and a joint committee are 




6.3.5 The principal of a public higher education institution 
 
Section 27(1) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 states that the Council of 
a public higher education institution must govern it. Section 30 provides 
 
49 Ins t i tu te  o f  Direc tors South Afr ica  King IV practice no te for  Govern ing  Body 
Commit tees February 2018 3.  
50 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  s  29  of  the Higher  Educat ion Act  
of  1997.  
 
51 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  and 4.4 .4  fo r  the var ious committees  provided for  in  King 
IV and the 2014 Reporting Regula tions.  
 
52 These committees wil l  be discussed in  para 6 .3  below. No recommendat ions wi l l  be 
made with  regards to  Se nate.  This research  conside red whether  the Higher  Education  
Act  of  1997 should  rather  inc lude the committees,  however ,  the 2014 Reporting 
Regula tions  a lready provide for  cer tain  of  these  committees.  Once the Reporting 
Regula tions  are  rev ised and the confus ing wording is  clar if ied,  a l l  the h igher  educat ion 
ins t i tut ions  must  comply th erewi th,  which wil l  include these committees.  
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that its principal must be responsible for the management and 
administration of the public higher institution. It is therefore recommended 
that the section is amended to clarify that the Principal is responsible for 
the management and operational matters of the institution. Furthermore, 
there is nothing in section 30 to state that the principal must report to the 
Council and be bound to Council decisions. Although this might be obvious, 
it is suggested that it be included for purposes of clarity. It is my 
recommendation that this must be clarified in the Higher Education Act of 
1997 as follows: 
30 The principal of a public higher education institution is 
responsible for the day-to-day management and 
administration of the public higher education institution, 
and report to council. The day-to-day management and 
administration of the institution must be subject to this 
Act and the institutional statute.  
 
 
6.3.6 Institutional statute 
 
The author considered making recommendations to amend section 32 of 
the Higher Education Act of 1997.  It was found not to be necessary to 
propose any amendments to this section.  The reason for considering any 
amendments was the way in which section 32(1) was drafted.  The word 
“may” used in section 32(1) gives the impression that making an 
institutional statute is optional. Section 33(3) provides clarity in this regard 
as it confirms that every higher education institution that does not make its 
own institutional statute must rely on the standard institutional statute. 53  In 
the author’s opinion the standard institutional statute adequately covers all 











6.3.7 Compliance function 
 
In addition to the Companies Act of 2008, the Banks Act of 1990 also 
provides some guidance on further recommendations to improve 
governance in higher education institutions. 54 The Banks Act of 1990 not 
only provides for bank directors’ fiduciary duties and duties of care and skill 
but also clearly provides for a compliance function as well as a corporate 
governance function.55 It is submitted that this is also required in respect of 
higher education institutions.  It is therefore recommended that a new 
section 38A be inserted in the Higher Education Act of 1997, providing as 
follows:  
 
38A A public higher education institution shall establish 
an independent compliance unit as part of its risk 
management framework. 
(a) The compliance unit shall be headed by a 
compliance officer, who shall perform his/her 
functions with such care and skill as can reasonably 
be expected from a person responsible for such a 
function in a similar institution.  
(b) The compliance officer’s functions and mandate shall 




6.3.8 Corporate governance  
 
The Banks Act of 1990 also provides explicitly for effective corporate 
governance processes. Such provisions are, in view of recent shortcomings 
found in the corporate governance practices of some higher education 
institutions, also required in the Higher Education Act of 1997. Although 
these amendments might not prevent all governance challenges at public 
higher education institutions, they should serve as deterrent by ensuring 
 
54 The Companies Act  of  2008 is  discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .2 ,  whi le  the Banks Act 
of  1990 i s  discus sed in  para 4 .3 .  
 
55 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .3  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Banks Act of  1990.  
 
56 This i s  based on s 60A of  the Banks Act of  1990; and in  compliance wi th  
recommended pract ices 90 –  99 of  King IV .  See  para 6 .3 .3  below for  a  d iscuss ion of  the 
compliance  off icer .  
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that there is accountability for management and council members who have 
not acted in the best interest of the institution. The insertion of a new 
section 38A of the Higher Education Act of 1997 is therefore proposed: 
 
Before (1) insert 38A as follows: 
38A (1) The members of a council and the executive 
management of a public higher education institution 
shall establish and maintain an adequate and 
effective process of corporate governance which 
shall be consistent with the nature, complexity and 
risks inherent in the activities and the business of the 
institution concerned; 
(2) The process of corporate governance shall be 
established with the objective of achieving the public 
higher education’s vision, mission and strategic 
objectives efficiently, effectively, ethically and 
equitably (within acceptable risk parameters), to 
ensure –  
(a) compliance with the strategic framework and 
guidelines established for the public higher education 
institution concerned; 
(b) commitment by the members of council and the 
executive management of the public higher 
education institution to adhere to behaviour that the 
institution recognised and accepted as correct and 
proper as to enhance the vision, mission and 
strategic objectives of a public higher education 
institution; 
(c) a balance of interest of any stakeholder,  employee, 
student or other interested persons who may be 
affected by the conduct of members of council or the 
executive management, within a framework of 
effective accountability;  
(d) That mechanisms and procedures are established 
and maintained to minimise or avoid potential 
conflicts of interest between the interests of the 
public higher education institution and the personal 
interest of members of council or executive 
management of the public higher education 
institution; 
(e) responsible and ethical conduct by the members of 
council as well as the executive management of the 
public higher education institut ion; 
(f) achieve the maximum level of efficiency of the public 
higher education institution, within an acceptable risk 
profile for the public higher education institution; 
(g) that the council of the public higher education 
institution retains control over the strategic and 
objective direction of the public higher education 
institution, whilst enabling the members of council as 
well as the executive management of the public 
higher education to manage the institution’s 
operations and the achievement of the agreed 
strategic objectives; and 
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(h) compliance with all applicable laws and regulations 




6.3.9 Funds of public higher education institutions 
 
Section 40 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 contains provisions rela ting 
to the funds of a public higher education institution. It is suggested that this 
section also include a reference to loans provided by higher education 
institutions to external commercial entities. 58 Section 40(2)(a) requires 
Council approval in the event of the institution entering into a loan or 
overdraft agreement. Section 39 (3A) of the Higher Education Act of 1997 
provides that if the Council of a public higher education institution fails to 
comply with any provision of the Higher Education Act of 1997 under which 
an allocation from money appropriated by Parliament is paid to the 
institution; or condition subject to which any such allocation is paid to such 
institution, the Minister may in writing request such Council to comply with 
the provisions or condition within a specified period. It is proposed that 
loans should also be declared in the annual report of each public 
institution.59 The latter should also be included in the reporting of each 
public higher education institution. The following amendments to section 
40(3) are thus recommended: 
40(3)(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a public higher 
education may only, by way of a resolution of its 
council, and not taking into account any vacancy that 
may exist, embark on any  
(i) Construction of a permanent building or other 
immovable infrastructural development;  
(ii) Purchase of immovable property;  
(iii) Long-term lease of immovable property; and 
(iv) Provision of a loan to any external party, including 
the companies it holds shares in.  
 
57 The proposed formula tion of  s  38B is  based on  s 60B of  the Banks Act of  1990 .  See 
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .3  above.  
 
58 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2 .3  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the Higher  Educat ion Act of  
1997.  
 
59 In  accordance  with  s  40(3)(b)  of  the Hig her  Educat ion Act of  1997,  the Minis ter’ s 
consen t  i s  al so required under  cer ta in  c ircumstances .  See para 6 .4 .2  be low for  the 




 (b) Any action contemplated in paragraph (a) must be 
approved by the Minister if the value of such 
development or property exceeds five percent of the 
average income of that public higher education 
institution received during the two years immediately 
preceding such action. Loans provided in terms of s 
40(3)(iv) must be reported in the annual financial 
report of each public institution following the 
reporting guidelines provided for public insti tutions. 
 
6.3.10 Ministerial directive  
 
Section 42 of the Higher Education Act of 1997 provides for ministerial 
directives to be issued by the Minister to the Council of a higher education 
institution.60 The 2016 amendments to this section make it clear that plac ing 
a public higher education institution under administration will be an option 
of last resort. These amendments were discussed in Chapter 4 above. In 
the author’s opinion, although section 42(d) requires compliance with all 
laws, it is essential to specifically mention the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.61 The objective of this Act is to combat 
corruption and fraud, and it specifically places an obligation on the Vice-
Chancellor of an institution to report corrupt activities. 62 This Act is 
relevantly recent and compliance with it is not clear. However, it seems that 
the Vice-Chancellors of public institutions are unaware of this obligation, or 
they are unaware that they may be found guilty of an offence in terms of 
this Act for non-compliance.63 It is the author’s view that by creating 
awareness of this Act and the obligation it places on the Vice-Chancellor of 
an institution, more corrupt activities will be reported, thereby improving 
governance at institutions. It is also essential to provide that the Minister 
may issue a directive to a public higher education institution in the event 
that its annual report does not comply with the Reporting Regulations. The 
following amendments to section 42 are, therefore recommended: 
 
60 See Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4 .2(a)  for  a  discussion of  s  42.  
 
61 Here inaf ter  referred to  as PRECCA.  
 
62 Section  34(1)  of  PRECCA.  
 
63 Section  34(2)  of  PRECCA .  
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Section 42(1)(c) should be amended as follows:  
42(1) The Minister may issue a directive to the council of  
a public higher education institution if the Minister, 
after having complied with the provisions of 
subsection (3), has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the Council or the management of that public 
higher education institution 
(a)      ……………………………………………………….. 
(b)      ………………………………………………………..  
(c)    has acted in an unfair, discriminatory or wrongful 
manner towards a person to whom it owes a duty 
under this Act or any other law;  
(d) has failed to comply with any law, and more 
specifically has failed to comply with the provisions 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
(e)    …………………………………………………………….. 
(f) has obstructed the Minister or a person authorised by 
the Minister in performing a function in terms of this 
Act and has failed to comply with the Reporting 
Regulations for public higher education institutions 
for a period of two consecutive reporting periods.  
 
 




The 2007 Reporting Regulations, which preceded the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations, clearly stated that all public higher education institutions must 
adhere to both the regulations and the implementation manual. 64 The 2014 
Reporting Regulations merely state that the implementation manual is a 
guide for such an institution to compile its annual report.65 For the 
avoidance of doubt, the 2014 Reporting Regulations must be clear that all 
public higher education institutions must adhere to and comply with them. 
This formulation is somewhat confusing and ambiguous, as institutions may 
be unsure whether or not they have to adhere to all the principles 
contained in the 2014 Reporting Regulations or whether they are merely 
presented as guidelines. This perceived uncertainty was apparent from the 
review of the annual reports of certain public universities, as discussed 
 
64 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the 2014  Report ing Regula tions .  
 




above.66 These annual reports show that public higher education institutions 
interpreted the 2014 Reporting Regulations differently, which in turn led to 
differences in their reporting on certain matters and the failure to meet 
some requirements. For instance, while it is a requirement of the 2014 
Reporting Regulations that the members of an audit committee be listed, 67 
one of the institutions reviewed listed the members of its audit committee, 
thereby confirming its independence, while the other institution did not list 
its members.68  
 
Both the regulations and the implementation manual should be regarded as 
one document, and it should be clear that higher education institutions 
should comply with the entire document. The implementation manual 
contains important information relating to the annual reporting requirements 
as well as the recommended Council committees. It is, therefore, crucial 
that no confusion relating to compliance with the implementation manual 
should exist. It seems that public higher education institutions perceive the 
2014 Reporting Regulations as merely a guideline rather than imposing a 
statutory framework for compliance. The 2014 Reporting Regulations are 
also at times unclear on what is expected of higher education institutions, 
resulting in confusion and non-compliance.69  
 
The 2014 Reporting Regulations confirm that it is one of the duties of the 
Council of a public higher education institution to ensure compliance with 
relevant laws.70 However, there are no regulatory checks in place to ensure 
 
66 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the review th a t  was  done on three 
annual  reports.  
 
67 See 2014 Reporting Regulations  24  –  25.  
 
68 Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  these requirements o f  the audi t  
committee in  the  2014 Reporting Regula tions.  
 
69 See Chapter  4 ,  par a 4 .4 .4  above for  a  d iscuss ion of  the 2014  Report ing Regula tions .   
 
70 2014 Reporting  Regula tions  16 .  See  a lso s 42(d)  of  Higher  Education  Act o f  1997.  
For  ins tance,  the  Promotion of  Access to  Information  Act  of  2000  (PAIA)  requ ires  tha t  
al l  publ ic  bodies  publ ish a  manual  in  terms of  s  14 descr ibing  the way in  which records  
and informat ion can be  requested from public  bodies.  I t  came to  l ight  that  var ious 
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compliance with legislation.71  The 2014 Reporting Regulations also state 
that “university Councils of public higher education institutions are 
encouraged to comply with relevant standards of accountability for 
governance and management”. It is suggested this should be a 
requirement, and not a recommendation, similar to the listing requirements 
of JSE-listed companies,72 thereby ensuring sound and effective 
governance practices.73  
 
The recommendations regarding the Reporting Regulations follow below. 
The numbering of the paragraphs will correspond with the numbering in the 
Reporting Regulations.74 Existing, unaffected text is only reflected where 
necessary to understand the proposed amendment or to provide context. 75 
Current text that is not repeated is indicated by an ellipsis. For ease of 
reference, the 2014 Reporting Regulations will be attached hereto as 
Annexure A. 
 
universi t ies do in  fac t  not  have these manuals  or  processes in  place or  avai lab le on  
their  websites .  I t  i s  recommended tha t  the DHE T should be  ab le to  monitor  compl iance  
to  appl icable  leg isla t ion .  
 
71 Upon request ing in formation  from the  DHET regard ing the compl iance mechanism 
used,  the ir  response was  that  the funct ion of  the  Univers i ty  Branch a t  the DHET was  to  
analyse  the  annual  repo rts  received to  check for  compliance.   In  the  even t  of  non-
compliance ,  the DHET would wri te  to  the ins t i tut ion involved  and request  them address  
the areas of  non-compliance.  However ,  no in format ion was received  regarding  the  
mechanisms used.  In  l ight  of  th e var ious instances of  possib le non -compliances picked  
up from analysing the  two annual  repor ts ,  i t  seems that  the DHET compl iance 
mechanisms and procedures could be improved.   The DHE T a lso confirmed  tha t  
universi t ies  must  compl y with  a l l  of  the  prov is ion s in  the  2014  Reporting Regulat ions .  
This informat ion i s  as received from Mrs .  Rekha Bennideen on 22 October  2016.  See  
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .4  fo r  a  discussion  of  the 2014 Reporting  Regulat ions .  
 
72 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .2  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the JSE l i s t in g requirements.  
 
73 The JSE l i st ing  requ irements mak e i t  c lear  that  annual  reports must  inc lude a 
narrat ive s tatement of  how a company has appl ied the p r inc iples  contained in  the King 
Code,  and the company must  provide explanation s with  regard  to  any non -compl iance.  
See  s 8 .63 of  the JSE List ing Requirement s .  
 
74 The 2014 Reporting  Regulations,  inc luding  the  implementat ion manual ,  conta in  page  
numbers  on both the top  and bot tom page.  For  the sake of  cla r i ty ,  the reference  to  page 
numbers  of  the regu lat ions re fers to  the page number ind ica ted at  the top of  the  page.  
 
75 The 2014 Reporting  Regulations  makes use o f  a  cap ita l  C when speaking about 
Council ,  therefore the use of  Counci l  with  a  cap ita l  C wi l l  be used for  this port ion of  




(1) REPORTING REGULATIONS 
 




In order to align the Regulations with King IV,76 the King definition should 
be changed as follows: 
 
“King III” means the King Report on Corporate 
Governance in South Africa, 2009, together with the King 
Code of Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2009.” 
King IV” means the King Report on Corporate 




The application of the 2014 Reporting Regulations and what each 
institution must report on must be made clear. The following amendments 
are recommended to avoid any confusion: 
 
(1) These regulations apply to all public higher 
education institutions. 
 (2) Each public higher institution must:  
  (a)  …………………………… 
  (b)  …………………………… 
  (c)  …………………………… 
  (d)  …………………………… 
  (e)  …………………………… 
(f) Submit an annual report containing all the 
reports and other relevant information 
contained in the implementation manual 
attached to these regulations.  
(g) Declare any interest it holds in any company 
that is subject to the Companies Act of 2008 






76 King IV i s  discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3  above.  
 




 (7) ANNUAL REPORT 
 
It is recommended that this paragraph be changed to clarify that the annual 
report must be an integrated report. Further to this, it should be a 
requirement that the names of the members of the committees be reported 
to ensure high levels of independence and that there are increased 
reporting requirements for the remuneration of executive management. 78 
7.  (1)……………………………………………………………  
 (2) …………………………………………………………… 
 (3) …………………………………………………………… 
 (4) Each public higher education institution must 
submit to the Department by 30 June of year three 
hard copies and an electronic version of its 
integrated79 Annual Report for year n-1 which must –  
(a) report on the work of the institution and the extent 
to which the objectives as set out in the Annual 
Performance Plan have been met, and the extent to 
which the institution believes that it has met the 
objectives and goals of its Strategic Plan:  
(b) include the following information for year n-1: 
(i) ……………………………………………………………  
(i) …………………………………………………………..  
(ii) ………………………………………………………… 
(iii) ………………………………………………… 
(iv) …………………………………………………  
(v)  …………………………………………………………  
(vi) the report of council on risk assessment and 
management of risk, which must include the names 
of the members of the Risk Committee;     
(vii) …………………………………………………  
(viii) ………………………………………………  
(ix) ……………………………………………… 
(x) the statement of the Audit Committee on how it has 
fulfilled its duty, which must include a list of the 
names of the members of the Audit Committee;  
(xi) …………………………………………………  
(aa)………………………………………………………..  
(bb)the annualised gross remuneration for Executive 
Management is disclosed in a note showing the 
gross remuneration paid to each individual in their 
executive capacity and separated gross 
remuneration paid to him/her by the institution for 
other services. The remuneration must also include 
any bonuses received by executive management 
and any other benefits like housing, car, cell phone 
and travel allowances. 
 
78 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  where the commit tees  conta ined in  the 2014 Reporting 
Regula tions  are  discussed.  
 




(cc)the gross remuneration of each council member 
paid to him or her for his work as a council member 
disclosed in a note to the annual financial 
statements. This must include any bonuses paid to 






(8) (1) The Department developed a manual to the 
Reporting Regulations as a guide to assist public 
higher education institutions for with compiling 
their annual reports, annexed hereto as Annexure 
A. All institutions must comply with the 
implementation manual and all the requirements 
therein and must be reflected in the annual report 
of each public higher education institution.81 
 
 
6.4.2 Recommended changes to the implementation manual of the 
2014 Reporting Regulations  
 
The implementation manual in the 2014 Reporting Regulations is discussed 
above.82 It is suggested that the way in which this manual is drafted must be 
changed to minimise any confusion. The manual must make it clear that the 
annual reports of all public higher education institutions must contain all 
the information required by the Regulations and that this information will be 
verified for compliance by the DHET. The recommended changes to the 
implementation manual are set out below.  Only those parts of the manual 
affected by the suggested recommendations and changes are referred to. 
The proposed amendments are indicated by way of underlining, while the 
deletions are indicated in strikethrough. Existing unaffected text is only 
reflected where necessary to understand the proposed amendment or to 
provide context. Existing text that is not repeated is indicated by an ellipsis. 
 
80 This paragraph can be found in  the 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  9  –  10.  
 
81 This paragraph can be found in  the 2014 Report ing Regulat ions  11.  
 











The introduction of the implementation manual should be amended to 
include reference to the International Integrated Reporting Framework 
(IIRF), the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as well as 
King IV.83 It is therefore recommended that the introduction be amended as 
follows:  
Public higher education institutions in South Africa enjoy 
statutory independence and considerable statutory 
independence and autonomy. This independence makes 
it important that the structures of governance and 
management of these institutions should account to both 
internal and external stakeholders in a consistent, 
transparent and prescribed manner. The developments in 
reporting and the emphasis on “harmonisation,” both 
nationally and internationally, require that reporting 
should comply with international generally accepted 
practice. according to the IFRS. The reporting for all 
higher education institutions must be done in terms of the 
International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF), the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and 
the King IV Report on Corporate Governance (King IV).84 
 
2. PURPOSE OF THE MANUAL 
 
The purpose of the manual should make it clear that high standards of 
reporting are required instead of minimum standards. By increasing the 
levels of reporting, the governance practices of higher education 
institutions will have to improve. Further to this, the wording should be 
clear that all higher education institutions must comply with both the 
 
83 King IV i s  discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  pa ra  4 .4 .3  above,  which also included a discussion 
of  the IIRF.  
 
84 As  above,  the  changes  and recommendations a re indica ted by way of  underl in ing,  
whi le  the de le t ions are indica ted by way of  s tr ikethrough of  tex t .  In  order  to  avo id 
rewr it ing  the  whole manual ,  on ly the paragraphs  affec ted by changes and amendments 




regulations and the implementation manual to avoid any confusion as to 
what must be reported. It is therefore recommended that the purpose 
statement be amended as follows: 
 
The primary purpose of this manual is to provide 
guidance on the format and content of the annual report, 
and to provide a framework for reporting by public higher 
education institutions aimed at ensuring minimum high 
standards of reporting by governance structures and by 
management. The manual constitutes the determination 
of the Minister of Higher Education and Training in terms 
of the Higher Education Act of 1997 (Act No. 101 of 
1997), as amended. These regulations and the 
implementation manual are issued in terms of section 69 
of the Higher Education Act of 1997 and must be 
complied with by all public higher education institutions. 85 
 
4. GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC HIGHER 
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS  
 
It is necessary to amend this paragraph to align it with the principles of 
King IV. 
Conditions confronting higher education institutions have 
become more demanding with regard to good 
management over the past two decades. Constantly 
dwindling opportunities for acquiring essential resources 
and, in recent years, increasing competition among 
public higher education institutions from a growing sector 
of private higher education institutions, are but a few 
examples of factors that have contributed to a new and 
challenging environment. 
 
Compliance with the demands on public higher education 
institutions to adopt the best governance, financial and 
general management practices under these increasingly 
difficult economic conditions are largely dependent on 
the availability of financial and other relevant information 
in accordance with best practices.  
 
Public higher education institutions must demonstrate 
good governance, sustainability and corporate 
citizenship. King III  King IV describes these in the 
following terms: 
• Good governance is essentially about ethical and 
effective leadership. Leaders should rise to the 
challenges of modern governance. Such leadership is 
characterised by the ethical values of integrity, 
competence, responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency and based on moral duties. 
 




Responsible leaders direct institutional strategies and 
operations with a view to achieving sustainable 
economic, social and environmental performance; 86 
 
• Sustainability is the primary moral and economic 
imperative of the 21st century. It is one of the most 
important sources of both opportunities and risks for 
public higher education institutions. Nature, society 
and public higher education institutions are 
interconnected in complex ways that should be 
understood by decision-makers. Most importantly, 
current incremental changes towards sustainability are 
not sufficient - there needs to be a fundamental shift in 
the way public higher education institutions act and 
organise themselves; and 
 
The concept of corporate citizenship which flows from the 
fact that a public higher education institution is a juristic 
person and should operate in a sustainable manner. 
Sustainability considerations are rooted in the South 
African Constitution which is the basic social contract 
that South Africans have entered into. The Constitution 
imposes responsibilities upon individuals and juristic 
persons for the realisation of the most fundamental 
rights.87 The Annual Report should demonstrate an 
institution's commitment to these and its achievements in 
what can be referred to as an integrated report.  
 
The governance responsibilities of Council are to:  
• provide effective leadership based on an ethical 
foundation; 
• ensure that a public higher education institution is 
seen to be a responsible corporate citizen;  
• ensure that public higher education institutions' ethics 
are managed effectively;  
• act as the focal point for and custodian of governance 
in the institution; 
• understand that strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability are inseparable;  
• ensure that there is an effective and independent audit 
committee; 
• be responsible for the governance of risk, ensure that 
there is an effective risk-based internal audit and 
report on the effectiveness of public higher education 
institutions;' 
• ensure systems of internal controls; 
• ensure that the institution’s assurance services and 
functions enable an effective control environment; 
• be responsible for information technology (IT) 
technology and information governance;  
• comply and ensure compliance with the laws; 
• ensure that the institution remunerates its employees 
fairly, responsibly and transparently;  
 
86 King IV Pr incip le 1 .  
 




• appreciate that stakeholders' perceptions affect public 
higher education institutions' reputations;  ensure that 
the institution adopts a stakeholder-inclusive approach 
that balances the needs, interests and expectations of 
material stakeholders in the best interests of the 
institution; 
• promote responsible investment;  
• promote good governance and the creation of value by 
the companies in which it invests;88 
• ensure the integrity of public higher education 
institutions' integrated report; and 
• act in the best interests of public higher education 
institutions.89 
 
The promotion of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and 
ethical behaviour in accordance with relevant legislation 
depends on adequate management measures for, 
amongst others, the planning, budgeting, authorisation, 
control and evaluation of the procurement and utilisation 
of resources. At the same time, it is essential for every 
public higher education institution to maintain the quality 
of its primary activities of education (teaching and 
learning) and research. 
 
It has become important for public higher education 
institutions' information systems to support ‘best 
practices’ in general and sound financial management. In 
respect of the latter, it is necessary to facilitate more 
flexible financial planning and reporting processes in 
order to enable the management of a public higher 
education institution to budget, allocate and employ its 
financial resources to the best advantage of the 
institution and with the minimum of restrictions.  
 
It is the responsibility of a Vice-Chancellor, through the 
executive management team, to institute these 
management and operational measures.  
 
It is the responsibility of the Council to ensure that an 
institution's primary operations, and its management and 
administration, function accordingly. 90  
 
5. GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE 
 
Although fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill exist in terms of the 
common law, it is important that Council members and the executive 
 
88 King IV  pr inc iple  17,  th is  i s  importan t  where inst i tu t ions invest  in  commercial  
companies .  
 
89 Summary of  King  IV ,  pr incip le 1  –  17.  
 




management be aware of the duties that they owe to the institution. 
Furthermore, this paragraph must also be aligned with King IV.91 The 
following amendments are suggested with regards to governance 
compliance: 
The Council is responsible for governance, and Executive 
Management is responsible for the effective management 
and administration of the institution. Both the Council and 
the executive management owe fiduciary duties and 
duties of care and skill towards their institution. The 
Council is responsible for governance, while the 
executive management is responsible for effective and 
ethical management and administration of the institution.  
The integrated annual report should show how, and to 
the extent to which, the Council and executive 
management have discharged these responsibilities. King 
III contains a set of recommendations for listed 
companies. In regard to listed companies King 
IIIrecognizes that there is no “one size fits all” set of 
rules. For that reason, it sets out its recommendations 
and invites all organisations to consider these. Listed 
companies are required to follow and “apply or explain” 
governance framework; where the board does not accept 
a recommendation, the onus is on the board to explain 
(to itself and to its shareholders” why it does not. 
University Councils of public higher educations are 
encouraged to do the same as appropriate to the size, 
nature and complexity of their organization.  King IV 
contains a list of recommended principles and practices 
for all organisations, including higher education 
institutions. King IV advocates an ‘apply and explain’ 
approach. Therefore, all public higher education 
institutions must apply this approach in their organisation 
as appropriate to the size, nature and complexity of their 
institution. 
 
In reporting, each institution:  
 
(a) Is encouraged to must comply with relevant standards of  
accountability for governance and management as 
recommended by King III King IV; and 
 
(b) In its financial reporting is required to comply with the 
standards as codified in the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), though the form and presentation of an 
annual report must be adopted to acknowledge the different 
purposes for which funds are held and used in public higher 
education institutions, including transparent reporting for 
loans provided by the institutions to commercial companies in 
which the institutions hold interest.92 
 
91 King IV i s  discussed in  Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3  above.  
 
92 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .4  above.  Thi s paragraph is  in  accordance wi th  the 2014 





It is critical that both Council members and members of the executive 
management to understand that they are accountable for their actions and 
decisions. Furthermore, their duties must be exercised in terms of a 
delegation of authority. It is also necessary to align this paragraph with 
the principles of King IV. The following recommendations are made below 
with regards to the accountability paragraph: 
Individuals or groups of individuals who assume fiduciary 
and/or managerial responsibilities by means of mandates 
or delegated powers are responsible for giving regular 
account of the results of exercising those powers. In 
discharging this obligation, it is essential that this form of 
reporting not be restricted to events, facts and 
achievements in abstract terms, but provides the means 
whereby these can be assessed and measured against 
projected outcomes, plans and targets. 
 
Council members and members of the executive 
management must exercise their duties in terms of the 
delegation of authority approved by the Council. Each 
Council member as well as members of the executive 
management must exercise their duties with the 
necessary accountability. 
 
In public higher education institutions, the following 
delegated powers and responsibilities are provided for in 
terms of the Higher Education Act of 1997 (as amended):  
• The duly constituted Council:  
 
The Council must govern a public higher education 
institution, subject to the Higher Education Act, 
section 27 (1) – (9 12) and the institutional statute. 93  
 
• The duly constituted Senate: 
 
The Senate is accountable to the Council for the 
academic and research functions of a public higher 
education institution and must perform such other 
functions as may be delegated or assigned to it by the 
Council in terms of section 28 (1) – (4), and  
 
as the core function of a public higher education 
institution is teaching and research, the Senate’s 





93 Recommendat ions  to  amend s  27 were made above to  include more sub -sections;  




• The duly appointed Vice-Chancellor: 
 
The Vice-Chancellor is responsible for the 
management and administration of a public higher 
education institution in terms of section 30.  
 
Management and administration will encompass risk 
and opportunity management; the governance of 
information technology technology and information; 
compliance; risk-based internal audit and integrated 
reporting in line with the relevant provisions of King 
IV. 
 
• The duly appointed Institutional Forum: 
 
The Institutional Forum of a public higher education 
institution must advise the Council on issues affecting 
the institution; and perform such functions as 
determined by the Council in terms of section 31. The 
Council must consider the advice provided by the 
institutional forum and provide written reasons if the 
advice is not accepted.94 
 
Each of these structures and the Vice-Chancellor has 
the obligation to account for their actions under their 
mandates in a transparent way.95 
 
7. CONTENT AND FORMAT OF ANNUAL REPORTS  
 
The introduction to this paragraph as well as the prov isions of paragraph 
(a) in respect of the performance assessment report are, in the author’s 
view, clear and should be retained, except that references to King III 
should be replaced by King IV. It is recommended that the content and 
format of the annual reports which include the reports on governance, must 
comply with the recommendations of King IV and the principles of good 
governance and compliance, as indicated below. Furthermore, an 
additional report relating to the interest held by institutions in companies 
should also be required. It is therefore recommended that this paragraph 
be amended as follows: 
The following is a representation or example of the 
content and format of the Annual Report that each public 
higher education institution is required to submit. 
 
 
94 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .3 .2(b.3)  for  a  discussion of  the inst i tut iona l  forum.  This 
recommendat ion i s  made  in  terms of  sec tion  31(1A),  which now prov ides for  this 
requirement.  
 
95 This paragraph is  in  accordance  with  the 2014 Repor ting Regulat ions  17 –  18.  
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References in bold type are to page numbers in the King 
III published report. References in bold type are to the 
principles of King IV. All public higher education 
institutions are expected to must comply with its 
applicable recommendations. The various references are 
for the reader's convenience and are not intended to 
convey the only content of the report that is applicable to 
a public higher education institution. 
 
The reports on governance and operations must 
comprise of the following: 
 
• Performance assessment report; 
• Report by the Chairperson of the Council;  
• Council's statement on governance;  
• Council's statement on sustainability;  
• Senate's report to the Council; 
• Institutional Forum's report to the Council;  
• Vice-Chancellor's report on 
management/administration; 
• Report on internal administrative/operational 
structures and controls; 
• Report on risk exposure assessment and the 
management thereof; 
• Annual financial review; 
• Report of the audit committee; and 
• Report on Transformation; and 
• Report on the interest held by the institution in any 
commercial companies.  
 
(b) Report of Chairperson of Council 
 
Some amendments and additions are suggested here to ensure compliance 
with the principles of King IV.96  
 
The Report of the Chairperson of Council would 
include: (King III Chapters 1-9 King IV principles 1 – 
17). 
 
This is an integrated report that conveys adequate and 
concise information about the operations of a publ ic 
higher education institution, its sustainability and 
financial reporting. It should must include a performance 
review encompassing economic, social and 
environmental aspects, and should not confine itself to 
past issues but should provide forward looking 
information to place the reported results and performance 
in context and to show transparency;  
 
King III King IV recommends the following: 
 
 
96 See King IV princip les 1  –  17.  This i s  discussed  i n  Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3  above.  
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• Effective Ethical Leadership and Corporate 
Citizenship; 
• Governance of Risk; 
• Governance of Information Technology; Technology 
and Information; 
• Compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards and 
governance; 
• Governing Stakeholder Relationships; Stakeholder-
inclusive relationships; 
• Remuneration of Councilors dealing with the policies, 




Council must report on risk management in its report and 
particularly with regard to the following:  
 
• Council is required to make a statement on risk 
management wherein they comment on how a public 
higher education institution has dealt with the issue of 
risk management. It should provide a statement that 
the Council is responsible for the total process of risk 
management as well as forming its opinion on the 
effectiveness of the process. Council should must 
disclose the system that it has put in place to support 
its opinion, including independent and objective 
reviews of the risk management process within a 
public higher education institution.  
• ………………………………………………………………  
• ……………………………………………………………..  
Councils should give due consideration and must report 
on the following: 
• ………………………………………………………………  
• ………………………………………………………………  
• ………………………………………………………………  
• A statement regarding how contracts are managed, the 
process of managing service level agreements and the 
monitoring of suppliers’ performance and workplace ethics, 
including the implementation of penalties.  
• A statement on whether or not there was any contravention of 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004 (PRECCA) relating to any corrupt activities in terms of 
contracts and tenders as contained in section 12 and 13 of 
PRECCA. In the event of any contravention of PRECCA, 
whether the institution has reported this in terms of PRECCA 
and what other measures were taken by the institution against 
any employee or Council member. 
• Council should must indicate in this report the number of 
requests for information received and the reasons for refusals 
of relevant requests for information that were lodged with a 
public higher education institution in terms of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act of 2000;  
• …………………………………………………………………………  
• Councils ’ reports must indicate the processes, procedures and 
systems that their institutions have implemented to safeguard 
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personal information in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act of 2013.97 
This report must be signed by the Chairperson of the Council.  
 
(c) Council’s statement on governance  
         (King III King IV Code of Governance Principles) 
 
A positive statement should be made where the Code of 
governance principles has been applied. Where the 
Council decides not to apply a specific principle and/or 
recommendation, this should be fully explained. It must 
further be explained how the principles were applied. 98 
The Council is required to provide an account of its 
governance by means of a separate governance 
statement, an example of which appears below, in which 
the detail of governance structures, responsibilities and 
procedures are provided. 
 
Council must approve this statement 
………………………………………………99 
 
(i)     Council and Council Committees 
(King III Chapter 1 principle 1.1 King IV Part 5.1 principle 1) 
The following statement is provided to assist readers of the 
Annual Report to obtain an understanding of the governance 
structures and procedures applied by a public higher education  
institution's Council: 
 
Each public higher education institution must comply with King IV. 
A public higher education institution is committed to the principles 
of discipline, transparency, integrity, competence, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility, as 
advocated in the King III IV Report. Accordingly, the Council 
endorses, and during the period under review has applied the 
Code of Practices and Conduct and the Code of Ethical Behaviour 
and Practice as set out in the King III IV Report. In supporting this 
Code, the Council recognises the need to conduct the business of 
a public higher education institution with integrity and in 
accordance with generally accepted practices. Monitoring the 
public higher education institutions' compliance with the Code 
forms part of the mandate of a public higher education 






97 This paragraph is  in  accordance  with  the 2014 Reporting Regulat ions  19 –  21.  
 
98 Reference to  the “apply  or  explain”  approach has been de leted and  r eplaced with  the 
“apply and explain” in  l ine with  King IV ;  see Chapter  4 ,  pa ra  4 .4 .4  above.  
 
99 This paragraph is  in  accordance  with  the 2014 Reporting Regulat ions  22.  
 
100 This paragraph is  in  accordance  with  the 2014 Reporting Regulat ions  22.  
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   Council 
(King III King IV Chapter 1 Part 5.1 principle 1 – 3; 1.1; 2.16; 
2.18; 2.22; 2.23   Part 5.3 principle 7; 8 and 9) 
  
The Council must comprises academic and non-academic 
persons appointed in terms of the Statutes of a public 
higher education institution of whom the majority (at least 
60 per cent) are neither employees nor students of the 
institution. (A list of Councillors with their representative 
constituency to be attached, indicating whether or not 
they are internal or external to the public higher 
education institution, as well as an arithmetic summary 
indicating the percentage of internal vs. external 
members to be shown). 
 
The report should include a statement:  
 
(a) that the role of the Chairperson of the Counci l is 
separate from the role of a public higher education 
institution's chief executive, the Vice Chancellor.  
(b) on the proposed length of tenure of the Chairperson. 
 
Matters reserved to the Councils for decision-making are 
set out in the Statutes of public higher education 
institutions by custom and in terms of the Higher 
Education Act (101 of 1997). The Council is responsible 
for the ongoing strategic direction of a public higher 
education institution, approval of major developments 
and the receipt of regular reports from management on 
the day-to-day operation of its business. The Council:  
 
(a)    meets four times a year and; 
(b) has several committees, including a Remuneration 
Committee, a Finance Committee, a Risk Committee, a 
Council Membership Committee, Planning and Recourses 
committee, a Social and Ethics Committee, a Committee 
on Commercialisation and Innovation,  an Information 
Technology Committee, a Governance and Compliance 
Committee and an Audit Committee.  
 
In the event that there is no separate Risk Committee, 
there must be an explicit statement to this effect and 
clarification as to how Council addresses the issue of risk 
i.e. which committee of Council is tasked with addressing 
the issues of risk. 
 
A list of Council and sub-committee meetings is attached 
on page xx. All of these committees are formally 
constituted with terms of reference and are comprised of 
a majority of members of the Council who are neither 
employees nor students of a public higher education 
institution. Each report must list the names of the 
members of these committees. The committees 
constituted in terms of these regulations must comply 
with principle 8 of King IV. 
 
The Council should: 
 
(a) indicate in this report that evaluation of the 
performance appraisals of the Council and its committees 
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has been conducted in compliance with principle 9 of 
King IV. 
(b) include a table indicating the composition of the 
Council; length of service (including service on a 
previous Council of a public higher education institution 
merged to form a new institution) and age of each 
Councillor; which sub-committees they sit on; number of 
Council meetings and committee meetings held and their 
respective attendances at these meetings; and must 
declare any significant directorships held in companies.101 
 
Remuneration Committee 
(King III King IV Chapter 2 principle 2.25 Part 5.3 
principle 8 recommended practices 65 – 67; and Part 
5.4 principle 14)  
 
The remuneration committee should must issue a 
remuneration report in compliance with King IV, principle 
14, recommended practices 32, to explain a public higher 
education institution's remuneration philosophy policy 
and how it has been implemented. The remuneration 
policy must comply with King IV, principle 8, 
recommended principle 50.  The remuneration committee 
would typically disclose the remuneration policies 
followed and the strategic objectives that it seeks to 
achieve. The committee typically explains the policy on 
base pay, including the use of appropriate benchmarks. A 
policy to pay salaries on average at above the median 
requires special justification. 
 
The members of this committee must be non-executive 
members of the governing body, with the majority being 
independent non-executive members of the governing 
body.  
 
The remuneration committee's specific terms of reference 
include direct authority for, or consideration and 
recommendation to the Council of, matters relating to:  
 
• amongst others general staff policies, remuneration 
and prerequisites, bonuses, executive remuneration, 
members of Council remuneration and fees;  
• service contracts and retirement funds including 
post-retirement medical aid funding; 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities and 
functions; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings; and  
 




• whether the committee is satisfied, that it has fulfilled 
its responsibilities in accordance with its  terms of 
reference for the reporting period.102 
 
The definition of gross remuneration is to be found in 
Section 1 of these Regulations. All components of this 
definition must be considered and reported on by the 
remuneration committee. 
 
Any material payments that may be considered ex gratia 
in nature should be fully explained and justified.  
 
Disclosure is typically must be made of the performance 
parameters in respect of performance bonuses and the 
methods of evaluation of performance and determination 
of such bonuses. Policies regarding executive service 
contracts should must be disclosed in the annual 
remuneration report, including the period of the contract 
and notice conditions. 
 
The note to the annual financial statements which 
reflects executive remuneration together with the 
comparative figure for the prior year must be approved by 
the Remuneration Committee. This includes fees paid to 




(King IV Chapter 3 principle 3.1; 3.2; 3.4; 3.7; 3.8; 3.9 
part 5.3; principle 8, recommended practice 50 – 59; 
 
The Council, operating through its Audit Committee, 
provides oversight of the reporting process as 
customised for the individual institution. 
 
The Audit Committee, whose members must be 
independent, non-executive members of the Council 
whose chairperson and Members must either be 
members of Council or not members of Council  but 
specialists in the field of financial  literacy and skills, was 
established x (number) of years ago. The Audit 
Committee has a minimum of x number of members. All 
members of the Audit Committee are be independent of 
the public higher education institution and are not 
employed by the public higher education institution. 
Members of the Audit Committee must have the 
following: combined qualif ications and/or experience in 
business: X, Y, Z....  
 
Both the internal and external auditors have unrestricted 
access to the Audit Committee, which ensures that their 
independence is in no way impaired. The Audit 
 
102 The recommended additions are in line with both King IV and support the terms of reference provided for 
in the 2014 Reporting Regulations. 
 




Committee must have unrestricted access to the Council. 
Meetings are held at least twice a year and are attended 
by the external and internal auditors and appropriate 
members of the executive management. The Audit 
Committee should meet annually with the internal and 
external auditors respectively,  without the members of 
executive management being present, to facilitate an 
exchange of views and concerns that may not be 
appropriate for discussion in an open forum.104 The Audit 
Committee operates in accordance with written terms of 
reference, confirmed by the Council, which provide 
assistance to the Council with regard to:  
 
• ensuring compliance with applicable legislation and 
the requirements of regulatory authorities;  
• consideration of sustainability matters in the 
integrated report; 
• monitoring the appropriateness of a public higher 
education institution’s combined assurance model;  
• ensuring arrangements are in place for combined 
assurance and the Committee’s views on its 
effectiveness; 
• concluding and reporting to stakeholders on an 
annual basis on the effectiveness of internal 
financial controls;  
• matters relating to financial and internal control, 
accounting policies, reporting and disclosure;  
• reviews at least annually the internal auditor's 
assessment of risks and approves the internal audit 
plan to ensure that audits are appropriately 
conducted to mitigate the risks identified;  
• reviewing the quality of the performance of the 
external auditor, with reference to audit quality 
indicators; 
• monitoring compliance with internal and external 
audit policies;  
• monitoring compliance with the Regulations;  
• the activities, scope, adequacy and effectiveness of 
the internal audit function and audit plans;  
• the assessment of all areas of financial risk and the 
management thereof;  
• review/approval of external audit plans, findings, 
annual audit management letters, problems, reports 
and fees;  
• discussing significant matters that the Audit 
Committee has considered in relation to the annual 
financial statements, and how these were 
addressed; 
• providing its views on the effectiveness of the Vice-
Chancellor and the arrangements for internal audit;  
• providing its views on the effectiveness of the Chief 
Financial Officer / Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Finance) of the institution and the finance function;  
• after due deliberation and discussion with the 
external auditors, recommends the annual financial 
statements to the finance committee;  
 
104 See King IV princip le 8 ,  recommended pract i ce 58.  
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• follows up on a regular basis that all items raised  in 
the annual audit management letter and interim 
internal audit reports are addressed, and that 
actions previously taken to address these issues 
are still in place and effective - including points 
raised in previous reports and deemed to have 
been previously resolved; so as to ensure that the 
problem has not recurred;  
• review and recommend to the Council financial 
policies and any changes thereto;  
• is responsible for ensuring that policies are in place 
to ensure the protection of a public higher 
education institution's assets from loss or 
unauthorised use and reporting to the Department 
on material losses arising from unauthorised or 
illegal actions and actions taken to remedy the 
situation. (Material meaning: Information is material 
if omitting it or misstating it could influence 
decisions that users make on the basis of financial 
information about a specific reporting entity). In 
other words, materiality is an entity-specific (i.e. 
determined by the Audit Committee or Council) 
aspect of relevance based on the nature or 
magnitude, or both, of the items to which the 
information relates in the context of an individual 
entity's financial report;  
• in the event that a public higher education 
institution's audit report is qualified, the audit 
committee makes a statement to that effect and 
explains the reasons for the qualification and 
outlines in reasonable detail what actions have 
been implemented to ensure the immediate 
reversal of this state;  
• in the event that a public higher education 
institution's audit report includes a statement of 
emphasis of matter, the audit committee makes a 
statement to that effect and explains the reasons 
for the statement of emphasis of matter and 
outlines in reasonable detail what actions have 
been implemented to ensure the immediate 
reversal or correction of this state;  
• compliance with a public higher education 
institution's Ethics and Corporate Citizenship 
initiatives (replacing the old "Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct"); 
• compliance with public higher education 
institution's Code of Ethics; and 
• in the event of a public higher education institution 
having no credible internal audit function, an 
explicit statement as to this fact needs to be 
accompanied by how the audit committee have 
satisfied themselves that all the necessary controls 
and procedures have been adhered to.  
 
A statement must be included to confirm that the  Audit 
Committee is satisfied that the external auditor is 
independent of the institution. The statement should 




• the policy and controls that address the provision of 
non-audit services by the external auditor, and the 
nature and extent of such services rendered during 
the financial year; 
• the tenure of the external audit firm, and in the 
event of the firm having been involved in a merger 
or acquisition, the tenure of its predecessor firm 
must be included; 
• the rotation of the designated external audit 
partner; and 
• significant changes in the management of the 
organisation during the external audit firm’s tenure 
which may mitigate the attendant risk of familiarity 
between the external auditor and the management.  
 
 
The audit committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities;  
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 105 
 
 
The composition of the committee, with academic 
qualifications, to be attached indicating internal or 
external to a public higher education institution and the 
period for which they have served. An arithmetic 
summary indicating the percentage of internal vs. 
external members (to be shown) as well as the number of 
meetings held and members' attendances. 106 
 
Risk Committee 
(King IV Chapter 3 (3.8) and Chapter 4 (4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 
4.6; 4.8; 4.9 Principle 8, recommended practice 50, 65 
– 67, Part 5.4, Principle 11, recommended practices 1 
- 9) 
 
Each public higher education institution should must have 
a risk committee in some form. The risk committee may 
be combined with the audit committee. In the event that 
the risk committee and the audit committee are separate, 
the institution should consider one or more members to 
have joint membership of both committees. The 
chairperson of this committee must be an independent, 
non-executive member. The risk committee considers all 
issues of risk which may result in some form of exposure 
for a public higher education institution and not  just 
 
105 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV pr inc iple  8 ,  recommended pract ice 50.  See 
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3(b)  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the audit  commit tee.  
 
106 This i s  in  accordance w ith  the 2014 Report ing Regu la tions  24 26.  
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financial risk. The Council's integrated report will indicate 
how this committee is constituted and its reporting line.  
 
The risk committee must maintain a reporting system that 
enables it to monitor changes in a public higher 
education institution's risk profile and gain an assurance 
that risk management is effective.  
 
The risk committee establishes materiality levels and 
determines a public higher education institution's risk 
appetite. It then considers all possible risks, their 
likelihood, and where applicable, establishes risk 
mitigation procedures. They also ensure that there is a 
risk management system, and a risk register is 
maintained. The register is constantly monitored and 
updated. 
 
NB: Relevant detail of all other Council sub-committees 
concerned with strategic, policy or financial matters are 
typically included. 
 
The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance of those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 107 
 
IT Technology and information governance committee 
(King IV, part 5.4, principle 12, recommended practice 
10 – 17) 
 
This would typically include the following:  This 
committee would be responsible for the following:  
 
• statement that the Council is responsible for 
technology and information the information 
technology (IT) governance and how the Council 
has fulfilled this role; and that management is 
responsible for the implementation of a IT 
technology and information governance framework; 
• comments on the alignment of IT information 
technology with the performance and sustainability 
objectives of the public higher education institution;  
• comments Confirmation that the Council monitors 
and evaluates significant IT information technology 
investment and expenditure; 
 
107 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV ,  pr inc iple 8 ,  recommended pract ice  50.  See 
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3(c)  for  a  discussion  of  r i sk  governance .  See fur ther  the 2014 
Reporting Regulat ions  26 –  27.  
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• how IT information technology is an integral part of 
the public higher education institution's risk 
management; 
• monitoring that IT information technology assets 
are managed effectively; and 
• comments that/how on how the Risk Committee and 
Audit Committee (if/as appropriate) assist the 
Council in carrying out its IT information technology 
responsibilities. 
• integration of people, technologies, information and 
processes across the organisation; 
• integration of technology and information risks into 
organisation-wide risk management; 
• proactive monitoring of intelligence to identify and 
respond to incidents, including cyber-attacks and 
adverse social media events; 
• management of the performance of, and the risks 
relating to, third-party and outsourced service 
providers; 
• the assessment of value delivered to the 
organisation through significant investments in 
technology and information, including the 
evaluation of projects throughout their life cycles 
and of significant operational expenditure;  
• the responsible disposal of obsolete technology and 
information in a way that has regard to 
environmental impact and information security;  
• ethical and responsible use of technology and 
information; 
• compliance with relevant laws;108 
 
The following should be disclosed in relation to 
technology and information: 
 
• an overview of the arrangements for governing and 
managing technology and information;  
• key areas of focus during the reporting period, 
including objectives, significant changes in policy, 
significant acquisitions and remedial actions taken 
as a result of major incidents;  
• actions taken to monitor the effectiveness of 
technology and information management and how 
the outcomes were addressed; and 
• planned areas of focus.109 
 
The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities;  
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
 
108 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV,  pr inc iple  12 ,  recommended pract ice 13.  
 




• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings; 
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 110 
 
The following new committees are recommended and should be added to 
the revised Reporting Regulations:111 
Committee on commercialisation and innovation 
 
A mandatory Council committee must be established to 
deal with all matters relating to commercialisation and 
innovation, including the registration of companies or the 
buying of shares in such companies.112  
 
The membership of this committee should comprise 
members of the executive management of the higher 
education institution, members of the technology transfer 
office of the institution as well as external members with 
the required business, financial and legal expertise.  
 
This committee will be responsible for the following:  
 
• protecting the commercial interests of the institution 
as well as the intellectual property rights of the 
institution. This will include generating third stream 
income to supplement government funding received 
by the institution; 
• making recommendations relating to the 
incorporation of companies to assist the institution 
in carrying out its responsibilities;  
• ensuring that companies are not registered for the 
sole purpose of housing intellectual property that 
was created within the institution, thereby 
contravening the Intellectual Property Rights from 
Publicly Financed Research and Development Act 
of 2008; 
 
110 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV  pr inc iple  8 ,  recommended pract ice 50.  See 
Chapter  4 ,  para  4 .4 .3  (c)  for  a  d iscuss ion  of  technology and informat ion.  See the  2014 
Reporting Regulat ions  27.  
 
111 These should be inser ted af ter  “ technology and information commit tee” on page 27  
of  the 2014 Report ing Regulat ions.  
 
112 In  terms of  s  6  of  the  Intel lec tua l  Proper ty  Rights  f rom Public al ly  Financed Research 
and Development  Act  of  2008 (IPR Act) ,  each  public  high er  education  inst i tu t ion  must  
es tabl i sh an off ice of  technology transfer .  The la t ter  off ice is  responsib le for  
undertak ing the obl iga t ions o f  the inst i tu t ion  in  te rms of  the IPR Act.  Sec tion 7(1)  
confirms tha t  the  function of  this  off ice  must  be performed by appropr iately  qualif ied 
personnel  who have  in terdiscip linary knowledge,  qua lif icat ions  and  expert i se  in  the 
ident if ica t ion,  pro tection,  management  and commerc ial i sat ion of  int el lec tual  proper ty  
and in te l lec tua l  proper ty  transact ions.  Sect ion 7(2)  provid es a  l i st  of  functions tha t  th is  
off ice  must  a t tend to .  See  para  6 .3 .3  (pr inc ip le 9)  below concerning  the proposed  




• ensuring that proper policies and procedures are in 
place with regards to any commercial  and 
innovation activities; 
 
The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 113 
 
Social and ethics committee 
(King IV part 5.3, principle 8, recommended practice 
50, 68 – 70) 
 
It is a requirement for all public higher education 
institutions to establish a social and ethics committee, 
either as a standalone committee or as part of another 
committee.  
 
The members of this committee must comprise both 
internal and external members, with a majority being 
external members of the institution.  
 
The committee will be responsible for the following:  
 
• upholding, monitoring and reporting on 
organisational ethics, responsible corporate 
citizenship, sustainable development and 
stakeholder inclusivity;114  
• monitoring the university’s activities with regard to 
legislation, relevant legal requirements and 
prevailing codes of best practices in social and 
economic development; 
• good corporate citizenship, the environment, health 
and public safety;  
• consumer relationships with students and labour 
and employment to draw matters within its mandate 
to the attention of the university Council and 
management;  
• reviewing and enforcing policies and procedures as 
far as possible and reporting to the Council on a 
regular basis on matters within its mandate and 
especially drawing Council’s attention to any risks 
that have been identified.115  
 
113 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV pr inc iple  8 ,  recommended  pract ice 50.  
 
114 King IV 47.  
 
115 See Chapter  4 ,  para 4 .4 .3(b)  for  a  d iscuss ion of  the soc ia l  and eth ics commit tee .  
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The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period.116 
 
Tender and procurement committee 
 
Each public higher education inst itution must have a 
tender and procurement committee. Separate 
procurement and tender committees may be provided for, 
but policies and procedures for both procurement and 
tenders must be provided for, and these documents must 
be available to the public to ensure transparency.  
 
The tender and procurement committee will be 
responsible for the following:  
 
• credible, fair, equitable and transparent policies 
and processes relating to the awarding of tenders;  
• a clear procurement process for becoming a vendor 
at the institution;   
• declarations of any conflicts of interest during the 
tender and procurement processes;  
• the process to be followed in the event of approval 
of a preferred service provider;  
• ensuring that the correct documents and contracts 
are used during each of the processes;  
• confirming the signature authority for both tender 
and procurement contracts;  
• confirming the correct process for the issuing of a  
purchase order; 
• confirming the purchasing thresholds;  
• confirming the process for obtaining quotations;  
• confirming the process for removing suppliers from 
the database, which must be in accordance with the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000;  
• confirming the meeting processes for both the 
tender and procurement committees, including the 
number of meetings to be held annually, the 
process to be followed in the event of an 
emergency procurement, compliance with the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
No. 53 of 2003 (B-BBEE Act), Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Amendment Act No 46 of 
 
 
116 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV ,  pr inc iple 8 ,  recommended pract ice  50.  
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2013 and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act No. 12 of 2004. 
 
The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it  has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 117 
 
Governance and compliance committee 
 
It is recommended that a governance and compliance 
committee be established in each public higher 
education, either as a standalone committee or combined 
with another committee.118 It is recommended that this 
committee meet at least four times a year. The members 
of this committee should include the governance or 
compliance professionals of the institution, member(s) o f 
Council, member(s) of the audit and risk committee and a 
member of the social and ethics committee.  
 
The terms of reference of the governance and 
compliance committee should include the following:  
 
• to review overall governance effectiveness and 
efficiency and recommend improvements, including 
improvements to the council’s operations;  
• to review governance-related policies of the 
institution and make recommendations to Council in 
this regard;  
• to advise on and approve orientation programmes 
as well as ongoing training on good governance of 
Council and executive management members;   
• to develop, implement and monitor procedures for 
assessing the effectiveness of governance 
processes in the institution;   
• to provide guidance to Council and executive 
management;  
• to review and recommend improvements with 
regards to compliance, ensure that all members of 
the committee keep up to date with compliance with 
legislation and policies and to make 
recommendations in this regard to Council; and 
 
117 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV ,  pr inc iple 8 ,  recommended pr act ice  50.  
 
118 See the  York Universi ty’s Terms of  Reference and Mandate  for  their  Governance  and 
Human Resources Committee.   
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• to identify any risks that might occur and report to 
both the risk management committee as well as to 
council. 
 
The committee should disclose the following:  
 
• its overall role and associated responsibilities; 
• its composition, including each member’s 
qualifications and experience; 
• any external advisers or invitees who regularly 
attend committee meetings; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• the number of meetings held during the reporting 
period and attendance at those meetings;  
• whether the committee is satisfied that it has 
fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its 
terms of reference for the reporting period. 119 
 
 (iv) Statement on Code of Ethics 
(King IV: Chapter 1, principle 1.1 part 5.1, principle 2, 
recommended practices 4 - 10) 
 
The Code of Ethics commits a public higher education 
institution to the highest standards of integrity, behaviour 
and ethics in dealing with all its stakeholders, including 
its Council members, managers, employees, students, 
customers, suppliers, competitors, donors, and society at 
large. Council members and staff are expected to 
observe the institution's ethical obligations in order to 
conduct its business through the use of fair commerc ial 
competitive practices. 
 
The Council should ensure that its codes of conduct and 
ethics policies: 
 
• encompass the institution’s interaction with both 
internal and external stakeholders as well as 
broader society; and 
• address the key ethical risks of the institution. 
 
The Council must ensure that the codes of conduct and 
ethics policies provide for arrangements that familiarise 
employees and other stakeholders with the institution’s 
ethical standards. These arrangements include:  
 
• publishing the institution ’s codes of conduct and 
policies on the organisation’s website or on other 
platforms or through other media as appropriate; 
• incorporating by reference or otherwise, the 
relevant codes of conduct and policies in supplier 
and employee contracts; and 
• including the codes of conduct and ethics policies 
in employee induction and training programmes.  
 
 
119 This i s  in  accordance with  King IV ,  pr inc iple 8 ,  recommended pract ice  50.  
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The Council must exercise ongoing oversight of the 
management of ethics and ensure that it results in the 
following: 
• application of the institution’s ethical standards to 
the processes for the recruitment, evaluation of 
performance and reward of employees as well  as 
the sourcing of suppliers; 
• having sanctions and remedies in place when the 
institution’s ethical standards are breached;  
• using protected disclosure or whistle-blowing 
mechanisms to detect breaches of ethical 
standards and dealing with such disclosures;   
• monitoring adherence to the institution’s ethical 
standards by employees and other stakeholders 
through, among others, periodic independent 
assessments. 
 
The statement should contain the following information:  
 
• an overview of the arrangements for governing and 
managing ethics; 
• key areas of focus during the reporting period;  
• measures taken to monitor the institution’s ethics 
and how the outcomes were addressed; and  
• planned areas of future focus. 
 
 
The Council reviewed the Code of Ethics in the year 
under review at its meeting of dd/mm/yyyy, which 
meeting quorate and the documentation for approval by 
the Council was circulated with the meeting agenda in 
advance with due notice. 
 
The wording used in the above examples should be 
adapted to the circumstances applicable to individual 
institutions. 
 
The Council must approve the above statements.  
 
f) Institutional Forum's report to the Council  
 
The content of the report will depend on the activities of 
the Institutional Forum as stipulated in the institutional 
statute. The report of the Institutional Forum should must 
include all instances of advice sought by and advice 
given to the Council by the Institutional Forum. Council 
must consider the advice and provide written reasons if 
the advice is not followed.120 The composition of the 
forum should must be listed. The report must specify how 




120 Section  27(1A)  of  the Higher  Education  Act of  1997,  as  amended by s 9  of  the 
Higher  Education  Amendment Act  of  2016.  
 




g) Vice-Chancellor's Report on management / 
administration 
(King III: Chapters 8 and 9 IV part 5.2, principle 4, 
recommended practices 1 – 8; principle 5 
recommended practices 9 – 15; part 5.5, principle 16, 
recommended practices 1 – 5) 
 
No changes are recommended to this paragraph, except 
to align it with King IV.122 
 
h) Report on internal administrative/operational 
structures and controls 
(King III: Chapters 5, 7 and 9 King IV, part 5.2, 
principle 4, recommended practice 9 – 15; part 5.4, 
principle 12 recommended practice 10 – 17; principle 
15, recommended practice 48 – 61) 
 
No changes are recommended to this paragraph, except 
to align it with King IV.123 
 
i) Report on risk exposure assessment and the 
management thereof 
(King III: Chapter 4 IV, part 5.4, principle 11, 
recommended practices 1 - 9) 
 
No changes are recommended to this paragraph, except 
to align it with King IV.124 
j) Annual financial review - Report by the Chairperson 
of the Finance Committee and the Chief Financial 
Executive 
 
No changes are recommended to this paragraph, except 
to align it with King IV  125 
 
k) Report of the Audit committee 
 
The following elements of Audit Committee's reporting 
duties are dealt with in Chapter 3 of :  King IV, part 5.3, 
principle 8, recommended practice 51 – 59 
 
• The Audit Committee should satisfy itself as to the 
expertise, resources and experience of the company's 
institution’s finance function. Results of the review 
should be disclosed; 
• The Audit Committee should report internally to the 
Council on its statutory duties and duties assigned to 
it by the Council; 
 
 
122 This paragraph is  in  accordance wi th  the 2014 Reporting Reg ula tions  30 .  
 
123 This paragraph is  in  accordance wi t h  the 2014 Reporting Regula tions  30  –  32.  
 
124 See the  2014 Reporting  Regula tions  32 –  33.  
 




The Audit Committee should report on its statutory 
duties: 
 
• how its duties were carried out;  
• if the committee is satisfied with the independence of 
the external auditor; 
• the committee's view on the financial statements and 
the accounting practices; 
• whether the internal financial controls are effective; 
and 
• internal audit functions. 
 
The Audit Committee should provide a summary of its 
role and details of its composition, number of meetings 
and activities; and 
 
The Audit Committee should recommend the integrated 
report for approval by the Council. 
 
This report must be signed by both the Chairperson of 
the Audit Committee and Chairperson of Council   
 
 
The international comparison that was done with the state of Georgia in the 
USA included a review of the Georgia Board of Regents ’ ethics and 
compliance programme.126 It is the author’s view that a similar programme 
should be established by the DHET. The DHET needs to establish an office 
responsible for overseeing and implementing this programme. The 
compliance officers in this office should also be responsible for conducting 
compliance and ethics investigations at public higher education institutions 
where non-compliance has been detected.127 It is not the intention of this 
recommendation that the DHET be directly responsible for compliance, but 
rather that this office at the DHET will assist and oversee the programme.  
This will in then in turn lead to better governance and compliance. As part 
of the mandate of this office, the annual reports of each public university 
must be verified to ensure compliance with the provisions of the 2014 
 
126 See informat ion re la t ing to  the Georgia Boa rd of  Regents eth ics and co mpliance 
programme on https : / /www.usg.edu /organ izat ional_effect iveness /eth ics_compliance  
(Date of  use :  30 January  2019);  a lso see Chapter  5 ,  para 5 .5 .1(c)  for  a  d iscussion o f  
this programme.  
 
127 See the  Universi ty  System of  G eorgia’s “Compl iance  and Ethics  Charter” 
https: / /www.u sg.edu /assets/organ izat iona l_effec tiveness /documents/2018_USG_Compl i




Reporting Regulations. It is recommended that the following article be 
added to the Reporting Regulations.128 
8. Ethics and compliance programme 
 
In order for the DHET to assist higher education 
institutions to achieve the highest level of compliance 
and ethics, it is recommended that an ethics and 
compliance programme be introduced. The functions of 
this programme would be the following:  
• promoting the highest level of ethical conduct in public 
higher education institutions;  
• coordinating and supporting institutional ethics and 
compliance functions; 
• ensuring compliance with all relevant legislation, 
regulations and policies; and 
• conducting compliance investigations as needed.   
 
The objectives of this programme should be the 
following: 
 
• identifying legislation, codes of conduct, policies and 
regulations that affect higher education institutions;  
• assisting higher education institutions to achieve their 
compliance and ethics goals by identifying non-
compliance and providing the institution with an 
opportunity to become compliant;   
• ensuring that the responsibil ity of compliance is 
delegated to competent employees and that Council 
train relevant employees to empower them to achieve 
optimal compliance and ethical standards.129 
 
9. Reporting by public higher education institutions on their 
interests held in commercial companies  
 
(a) General  
 
The DHET and higher education institutions have agreed to disagree on 
whether or not higher education institutions may form or participate in 
commercial companies. The DHET is of the opinion that the universities 
should not be allowed to form or participate in these companies since most 
 
128 This should fo llow “report  on t ransformation” on page 35 of  the 2014  Reporting 
Regula tions .  
 
129 See the  Universi ty  System o f  Georgia’s “Compl iance  Pol icy” 
https: / /www.usg.edu /organiza tional_effec tiveness/eth ics_compliance  (Date of  use :  7  




of these companies have an educational component and should, therefore, 
be registered as private higher education institutions. Furthermore, the 
DHET believes that funding and resources earmarked for public higher 
education institutions are being used for these companies. 130 However, 
public higher education institutions and the USAf are of the opinion that 
there is nothing in the Higher Education Act of 1997 that prohibits these 
institutions from participating in and/or incorporating both for-profit and not-
for-profit companies for various business ventures. 131 The public institutions 
and USAf agree that public institutions have vast intellectual capital and 
that it is imperative that this capital be mobilised in a manner that is fair, 
equitable and sustainable for the benefit of the public higher education 
institution concerned. There is, on the one hand, a need to identify and 
exploit alternative economic resources to sustain public higher education 
institutions. On the other hand, there is a need for these institutions to 
mitigate the risks associated with various business ventures. Thus, 
according to the public higher education institutions and USAf, the solution 
is to establish separate legal entities in the form of companies. The assets 
of the public higher education institution will then not be at risk. 132 
According to the public higher education institutions, these business 
ventures would not only assist with teaching, learning and innovation but 
would also create much needed third-stream income. Further to 
establishing commercial entities to generate third-stream income and to 
participate in research and innovation, these public institutions want to 
commercialise intellectual property. The author is of the opinion that 
intellectual property created in a public higher education institution should 
 
130 I t  i s  no t  suggested that  higher  educat ion inst i tu t ions should mic ro manage the  
governance  of  these companies.  The  in ten tion  is  to  recommend that  h igher  education  
ins t i tut ions ,  as publ ica l ly  funded  inst i tu t ions,  should report  to  the DHET on any  
interes t  he ld in  commercia l  companies.  
 
131 HESA’s Legal  Advisory Committee mem orandum to the DHET dated 23 September  
2014.  This  memorandum was suppl ied to  the  author  by  Prof  Chr is de Beer .  HESA’s 
name has now changed to  USAf.  
 
132 HESA’s Legal  Advisory  Commit tee memorandum to  the  DHET dated 23  Sep tember  




be commercialised for the benefit of the institution within the ins titution and 
not through a separate juristic entity.  
 
The DHET should reconsider its position on the registration of private 
companies by public higher education institutions. The author agrees that 
some of these private companies have an educational and research aspect 
to them and must therefore be registered as private higher education 
institutions in compliance with the Higher Education Act of 1997. However, 
there are other such companies that focus on development and 
commercialisation, which may result in the creation of third stream income 
for these institutions. It is the author’s opinion that provided they are 
regulated to ensure that public money is not mismanaged, these companies 
have an important role to play in public higher education institutions. It is 
recommended that the Minister of Higher Education and Training should 
consider imposing a requirement on public institutions to report any 
interests held in commercial companies as well as any loans provided to 
these commercial entities. Ignoring this increasing trend at universities will 
exacerbate the ongoing governance problems, especially with regard to the 
use of public university resources. Some institutions provide loans to these 
companies as well as allowing them to use the institutions’ in frastructure 
and human resources because they cannot afford their own.  
 
A recent forensic investigation into certain commercial activities at the 
University of Johannesburg (UJ) led to the dismissal and prosecution of 
senior executives. This highlights the need for the improvement of 
governance practices of higher education institution and commercial 
companies in these situations.133 Two senior members134 of UJ have stepped 
 
133 See Chapter  4 ,  para 3 .3 .2(a)  above where this mat ter  is  d iscussed .  The recent  
commerc ia l i sa t ion fa i lu res a t  the Univers i ty  of  Johannesburg came under  scru tiny  
during 2017 when two sen ior  univers i ty  off icials  had a l leged ly personally  benef i ted  
from commercial  act ivi t ies of  the Universi ty .  See Seale L “Senior  managers accused of  
swindl ing UJ face  the  axe”  2017-09-24Sunday  Independent .  
 
134 Some of  these a l legat ions include tha t  the two sen ior  off icia ls  used UJ companies to  
personally  benef i t  f rom contract s and  projects.  The  Univers i ty  o f  Johannesburg 
confirmed  tha t  i t  had  es tabl i sh ed a commercial i sa t ion un it  to  prov ide a  third  st ream of  
437 
 
down from their positions following a forensic investigation that indicated 
their involvement in fraudulently obtaining R30 000 000 from the university 
to benefit their own business.135 The investigation was initiated after fraud 
allegations were made against the former chairperson of Council and a 
member of the executive management of UJ, who allegedly abused their 
positions to channel money earmarked for the institutions into commercial 
companies in which they held interests but which they failed to declare to 
the institution. Although the funds were fraudulently obtained, there were 
also indications of non-compliance with several institutional policies and 
procedures.136  Although this investigation relates to fraudulent activities, 
the lack of proper governance practices and oversight possibly made it 
easier for the individuals to commit the fraudulent acts.    
 
It is recommended that the 2014 Reporting Regulations be amended to 
include a requirement that public higher education institutions report on 
their interests in commercial companies. The following insertion is 
recommended:137 
All public higher education institutions must declare the 
following information in their annual reports in relation to 
any interest it holds in commercial companies:  
• any shareholding in all companies in which they hold 
interest; 
 
income through the patenting and l icensing of  invent ions.  Sect ion 69(8)(b)( i i i )  of  the  
Companies  Act of  2008  provides tha t  a  person  i s  d isqual if ied from act ing as a  d irec tor  
of  a  company if  such a pe rson has been removed from an off ice of  trust  on the grounds  
of  misconduct  invo lving  dishonesty.   
 
135 Seale L  “High - rank ing UJ Leaders Accused of  Swindling R25m” 2017-07-
01 Independent Onl ine.  On 1  August  2017,  students f rom the  Univers i ty  of  
Johannesburg  proceeded  to  lay cr iminal  charges against  these ind ividuals;  see ENCA  
“Fraud Charges aga inst  UJ Staffers” 2017-08-01;  News24  “Two UJ Council  Members  
Implicated in  al leged  R25m Fra ud” 2017-08-01.  
 
136 The matter  is  al so currently  being  invest iga ted  by the Hawks .  See  in  genera l ,  Nkosi  
B “UJ retr ieves sto len R14m from execs” 2018-08-08 The Star;  Nkosi  B “Hawks to  
Zoom in on UJ Fraud  Suspects” 2018-06-01 The Star  The Ci t i zen  “R14 m Sto len by UJ 
Execut ives to  be Recovered” 2018-08-08 See  Chapter  3 ,  para 3 .4 .2 (a)  abo ve for  a  
discuss ion on th is matte r .  
 
137 This must  fo l low af te r  para 8  “eth ics and compliance”  programme in  the 2014 




• the composition of the board of directors of each of 
these companies, and state whether they are 
executive or non-executive directors;138 
• whether or not any loans were provided to any of 
these companies and if so, the amount of the loan; 139 
and  
• whether or not any of the public higher education’s 
infrastructure, equipment or human resources are 
used to assist these companies, and if so the period 





Since the attainment of democracy in South Africa, the higher education 
landscape has been subject to continuous revision and is in need of further 
improvement. Although these suggested amendments might not have 
completely prevented fraudulent activities at the universities that was 
researched for this thesis, but it would have made it harder to commit fraud 
and easier to detect these types of activities. Furthermore, earlier detection 
could have lessened the detrimental effect on these institutions, and would 
have ensured accountability for the errant individuals. However, in the 
author’s opinion, the improvement of governance-related aspects has not 
been prioritised, given the many other matters requiring attent ion. A lack of 
proper governance and compliance has been confirmed following 
investigations and administrations of various higher education institutions. 
Some of the amendments brought about by the Higher Education and 
 
138 This declarat ion i s  relevant ,  as i t  wi l l  indica te whether  the board of  directors i s  
consti tuted on ly of  un iversi ty  employees or  whether  there i s  a  ba lance between  
universi ty  employees and externa l  appointments .  In  the  even t  of  the board being  solely  
consti tuted  of  un iversi ty  employees,  a  con f l ict  o f  interest  can  eas i ly  ar i se,  as i t  wi l l  not  
always  be  poss ible act  in  th e  in teres ts  of  the  company  as d irector  and in  the  best  
in teres ts  of  the un iversi ty  as employee.   
 
139 Declar ing this informat ion i s  very important  as  public  higher  education inst i tu t ions  
rece ive public  funding.  I f  they  use th is publ ic  funding to  provide  loan s  to  a  company,  i t  
must  be dec lared.  This  declarat ion wi l l  a l so indicate  how many loans were provided for  
these companies .  
 
140 The relevance of  th is  declarat ion i s  that  the use  o f  the un ivers i ty’s infrastru cture,  
equipment and human resources is  an  add it ion a l  expense to  the  un ivers i ty  and  must  be 
declared.  These companies should not  use the infras tructure,  equ ipment or  human 
resources of  the  univers i ty  fo r  a  prolonged  per iod.  By  d ec lar ing this on  a year ly  ba sis,  
i t  wi l l  be clear  whether  the company is  sustai nable af te r  a  cer tain  per iod or  whether  
public  money is  being  used in  a  wasteful  manner .  
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Training Laws Amendment Act of 2012 threatened institutional autonomy 
by providing the Minister with more powers to intervene in the affairs of a 
public higher education institution. The Higher Education Amendment Act 
of 2016 is commended for its attempts to address the concerns raised by 
the various higher education stakeholders. Despite these initiatives, this 
study has identified additional areas where governance practices in higher 
education could be improved. Recommendations have therefore been 
made, drawing on provisions in the Companies Act of 2008, the Banks Act 
of 1990, the regulation of higher education, corporate law and corporate 
governance in two selected foreign jurisdictions, as well as the provisions 
of King IV.  
 
Specific amendments were suggested to the Higher Education Act of  1997 
as well as the 2014 Reporting Regulations. In my view, these amendments 
will improve the accountability of public higher education institutions and 
those responsible for their governance and management. The proposed 
amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1997 specifically provide for 
the duties of Council members and members of the executive management 
and their potential liability, removal of Council members and declaring 
Council members delinquent. It is hoped that the enforcement of these 
provisions will lead to greater accountability in public higher education 
institutions. The suggested recommendations for the 2014 Reporting 
Regulations were aimed at clarifying any ambiguities in their interpretation,  
aligning the  Regulations with King IV,  providing for a compliance and 
ethics programme to be implemented by the DHET and requiring all public 
higher education institutions to report on any interests they hold in 
commercial entities. 
 
The improvement of governance, compliance and accountability in public 
higher education institutions should lead to increased confidence in these 
institutions as custodians of public funding. It should also assist the 
institutions to fulfil their crucial role in providing tertiary education, in line 
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with the Constitution141 and various policy documents like the National 



























141 See Chapter  2 ,  para 2 .2  above for  a  discussion  of  the Const i tu t ion  in  the post -1994 
era.  
 
142 For more information on the National Development of 2030, see https://www.gov.za/issues/national-
development-plan-2030 
 
143 For  more informat ion on Afr ica 2063,  see Afr ican Union Commission  (2013)  
ht tps: / /au. in t /en /agenda2063  (Date used :  25 February 2019) ,  especial ly  paragraphs FE 
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